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ABSTRACT
This study deals with relations between the member states of the European 
Community and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (AC?) countries all of which are 
signatories to the Lomé Convention. It traces the origins of Eurafrican association to the 
relations which existed between France and her colonies and Britain and the 
Commonwealth. It then examines AC? organs and EEC institutions for negotiation and 
policy implementation but focuses on the AC? countries. The thesis aims principally to 
determine the appropriateness of AC? diplomacy to the objectives of ACP-EEC 
cooperation and theoretical concepts pertaining to group diplomacy, coalition formation, 
influence, conflict and cleavages are used to analyze the procedures involved in the 
negotiation of common ACP positions.
The thesis is based on the consideration that cooperation between developed and 
developing countries can neither be ignored nor avoided and that, judging by the historical 
fact of interdependence among states, it is reasonable for the ACP countries to attempt to 
maximise the benefits of their EEC connections. The investigations in this study suggest 
that as a result of the underdeveloped economic and political potentials of the ACP 
countries, ACP diplomacy is essentially reactive especially over bread-and-butter issues 
such as aid and trade cooperation with the EEC. These issues, incidentally, are at the fore 
of ACP-EEC relations. However, there is also evidence that ACP diplomacy can be 
dynamic where life-and-death issues such as toxic waste dumping and environmental 
degradation in Africa are concerned.
ACP-EEC cooperation has so far failed to meet the ultimate aim of redressing 
development problems in the ACP states. But, the ACP-EEC relationship is in fact a
model representation of general North-South relations and this failure should be placed 
in that context. However, an exception is taken to the line of argument in development 
theory which puts all blame on the North for the inability of the South to achieve 
economic success. The argument reinforces the notion of incapacity on the part of the 
ACP countries to find solutions to their own problems and inappropriately takes away 
blame, as well as responsibility for policy implementation and economic development, 
from the ACP countries. An alternative view is adopted that the quest for a panacea to the 
social, economic and political problems of the ACP countries should be conducted from 
within the ACP group with improved and strengthened institutions and the postulates of 
such a search should help shape ACP positions in ACP-EEC cooperation.
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PROLOGUE
If we cannot renegotiate, we wither and die!
- Vincent (Danny DeVito) 
in TWINS, Universal City Studios, 1988
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INTRODUCTION
This study deals with relations between the member states of the European 
Community and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, but it focuses on the 
ACP countries with the aim of determining the appropriateness of ACP diplomacy to the 
objectives of ACP-EEC cooperation. It examines ACP-EEC cooperation in general and 
ACP diplomacy in particular and covers the period from the signing of the Treaty of 
Rome (1957) through to the entry into force of the Lomé IV Convention (1990). ACP 
diplomacy is evaluated to show that it can be dynamic where life-and-death issues such 
as toxic waste dumping and environmental degradation in Africa are concerned. However, 
as a result of the underdeveloped economic and political potentials of the ACP countries, 
ACP diplomacy remains essentially reactive especially over bread-and-butter issues such 
as aid and trade cooperation with the EEC. These issues, incidentally, are at the centre of 
ACP-EEC relations.
Several ideas and events mark the evolution of ACP-EEC cooperation and ACP 
diplomacy. Historically, the idea of an association between Europe and Africa grew out 
of the special relations which existed between France and her Overseas Countries and 
Territories (OCTs). These relations led to the granting of special trade concessions to the 
OCTs through their inclusion in Part IV of the Treaty of Rome which established the EEC 
in 1957.’ Following independence in 1960, eighteen of the former French colonies signed
'In keeping with the practice in most published works and official documents, the 
term EEC is used throughout this study rather than the more precise EC to refer to the 
European Community. The Community evolved to become the European Union (EU) 
following the entry into force of the Maastricht treaty on 1 November 1993: "Disunion 
greets birth of the European Union", Financial Times. October 30-31 1993, p.3. However,
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two Yaounde Conventions with the EEC in 1963 and 1969 respectively. Britain's 
successful bid to join the EEC in 1972-1973 later encouraged Commonwealth developing 
countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific to join the first Lomé negotiations 
which were concluded in 1975. Elements of present ACP-EEC cooperation and ACP 
diplomacy derive from these early initiatives.
It has often been said that ACP-EEC efforts in the Lomé Convention are 
insufficient. However, these efforts remain commendable especially in view of the 
stagnant North-South dialogue. As one ACP diplomat aptly put it: "Lomé is the only show 
in town."^ Furthermore, at the signing of the third Convention in Lomé, capital of Togo, 
that country's President, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, declared that the renewal of the Convention 
constituted a proof of the effectiveness of the ACP-EEC instrument of cooperation.^ The 
effectiveness of the Lomé Convention is certainly questionable, but the upward 
progression in the number of countries joining the Convention perhaps indicates approval 
of the efforts made in ACP-EEC cooperation.^
the metamorphosis has not had an immediate effect on the organisation of the ACP and 
EEC structures discussed here. Besides, this study focuses on the period from 1957-1990.
^Cited by Jürgen Notzold and Klaus Freiherr von der Ropp, "Lomé IE: New beginning 
for EEC/ACP Cooperation" in AussenPolitik. Vol.36, No.3 1985, p. 177.
O^biectif Europe. Nos 26-27, Décembre 1984, p.3.
^Due to lack of space, and also as a result of the express bias in favour of the ACP 
countries, a complete text of the ACP-EEC Lomé Convention is not reproduced in this 
study. Instead, the Georgetown Agreement and the Suva Declaration - two documents 
relating to the establishment of the ACP group - are given in Appendices 1 and 2 
respectively. For a complete text of the Lomé Convention, see special issues of The 
Courier: no.31, March 1975 for Lomé 1; and no.58, November 1979 for Lomé II For the
13
The number of participants on both sides of the negotiating table increases 
constantly but, clearly, there has been a greater increase on the ACP side. A total of 46 
ACP countries joined the Lomé I Convention; 57 joined Lomé II which was signed in 
1979, 66 joined Lome HI in 1984 and 69 joined Lome IV in 1989.  ^ACP populations have 
also increased from 69 million people at Yaounde I to 413 million at Lome HI® and 427 
million at Lomé IV. Again, the ACP countries at Lomé IQ represented more than half of 
the world's developing countries. Furthermore, the Lomé Convention itself is far-reaching 
in that it gives duty-free access to the EEC market for nearly 99 per cent of ACP products 
without reciprocity.^
It is clear from the brief statistics that the ACP countries and the EEC member 
states are not contemplating the end of their relationship. Consequently, this study is based 
on the reasoning that, in ACP-EEC relations, there is a backlog of tasks in economic
Lomé m  and IV Conventions, see The Third ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé. 
Luxembourg: Office for Publications of the European Communities, 1985; and 
Compilation of Texts XV. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 1992 respectively.
^Appendix 3 gives a list of 69 ACP countries by region, indicating state capitals, 
population size, land mass, and first treaty or convention signed with the EEC. The 
signing of the Lomé Convention by the EEC member states (currently 12) reflects 
membership of the Community: France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and The 
Netherlands were the original member states in 1957; Britain, Denmark and the Republic 
of Ireland joined in 1973; Greece in 1982; and Spain and Portugal in 1986.
^"Bilan de la coopération financière et technique ACP-EEC 1976-1985" in Marchés 
Tropicaux et Méditerranéens. N®2138, 42® Année, 31 Octobre 1986, p.2721.
^Objectif Europe, o p . cit.. pp.2-3.
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development, both begun and unfinished.* It is, therefore, not feasible in the foreseeable 
future to complete all these projects, pay off all dues, and start fresh, radically different 
relations. Since that eventuality is not even on the agenda of ACP-EEC negotiations, and 
in consideration of the historical fact of interdependence among states, it is reasonable for 
ACP negotiators to invest their efforts in the elaboration of long-term projects.
Recent events in international relations, in particular, reforms in Eastern Europe 
and opportunities for Western investments in the former Eastern bloc countries, further 
underline the need for the ACP countries and the EEC member states to be more focused 
on the principles of the "model" relationship which they have established in the Lomé 
Convention.® Given that ACP-EEC relations will be continued, at any rate, into the 
foreseeable future, it makes good sense for the ACP countries to take an inward look and 
to re-orientate their negotiating strategies and demands for the establishment of adequate 
structures to confront the challenge of economic development. On the evidence reviewed 
in the thesis, there is certainly a need for the ACP countries to be more demanding, 
innovative and pro-active in their relations with the EEC.
Development theory has extensively explored the impact of contacts between 
Europe and Africa on Africa's development. Two critiques, one of intra-African relations 
and the other of Africa-developed world relations, have been made. On the one hand.
*1. William Zartman, "Lomé HI: Relic of the 1970s or Model for the 1990s" in C. 
Cosgrove and J. Jamar (eds.). The European Communitv's Development Policv: The 
Strategies Ahead. Bruges: Collège D'Europe, Cahiers N.S. 44, 1986, p.59.
®The first article of both the Lomé I and II Conventions affirms the desire to secure 
a "better balance" in the trade of the ACP and EEC countries while the first article of the 
Lomé in  and IV Conventions expresses a resolve that ACP-EEC cooperation should 
constitute a model for North-South relations.
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Vijay Gupta has demonstrated that colonisation adversely affected trade between two 
neighbouring African states where they happened to be under the rule of different 
metropolitan powers, and that colonisation obstructed the formation of natural markets, 
even within the framework of colonial divisions/° On the other hand. Bade Onimode has 
argued that contact with Europe through slavery and colonisation is the root cause of 
Africa's underdevelopment. Onimode pushes the argument to its extreme by drawing 
extraneous links to the internal causes of Africa's underdevelopment. The lack of modem 
democratic practice in Africa, for instance, is linked to the authoritarian nature of 
colonialism, while bloated military expenditure and neglect of investment in social 
infrastructures is explained by the fear of foreign intervention." The debate is interesting; 
however, the present study is based on the contemporary era (1957-1990) and looks to the 
future on the principle of Africa's ability to control her own destiny. This implies that 
Africa, especially after 30 years of independence, should accept a fair measure of 
responsibility for policy implementation and economic development.
Present trends in ACP-EEC cooperation suggest that the raison d'être of the ACP 
group is relations with the EEC while the converse is far from being the case for the EEC. 
For example, concessionary resource transfers from the EEC have been seen as the reason
^®Vijay Gupta, "The ECOWAS and West European Colonial Heritage" in K. B. Lall 
and H. S. Chopra (eds.) The EEC and the Third World. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: 
Humanities Press, 1981, pp.312-314.
"Bade Onimode, A Future for Africa - Bevond the politics of adiustment. London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd, in association with the Institute for African Alternatives, 1992,
pp.8-12.
16
for signing successive Lomé Conventions by almost all the ACP states/^ The Community 
was not established as a result of the ACP countries, but neither was the ACP group 
constituted as a result of the Community. Certainly, the ACP countries came together for 
the first time in order to negotiate trade agreements with the EEC but they should not be 
written off as merely dependent on the EEC. In this consideration, it is worth recalling 
that the ACP group was formed by the ACP countries themselves in an effort to 
institutionalise the level of unity which they had achieved in the first Lomé negotiations 
in 1975. Moreover, as a result of these circumstances, the ACP group has developed a 
particular diplomatic strategy with regard to the EEC. Thus, the ACP group developed out 
of the historical and economic circumstances which linked Africa and Europe one to the 
other. And the evolution of ACP-EEC relations reflects the will of the ACP countries to 
exploit their European connections just as, for its part, the EEC led by France had worked 
to profit from her African connections. These considerations underlie our study of ACP- 
EEC cooperation and ACP diplomacy.
Other considerations bear upon ACP diplomacy in their negotiations with the EEC. 
The ACP countries have some characteristics in common (economic underdevelopment, 
small size of local markets, etc.). However, they also have ideological differences which 
are reflected in disagreement on certain issues. But, it is not unusual for the members of 
a coalition to disagree with each other. In some cases, the differences give some strength 
to the group as the different positions converge in the search for a compromise. With their 
differences and commonality of interests, the ACP countries are effectively treated as a 
group. ACP group diplomacy is examined through issues arising from the Lomé
'^Adrian Hewitt, "The Lomé Conventions: Entering a Second Decade", in Journal of 
Common Market Studies. Volume XXIII, No. 2, December 1984, p. 105.
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Convention.
By studying the issues raised in the Lomé Convention, we intend to analyze the 
workings of ACP-EEC cooperation and ACP diplomacy. This will enable us to identify 
areas where ACP diplomacy has been dynamic, or has remained reactive, in the goal of 
working in partnership with the EEC in the task of redressing development problems in 
the ACP states.
Outline of Chanters
This study is made up of seven chapters. Chapter 1 surveys the literature on the 
Lome Convention and related subjects as well as the aims, scope and methodology of the 
study. This chapter also gives some of the theoretical considerations of the study. The 
remaining six chapters are divided into two parts each of which is made up of three 
chapters. As this study focuses on ACP diplomacy within AC.P-EEC cooperation, all the 
chapters deal with ACP-EEC relations in some detail. However, Chapters 2-7 are 
presented to underline different phases in the development of ACP diplomacy. There are 
three such phases. The initial phase (Chapters 2 and 3) relates to both reactive and 
dynamic African diplomacy. The second phase (Chapter 4) relates to dynamic ACP 
diplomacy at its zenith. The third phase is also the current phase (Chapters 5-7) and 
relates to reactive ACP diplomacy with bouts of dynamism.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 (Part I) provide us with a background analysis to the subject 
of ACP-EEC cooperation and ACP diplomacy. However, the issues discussed in these 
chapters are not merely introductory to the present study: they form an integral part of the 
thesis because they enable us to identify evolving stages in ACP-EEC cooperation and
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ACP diplomacy. Chapter 2 traces the events and ideas which led to the establishment of 
an association between the EEC and the ACP countries. Two historical events are 
evaluated in the consideration of the origins of ACP-EEC cooperation. Firstly, the special 
relations which existed between France and her former colonies contributed directly to the 
signing of two Yaounde Conventions for former French colonies in the 1960s. Secondly, 
Britain's unsuccessful bid to join the EEC in 1961-1962 contributed indirectly to the 
signing of the Nigeria-EEC Agreement and the Arusha Accord in the 1960s for Nigeria 
and the East African countries respectively. Elements of later ACP-EEC cooperation 
derived from these initial agreements by retaining acceptable principles and abandoning 
controversial ones. Chapter 3 examines the differences and commonality of interests 
between the ACP countries through conceptions in the 1960s on ideological questions 
such as self-determination, independence, association, economic development, and 
international trade. The ACP group was not constituted until 1975 and a phase in African 
diplomacy characterised by both reactiveness and dynamism is identifiable through the 
discussions of these concerns of the immediate post-independence era. Chapter 3 also 
examines the commonality and divergence of interests between the ACP and the EEC.
Chapter 4 analyses the conflict, negotiations and coalitions which culminated in 
the signing of the first Lomé Convention in 1975. This phase witnesses the birth of ACP 
diplomacy strictly speaking and it is characterised by dynamism at its highest level. In this 
regard, it considers the inter-African arguments over reverse preferences as well as the 
role in decision making of major actors such as big member countries, the position of 
small members and effects of membership in regional organisations such as the OAU, 
ECOWAS, CARICOM and SPEC. Chapter 4 also evaluates the outcome of the first Lome 
negotiations and the Georgetown Agreement which subsequently institutionalised the ACP
19
group.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 (Part II) examine contemporary ACP-EEC relations and ACP 
diplomacy in practice through the functioning of ACP organs, EEC departments and joint 
ACP-EEC institutions. Chapter 5 looks at the internal diplomacy of the ACP group 
through ACP organs, procedures for negotiations and joint ACP-EEC structures as well 
as specific EEC departments and institutions which are concerned generally with EEC 
development cooperation policy, and those structures concerned specifically with the ACP 
countries. The effect of the organisation of these structures is related to ACP group 
coordination and an attempt is made to ascertain the impact of these arrangements on ACP 
bargaining strategy. The relative smallness in ACP staff numbers and lack of expertise in 
comparison to the EEC point to overwhelming evidence that current ACP diplomacy is 
essentially reactive on bread-and-butter issues such as aid and trade relations with the 
EEC.
Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the major issues raised at the negotiation of each 
Convention from Lomé IIV. Chapter 6 studies the main issues raised during the Lomé 
I and Lomé II negotiations in 1973-1975 and 1978-1979 respectively. For example, the 
implied principles of ACP-EEC cooperation, i.e. aid and trade preferences, formed the 
basis of these early ACP-EEC negotiations. The concepts of aid and trade preferences are 
discussed with reference to ACP collective bargaining and the GSP introduced by the EEC 
in 1971. STABEX, a scheme for the stabilisation of foreign exchange earnings for certain 
agricultural products in vulnerable ACP states which was introduced at Lomé I and 
SYSMIN, a comparable scheme for mineral products which was introduced at Lomé II 
are both also discussed in Chapter 6.
Chapter 7 evaluates the major issues and innovations at the Lomé HI and Lomé
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rV negotiations in 1983-1984 and 1988-89 respectively. The questions of human rights 
and "policy dialogue" were topical at Lomé HI while the environment and the notion of 
sustainable development became crucial issues at Lomé IV. Regional Cooperation is also 
discussed in this chapter. Although regional cooperation was incorporated in ACP-EEC 
relations since Lomé I, it represents one of the most important - and at the same time one 
of the most elusive - areas of ACP-EEC cooperation. We consider the discussion of 
regional cooperation at the end of the last part of the study to be symbolic because the 
spirit of ACP-EEC cooperation can be related to the principle of regional integration. With 
regard to ACP diplomacy. Chapters 6 and 7 further demonstrate the reactiveness of ACP 
diplomacy on aid and trade issues. However, ACP diplomacy has also known spasms of 
dynamism especially on life-and-death issues such as toxic waste dumping in Africa and 
protection of the environment. Dynamic ACP diplomacy is captured through discussions 
of these issues in Chapter 7.
The conclusion incorporates a discussion of the problems and prospects of ACP- 
EEC cooperation and ACP diplomacy. It addresses the question of the appropriateness of 
ACP group diplomacy in responding to the objectives of ACP-EEC cooperation as set out 
in the Lomé Convention. Among other things, it summarises tlie various recommendations 
which have been made by ACP and EEC experts or diplomats, as well as this writer's 
suggestions, aimed at maximising the effectiveness and, by extension, the benefits of ACP 
diplomacy in ACP-EEC cooperation.
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CHAPTER ONE:
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
1.1 SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE^
Literature for this study can be classified into two broad subject areas according 
to whether they deal with ACP-EEC trade relations or whetlier they deal with the ACP 
group as an established institution and assess ACP diplomacy. In general, studies in the 
first category assess ACP-EEC cooperation within the context of international political 
economy while those in the second category assess ACP-EEC relations from an 
institutional, group diplomatic or legal perspective. However, it is worth noting that there 
is no watertight categorisation of the literature. The subject areas are inter-related: one 
particular aspect of ACP-EEC cooperation may motivate a given study, but the final work 
cuts across different aspects of the relationship.
1.1.1 ACP-EEC Trade and Political Relations
Works in this category look at the political economy of ACP-EEC relations. They 
also examine trade under successive conventions and sometimes evaluate the progress 
made in ACP-EEC cooperation from one convention to another. Trade is the main focus 
of ACP and EEC relations, but Commonwealth countries were noticeably absent from 
EEC trade cooperation in the 1960s, except for the Nigeria-EEC Agreement in 1966 and
'Details concerning the publishers of works surveyed in this section can be found in 
the Bibliography.
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the Arusha Accord between the EEC and the East African Community (consisting of 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) in 1969. As a result of the relative absence of English- 
speaking participants, there are few English-language publications on Eurafrican 
cooperation during this period. One exception, however, is P. N. C. Okigbo (Africa and 
the Common Market. 1967) which gives a clear account of the issues which were involved 
in the first Yaounde and the Nigerian negotiations.
Most of the literature on Eurafrican trade relations after the signing of the Treaty 
of Rome was based precisely on that Treaty and the later Yaounde Conventions. Pierre- 
Bemard Cousté (L'Association des Pavs d'Outre-Mer à la Communauté Economique 
Européenne. 1959) studies the aspects of the Treaty of Rome which relate to the 
associated territories. Daniel Vignes (L'Association des Etats Africains et Malagache à la 
CEE. 1970) and Jacques Bourrinet (La Coopération Economique Eurafricaine. 1976) both 
assess Eurafrican relations during the period of the Yaoundé Conventions. It is clear that 
these works were produced by French authors, some of whom treated EEC development 
policy as strictly relations between France and her Overseas Countries and Territories 
(OCTs). Indeed, during this period, Britain and the Commonwealth developing countries 
had not maintained relations with the Community long enough to generate a comparable 
volume of literature in English. The Nigeria-EEC Agreement, in fact, never came into 
effect.
However, when it became apparent in the early 1970s that Britain would bid again 
for EEC membership (following unsuccessful bids in the 1960s), there was renewed 
interest in the Commonwealth countries for the EEC. In Britain, EEC-related studies were 
based on the merits for Britain of accession to the Treaty of Rome. However, prospects 
for trade with the Commonwealth African countries were sometimes analyzed to assess
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the extent to which it would be affected especially within a protected EEC. "The Phoenix 
is short-sighted - A survey of the prospects for European unity", special report by Norman 
Macrae in The Economist. 16 May 1970 centred on the benefits of EEC membership for 
Britain. On the other hand, Tom Soper (Britain, the EEC and the Third World. 1971) 
considers Britain-Commonwealth economic relations and notes such anomalies in the 
Imperial Preference System as EEC-associated East African Commonwealth countries 
granting preferences to EEC member countries and against Britain.
Britain's final accession to the Treaty of Rome in 1973 and subsequent 
participation of the Commonwealth developing countries in the first Lomé Convention 
brought about a change in the treatment of Eurafrican relations. A new phase emerged in 
EEC development policy which could only then be properly called ACP-EEC cooperation. 
The ACP also established itself as a group during this period. Henceforth, publications on 
the specific EEC development cooperation policy towards the African countries began to 
proliferate in English. In addition, these publications pioneered a new methodology which 
has come to dominate the analysis of ACP-EEC cooperation, namely, the assessment of 
past and present ACP-EEC Conventions.
Carol Cosgrove Twitchett (A Framework for Development: The EEC and the ACP. 
1981) analyses ACP-EEC trade, aid, stabex and industrialisation under the Lomé I 
Convention, and then assesses the Lomé II Convention which had just come into force. 
Following this type of analysis were political economy assessments such as Christopher 
Stevens (The New Lomé Convention: Implications for Europe's Third World Policv. 1984) 
and, later, Marjorie Lister (The European Community and the Developing World. 1988). 
Similarly, Gérard Brayer (Eurooe-Tiers Monde. Lomé: Une nouvelle coopération 
douanière?. 1989) analyses trade cooperation, but goes a step further and studies the EEC
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and the ACP countries as members of a large free trade area. Brayer applies the 
mechanisms of a customs union to their activities under both the Yaounde and the Lomé 
Conventions.
ACP-EEC cooperation was designed from the outset to represent a model for 
North-South relations. Consequently, Lomé is a "framework convention" which covers a 
wide variety of the economic and political activities involved in North-South relations. 
Perhaps due to its extensiveness, a volume can literally be produced on each area relating 
to ACP-EEC relations as, indeed, Christopher Stevens (ed.) has done in six separate 
surveys entitled EEC and the Third World (1981-1987) and as the Revue du Marché 
Commun did in April 1986 when it devoted an entire issue (No.296) to the Lomé 
Convention. Also, for reasons of extensiveness of the subject, the bulk of studies on ACP-
i.
EEC relations are presented in the form of short articles in scholarly journals. Some of 
the most important references for the present study come from such journal articles which 
generally deal with specific areas of ACP-EEC cooperation.
Some of these articles include Matthew McQueen ("Lomé and Industrial 
Cooperation - the Need for Reform" in Journal of World Trade Law. 1983). McQueen 
looks at ACP-EEC industrial cooperation and attributes the poor performance of ACP 
exports to restrictive trade measures of the EEC and the limited capacity of the ACP 
countries to export processed primary products and manufactured goods. Guy Martin 
("African-European Economic Relations under the Lomé Convention: Commodities and 
the Scheme of Stabilization of Export Earnings" in African Studies Review. 1984) 
analyses the stabex. And, Otto Schmuck ("Half-time in Lomé IV Negotiations" in 
Development and Cooperation. 1989) gives political and economic reasons for the 
continuation of Lomé relations despite the half-hearted commitment of the partners. The
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stated reasons are that Lomé is a show-case of EEC development cooperation, the EEC 
member states need raw materials supplied by the ACP countries; and for their part, the 
ACP countries need an export outlet for the primary products of their mono-cultural 
economies.
Numerous important articles under editors have been published since the pre-Lomé 
era. One pre-Lomé publication which gives an insight into the origins of ACP-EEC 
relations is Ali A. Mazrui ("African Attitudes to the European Economic Community" in 
Lawrence B. Krause (ed.). The Common Market: Progress and Controversv. 1964). More 
contemporary articles dealing with specific aspects of ACP-EEC cooperation include 
Joshua C. Anyiwo ("Industrial Cooperation in the Lomé Convention" in Frans A M, 
Alting von Geusau (ed ). The Lomé Convention and a New International Economic Order. 
1977) and James May all ("The Implications for Africa of the Enlarged European 
Economic Community" in Timothy M. Shaw and Kenneth A. Heard (eds ). The Politics 
of Africa: Dependence and Development. 1979). Anyiwo criticises lack of adequate 
financial and technical provisions for the difficulties of industrial development in the ACP 
countries, and May all argues that the enlargement of the Community in 1973 helped to 
promote African unity because, their initial differences notwithstanding, the French- and 
English-speaking African countries at the end negotiated jointly with the EEC.
Similar contemporary analysis of ACP-EEC relations is offered in French by 
Sophia Mappa ("Les relations Nord-Sud dans les migrations des pays ACP vers la CEE: 
défis et impasses de la coopération" in Sophia Mappa, (éd.). Ambitions et Illusions de la 
coopération Nord-Sud: Lomé IV. circa. 1990), and Gérard Grellet ("Le processus 
d'ajustement dans les pays ACP" in Sophia Mappa (éd.). Ambitions et Illusions de la 
coopération Nord-Sud: Lomé FV. circa. 1990). Mappa and Grellet discuss the impact of
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international migration and structural adjustment respectively on ACP-EEC cooperation.
Apart from the above-mentioned sources, literature for the study of ACP-EEC 
relations is also produced by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and ACP-EEC 
organs. The Lomé Briefing series, edited by Myriam Vander Stichele, was produced 
during the negotiation of Lomé IV by the Liaison Committee of Development NGOs at 
the European Commission. The Committee was made up of researchers from several EEC 
and ACP countries. Similarly, The Courier magazine which gives general features of 
ACP-EEC cooperation and country profiles is published by the European Commission, 
with occasional editorial contribution from the ACP Secretariat. DG VUI also compiles 
reports, for example. Ten Years of Lomé. A Record of ACP-EEC Partnership 1976-1985 
(1986), assessing the progress achieved by ACP-EEC cooperation, with listings of projects 
funded by successive European Development Funds (EDFs).
1.1.2 ACP-EEC Institutions and ACP Diolomacv
Publications in this category assess the organisation and functioning of ACP-EEC 
institutions and consider the relevance of ACP diplomacy to the aims of development 
cooperation. In this area, 1. William Zartman (The Politics of Trade Negotiations between 
Africa and the European Economic Communitv - The Weak Confront the Strong, 1971) 
gives a detailed account of the issues which influenced negotiating positions in early 
Eurafrican relations. Sylvain Camara ("La Convention de Lomé et les investissements 
étrangers dans le Tiers Monde" in Afrique Contemporaine. 1984) gives a chronological 
account of evolving ACP and EEC positions in the negotiations preceding the signing of 
Lomé n  on the specific subject of the protection of private European investments in the
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ACP countries.
Tony Hill ("Un Nouveau Souffle pour Lomé" in Obiectif Europe. 1984) discusses 
the difficulties faced by ACP diplomacy and points out that ACP countries are scattered 
around the globe, have opposing interests, and only react to EEC proposals but are not 
innovative. A similar critical assessment is given by Adrian Hewitt ("The Lome 
Conventions: Entering a Second Decade" in Journal of Common Market Studies. 1984). 
Hewitt analyses the Lomé negotiating arrangements and considers the division of the ACP 
for concessionary purposes into least-developed, land-locked and island countries thereby 
obliging these countries to negotiate separately with the EEC. He then states that the 
Community has found it easy to apply the policy of divide and rule, especially as the EEC 
definition of "least developed" is different from the accepted UN definition.
I. William Zartman ("Lomé HI: Relic of the 1970s or Model for the 1990s" in C. 
Cosgrove and J. Jamar (eds). The European Communitv's Development Policv: The 
Strategies Ahead. 1986) makes suggestions pertaining to ACP diplomacy such as the 
strengthening of the ACP Secretariat and the negotiation of yearly Conventions. The 
suggestion to strengthen the ACP Secretariat recalls a statement by the former ACP 
Secretary-General Edwin Carrington ("Le rôle du Secrétariat Général ACP" in Le Courier 
n°102, 1987) that the ACP Secretariat is one of the institutions best placed to function as 
a secretariat to all developing countries.
One of the rare works which consider the ACP countries in a group diplomatic 
context is John Ravenhill (Collective Clientelism - The Lomé Conventions and North- 
South Relations. 1985). On case studies, it has been shown by Trevor W. Parfitt "EEC 
Aid in Practice: Sierra Leone" and Adrian Hewitt "Malawi and the EEC: the First Seven 
Years" both in Christopher Stevens (ed.), EEC and the Third World: A Survev 4 (1984)
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that EEC aid has, in sum, been insufficient due to a combination of insufficiency of funds 
and improper local administration.
On special issue areas, Paul Collier ("Africa's External Economic Relations 1960- 
1990" in Douglas Rimmer (ed.), Africa 30 Years On. 1991) has stressed the need to 
rethink the franc zone because of the impending monetary union of Europe. To this end. 
Amadou B. Touré ("Les pays africains face à l'échéance européenne de 1992" in Marchés 
Tropicaux et Méditerranéens. 1991) has proposed the establishment of an African currency 
with a fixed parity to a future European currency and envisages a Eurafrican currency 
system similar to the French operated CFA zone, although the European monetary system 
would include English-speaking African countries such as Nigeria. These suggestions are 
similar to those offered by Patrick et Sylviane Guillaumont ("Moimaie européenne et 
monnaies africaines" in Revue Française d'Economie. 1989) and modified into English 
with an English-speaking bias as "The Implications of European Monetary Union for 
African Countries" in Journal of Common Market Studies. 1989. The English-speaking 
focus stresses the incentive for Britain's traditional African trading partners to peg their 
currencies to a Eurafrican currency system if Britain joins the European Monetary Union 
(EMU).
Several other special issue areas have been discussed including Francisco Granell 
("El acceso de Haiti y Republica Dominicana a las ayudas del Convenio de Lomé" in 
Revista de Instituciones Eurooeas. 1991) who examines the problems faced in the 
implementation of the Regional Cooperation Fund by the CARICOM Secretariat following 
the accession of Haiti and the Dominican Republic to the Lomé Convention, particularly 
in view of the fact that the two new Caribbean members as well as Surinam are non­
members of CARICOM.
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ACP-EEC relations can also be assessed from a legal perspective. José Heredia 
(Las Relaciones de Coooeracion para el Desarrollo CEE-Estados ACP. 1985) concentrates 
on the association agreements and related documents as well as on the legal framework 
of EEC development cooperation policy with the ACP countries. Michael K. Addo ("Some 
issues in European Community Aid Policy and Human Rights" in Legal Issues of 
European Integration. 1988) focuses on the legal aspects of the ACP-EEC policy dialogue 
and human rights debate and argues that the differences between the EEC and the ACP 
countries on those issues were over the means to be adopted rather than the end 
(improving aid effectiveness) on which both parties were in agreement.
1.1.3 Other Related Publications
Mention still needs to be made of two other categories of publications which are 
of relevance to the subject of ACP-EEC cooperation. The first category relates directly 
to the subject but was not classified above because it is not author-produced. This 
category includes specialist reviews which target international investors but report 
occasionally on specific aspects of ACP-EEC agreements. These reviews include Marchés 
Tropicaux et Méditerranéens (various); Multinational Business (cf. "What’s new in Lomé 
m?", No.2 1985); and Transnational Associations (cf. "Lomé IV et l'environnement: les 
propositions des associations européennes", No.4, Juillet-Août 1989). Another occasional 
newsletter is Ecomonde Service which has been published during negotiations for each 
Convention since Lomé II It is an authoritative and useful reference.
The second category of related publications comprises those which are useful as 
references but do not deal directly with ACP-EEC relations. Some of these focus on the
30
concepts of diplomacy and negotiations, others centre on the institutions and structures of 
the EEC, and yet others deal with general developed-developing country relations. Among 
those focusing on diplomacy and negotiations are Fred Charles Iklé (How Nations 
Negotiate. 1964) and Gerard Curzon (Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy. 1965). Those 
which centre on the EEC include T. C. Hartley (The Foundations of European Communitv 
Law. 1981) and Paul Taylor (The Limits of European Integration. 1983). Hartley explains 
the relationship between Commission and Council decisions, directives, recommendations, 
and so on and Taylor discusses Community decision-making procedures. Finally, those 
publications which deal with general developed-developing country relations include Peter 
Tulloch (The Politics of Preferences. 1975) and Marc Williams (Third World Cooperation: 
the Group of 77 in UNCTAD. 1991). Several other works relating to the thesis are listed 
in the Bibliography.
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1.2 AIMS. SCOPE OF THE STUDY. METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS
1.2.1 Aims of the Study
Survey of the literature in the previous section has shown that some aspects of 
ACP-EEC cooperation have not received adequate consideration. For example, the scope 
of previous studies have tended to be limited both by the issues raised and the number of 
Lomé Conventions used in the analysis. Furthermore, the spirit of the ACP-EEC 
relationship has not been reflected in previous studies which have tended too often to be 
uni-dimensional, being either mainly French- or English-inspired in terms of the issues 
considered or the sources of materials used. Again, ACP diplomacy and negotiating 
strategy have not been properly explored and the concept of group as it applies to the 
ACP countries has not been adequately discussed.
Any study on ACP-EEC cooperation reflects the relevant issues of its time. And 
time has given us the advantage of being able to discuss a wider range of issues, 
elaborated over four Lome Conventions with the added possibility of drawing on examples 
or experiences from two Yaounde Conventions. The present study aims to take full 
advantage of this historical facility. Furthermore, linguistics will be put to beneficial use 
through a wider consideration of the literature in English, French and Spanish - especially 
useful in view of the fact that the Dominican Republic joined the ACP group in 1990. The 
wider linguistic consideration will take account of diverse motivating interests in ACP 
group cohesion. From an ACP-EEC perspective, this will not only place emphasis on 
France and Britain as the focus of early ACP-EEC relations, but will also allow us to
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consider the EEC and the ACP countries individually or collectively through, for example, 
interviews and discussions with a wider variety of ACP and EEC representatives than is 
usually found in the literature. With regard to ACP diplomacy, the issues raised in this 
study demonstrate that ACP diplomacy can be dynamic in some areas - usually over life- 
and-death issues, although it is essentially reactive - especially over bread-and-butter 
issues which remain the crux of ACP-EEC cooperation.
The question of the appropriateness of ACP diplomacy to the aims of ACP-EEC 
cooperation is addressed in this study through an analysis of the ways in which the ACP 
countries are constrained or motivated by the particular nature of their evolution in 
international relations. Thus, the ACP countries and their response to, or their diplomacy 
towards, EEC development cooperation is studied within the framework of other 
international developments. For example, the difficulty in forming an African consensus 
with regard to the EEC during the 1960s is related to the different colonial systems which 
existed in Africa and, subsequently, to the varying levels of appreciation of Eurafrican 
colonial relations by African post-independence leaders.
Similarly, the inter-African quarrel over reciprocity, or reverse preferences, is 
related to different African ideologies and conception on economic development, for 
example, Nigeria's stance against reverse preferences in international fora such as the 
UNCTAD and the GATT. Finally, this study aims to show that international factors such 
as an understanding reached between the United States and the EEC over the extension 
of trade preferences to all developing countries under the Generalised Scheme of 
Preferences (GSP) implied that non-reciprocity would be acceptable in the EEC 
association. This consequently weakened the argument of the Associated French-speaking 
countries for reverse preferences and facilitated joint African negotiations with the EEC.
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The principle of cooperation is emphasised in the thesis to reflect our interpretation 
of contemporary relations between the ACP countries on the one hand, and the EEC on 
the other. Eurafrican relations could be evaluated from three perspectives; colonial history, 
political economy of independence or juridical perspectives. Each approach allows a 
specific type of analysis. The first two, that is the colonial history and the political 
economy approaches, will tend to reveal a bias against Africa since it will almost certainly 
portray the continent as being composed mainly of former colonies. Thus, European 
initiatives will be seen to take precedence over African ones and European nations will 
be seen as active players which set the direction and the pace for Eurafrican relations. 
However, the juridical approach is adopted here to augment the literature which tends to 
be mainly based on the other two perspectives. The juridical equality approach is used to 
emphasise that more than thirty years after independence the ACP and the EEC can 
properly be considered de jure equal cooperating partners although, de facto, differences 
exist among them.
This approach has several merits which underline the exception of the present 
study to other literature on ACP-EEC cooperation. It avoids the traditional approach of 
seeing the ACP simply through EEC initiatives and analyses ACP actions within a wider 
international context. It is also a novel approach in that it does not consider the ACP 
countries as mere aid recipients but considers them as partners in cooperation with the 
EEC member states albeit partners in an unorthodox bargaining position. Of course, the 
peculiar history of the ACP countries can be a constraint on their choice of any particular 
development strategy or relations with certain trade partners. But so also, if well thought 
out, can that history facilitate a development strategy or special relations with other trade 
partners. Above all, the juridical equality approach implied in this study brings together
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both historical and economic considerations by studying the ACP as any other group in 
international relations characterised by factors other than dependence and exploitation.
1.2.2 Scope of the Study and Methodology
This study covers the period from the signing of the Treaty of Rome (1957) 
through to the entry into force of the Lomé IV Convention (1990). However, there are 
specific periods of focus. Indeed, the embryonic phase of ACP-EEC cooperation was the 
period 1957-1973, from the signing of the Treaty of Rome through to the end of the 
Yaounde II Convention. Similarly, the high point of ACP joint negotiation was the period 
1973-1975, from Britain's entry into the EEC to the signing of the Lomé I Convention. 
These two periods will be focused upon for their relevance to the development of ACP 
group diplomacy. In addition, examples of Eurafrican relations or ACP-EEC cooperation 
which support the thesis will be drawn from the period before 1957 and the period from 
1990 to the present respectively.
At an earlier stage in this study, a questionnaire was prepared in both English and 
French. The aim of the questionnaire was to determine the level of consciousness of 
regional economic organisations in Africa, the Caribbean and the South Pacific 
(ECOWAS, CARICOM and SPEC respectively) and to ascertain the level of awareness 
on the ACP group by comparing knowledge of the Lomé Convention with that of these 
regional organisations.^ The questionnaire was distributed to different categories of persons 
interested in the ACP countries. These included diplomats, lecturers, students and other
^Arlene Fink and Jacqueline Kosecoff, How to Conduct Survevs. A Step-bv-Sten 
Guide. London; Sage, 1985 was a useful reference in preparing the questionnaire.
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informed people in both French- and English-speaking African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries. A total of 130 questionnaires were distributed and 75, that is 58 per cent, were 
returned.^
The following observations can be made from the response to the questionnaire. 
For obvious professional reasons, diplomats from all regions showed full awareness of 
their own regional organisations, the organisations of other ACP regions, and the ACP 
group/Lomé Convention. Lecturers and students, for their part, generally showed full 
awareness of the regional organisations in their region of interest but appeared uninformed 
of the other regional organisations or of the ACP group/Lomé Convention. A noticeable 
exception is the specialised category of lecturers and students in the Social Sciences who 
showed awareness of regional organisations in their area of interest as well as the Lomé 
Convention, but not necessarily an awareness of the ACP group. This indicates that the 
Lome Convention (especially viewed as part of EEC development policy) is better known 
than the ACP group (the other half of ACP-EEC cooperation).
However, between the French- and English-speaking categories, sharply differing 
levels of awareness of the ACP group/Lomé Convention were recorded: 100 per cent for 
the French- and only 50 per cent for the English-speaking persons questioned. The full 
awareness rate of the French-speaking participants is hardly surprising since virtually all 
French-speaking African countries have participated in EEC development cooperation 
since independence; in other words, for a longer period than their English-speaking 
counterparts. Again, EEC development cooperation has been promoted and conducted 
almost exclusively by the French since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. EEC 
Commissioners do not take instructions from their home governments but it is instructive
^See Appendix 4A for a copy of the questionnaire in English.
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to note that the Italian Lorenzo Natali who became EEC Development Commissioner at 
the beginning of January 1985 was the first non-Frenchman to assume this function in the 
Commission/ The late Natali succeeded five French Commissioners in charge of EEC 
development cooperation: Robert Lemaignen, Henri Rochereau, Jean-François Deniau, 
Claude Cheysson, Edgard Pisani/ Natali was succeeded by the Spaniard Manuel Marin 
who is current Development Commissioner.
Finally, the high level of awareness in the French-speaking countries is not 
surprising against the consideration that participation in EEC development cooperation via 
the Lomé Convention and the ACP group has become a matter of public interest and of 
political recognition. During the May 1993 ACP Council of Ministers meeting in Brussels, 
the fact that Zaire was barred from attending was broadcast on the local radio thereby 
publicising the ACP group particularly among the Zairian community in Brussels and, by 
the same token, emphasising loss of recognition for Mobutu's government which had so 
far resisted the winds of démocratisation blowing across Africa.
On the whole, the findings of the questionnaire underline the need
1) for a new approach to be taken in ACP-EEC research - one which focuses more
on the ACP, and
2) for the above approach to be directed to speakers of the English language.
‘’Jürgen Notzold and Klaus Freiherr von der Ropp, "Lome IQ: New beginning for 
EEC/ACP Cooperation" in AussenPolitik. Vol.36, No.3 1985, at footnote, p. 177.
^Jacques Ferrandi, "Lorenzo Natali m'a dit...". Interview in Marchés Tropicaux et 
Méditerranéens. N°2194, 43® Année, 27 Novembre 1987, p.3141.
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The present study clearly addresses these needs.
The process of data collection was in two stages. ITie first stage involved the 
collection of secondary source materials and the second stage involved the collection of 
primary source materials. In essence, the first stage consisted of readings from relevant 
books and articles while the second consisted of readings from ACP and EEC publications 
and interviews or discussions with various persons interested in ACP-EEC relations as 
specialists, diplomats or negotiators. As part of the second stage of data collection, this 
writer visited Brussels in January 1992 and January 1993 prior to a three-month stay in 
Belgium from March-May 1993. Interviews were conducted with the Chief of Protocol 
at the ACP Secretariat (M. A. N. Barry); Section Coordinator at the European Commission 
Directorate-General Vm  for Development (Mr. James Moran); longest-serving ACP 
Ambassador in Brussels (His Excellency Raymond Chasle of Mauritius); and Head of 
Chancery of the biggest ACP member country (Mr. O. G. Nnaji of Nigeria). In addition, 
several less formal discussions were held with specialists of ACP-EEC cooperation.
Materials on the origins of ACP-EEC relations are collected mainly from published 
works and complemented by interviews with ACP and EEC experts, negotiators and 
diplomats. Materials on the institutional structures of ACP-EEC cooperation are partly 
collected from published works, principally from ACP and EEC working documents and 
complemented by discussions with ACP and EEC personnel concerned with development 
cooperation. Finally, the primary source of materials on ACP negotiating positions is 
minutes of ACP and EEC meetings and where possible specialist articles. These include 
reports on Development Cooperation from the EEC Commission and the European 
Parliament.
However, there were certain problems with collecting materials from ACP and
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EEC working documents and minutes of meetings. Earlier versions of these documents 
outlined the positions of particular EEC and ACP countries at various stages in the 
development of particular issues which eventually evolved into specific articles or 
protocols in subsequent Lomé Conventions. But more recent versions no longer state the 
particular EEC or ACP country which initiates a given proposal. Indeed, more recent 
Development Committee documents do not state the side (ACP or EEC) which makes a 
proposal. Perhaps in a bid to present a façade of united ACP-EEC coalition, these 
documents have moved from stating the country from which a proposal emanates as was 
done, for example, in the ACP-EEC Annual Report 1976-77 and the Second Annual 
Report 1977-78.^ Instead, subsequent documents, for example, European Working 
Document 2-1104/84^ simply state the side (ACP or EEC) which makes a proposal.
Consequently, finding out specific development of country or regional positions, 
or the evolution of given issues has involved consulting specialist publications and 
discussing with persons closely familiar with the negotiations. For example, Lome appears 
to be established as the ACP-EEC Convention signing city. However, based on close 
study of specialist publications and interviews, we now know that the venue for the 
signing of each ACP-EEC Convention was always open to debate.*
*%e 1976-77 Report discusses Somali bananas, p. 13 while the 1977-78 Report 
discusses Botswana's beef and veal, p. 15. But in these reports, it is clearly stated that such 
and such country representative raised a particular point.
^PE 93.106/fin., "Report on the achievements of the ACP-EEC Joint Committee and 
Consultative Assembly", 28/11/84, p. 13.
*Despite being chosen for the first signing ceremonies, Lome was not always an 
undisputed venue for the signing of subsequent Conventions. In the run-up to the signing 
of the second ACP-EEC Convention, Khartoum was tipped as the favourite candidate:
39
No particular preference is given to English texts over French or Spanish ones. For 
example, the choice of the language editions of The Courier magazine to be used 
depended more on the copies available than on a preference for a particular edition. Thus, 
during research at the EEC Commission Library in Brussels, French editions of texts were 
more often used, especially where English versions, being more highly in demand, were 
unavailable. However, within the body of this study, English terms, expressions or 
citations are used instead of their French or Spanish equivalents. Where a citation is given 
in one of those other languages, this writer's personal translation is given in the body of 
the text and the original text is printed in the footnote for further reference.
Ecomonde Service n°53, le 12 juillet 1979, Partie IV, p.9. We know that the Convention 
was eventually signed at Lomé.
By the third negotiations, however, Lome had established itself as a permanent 
venue. Mauritius was a strong contender for the third signing ceremonies, but as that 
country's Ambassador to the EEC, H. E. Raymond Chasle, revealed in a personal 
interview on 21 May 1993, Mauritius had to drop her bid when it turned out that despite 
initially obtaining the support of up to 40 ACP countries she would have received the 
final support of only 15 countries. This was because the idea of signing the Convention 
in Togo had become enshrined in the minds of the negotiators due to the availability of 
adequate accommodation and security facilities in Lome.
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1.2.3 Theoretical Considerations
Theoretical analysis of ACP-EEC cooperation provides a framework for insight 
into the construction, development and maintenance of ACP group diplomacy. Diplomacy 
is concerned with the management of relations between states and between states and 
other actors.® It refers to the interaction of these actors in which each participant aims to 
gain for his or her country or organisation some advantage, favour or prestige from others. 
Diplomacy goes back to early relations between states. But, in the period following the
first and second World Wars, and in view of the tragedies with accompanied those wars,
\  %
a particular awareness emerged among states based on the merits of harmonious 
coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Modem diplomacy ^ en  emerged on the 
basis of the principle of pacific coexistence among states.
The evolution of modem diplomacy was facilitated by the development of efficient 
transportation and telecommunications which led to increased interactions among different 
states. This also led to increasing cooperation among these states. Modem diplomacy was 
further facilitated by the political independence in the 1960s of several formerly colonised 
countries and territories resulting in a considerable increase in the ilumber of sovereign 
states. Dialogue between the emerging entities and other states, in particular on economic 
issues, was provided within the framework of modem diplomacy. Diplomacy is multi­
faceted and the procedures adopted to achieve set goals vary. One of the main types of 
diplomacy is conference diplomacy. But, this is a generic term which describes 
intemational meetings held on a high ministerial or professional level to discuss a subject 
of intemational political or economic interest. Conference diplomacy often leads to the
®R. P. Barston, Modem Diolomacv. London: Longman, 1988, p.l.
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creation of new organisations or the establishment of new codes of conduct or new 
principles of international law. A conference can also refer to the qualification of its 
participants, for example, a conference of technical experts or a summit conference of 
Heads of State and Government.
In the same manner, a trade conference refers to meetings held to discuss questions 
relating to trade between the countries concerned, and one clear example is the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). This type of conference 
relates to the principles of intemational trade and the diplomacy adopted is called trade 
or economic diplomacy. Trade relations by their nature are based on peaceful, that is non­
military, co-existence. When conflict occasionally arises, actors in these relations usually 
resort to dialogue with the aim of arriving at a compromise. Peaceful economic diplomacy 
has thus become an established area of modem diplomacy.
ACP-EEC cooperation is based primarily on the maintenance of economic 
relations. The ACP group is specifically concemed with improved and sustained trade 
relations with the EEC. This is stated as one of the main objectives of the group.’® It can 
therefore be stated that the ACP countries adopt economic diplomacy in their relations 
with the EEC. Moreover, the ACP countries adopt group diplomacy in their relations with 
the EEC because they are made up of different participants each working towards common 
benefits for all the members of the group. Indeed, group diplomacy takes place when two 
or more states work towards the attainment of some set objectives. It implies the existence 
of a coalition which has continuity at least up to a point where the principal objectives
’^ Article 2 (a), (b) and (c) of the Georgetown Agreement which established the ACP 
group in 1975 reaffirms the desire of the ACP countries to strengthen relations with the 
EEC on the basis of the Lomé Convention. See Appendix 1.
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are achieved. The furtherance of the interests of the members is a characteristic of groups 
or organisations with an important economic aspect."
States constantly negotiate to join organisations of which they are not members, 
or they try to leave organisations of which they are already members. For any given state, 
this is an expression of her independence and sovereignty. However, each time an 
intention is expressed to join or to leave a coalition, such intention provokes reactions 
from the members of the gaining, as well as those of the losing, coalition. It is pertinent 
to note in this regard that France insisted on the inclusion of the OCXs in Part IV of the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957. This was done as a result of the perceived disruptive effect of 
the European Common Market on the Franco-African Community. Similarly, Britain's 
initial attempt to join the EEC in the early 1960s and, later, her successful signature of 
the Act of Accession in 1972 provoked interesting discussions on EEC association for 
Commonwealth developing countries. Protocol 22 of the Act in turn facilitated the 
establishment of favourable relations between the EEC and the Commonwealth 
Associables. Reactions provoked by imminent or real changes in the membership of an 
organisation are reflected in the declarations or resolutions of its members. These reactions 
can be recorded through a study of individual members, sub-groups of members or the 
group as a whole. In other words, the effects of change on coalition can best be 
understood within the context of group diplomacy.
The study of a group explores the effects on individuals, organisations or states of 
dynamic factors such as the increase or decrease in the membership of the group or the 
increase or decrease in available benefits to the members of the group. Social
"Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action - Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups, London: Harvard University Press, 1971 (Eighth Printing, 1980), p.5.
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psychologists justify the study of group behaviour by maintaining that the attitude of one 
or several members of a group is modified as a result of an association or dissociation of 
other members.’^  This principle can be applied to interstate relations to justify the study 
of group diplomacy because the behaviour of states regarding a concept or ideology 
influences other states when, for example, one state leaves or another joins a group. In 
Eurafrican relations, despite strong initial criticisms of the EEC association by the 
Commonwealth African countries, Nigeria's subsequent decision to negotiate an agreement 
with the EEC in the mid-1960s clearly weighed on the East African Commonwealth 
countries which later negotiated their own accord with the Community. These combined 
Euro-African efforts facilitated the conclusion of the joint ACP-EEC Lomé Convention 
in 1975.
The concept of influence as an essential feature of collective action can also be 
applied to the study of group diplomacy. Within a group, members influence each other, 
for example, when the opinions or actions of some members are modified by the opinions 
or actions of other members. Two contrasting categories of influence situation can be 
identified. In the first, the source of influence is a majority and, in the second, the source 
of influence is a minority. Dynamics of influence are traditionally studied as a form of 
dependence which ensures the dominance of the majority or superior party over the 
minority or subordinate party. However, the concept of minority influence in group 
consensus formation can also be envisaged. The relationship of dominance and 
dependence has a component of conflict which emerges when influence is applied. This 
implies disagreement at least at the initial stages; yet, the essence of a group is continuity.
^^Randy Y. Hirokawa and Marshall Scott Poole (eds.). Communication and Group 
Decision-Making. London: Sage, 1986, p. 17.
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Under the threat of splitting the coalition, stronger members of the group may be inclined 
to redefine their positions or actions to appease the less powerful members. Thus, stronger 
members could lean to pressure however tacit from their less powerful partners.
Influence in ACP-EEC relations can be examined first in intra-ACP relations and 
second in ACP-EEC cooperation. Intra-ACP influence can be studied from two 
viewpoints: the first relates to the Lomé I negotiations and the second relates to present 
ACP institutional structures. At the Lomé I negotiations in 1973-75, the Commonwealth 
African countries, in particular Nigeria and the members of die East African Community 
(Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda), exerted a great deal of majority influence over the 
Associated French-speaking countries. Relatively developed economic base, relative trade 
independence from the six original EEC member states and bigger size of the internal 
market as a result of larger populations were factors which provided the basis of majority 
influence for the Commonwealth countries. However, present ACP institutional 
arrangements, for example, equal membership and voting in ACP decision-making organs 
has reduced the preponderance of these bigger-size ACP countries. One member-one vote 
procedures are adopted in ACP institutions and this ensures that a small size ACP country 
wields as much influence as does a big size country. This implies that a couple of small 
countries with a negligible combined population or economic strength can exert 
considerable minority influence in intra-ACP relations.
In ACP-EEC cooperation, it was clear that the ACP countries exercised 
predominant bargaining influence over the EEC in particular during the Lomé I 
negotiations when they pressured the Community into granting most of their economic
'^Serge Moscovici, Gabriel Mugny and Eddy Van Avermaet, Perspectives on minoritv 
influence. London: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. xi-xii, 3 and 18.
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demands. The intemational climate of the 1970s (oil crises, heavy EEC dependence on 
primary commodities from the ACP countries, the cold war and the often unstated political 
need for EEC presence in the ACP countries) gave an impetus to ACP influence. 
However, most of these situations having evolved, the ACP countries have now calmly 
assumed the position of the minority partner. However, in so far as the partners are 
interested in maintaining the ACP-EEC relationship, the ACP countries - even considered 
as a minority group - could exert vital influence. But, the ACP countries do not appear 
to consider this option seriously since some accounts have suggested that the ACP group 
is passive and only responds to EEC proposals. For example, during the last negotiations 
for Lomé IV, the ACP countries demanded that all provisions in the preceding Convention 
(Lomé XU) be renegotiated. Thus, the ACP countries were implicitly only reacting to EEC 
initiatives'^ since EEC priorities dominated the Lomé IQ negotiations.*^
Also related to group diplomacy is the concept of the collective good which 
implies that non-collective benefits must be provided to give potential members an 
incentive to join*  ^or to remain in the group. For most ACP countries, the propelling force 
of ACP-EEC cooperation is Lomé aid and grants. This is still mostly the case for the 
former Yaoundé Convention signatories for which the association arrangements were 
intended to provide development capital. However, other countries have joined the ACP- 
EEC partnership while development aid and grants have continued to diminish in real
'^Myriam Vander Stichele, "The Lost Spirit of Lomé" in Lomé Briefing N® 14 
January-February 1990, p.2.
'^Several proposals at the Lomé IQ negotiations, including the much-debated "policy 
dialogue", originated from the EEC Commission.
*^ancur Olson, op. cit.. p. 16.
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terms. Consequently, the new entrants into the Lomé Convention recourse to benefits other 
than financial aid and grants as a justification for joining the Lomé Convention. These 
alternative benefits refer mainly to concessionary trade in commodities such as sugar, rum, 
bananas, beef and veal, etc. In essence, it is necessary to provide alternative benefits for 
all members of a group because in the pursuit of their interests, states will not retain 
membership in a coalition if the costs to them outweigh the expected benefits.’^
Where there is no direct immediate advantage, the spill over benefits is another 
important consideration for countries participating in a group. Spill over benefits may refer 
to benefits to be realised at a later stage of association with the group or to be realised 
within a related association. In an ACP context, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, the 
two most recent ACP member countries could not arrive at cooperation arrangements with 
the Commonwealth Caribbean countries prior to joining the ACP group. However, since 
joining the ACP group in 1990, the possibility of cooperation between the two countries 
and the other Caribbean states has been underlined by Michael Manley, former Jamaican 
Premier.'* Similarly, concessions made by the EEC to ACP sugar producers represent an 
incentive to banana producers while they are negotiating concessions for their own 
product. Banana producers have arguably worked to consolidate the ACP group in 
anticipation of future favourable arrangements for bananas. The initial concessions made 
to sugar producers constitute a precedent which can be called upon in negotiations over
'^Marc Williams, Third World Cooperation: the Group of 77 in UNCTAD. London; 
Pinters, pp. 8-9.
'*Michael Manley stated that Jamaica would be pleased to work with Surinam, Haiti, 
the Dominican Republic and the English-speaking CARICOM countries within the 
framework of the Caribbean Forum and the Lomé Convention: Actualités - Journal 
périodique du Groupe ACP, Numéro 2 -Décembre 1990, p.l
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banana exports to the EEC/^ Thus, a distinction should be made between two kinds of 
common interests: an identical common interest in a single arrangement, and a 
complementary interest in an exchange of different objects/^ Direct or indirect benefits 
to be derived from membership is clearly an important consideration which may contribute 
to an increase in participation. The number of countries joining the ACP group is always 
on the increase. Constant increase in the membership gives credibility to a group, ensures 
continuity, helps cohesion and, in the case of the ACP group, encourages horizontal 
cooperation among ACP countries.
However, the existence of common interests does not eliminate conflict from a 
group. A conflict situation can arise both from a similarity or a dissimilarity of interests. 
The concept of cleavage relates to the process of conflict. Cleavage analysis is particularly 
helpful when attempting to assess the extent of division or similarity of interests and the 
existence of overlapping interests.^’ Cleavages are the criteria which divide the members 
of a community or subcommunity into groups. Three general classes of cleavages have 
been identified. Ascriptive or "trait" cleavages, for the purpose of this study, include levels 
of development, structure of domestic economies; attitudinal or "opinion" cleavages
^^ A break-through in the ACP-EEC banana negotiations was reached in early 1993 
when the EEC confirmed duty-free entry for 857 700 tonnes of ACP bananas to the EEC: 
Règlement (CEE) N° 404/93 du Conseil du 13 février 1993 portant organisation commune 
des marchés dans le secteur de la banane in Journal officiel des Communautés 
européennes. N° L 47, 25.2.93, Article 33, p .ll. However, the matter remains fully 
unresolved as a result of German opposition to the decision.
^°Fred Charles Iklé, How Nations Negotiate. London: Harper & Row, 1964, pp.2-3 
states that mutual tariff concessions have the purpose of settling an exchange.
’^Marc Williams, op. cit.. p.7.
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include ideology and a country's analysis of the political economy of trade and 
development as well as perceptions of the benefits from proposed measures; and 
behavioural or "act" cleavages include voting patterns, organisational membership and 
support for group cohesion. Cleavage by traits determines the "heterogeneity" or 
"homogeneity" of a group; cleavage by attitude determines the extent of "dissensus" or 
"consensus" of a group; and cleavage by behaviour determines the "fractionalisation" or 
"cohesion" of a group.^  ^These cleavages interplay continuously to determine the shifting 
levels of concord or discord on issues within a coalition.
In intra-African and later ACP diplomacy, the level of ascriptive cleavages was not 
significant because all countries were homogeneous in terms of levels of development and 
structure of domestic economies. However, attitudinal cleavages were rather significant 
in intra-African relations in the 1960s to early 1970s. Hence, there was a high degree of 
discord among these countries as they could hardly reach consensus in terms of ideology 
on colonisation and analysis of the political economy of trade and development. This 
explains the lack of full dynamism in African diplomacy during that period. Behavioural 
cleavages when related to inter-African relations in the 1960s can explain the level of 
fractionalisation between the French- and English-speaking countries as they voted 
differently on development issues in the UNCTAD as a result of their affiliations to 
different groups. However, in contemporary ACP diplomacy, voting pattern and 
organisational membership in the ACP has actually promoted group cohesion as these 
countries vote in other fora in support of issues favourable to members of their 
organisation.
%ouglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor, The Analvsis of Political Cleavages. London: 
Yale University Press, 1970, pp. 1-2 and Marc Williams, on. cit.. p.7.
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The concepts of bargaining and decision-making are also relevant to the study of 
group diplomacy. Three modes of bargaining have been identified: distributive bargaining 
where the parties attempt to maximise their share of fixed benefits; integrative bargaining 
where they attempt to increase the share of joint benefits; and mixed bargaining where 
they attempt to increase joint benefits and then decide on its allocation. A fourth 
bargaining process, intraorganisational bargaining, derives from the first three and refers 
to the course of negotiations designed to achieve consensus within the group and between 
the two sides in the negotiations.^^ With respect to ACP-EEC cooperation, the interplay 
of these modes of bargaining depends on whether the negotiations are "intra-group" (ACP) 
or "integrative" - between the group and another organisation (ACP-EEC). ACP-EEC 
negotiating procedures enable the ACP group to adopt integrative bargaining over the 
volume of financial aid allocated under the Lomé Convention. In effect, the volume of aid 
that would be allocated to a particular ACP country is not known at the outset of 
negotiations; but ACP countries put in a concerted effort to demand for increased aid from 
the EEC in the hope that each ACP country at the end would be rewarded with a 
reasonable volume of financial resources.
There are two tendencies within the EEC regarding financial disbursements to the 
ACP countries. One tendency is that of the EEC member states which prefer a reduction 
in Community financial commitments to the ACP countries. Supporters of this approach 
propose an alternative which amounts to easier access to the Community market for ACP
^^Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theorv of Labor 
Negotiations. 2nd ed.. New York: ILR Press, Cornell University, 1991, pp.xv and 4-6, and 
Marc Williams, oo. cit. pp.5-6.
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e x p o r ts .The other tendency is that of the EEC member states which support a real 
increase in financial assistance to the ACP countries or at least a maintenance of its level 
(taking into account increase in ACP membership and populations).^^ But, even with the 
support of the second group of EEC member states, the ACP countries always receive far 
less financial aid than they ever bargain for.
For example, at the Lomé II negotiations, the ACP countries were united in their 
requests for a total aid package of 10 billion UA from the EEC“  but at the end they 
received 5.227 billion UA^’ - a little more than half of the requested sum. Again, at the 
Lome m  negotiations, the ACP countries asked for ECU 10 billion^* but after intense 
negotiations they settled for ECU 8.5 billion. It soon became clear that discussions over 
the volume of Lome aid were inherently contentious. Henceforth, in order to avoid
^^Françoise de La Serre, "Lomé HI: l'approche britannique" in Revue du Marché 
Commun. Numéro Spécial - La Convention de Lomé El, n°296. Avril 1986, pp.200-203, 
presents Britain rather cynically as a major proponent of this approach. She links this 
tendency to Britain's traditional stance in favour of free trade.
^^France is among the foremost supporters of this approach for reasons of her 
historical commitment to financial cooperation. But, it is wortiiy to note that EEC member 
states which produce figs, early strawberries and citrus fruits, in particular Spain, Greece 
and Italy also support this tendency and sometimes back the idea of limited ACP access 
to the Community market in order to avoid competition from ACP tropical products: see 
Jurgen Nôtzold and Klaus Freiherr von der Ropp, "Lomé IV: A Chance for Black Africa's 
Return to the World Economy?" in Aussen Politik. Vol.41, No.2/90, p.l85.
*^^ Ecomonde Service. N°41, le 17 Janvier 1979, Partie IV, p. 1.
^^ Ibid.. N°61, le 4 Décembre 1979, Partie IV, p. 1.
% d . .  N‘^ 164, le 4 Juillet 1984, Partie IV, p.l4.
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recurrent stalemate in the Lomé negotiations, the negotiators adopted the practice of 
leaving the question of the volume of financial aid until nearer the end of the negotiations. 
During the Lomé IV negotiations which started in late 1988, discussions on the volume 
of financial aid were not even raised until October 1989^  ^ - three months before the 
signing of the Convention in December. However, in these negotiations, the ACP 
countries also asked for ECU 15.3 billion^ ® - more than the EEC was willing to concede. 
After vehemently rejecting two previous EEC offers, the ACP countries settled for ECU 
12 billion. However, in all these instances, integrative bargaining clearly promoted ACP 
group cohesion.
Three modes of group decision-making can be identified: minimum common 
denominator, splitting the difference, and upgrading the common interest.^’ For fear of 
down-grading the common decision when joint negotiation with the EEC was initially 
contemplated in the 1960s between the French-speaking Associates and the English- 
speaking non-Associates, the view was expressed, especially by the Nkrumah school of 
African thinking, that the African in the Commonwealth had greater sovereign dignity than 
the African in the Franco-African Community. It was therefore felt that an amalgamation 
of the two groups for the purpose of joint negotiation with the EEC might pull down the 
Commonwealth African to the level of dependence of the French-speaking African rather 
than pull up even, say, the relatively economically advanced Côte dlvoire to the level of
%^ d .. N°280, le 17 Octobre 1989, Partie I, p.4.
°^Ibid.. N°281 le 2 Novembre 1989, Partie I, p.26.
^'Ernst B. Haas, Bevond the Nation-State. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964, 
pp. 103-13 and Marc Williams, op. cit.. p.6.
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self-assertion open to Ghana.
In contemporary ACP-EEC relations, the particular decision-making approach 
adopted depends on the side (ACP or EEC) which is seen to be conceding advantages. 
Despite the fact that the EEC stands to gain from cooperation as much as the ACP or 
perhaps even better given the fact of fully established EEC institutions for the 
implementation of ACP-EEC decisions, a general impression has been created over the 
years that the EEC is the giver while the ACP is the receiver This trend is supported by 
the attitude of ACP negotiators who tend to see the aid component of the Lomé 
Convention as its most attractive feature.^^ Consequently, the EEC would be expected to 
focus on the minimum common denominator and the ACP group would aim to upgrade 
the common interests accruing to its members.
The concept of side payments is also relevant in this study. Side payments refer 
to the granting of bilateral or limited multilateral concessions to selected members of a 
group in order to reduce their support for a common position.The foregoing definition 
clearly refers to side payments when conceded by the group on the other side of the 
negotiating table. However, it is also possible within a given group for some of its 
members to concede benefits to fellow members in order to safeguard group cohesion. In
^^ Ali A. Mazrui, "African Attitudes to the European Economic Community" in 
Lawrence B. Krause (ed.). The Common Market: Progress and Controversv. N.J.: Prentice 
Hall, 1964, p. 131 and Ali A. Mazrui, The Anelo-African Commonwealth - Political 
Friction and Cultural Fusion, London: Pergamon, 1967, pp.65-66.
Adrian Hewitt, "The Lome Conventions: Entering a Second Decade", in Journal of 
Common Market Studies. Volume XXm, No. 2, December 1984, p. 101.
^^See Marc Williams, op.cit. p. 10.
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effect, side payments can be used by either side to make or break the coalition depending 
on bargaining priorities. In other words, side payments can be used for both positive and 
negative ends. We shall term "negative side payments" those offered by partners on the 
opposite side of the negotiating table with the potential effect of disrupting group cohesion 
of their opposite partners, and we shall term "positive side payments" those offered by 
members of a group to their co-partners with the potential effect of maintaining the 
cohesion of their group.
In ACP-EEC relations, negative and positive side payments occur when 
concessions are accorded to one or only a few ACP states. But, the ACP countries have 
turned their fortunes around by supporting initial negative EEC side payments and later 
achieving positive side payments by pushing for further concessions in favour of the ACP 
group. A relevant example was offered early in ACP-EEC relations by the decisions 
adopted during the Council of Ministers meeting in Fiji on 14 April 1977. At the request 
of the ACP states, derogations from the rules of origin were granted by the EEC in favour 
of Malawi (Decision No 1/77) and Kenya (Decision No 2/77) in respect of artificial fly 
for fishing.Requests from Mauritius with respect to textile products and tuna were not 
granted. However, about seven months later, at a meeting on 23 November 1977, the 
Committee of Ambassadors adopted, in favour of Mauritius, Decisions No 11/77 on the 
importation of bleached cloth and No 12/77 on canned tuna.’^
By granting initial concessions to Malawi and Kenya through joint ACP efforts, 
not only was group cohesion maintained in the mean time but the benefits were later
^^ Second Annual Report of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers, Brussels: European 
Commission, 14 March 1978, p.28.
""Ibid.. pp.28-29.
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extended to Mauritius whereas limited EEC concessions could potentially have split the 
ACP coalition. Concessions given in this way appear to serve a useful purpose both for 
group cohesion and for the advancement of the interests of a greater majority of the group. 
In intra-ACP relations, the French-speaking EEC Associates at the Lomé I negotiations 
were in favour of the idea of granting reverse trade preferences to the Community while 
the Commonwealth Associable countries were opposed to the idea. However, it can be 
argued that Nigeria offered positive side payments to the French-speaking Associates in 
return for their change of stance in the Lome I negotiations in support of the 
Commonwealth position. The Nigerian Government had hinted that it would be prepared 
to accept some responsibility for dealing with the special problems of the weaker African 
states. Nigeria's President, General Yakubu Gowon, had promised that Nigeria would not 
make excessive demands on the weaker states.^^
In negotiations between two groups of countries at different levels of political and 
economic development, the less favoured group could have its bargaining strength greatly 
improved by pooling together the resources of its composite members. In ACP-EEC 
relations, the ACP group by most analyses symbolises the less powerful side and the 
strategy by which the group can enhance its bargaining power has been called "collective 
clientelism". This refers to a process in which a group of weak states combine in an effort
” Gowon had said: "We shall be the last to call on our brothers to commit economic 
suicide in the face of unknown realities": West Africa. 16 July 1973 in James May all, 
"The Implications for Africa of the Enlarged European Economic Community" in Timothy 
M. Shaw and Kenneth A. Heard (eds.). The Politics of Africa: Dependence and 
Development. New York: Africana - Holmes & Meier, 1979, at footnote 27, p.314.
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to exploit the special ties that link them to a more powerful state or group of states.^* ACP 
group diplomacy precisely aims to extract concessions from the EEC by virtue of the 
historical connections which link the members of the group to the member states of the 
EEC
^*John Ravenhill, Collective Clientelism - The Lomé Conventions and North-South 
Relations, New York: Columbia University Press, 1985, p.22.
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PARTI -
ORIGINS OF ACP-EEC COOPERATION AND ACP DIPLOMACY:
FROM FRANCO-AFRICAN COLONIAL RELATIONS 
TO THE FORMATION OF THE ACP GROUP
This part of the study (comprising Chapters 2, 3 and 4) looks at the ideas which 
led to ACP-EEC cooperation and the events which subsequently led to the establishment 
of ACP group diplomacy. ACP-EEC cooperation and ACP diplomacy are traced to 
Franco-African colonial relations and the institutionalisation of the ACP group in 1975 en 
passant par Britain's initial EEC application in 1961 and the reactions to this application 
by the Commonwealth African and Caribbean countries since they became "EEC 
Associables" by virtue of Britain's application. This part of the study also examines 
Britain's eventual EEC membership in 1973 and the impact it had in facilitating joint 
African negotiations with the EEC.
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CHAPTER TWO; EVOLUTION OF ACP-EEC COOPERATION
ACP-EEC cooperation can be traced to several events and documents representing 
different stages in the evolution of ACP-EEC relations. The particular nature of relations 
between France and the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) marked the beginning 
of European development cooperation policy. The signing of the Treaty of Rome and 
formation of the EEC in 1957 later presented an occasion for the establishment of a legal 
framework. Part IV of the Treaty provided for the maintenance of special relations 
between the six original members of the EEC and their OCTs. After the independence of 
the OCTs, the special relations established by Part TV were continued in two Yaoundé 
Conventions signed in 1963 and 1969 respectively. French-speaking African diplomacy 
during this period relied on France to promote policies considered to be of interest to the 
emerging countries and territories.
Britain's initial 1961 bid to join the EEC sparked off a considerable level of 
interest from Commonwealth developing countries which became prospective Associates 
by virtue of Britain's application. In the event, Britain's entry was vetoed by General 
Charles de Gaulle, President of France. Yet, despite reservations on their part over 
Britain's intention to join the EEC, four Commonwealth African countries, that is, Nigeria 
on the one hand, and Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda on the other, later signed two separate 
agreements with the EEC in 1966 and 1969 respectively. This chapter looks at these 
developments and their relevance to ACP-EEC relations and ACP diplomacy which 
emerged in the early 1970s. At this initial phase, English-speaking African and Caribbean 
diplomacy was essentially reactive, and perhaps it was more clearly so than French- 
speaking African diplomacy. The Commonwealth developing countries seemed only to be
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responding to Britain's application and Eurafrican association arrangements.
59
2.1 FRANCE AND THE OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES (OCTs^
As negotiations for the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) were coming to an end at Messina in Italy in 1955, the French delegation raised 
a question on the economic relations that would exist between France, Belgium and their 
OCTs on the one hand, and between the Community and the OCTs on the other. France 
requested that the OCTs be given special concessionary status by member states of the 
Community. The French proposal aroused some interest and was further debated during 
negotiations for the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Common Market. As a 
result of French insistence. Part IV entitled "The Association of the Overseas Countries 
and Territories" was included in the Treaty of Rome.
2.1.1 Impact of Franco-African Colonial Relations
The origins of ACP-EEC cooperation can effectively be traced to the particular 
relations which existed between France and Belgium and their African dependent 
territories. Indeed, France, and to a lesser extent, Belgium and Italy, had developed 
important political and commercial relations with developing countries, mainly in Africa.’ 
A list of the OCTs concerned shows that France was involved in a majority of them, 
Belgium was involved in two, while Italy and the Netherlands were involved in one
’Delsie M. Gandia, The EEC s Generalised Scheme of Preferences and the Yaoundé 
and Other Agreements - Benefits in Trade and Development for Less Developed 
Countries, New Jersey, Montclair: Allanheld & Osmun, 1981, p. 1.
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colonial territory each.^ Understandably, other prospective EEC member states in particular 
Germany and the Netherlands were not supportive of the proposal to establish special 
relations with the OCTs because the arrangement would be unfavourable to them. The two 
countries had disengaged from their colonies since 1919; consequently, the two had 
developed extensive relations with developing countries in general. A majority of these 
countries were not part of the French overseas territories since the Franco-African 
Community was well shielded against foreign penetration.
However, France would not give in. She even went as far to make her own 
accession to the Treaty of Rome dependent on the association of the OCTs/ There are 
several economic and political (but hardly any humanitarian) explanations for France's 
show of benevolence. One of the few known humanitarian arguments holds that, 
historically, since the early days of European and African encounters, the French tended 
to treat the Africans generally better than did other nations in terms of raids, attacks and 
extermination of the people.^ The political and economic explanations are more
F^rance: Dahomey (Benin), Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, French Somaliland, Sudan, Togo, Upper 
Volta (Burkina Faso), Comoros, Algeria and the French Overseas Territories; Belgium: 
Belgian Congo (Zaire), Ruanda-Urundi (later producing Rwanda and Burundi 
respectively); Italy: Somaliland; The Netherlands: New Guinea, (Surinam became 
effectively associated in September 1962). Major source: The Courier no. 120, March- 
April 1990, p.27.
^Paul Bourdeaux, "Le marché commun et l'association CEE-EAMA dans la presse 
quotidienne de cinq pays africains". Mémoire, Université Catholique de Louvain: Juillet 
1967, p.5.
^See Dorothy Shipley White, Black Africa and de Gaulle: From the French Empire 
to Independence. London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1979, pp. 10-11.
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compelling. As far back as 1765, le Duc de Choiseul, French Minister for Foreign Affairs 
had issued instructions, in the face of fierce European competition, that Africa existed for 
trade and must produce goods different from those produced in the métropole.^ This policy 
was continued into the twentieth century.
General de Gaulle's policy towards the colonial territories, which emerged during 
World War H, was consistent with that of his forebears. In the aftermath of the War, de 
Gaulle was grateful for the contributions made by Africa towards the liberation of France. 
This is understandable since 100 000 Africans fought in the Free France armies. Also, de 
Gaulle's visits to Africa and BBC radio broadcasts to Brazzaville helped to coordinate and 
to consolidate the various branches of the French liberation movement. In his Memoirs. 
de Gaulle had said that if France was liberated, links of solidarity would be established 
with the overseas territories. On August 27 1946, he had declared that the French 
Constitution should reaffirm and impose the solidarity of all the overseas territories with 
France. He argued that France would remain a great power as long as she kept the 
territories, but without them she may not have much power.^ As history would have it, de 
Gaulle was President of France at the time of the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome.
After 1945, successive French Governments encouraged the production of tropical 
foodstuffs and cotton in their dependencies. In addition, they virtually prohibited imports 
into metropolitan France from third countries. The result was that the competitiveness of 
Franco-African markets had been stifled by the absence of free competition and by the 
mid-1950s most French colonies were uncompetitive by world market standards. It was 
largely this situation which led the French Government to insist on the inclusion of Part
"Ibid.. p. 17.
%id.. pp.78 and 153.
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rv  of the Rome Treaty as part of the price for its signature/ For France, colonial policy 
was intricately worked out and it would be a loss of administrative ingenuity and 
economic advantage to abandon the system.
Markets in French-speaking Africa were specially protected by a network of 
external tariffs, quotas and exchange controls. Moreover, access to French metropolitan 
markets for African products was guaranteed. To compensate for any losses caused by 
trade diversions from her territories, France paid surprix for African imports. This practice, 
also called the system of prise en charge  ^involved the payment of prices higher than those 
paid on the world market for African products. In return for running the system, France 
also received higher-than-market prices for her manufactured and processed goods. 
Furthermore, the French and CFA franc zone was maintained by special monetary 
agreements and provided for pooled foreign reserves which were held in Paris. When the 
need arose, these were used in addition to French grants and loans to balance deficits. 
Actual deficits on OCT trade were difficult to ascertain because invisible transfers within 
the franc zone, for example, repatriation of funds by French companies and individuals 
to France were not subject to any controls.^
Thus, the franc zone constituted a highly protected economic area. Commercial
^James Mayall, "The Implications for Africa of the Enlarged European Economic 
Community" in Timothy M. Shaw and Kenneth A. Heard (eds.). The Politics of Africa: 
Dependence and Development. New York: Africana - Holmes & Meier, 1979, p.296.
^Gerard Curzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacv. London: Michael Joseph, 1965, 
p.239.
Francis Terry McNamara, France in Black Africa. Washington DC: National Defense 
University, 1989, p. 101.
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exchanges between the métropole and the OCTs were guaranteed by customs, monetary 
and other barriers which offered an efficient protection against foreign competition/° 
Invariably, these arrangements secured favourable trade balances for France. For example, 
close to the time of negotiations for the Treaty of Rome, in 1954, the surprix paid by 
France on trade with her overseas territories amounted to 60 billion old French francs 
whereas in the same year, the overseas territories paid a surprix of 80 billion old French 
francs. Thus the net advantage accruing to France amounted to 20 billion old French 
francs." Similarly, in 1956, in the heat of negotiations for the Treaty, 30 per cent of 
French exports went to her overseas territories while 70-80 per cent of the production of 
the French Union were imported by France under favourable conditions of trad e .T h e  
reason for the insistence of France on the inclusion of the OCTs in the Treaty of Rome 
is clear from the foregoing considerations.
Until only recently, the CFA franc had a pre-independence fixed parity of 50 to 
1 French franc.However, the French Treasury still finances deficits in the operation of 
the franc zone. In addition, the operating account of the franc zone has continued to
’^ Pierre-Bemard Cousté, L'Association des Pavs d'Outre-Mer à la Communauté 
Economique Européenne. Paris: Librairies Techniques, 1959, p.209.
"Teresa Hay ter, French Aid. London: Overseas Development Institute, 1966, p. 73.
*^ José Manuel Sobriflo Heredia, Las relaciones de Cooperaciôn para el Desarrollo 
CEE-Estados ACP. Universidad de Santiago de Compostella, Monografias n°107, 1985, 
p.93.
*^ 13 of the 14 CFA countries devalued their currency on 12 January 1994 by 50 per 
cent with the 14th limiting its devaluation to a third: Africa Research Bulletin. Volume 
30 Number 12, December 16th 1993-January 15th 1994, p.ll535.
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register deficits but, the French Treasury has also continued to compensate the deficit. For 
example, the French Treasury had to compensate deficits of 988 billion CFA francs (19.5 
billion FF) in 1986 and 550 billion CFA francs (11.6 billion FF) in 1987 respectively. 
However, France has not ceased to record a trade surplus with the CFA franc zone 
countries. She recorded surpluses of 21.5 billion FF in 1986 and 15.8 billion FF in 1987 
respectively. A comparison of the deficits of the franc zone financed by France and trade 
surpluses recorded during this period shows that France ended up with a credit balance.'^ 
The establishment of a customs union and a common external tariff (CET) by the EEC 
would have meant the erosion or total elimination of the favourable position which France 
occupied in the markets of the OCTs. Viewed within the context of the post-War period, 
France's closed economic system had two main purposes. The first was to shelter the 
weakened French economy from competition and the second was to provide official 
French development capital to the African countries and dependencies.
However, at about the same time that negotiations for the Treaty of Rome were 
taking place, a wind for political emancipation was blowing across colonial territories. 
Ghana, led by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, set a precedent in West Africa by proclaiming full 
independence from Britain in 1957. Ghana's independence certainly raised the possibility 
of independence for other European colonies in West Africa. Suddenly, France was 
contending not just with European integration but also with possible serious modifications 
of her colonial empire. These prospects should also be placed in the context of French 
colonial wars. At the end of the second World War, France engaged herself in the war of 
Indochina. France lost that colony in 1954 when North and South Vietnam emerged, and
‘^ Amadou B. Touré, "Les pays africains face à l'échéance européenne de 1992" in 
Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens. N°2400,4T Année, 8 novembre 1991, pp.2838-39.
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she only narrowly escaped being caught up in the Vietnam war which ensued soon 
afterwards. But, even as France was pulling out of Indochina, tension was rising in 
Algeria. Militant members of the Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques 
including Ben Bella formed a Revolutionary Committee in 1954. French response which 
included military raids in Algeria continued throughout the late 1950s up to 1962 when, 
following the Evian Accords, Algerians voted for independence.’^  The long struggle for 
independence in Indochina and North Africa was an education for French-speaking 
African leaders.’®
In France, consequent to these colonial wars, public opinion was arguably more 
favourable towards autonomy-seeking African territories in the late 1950s. The new 
attitude was adopted for two reasons. Firstly, French politicians did not want their country 
to be ever fighting colonial wars. Secondly, it was estimated that if France remained 
foremost in support of the emancipating territories, there was a possibility of maintaining 
favourable French positions after independence. This, in turn, would continue the 
promotion of French civilisation in the independent states. Henceforth, the concern in 
France was over the means of preventing political independence from automatically 
breaking up the close links which had been forged over many years. Nudged on by the 
general international trend towards decolonisation, France became clearly disposed to 
accord formal independence to the African territories but at the same time was determined 
to preserve close cultural, economic and political ties with the OCTs.
’®These accounts of the Indochina and Algerian wars are based on readings from Petit 
Robert 2. Paris: Dictionnaires Le Robert, 1989.
’®I. Wallerstein, The Road to Independence: Ghana and the Ivorv Coast. Paris: Mouton 
& Co, 1964, pp.73-74.
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Although aspects of Franco-African relations had been established prior to this 
period as witnessed by the surprix and the franc zone systems, the establishment of a 
European Common Market and the prospects of political independence of the territories 
gave renewed vigour to French association policies. Also, in proposing the inclusion of 
the OCTs, France clearly expected to score political points. Apart from affording de 
Gaulle the opportunity of fulfilling his War-time promise to the African territories, the 
project of association with the EEC was within the framework of de Gaulle's third world 
policy. The policy involved rallying round emancipating countries and territories to form 
a third way*^  or troisième force^* during the bipolar cold war period distinct from both the 
United States and the Soviet Union. France would play the role of leader and 
spokesperson for the emerging political entities.
Incidentally, France was not the only party that showed reluctance in breaking off 
relations: the OCTs were equally unwilling to severe all links with the métropole. 
Following the completion of the project for a new Constitution establishing the Fifth 
Republic in France, a referendum was held on 28 September 1958 to decide on the fate 
of the Franco-African Community in view of these developments and political aspirations 
in Africa. In the referendum held simultaneously in metropolitan France and in the 
colonies, the overseas territories voted overwhelmingly with a "yes" in favour of the 
Franco-African Community. They voted to remain with France while retaining 
autonomous powers in some areas of government. They would have their own institutions 
with internal autonomy but not full sovereignty since certain domains such as foreign
Troisième voie ou voix.
**Enzo R. Grilli, The European Communitv and the Developing Countries. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 102.
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policy, defence, money, common economic and financial policy, raw materials, the 
judiciary, higher education, telecommunications and international transportation would 
remain under French control.
One colonial territory, however, refused to join the Community. Guinea under 
Sékou Touré voted "no" in the referendum with a majority of 95.2 and became 
independent on the same day in 1958. A few days after the "no" vote, a note was sent to 
Guinea ending French help in administration and transferring the French civil service 
within two months. Equipment credits were also cut off and the French army, including 
army doctors and medical supplies which had been responsible for the health of the 
civilian population, were also removed. A detailed account shows that when Touré arrived 
at Government House all the furniture, telephone and other utilities had been removed. 
Indeed, fearing that the example of Guinea might be followed by other states which had 
joined the Community, the French Government removed everything of value from the 
Guinean territory. Nkrumah, the Ghanaian leader, later recounted with compassion that 
French administrators and teachers were promptly withdrawn from Guinea while 
documents and even electric light bulbs were removed from government buildings. 
Financial assistance, trade support and the payment of pensions to Guinean war veterans 
were also discontinued.
But, precedence had been set by Nkrumah's Ghana and, more especially among
'^ o r  a full account of Guinea's vote for independence and subsequent deterioration 
of relations with France see Dorothy Shipley White, op. cit.. pp.210-11 and Edward 
Mortimer, France and the Africans 1944-1960: A Political Historv. London; Faber & 
Faber, 1969, pp.329-35.
^°Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-colonialism - The Last Stage of Imperialism. London: 
Thomas Nelson, 1965, pp. 16-17.
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French-Speaking colonies, by Guinea. Independence was inevitable. The majority of the 
colonies became independent in 1960.^’ An efficient system of bilateral agreements then 
became the basis of relations between France and the newly independent states. Each 
agreement was tailored to the specific needs of each African state. For example, 
agreements with Senegal, Ivory Coast, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Chad, 
Dahomey (Bénin), Niger, Mauritania and, after the coup d'état in 1963, Togo included a 
full range of diplomatic, defence, monetary, economic and technical assistance. 
Arrangements with Cameroon and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) avoided the common 
defence accords but covered all the others including military aid agreements. 
Arrangements with Mali, which at the time was seeking autonomy, included only 
economic and technical assistance.^^ In January 1959, three protocols were signed with 
Guinea for technical, financial and cultural agreements. Still, Guinea was conspicuously 
absent from the full cooperation arrangements.
Thus, although independence profoundly changed the formal nature of relations 
between France and the new African countries, the continuity of French presence and 
privileges was maintained through cooperation agreements. In this way, transition to 
political independence in French-speaking Africa was achieved without resorting to
*^A11 the Associated African States and Madagascar, except Burundi and Rwanda, 
gained political independence in 1960. These two gained their own independence on 1 
July 1962. Table showing dates of independence presented by Paul Bourdeaux, op. cit.. 
p.7.
^^Francis Terry McNamara, op. cit.. p.96 and Maurice Ligot, Les accords de 
coopération entre la France et les Etats Africains et Malgache d'expression française. 
Paris: Documentation française, mai 1964, pp.27-48. Ligot lists each of these Franco- 
African cooperation accords.
6# ^
measures that would displease the newly independent countries. The above accounts serve 
to demonstrate that France insisted on the inclusion of the CCTs in the Treaty of Rome 
out of well-considered foreign policy objectives. The proposal to give special 
consideration to French OCTs was seen as an extension of French colonial policy aimed 
at transferring part of her financial obligations to her European partners.^^ Some people 
further argue that the Eurafrican association to some extent helped to reduce tension in 
the French decolonisation process. '^*
All in all, France benefited economically and politically from the new 
arrangements in three ways. Firstly, France was actually able to shed some of her 
responsibilities by getting her EEC partners to contribute towards the European 
Development Fund (EDF) which was set aside for the finance of projects in the OCTs. 
Apart from projects in the newly independent African countries, those in French overseas 
departments such as Martinique and Guadeloupe were also eligible for EDF finance. 
Secondly, since French companies were already implanted in the OCTs, they walked off 
with some of the best contracts funded by the EDF. Finally, from the perspective of the 
African countries, due to French proposals and persistent supjjort for these arrangements, 
France came to be viewed as the champion of their cause among developed countries. 
These discussions have shown that French-speaking African diplomacy during this period 
was not pro-active: it was essentially dormant and relied on France to initiate policies on 
behalf of the emerging entities.
^ J^osé Manuel Sobrino Heredia, op.cit. p.95. 
^Paul Bourdeaux, o p . cit.. p.7.
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2.1.2 The Treaty of Rome and the Yaoundé Conventions
At the Messina Conference in June 1955 where the six members of the ECSC laid 
down the foundation for a future European Community and at the Venice Conference in 
May 1956, the French delegation suggested that the future Community should establish 
an association with the overseas territories. This position was reaffirmed in a Franco- 
Belgian report on the "Participation of the Overseas Countries and Territories in the 
European Economic Community" presented on 11 October 1956.^  ^France, as the richest 
country in colonies, was not going to sign the Treaty of Rome if there was no special 
provision for the OCTs. In the final analysis, Germany and the Netherlands along with the 
other EEC member states towed the French line. De Gaulle as President of France 
succeeded in getting his European partners to accept the proposal for an association partly 
because of the good personal relationship which existed at the time between him and 
Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany. The Chancellor met M. Guy Mollet, the President 
of the Council in February 1957^ ® and in March the Treaty of Rome, including Part IV 
on the "Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories" was signed. The association 
regime of the Treaty of Rome established the first EDF (EDF I). The association regime 
was also reciprocal, that is, the Associated countries and territories were expected to also 
provide non-discriminatory preferential trade access to all EEC member states.
During the period of operation of the Treaty of Rome, from 1957 to 1963, many 
of the OCTs were still evolving as independent states. When final independence
^^Doc. M A E. (document of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs no. 5481,1956) in José 
Manuel Sobrino Heredia, o p . cit.. p.92.
^®José Manuel Sobrino Heredia, ibid.. p.95.
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significantly changed their political status and the nature of their association with 
European nations, the OCTS re-submitted to join subsequent Conventions with the EEC. 
In this respect, the first Yaounde Convention which was signed in July 1963 can be 
considered a roll call to determine which countries were still in the association and which 
countries were out. In essence, the Yaounde Convention took stock, in a new juridical 
context, of the intervening changes in Eurafrican relations since the signing of the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957.
Association under the Treaty of Rome was imposed on the OCTs concerned but, 
under Yaounde, associated countries for the first time were able to sign up for themselves. 
For example, although included in the Treaty of Rome as Somaliland, Somalia, comprising 
former British Somaliland after 1960, re-associated with the EEC at the first Yaounde 
Convention in 1963. Similarly, following the union of French and British Trust Territories 
of Cameroon in 1961, the country rejoined Yaounde 1 which, besides, was signed in its 
capital. Furthermore, Burundi and Rwanda, members of the former Belgian colony of 
Burundi-Rwanda re-signed Yaoundé 1 after independence. However, two countries 
associated under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome - Algeria and Dutch New Guinea - did 
not sign the Yaounde Convention after independence.^^ Algeria was associated to the EEC 
in 1957 but, following the war with France, she did not join the association after 
independence in 1962.^*
^^Paul Bourdeaux, on. cit.. pp.7-8.
Algeria later signed a bilateral cooperation agreement with the EEC on 26 April 
1976: Council of the European Communities, Protocols to the EEC-Aleeria Cooperation 
Agreement and other Basic Texts. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 1990, cf. p.3.
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In all, Yaoundé I embraced eighteen of the former OCTs. It entered into force on 
1 June 1964 and instituted a five-year aid and trade package. This was the first concrete 
effort towards cooperation between sovereign European and African states. However, 
Yaounde I was in fact adapted from Part IV of the Treaty of Rome which had been 
drafted according to the wishes of the EEC, and in the absence of the African states. With 
reference to the principle of equality used in this study, it should be noted, however, that 
in December 1962 the eighteen Associated African States and Malagasy (AASM) agreed 
with the six EEC member states to continue their association on the basis of equality. 
Thus, Yaounde I was concluded between de jure equal partners, even though the Eighteen 
were still regarded as Associates.
These initiatives also laid the foundations for future ACP-EEC cooperation. Three 
parallel negotiating procedures were adopted at the Yaoundé negotiations: one on the level 
of the six EEC member states, the second on the level of the eighteen Associates, and the 
last on the level of the Twenty-four.^^ At the insistence of the Associates themselves, a 
provision was included in Article 13 of the Convention to allow them to form free trade 
areas or customs unions, and to conclude economic cooperation agreements with other 
African states.^ ® Apart from this, the new association also provided for technical and 
financial assistance through funds set aside under EDF II.
Yet, Yaoundé I had its limitations and consequently the negotiators were 
apprehensive of the future. However, these developments can be placed within the context 
of the period between the signing of the Rome Treaty (1957) and the first Yaoundé
^^aul Bourdeaux, o p . c i t . .  p p .6  and 9.
^°James Mayall, "The Implications for Africa of the Enlarged European Economic 
Community" p.290.
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Convention (1963) which also witnessed the accession of the African states to political 
independence with the attendant difficulties in state building. The newly-independent 
states were preoccupied with the consolidation of administrative and juridical institutions. 
One can then appreciate that negotiations for Yaounde I were not carried out in an entirely 
propitious atmosphere. However, Euro-African efforts in Yaoundé I certainly set the scene 
for future negotiations. Yaoundé II was signed on 29 July 1969. In many ways, it was 
similar to the first Convention.
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2.2 BRITAIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Following the independence of Ghana in 1957 and that of several other 
Commonwealth African countries in the 1960s, it was inevitable that the new states would 
try to exert some influence in Commonwealth relations, at least as an expression of their 
new-found sovereignty. The African countries promptly exercised their new influence 
against race-conscious South Africa which, in the face of imminent Ghanaian 
independence, had vowed in 1955 that if Ghana was accepted into the Commonwealth, 
she would withdraw. By 1961 the threat to withdraw from the Commonwealth as a device 
for keeping some other country out of the club was turned against South Africa herself. 
An article published by Dr. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania in The Observer (London) on 7 
March 1961, during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, created a climate 
of negative opinion against South Africa. This in turn forced South Africa which had 
hoped to re-enter the Commonwealth after becoming a Republic to withdraw her 
application rather than face almost certain refusal.^  ^ Ghana, in her turn, joined Tanzania's 
demands and declared: "It is either South Africa or Ghana - Commonwealth must
decide.
It became thus clear that, as enthusiastic members of the Commonwealth, African 
countries were going to have their say when Harold Macmillan's Government applied for 
Britain's EEC membership in July 1961. The issue was seriously raised about associating
‘^Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Unitv - Uhuru na Umoja - A Selection from Writings 
and Speeches 1952-65, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 108.
^^ Ali A. Mazrui, The Anelo-African Commonwealth - Political Friction and Cultural 
Fusion, London: Pergamon, 1967, p.33.
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Commonwealth Africa to the EEC, particularly as the Commonwealth was in many ways 
viewed as a positive organisation from the perspective of the newly independent countries. 
On the specific issue of race, the concept of the Commonwealth tended to connote an 
exact antithesis to the racialistic associations of the term European. As an objective before 
the eyes of the nationalists in pre-independent Africa, membership of the Commonwealth 
constituted more of a recognition of sovereignty than, say, a seat in the United Nations 
given the fact that the United Nations had always been multi-racial.^^
The debate over Britain's EEC membership was therefore more precisely over the 
preservation of Commonwealth principles. But there was a cloud of uncertainty over the 
exact implications of Britain's application and the effects that it would have on 
Commonwealth relations. However, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan cleared the air by 
confirming that there was no choice to be made between the Commonwealth and the 
Community. The problem, he said, was rather "how to reconcile the historic and living 
structure of the Commonwealth with the new and growing structure of Europe". 
However, it turned out that English-speaking African and Commonwealth diplomacy was 
essentially reactive: it only seemed to be responding to Britain's EEC application and to 
Eurafrican association arrangements which were threatening their traditional trading outlets 
to the Community.
” lbid, pp.60 and 74.
^^"Report of Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers", September 1962, cited in 
P. N. C. Okigbo, Africa and the Common Market. London: Longmans, 1967, p.74.
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2.2.1 Britain's initial EEC Application and Effects on African and Caribbean EEC 
Relations
On 10 October 1961, Edward Heath, the Lord Privy Seal, opened negotiations for 
Britain's entry into membership of the EEC.^  ^ The Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
meeting held in London from 10-19 September 1962^ ® provided an occasion for the 
expression of Commonwealth reactions to Britain's proposed EEC membership. Perhaps 
in anticipation of forth-coming firm comments on Britain's EEC membership from 
Commonwealth countries, Edward Heath, the chief British Common Market negotiator, 
was hard pressed to give some outlining definitions of the Commonwealth in a speech 
made to the Ministerial Council of Western European Union held in London on 10 April 
1962. The member states of the EEC were certainly not used to firm opinions from their 
ex-colonies over the organisation of the Common Market, but Mr. Heath knew only too 
well that the Commonwealth countries would insist on making their voices heard over 
Britain's potential EEC membership. He therefore reassured his colleagues on the Council;
"We shall, of course, retain our constitutional ties and the arrangements for 
consultation with the Commonwealth, which we have worked out. In my judgment 
these will be a source of strength to Europe. They will in no way prevent us from 
participating fully in the growth of a new Europe, and this in its turn will give
^^ Common Market and Commonwealth - a new survey by The Times. London: The 
Times Publishing Company Limited, October 1962, p.49.
"%id.. p. 107.
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fresh vitality to our Commonwealth connexions. The Commonwealth is a grouping 
of countries with widely differing views about the great questions which divide the 
world. In our opinion it will be particularly important that Europe should continue 
to show a sympathetic comprehension for these different attitudes towards world 
affairs."""
Britain was clearly caught between two sides (EEC and Commonwealth African 
countries) which, having essentially different opinions on economic development, had so 
far avoided direct confrontation on the specific issue of Eurafrican association. Having 
pre-empted the members of the EEC, it was now left to Edward Heath to elaborate on the 
implications of Britain's EEC bid for Commonwealth countries. Mr. Heath reaffirmed that 
association would be a suitable solution for both African and Caribbean Commonwealth 
countries. He made it clear that the British Government seriously hoped that the 
Commonwealth countries would see the advantages to themselves of association, of the 
trade concessions offered and of assistance from the development fund,"*
However, all the independent states, with the exception of Sierra Leone and 
Trinidad, were unequivocal in their rejection of the offer of association under Part XV of 
the Treaty of Rome. The ground for this rejection varied from country to country, but 
three major levels of objection were discernable in the attitudes of its Commonwealth 
African critics."^ There was, first, the objection such as Ghana's which, in its extreme
""The Times. 13 April 1962, p .ll. 
"*P. N. C. Okigbo, 00. cit.. pp.74-75.
"^These attitudes have been discussed by Mazrui, but subsequent developments in 
Euro-African relations enable us to develop the arguments further. Compare Ali A.
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form, amounted to virtually complete opposition to the idea of a united Europe. There 
was, second, an attitude of objection shown by Nigeria and the East African Community 
which conceded an African need to be linked to the prosperity of a united Europe, but not 
on the terms implied by formal associate membership. The third attitude, such as Sierra 
Leone's, suggested indifference to whether Europe united or not, and was not particularly 
enthusiastic about Africa being directly linked to a united Europe.
Nkrumah of Ghana had criticised, in the following terms, the inclusion of the 
French-speaking African states in Part IV of the Treaty of Rome and the reciprocity 
arrangement between the EEC and these countries:
"The main benefit of this is reaped not by the people of these parts of Africa, who 
cannot afford the expensive products of industrial Europe, but by European 
industry which is assured of cheap, tariff-free raw material. Furthermore, the 
arrangement prevents the building up of industry in Africa which, to survive, needs 
the protection in the early years of its growth from the unequal competition of the 
industrialized nations."^
In Nkrumah's absence at the 1962 Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting in 
London, Mr. Goka, Ghana's Minister of Finance, recalled a speech by the President the 
previous year stating that Œ ana was "decidedly and strongly opposed" to any
Mazrui, "African Attitudes to the European Economic Community" in Lawrence B. Krause 
(ed.). The Common Market: Progress and Controversv. N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964, p. 122.
'^^Kwame Nkrumah, "Positive Action in Africa", in James Duffy and Robert A. 
Manners (eds.), Africa Sneaks. London: D. Van Nostrand, 1961, pp.48-57.
79
arrangement which used the unification of western Europe as a cloak for the perpetuation 
of colonial privileges in Africa. Mr. Goka emphasised that Ghana still thought that the 
Treaty of Rome, through the device of associate membership, would prevent the complete 
political and economic emancipation of the African continent.^' Mr. Goka rejected 
association because the concept was neo-colonialist and it would deter economic and 
political emancipation of African countries:
"the European Economic Community was bound to discriminate economically 
against African countries and to perpetuate the many artificial barriers which had 
been imposed on Africa by European colonial Powers. [Ghana would therefore] 
not seek association with the Community on any terms whatever".
Nigeria challenged the legality of the Common Market's arrangements. Nigeria's 
Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, put forward a proposal for the solution of 
the trade problem, namely the dismantling of preferential areas and the placing of the 
currently preferred countries on an equal footing with other countries. Supported by Ghana 
and other tropical producers, Nigeria linked the solution of the problem of EEC selective 
preferences to free entry for tropical products into all European countries and North 
America.'’^  Sir Abubakar also rejected association on the grounds that it had not solved 
the economic problems of the Associated African countries. Besides, the EEC seemed to
^^The Times. 12 September 1962, p.8.
^^"Report of Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers", September 1962, cited in 
P. N. C. Okigbo, 00. cit.. p.75.
^^Gerard Curzon, oo. cit.. p.283.
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be opposed to the actual development of African countries by encouraging the export of 
agricultural products the volume of which was on a constant decline, and the import of 
manufactured products the prices of which were on a constant increase.
Furthermore, Nigeria's attempt to diversify her export products through 
industrialisation was met with resistance. Sir Abubakar affirmed that the problems 
confronting developing countries were of so profound a nature that the issue of association 
or non-association was relatively insignificant; the attitude of the EEC towards economic 
development was far more the issue. Sir Abubakar summed it up: "The trade policies of 
the E E C towards the developing countries are, to say the least, perplexing."^ He viewed 
with foreboding Mr. Macmillan's hope that Britain's entry would infuse ihe EEC with a 
liberal outward-looking spirit, and commented: "I cannot easily persuade myself to 
optimism on this subject, and can only pray that you succeed.
The Commonwealth East African countries (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) based 
their main argument on the possible impact on their own East African Community of both 
Britain's entry into the Common Market and the EEC association. Mr. Kawawa, the Prime 
Minister of Tanzania, speaking also on behalf of Kenya and Uganda, rejected association 
for the East African Governments in terms as strong as Ghana's. He argued that the 
political implications of association were objectionable since association involved a 
commitment to a particular bloc. However, Mr. Kawawa maintained that the East African 
Governments would value the economic opportunities that might become available in the 
Community. He was clearly thinking of the conclusion of a trade agreement since "it 
should be clearly understood that association was wholly ruled out of consideration as far
^The Times. 13 September 1962, p. 13. 
""Ibid.
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as Tanganyika [Tanzania] was concerned"/^ Mr. Kawawa added that he expected Britain 
to help them, so that their trading position was not affected:
"We have informed the British Government that we would like to have some other 
arrangements with the Common Market besides associate membership. We have 
proposed arrangements like Libya, Tunisia and Morocco have with the Common 
Market. We thought these would be quite good for us, but would not commit us 
in political implications. We don't see any reason why Britain should not secure 
such arrangements for us."^ ^
The protocol concerning Libya, Tunisia and Morocco provides that the application 
of the Treaty of Rome shall not prevent these countries from enjoying free entry for their 
goods to the European country which already offered them free entry: Morocco and 
Tunisia to France, and Libya to Italy.
Other Commonwealth African leaders based their arguments against association 
on the political and cultural virtues of the Commonwealth. Julius Nyerere, Tanzania's first 
Prime Minister, and later President when the country became a Republic on 9 December 
1962, explained his faith in the Commonwealth quite simply:
"The Commonwealth is the one association of nations in the world with which you 
can associate something positive: the good of the members themselves who have
^®"Report of Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers", September 1962, cited in 
P. N. C. Okigbo, op. cit.. p.77.
^^ The Times. 18 September 1962, p. 14.
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come together. You mention the Commonwealth and you cannot think of anything 
negative they want to do. They want to do something positive for themselves. 
They have nothing against anybody.”^ *
Nyerere was right particularly in view of the fact that comparable organisations 
such as the Franco-African Community and, indeed, the European Community had set up 
trade barriers which would in time have negative effects on the trade of non-member 
states or non-associated countries and territories. Nyerere feared that through association 
with the Common Market, the Commonwealth might begin to think in negative instead 
of positive terms. Similarly, Tanzania's Minister for Finance, Mr. Paul Bomani, said at a 
press conference at the 1962 Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting that
"the political association of the Commonwealth can best be strengthened by the 
sort of common purpose which we have at present. At present we have special 
privileges when we trade with a Commonwealth country. But once that is removed 
there would be a vacuum, and that vacuum would tend to slacken the tie-up 
between the Commonwealth countries.
Even in Ghana where criticisms of European association had been the most fierce, 
officials believed that countries which graduated from the same tutelage in the task of 
governing a modem state should be kept in touch with one another under an association 
such as the Commonwealth provided, and this was accepted as a thing of value. So also
%^id.. 7 September 1962, p. 13. 
'"Ibid.
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was the similarity in institutions by which the peoples of the member countries were 
governed. These were the ties to which Ghanaian leaders referred when they talked of 
common heritage. But the suggestion that this had any concrete political significance was 
dismissed as unrealistic. It was argued that were any significance to be attached to the 
political content of the Commonwealth association, it would be only a matter of time 
before Commonwealth membership would be swapped for membership of pan-Africa, 
Europe, or a union of neutralist republics. Ghana pointed to the intra-Commonwealth 
alignments of Natoists, neutralists, pan-Africanists, and European Common Marketeers, 
which continue to multiply within the club.^°
The disposition of the Commonwealth to accommodate change and diversity in the 
expression of sovereignty was also part of its appeal to the African countries which 
preferred Britain's free hand to France's heavy handedness and disapproval of change as 
witnessed by the treatment of Guinea when it opted for independence in 1958. Within the 
Commonwealth, there used to be a time when direct allegiance to the British Crown was 
deemed as the essential link that kept the Commonwealth together. The accession of India 
and Pakistan established that a republican form of government was not inconsistent with 
membership of the Commonwealth. There used further to be a time when the ultimate test 
of "Reciprocity in Defence" in the face of an enemy was regarded as the final proof of 
the oneness of the Commonwealth. It can no longer be seriously suggested that non- 
alignment is inconsistent with membership of the Commonwealth.^* Several 
Commonwealth countries belong to the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), and Nigeria, 
which at independence in 1960 had conceded refuelling, stopover and other rights to the
°^Common Market and Commonwealth, o p . cit.. p.87.
*^Ali A. Mazrui, The Anelo-Afncan Commonwealth, p.74.
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British in the event of war or international crisis/^ abandoned the Anglo-Nigerian Defence 
Pact following student protests in 1962.
Nor could the time have been forgotten when it was taken for granted that 
common democratic ideals constituted the essential heritage of the Commonwealth. The 
emergence of a benevolent dictatorship in Pakistan, and of authoritarianism in Ghana, had 
established that departures from parliamentary ideals were not inconsistent with 
membership of the Commonwealth. And, since 1961, it had been argued by champions 
of Britain's entry into the Common Market that even the disappearance of the 
Commonwealth Preference would not weaken the links between Britain and other 
members of the Commonwealth.”  However, criticisms of Britain's EEC application were 
persistent.
Sir Alexander Bustamante, Prime Minister of Jamaica, firmly supported the virtues 
of the Commonwealth and on that account was as critical of Britain's application to join 
the Treaty of Rome as Ghana, Nigeria and the East African countries. The Jamaican Prime 
Minister emphasised that he did not share the optimism of Mr. Macmillan that Britain 
would be able in the future to maintain its own character and institutions intact against 
the pressure of Continental institutions and thinking:
"...the Treaty of Rome is like a surgeon's knife thrust into the body of the
Commonwealth, cutting off one member from another, dividing one friend from
” James May all, "The Hopes & Fears of Independence: Africa and the World 1960- 
1990" in Douglas Rimmer (ed.), Africa 30 Years On. London; The Royal African Society 
in association with James Currey Ltd, 1991, p.23.
” Ali A. Mazrui, The Anelo-African Commonwealth, p.74.
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another. I do not see that such a treaty can be beneficial to us all. «54
But Sierra Leone and Trinidad supported the idea of Britain's membership of the 
EEC. Dr. Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad, went a step further. He expressed his 
determination to join the EEC association, irrespective of Britain's decision, on 
considerations of the beneficial impact it would have in promoting Caribbean unity. He 
firmly stated: "Whether or not Britain joins the Common Market, Trinidad will seek 
associated status."^’
But the main rub of the British offer was the contention that for some 
Commonwealth countries association would be incompatible with the Treaty of Rome 
while for others it was held fully compatible. The concept had been rejected for India, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka but held appropriate for African and Caribbean countries. 
According to Mr. Heath, the offer of association could not be made to India, Pakistan and 
Sri Lanka because these countries differed from the associated countries in their products, 
their stage of economic development and their size. The implication was clearly that the 
more industrialised a country was, the more difficult it became to accept its association 
with the Community. It was generally accepted by both Britain and the EEC that the 
economic structure and production of the Commonwealth African countries were 
comparable to those of the associated states. Europe's position on the association of these 
countries implied that
"association would not be acceptable for developing countries with powerful
"^*The Times. 13 September 1962, p. 13. 
%^ id.. 18 September 1962, p. 14.
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manufacturing industries and trade predominantly in manufactures and semi­
manufactures."^^
Besides, Mr. Heath explained that no associated state was likely to become 
sufficiently advanced industrially in the next five years to create a disruptive problem for 
the Community. He added that where, in course of time, any associated state should 
become so industrialised, the logical development would be for a bilateral trade agreement 
to be substituted for association. This argument of British officials lent strong weight to 
the criticism that association under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome might hamper the 
industrialisation of the associated countries in spite of the provisions that ostensibly 
enables them to protect an infant industry.The United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa (ECA) had, in fact, expressed a fear shared by many Africans, notwithstanding 
EEC assurances to the contrary, that
"if the associated territories were to try to diversify their economies, by increasing 
the protection of their local industry against the competition of the EEC, it is 
doubtful if the EEC countries would continue to offer the same advantages to the 
export of primary products by the associated countries.
N. C. Okigbo, op. cit.. p.72-73.
% d . .  p.77.
^*"The Impact of Western European Integration on African Trade and Development," 
U.N. Economic and Social Council Document E/CN. 14/72, 7 December 1960. Cited by 
Ali A. Mazrui, "African Attitudes to the European Economic Community", p. 126.
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The Prime Minister of Sierra Leone, Sir Milton Margai, raised the legal question 
on whether Article 238 of the Treaty was available to African countries as an alternative 
to association under Part IV of the Treaty. Mr. Heath replied that Article 238 was limited 
to association of fully developed countries such as Greece, while Part IV was concerned 
with free or preferential entry into Europe of tropical products and products resulting from 
industrialisation in tropical countries. Dr. Jagan of British Guiana asked another question 
to which Mr. Heath reiterated this argument in maintaining that Article 238 would have, 
of necessity, to cover free movements of persons between the contracting parties while 
Part rV did not explicitly provide for this though making no provision against it.*’
Furthermore, if Britain's negotiations succeeded, it was proposed that with African 
countries declining association the enlarged Community would negotiate trade agreements 
but on terms less favourable than those of association. Mr Goka raised the question 
whether countries that rejected association would have to suffer reverse preferences. To 
this Mr. Heath replied that African countries of the Commonwealth that rejected 
association would certainly face reverse preferences. Thus, Britain had accepted the 
principle that there would be discrimination between Commonwealth countries that 
accepted association and those that did not, although this was subject to such alternative 
arrangements as might prove to be negotiable.^
The above points cast some doubt on the preparedness of the EEC to achieve full 
industrialisation for the associated countries. The points further suggest that even if ACP- 
EEC cooperation develops into a proper free trade area, full integration would be excluded 
given such reluctance expressed at this early stage by the EEC to favour free movements
’^P. N. C. Okigbo, op. cit.. p.76. 
^ i d . .  pp.75-76.
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of persons which is a sure way of extending the benefits of integration to the populations 
of all the countries involved.
In the event, Britain's bid to join the EEC collapsed^  ^ in January 1963 due to a 
veto by General de Gaulle of France. This also put a temporary hold on any kind of 
eventual association for the Commonwealth developing countries. Later events, for 
example, the support given to the Nigerian-EEC Agreement, showed that other EEC 
member countries, in particular Germany and the Netherlands, were not pleased with the 
failed opportunity to bring Commonwealth developing countries into some kind of 
association with the EEC. In the meantime, EEC development cooperation remained 
essentially a Franco-Afncan affair.
Following the failure of the Britain-EEC negotiations. Commonwealth developing 
countries began to reassess their relations with the EEC. The African countries most 
critical of association, in particular Ghana and to a lesser extent Nigeria, however, 
continued to criticise association. Meanwhile, the French OCTs having become 
independent in 1960 negotiated and signed the first Yaoundé Convention which came into 
force in 1964. In 1965, Nkrumah pointed to the wider problems of neocolonialism and its 
irresponsible nature and commented on the new association grouping which he said had 
been devised to benefit a wider range of European nations:
"...the limited neo-colonialism of the French period is now being merged in the 
collective neo-colonialism of the European Common Market which enables other 
States, hitherto outside the French preserve, to profit by the system.
^'See The Economist. "The common market's backyard", 6 May 1972, p.74.
^^Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-colonialism - The Last Stage of Imperialism, p. 19.
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Britain's more liberal trade policy in her former colonies had meant that Ghana by 
1962 already had considerable amount of trade with the members of the European 
Community. But dependence on Italy, Germany, France and Britain as separate trading 
partners was quite different from a new dependence on these countries as a unified 
economic entity, collectively bargaining for the same terms from Africa. Associate 
membership would formalise this latter type of dependence.^^ Ghana, therefore, considered 
association unacceptable. Nigeria, on her part, also continued to reject association and to 
criticise the reverse preferences which the EEC demanded from the Associates as the price 
for the Community's concessions. Alhaji Shehu Shagari, at that time Nigeria's 
Commissioner for Finance, had declared that "Nigeria will definitely not associate.'"^
However, as a result of the failure of this round of negotiations to include Britain 
in the EEC and also as a result of continued EEC efforts to consolidate the Community's 
common external tariff (CET), Commonwealth African covmtries finally began to re­
examine the nature of the relations that would govern their trade, in the absence of 
Britain, with the burgeoning Community. Britain's accession would have had both positive 
and negative implications for trade between the Commonwealth African countries and the 
EEC. On the positive side, Britain's accession would have greatly improved Africa's trade 
since Commonwealth Africa's traditional exports to both Britain and the EEC member 
states would have combined to qualify for duty-free entry into the Community. Thus, 
Britain's entry into the EEC would have doubled the total volume of Nigeria's exchanges 
with the Community, increased Ghana's by 175 per cent, and the East African countries'
^^ Ali A. Mazrui, The Anelo-African Commonwealth, p.66.
'^’"The Market Game", West Africa. No. 2855, 3rd March, 1972, p.242.
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by 273 per cent.®^
But, on the negative side, if Britain had successfully acceded to the EEC, the 
alignment of the UK tariff with the Community's CET would have caused the imperial 
preference to be eroded and in due course to disappear. With the initial failure of the 
British negotiations this threat was no longer there, but, it would reappear if Britain 
renewed her bid successfully at a future date.“  Consequently, there was a pressing need 
from the perspective of the Commonwealth African countries to negotiate special 
arrangements with the Community in anticipation of such an event.
Between the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting of September 1962 where 
Commonwealth developing countries, notably Œiana, Nigeria and the member countries 
of the East African Community, had rejected association, and 1964 when many of these 
countries had reconsidered their decision and requested negotiations toward association, 
many issues had evolved to encourage a change of heart. Indeed, Britain's bid for EEC 
membership had failed. But, the Yaounde Convention had also been made public and 
signed, and it had become clear that some agreement protecting Commonwealth Africa's 
trade with the Community would be necessary.®^
Other elements had also contributed to the change of heart. One was the text of 
the Yaounde Convention itself, which helped allay political fears, particularly through its 
safeguard clauses (Yaounde, art. 13) and through its verbal encouragement of intra-African
“ p . N. C. Okigbo, OP. cit.. p.78. 
^ id .
William Zartman, The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the 
European Economic Communitv - The Weak Confront the Strong, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1971, p.78.
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economic arrangements (Yaoundé 9). Another was the end of Nigeria's isolation in Africa 
and its growing contacts with French-speaking states in the various African groups^* of 
the OAU. A third element was the absence of European constraint on the foreign policies 
of the Associates, as shown by the ostentatious radicalism of Mali and Congo-Brazzaville. 
Furthermore, the January 1963 veto of British entry into the Common Market by France 
reinforced the determination of the other five members of the EEC and the Commission 
not to have the association limited primarily to former French colonies. This desire was 
substantiated before the Dutch would agree to final ratification of the Convention.
But the most important element which later substantialised tiie desire of the five 
EEC member states to include other developing countries in the EEC association was a 
Declaration of Intent of the EEC Council of Ministers. The Declaration was issued at the 
end of a meeting held from 1-2 April 1963 and was distributed in mid-July, at the time 
of the signing of the Yaoundé Convention.^*’ The Declaration confirmed an offer made 
during Britain's negotiations that association should be open to independent 
Commonwealth countries in Africa and the Caribbean. The EEC Ministers declared that 
the Community would be ready to:
*^At the announcement of the Six Year Plan in March 1962, Nigeria's Minister of 
Finance, Chief Okotie-Eboh, stated that Nigeria attached "the greatest importance to the 
closest possible economic cooperation with other African states and particularly, initially, 
with the other West African states ": Claude S. Phillips, The Development of Nigerian 
Foreign Policy. Evanston: African Studies No. 13, Northwestern University Press, 1964,
p.116.
William Zartman, The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the 
European Economic Communitv. p.79.
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"negotiate in a sympathetic spirit agreements with any non-member countries who 
so requested and whose economic structure and production were comparable to 
those of the Associated States" 7°
Three options were open to such countries;
i) full accession to the Association Convention according to the procedure in 
Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome;
ii) some other form of association including reciprocal rights and obligations, 
notably in respect of trade (allusion to reverse preferences); or
iii) trade agreements to facilitate and develop trade between (a group of) countries 
and the Community/*
It was on the basis of these provisions that Nigeria and the East African 
Community eventually started negotiations for preferential relations with the EEC
°^EEC. Seventh General Report. 1963/64. pp.225-6. Cited in P. N. C Okigbo, o p . cit.. 
p .ll6.
Anthony Kershaw, "The developing countries in the official negotiations" in Tom 
Soper, (Rapporteur of Conference), Britain, the EEC and the Third World. London: 
Overseas Development Institute, 1971, p.26.
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2.2.2 The Nieeria-EEC Agreement and the Arusha Accord
It has been stated that the Lagos Convention was based on Article 238 of the 
Treaty of Rome which provides for association between the Community and non­
members, unlike the Yaounde Convention, which grew out of Part IV of the Treaty. 
However, the comments made by Edward Heath at the 1962 Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers meeting specifically on this subject in response to a question by Sir Milton 
Margai of Sierra Leone and Dr. Jagan of British Guiana^  ^ lead us to believe that the 
Nigeria-EEC Agreement indeed grew out of Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. The Nigerian 
negotiations were concluded in mid-1965,^  ^but French boycott prevented the Agreement 
from entering into force at the beginning of 1966 as initially planned. The entry into force 
was further delayed by the Nigerian military coup of January 1966. In all, it took two and 
a half years for Nigeria to squeeze through the negotiations.^^
Throughout the negotiations, Nigeria and France maintained less than friendly 
relations. Nigeria had broken diplomatic relations with France in early 1961 in protest 
against French atomic tests in the Sahara. But although rupture of relations was never an 
explicit obstacle, it certainly cast an ambiguous shadow over the negotiations.Again,
^Gordon L. Weil, A Foreign Policv for Europe? - The External Relations of the 
European Communitv. Bruges: College of Europe, 1970, p. 167.
^^These responses have been discussed in the previous section.
'^‘"In from the cold". The Economist. 17 July 1965, p.230.
^^"The Six and Africa - Come and join the club". The Economist 23 July 1966, p.341.
William Zartman, The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the 
European Economic Communitv. pp.82 and 92.
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Nigeria and France had had a running battle since November 1961, when Nigeria 
proposed to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) meeting the immediate 
elimination of tariffs on tropical products, a proposal which France opposed as direct 
attack on Association/^ Furthermore, France stood against Nigeria which at the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) meeting in Geneva in 1964^ * 
had taken a strong stance against reciprocal tariff arrangements such as the EEC 
Association and yet was seeking to benefit from an arrangement with the EEC. Nigeria 
had openly challenged the legality of the Yaounde Convention's preferential arrangements 
when compared with GATT rules. Finally, as the Dutch and the Germans reacted to the 
1963 veto of British membership with a determination to push the open nature of the 
Association, so did France in turn respond with proud resolution not to acquiesce 
automatically in the Dutch and German campaign for their overseas candidate.^®
In the Nigerian negotiations, the EEC asked for reverse preferences, or reciprocity, 
such as was offered by the Yaounde Associates. This was difficult for Nigeria which had 
consistently supported the argument within UNCTAD and other international organisations 
against the extension of concessions from developing to developed countries. Article 1 of 
the GATT establishes the most favoured nation (MFN) principle, i.e., non-discrimination, 
as the basic rule of international commerce. But non-reciprocity was also established under 
Chapter 3 of the GATT as the principle governing participation by developing countries
’^Gerard Curzon, op. cit.. pp.238 and 283.
^*Marc Williams, Third World Cooperation: the Group of 77 in UNCTAD. London: 
Pinters, p.43.
William Zartman, The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the 
European Economic Communitv. p.83.
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in trade negotiations with industrial states.*® However, the EEC agreement with the 
Associates had been justified under Article 24 of the GATT, which allows for exceptions 
to the MFN rule in cases of custom unions and free trade areas. While non-Associates 
accepted the desirability of a contractual agreement, they wished to reject Article 24 as 
a proper guide to relations between developed and underdeveloped countries.*' As non- 
Associate, Nigeria defended this line of argument in the major international fora.
Nigeria had stated that she stood against the extension of preferential systems and 
did not propose to negotiate for preferences in the Community.*^ She had stated that her 
purpose in negotiating with the Community was merely
"to seek an equally competitive position with her major competitors for whom a 
preferential zone had been created only in 1958, thus endangering her position in 
her traditional markets in Europe."*^
The argument is understandable against the consideration that the EEC market 
represented an ever-increasing outlet for Nigeria's exports over a quarter of which, in 
1964, were going to the six EEC member countries compared to 14 per cent ten years
*®James May all, "The Implications for Africa of the Enlarged European Economic 
Community", p.303.
*'lbid.. p.304.
*^ P. N. C. Okigbo, OP. cit.. p. 118.
*"lbid.
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earlier.*'* Furthermore, the distribution of Nigeria's foreign trade was such that between 
I960 and 1964 her exports to the Commonwealth had fallen from 50 to 42 per cent while 
her exports to the EEC had risen from 31 to 41 per cent.*  ^Nigeria finally made a gesture 
on reverse preferences by dropping customs, but not revenue, duties on twenty-six items 
from the EEC which were of little importance to her trade and of almost total indifference 
to her trading partners outside the EEC The twenty-six items together accounted for 9 per 
cent of Community exports to Nigeria,*® and only 4 per cent of Nigeria's total imports and 
represented no more than a symbolic preference.*^ Thus, English-speaking African 
diplomacy during this period was essentially reactive: it only responded to Britain's EEC 
application and to Eurafrican association arrangements which were threatening their 
traditional trading outlets to the Commimity.
The Nigerian Agreement was much more limited than the Yaoimdé Convention. 
Firstly, while the EEC gave imlimited free entry to exports from the Associated coimtries, 
it imposed duty-free quotas on Nigeria's four most important exports: cocoa, groundnut, 
plywood and palm products. However, it was expected that this would be no great 
hardship to Nigeria as she had argued that the Agreement was negotiated primarily to 
secure existing outlets to the Community.** Secondly, the Nigeria-EEC Agreement created
*'*"Nigeria as Associate", review of P. N. C. Okigbo, Africa and the Common Market 
(London: Longmans, 1967) in The Economist. 23 September 1967, p. 1102.
*^ P. N. C. Okigbo, OP. cit.. p.81.
*®Gordon L. Weil, op. cit.. pp. 167-168.
*^ "In from the cold". The Economist. 17 July 1965, p.233, and "The Six and Africa - 
Come and join the club". The Economist. 23 July 1966, p.341.
88»The Six and Africa - Come and join the club". The Economist. 23 July 1966, p.34L
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an obligation for both sides not to impose new quantitative restrictions, raise customs 
duties or impose new ones, except under defined conditions. But, there was no obligation 
to harmonise the customs tariff. Each side was free to determine and to implement its own 
external tariff against third countries.*  ^ Thus, although the Nigeria-EEC Agreement 
corresponded to a free trade area^ similar to that created by the Yaoundé Convention, it 
was different from the Yaounde association where the terms of the free trade area between 
an Associated state and a given EEC member country could be modified by an existing 
or future concessionary arrangement agreed between the Associate and another EEC 
country. In essence, the Nigeria-EEC Agreement gave some freedom of manoeuvre in the 
development of trade links with third countries.
Thirdly, there was a major difference between the presence in the Yaounde 
Convention of institutions such as the joint ministerial Association Council and 
parliamentary assembly both established for the administration of cooperation, and the 
absence of such institutions in the Nigeria-EEC Agreement. Nigeria tried to keep the 
institutional links to the barest minimum to safeguard her independence. As one of the 
biggest of the newly-independent African states, Nigeria was determined to assert her 
political independence from Europe. Finally, the Yaoundé Convention and the Nigeria- 
EEC Agreement were also different in that the six EEC member states provided financial 
aid worth $730 million to the eighteen Associated countries while Nigeria neither asked 
for nor received any financial assistance from the EEC/' Thus, Nigeria avoided not only
N. C Okigbo, OP. cit.. p. 131. 
wibid.
91IIThe Six and Africa - Come and join the club". The Economist. 23 July 1966, p.341.
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the close political ties envisaged in the Yaoundé Convention but also the European 
programme of multilateral development finance/^
The Nigeria-EEC Agreement, however, did not come into force due to the outbreak 
of the Biafran civil war®^  and the ensuing deterioration of relations between Nigeria and 
France/^ However, the principle of the Agreement provided a basis for the future structure 
of Africa’s international economic relations. Post-independence trade relations between 
Africa and the rest of the world had been polarised into two blocs. The first bloc 
comprised Britain and the Commonwealth (for the English-speaking African countries) 
while the second bloc comprised France and the EEC (for the French-speaking African 
countries). The conclusion of the Nigerian Agreement represented a bridge between these 
two trading blocs.^  ^As a point of African solidarity, the Yaoundé Associates had backed 
the Nigerian Agreement even though the Associates would have been facing Nigerian 
competition in selling their tropical produce to the EEC market.^ Thus, although never 
ratified, the Nigerian Agreement certainly marked a bridge across the long-standing
N. C. Okigbo, OP. cit.. p. 158.
” Carol Cosgrove Twitchett, A Framework for Development: The EEC and the ACP.
p.8.
^^Nigeria accused France and South Africa (among other countries) of supporting 
Biafra during the war, to the frustration of Frenchmen in Lagos who exclaimed: "Dans le 
même sac que l'Afrique du Sud..! Zut alors!": "Sheep, goats and Frenchmen", The 
Economist. 31 January 1970, p.30.
^^ P. N. C. Okigbo, op. cit.. p. 132.
^"In from the cold". The Economist. 17 July 1965, p.233 and "The Six and Africa -
Come and join the club". The Economist. 23 July 1966, p.341.
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division between English- and French-speaking Africa/^
The Nigeria-EEC Agreement also set a precedent in Commonwealth African 
relations with the EEC. But, by going through with the agreement, Nigeria delivered a 
blow to the Nkrumahist doctrine that association with the common market is nothing but 
a neo-colonialist plot.^* From a group theory perspective, we have already noted that the 
attitude of one or several members of a group is modified as a result of an association or 
dissociation of other members.^ We can now consider Nigeria and the members of the 
East African Community as belonging to a similar group, that is, the group of Associable 
Commonwealth developing countries. We can then note that despite the strong initial 
criticisms of the EEC association by the Commonwealth African countries, Nigeria's 
decision to negotiate an agreement with the EEC encouraged the Commonwealth East 
African countries to conclude their own accord with the Community since the Nigerian 
effort had taken the weight out of the argument against association.
Indeed, the Commonwealth East African countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda) 
negotiated an accord with the EEC which was signed in Arusha, Tanzania, on 24 
September 1969. The Arusha Accord came into effect at the beginning of 1971 and 
established reciprocal trade preferences between the six EEC member countries and the 
three East African states but on a more limited scale than the Yaoundé Convention.
^"Nigeria as Associate", review of P. N. C Okigbo, Africa and the Common Market. 
in The Economist. 23 September 1967, p. 1102.
^®"The Six and Africa - Come and join the club". The Economist. 23 July 1966, p.341.
” See Theoretical Considerations section of this study and Randy Y. Hirokawa and 
Marshall Scott Poole (eds ). Communication and Group Decision-Making. London: Sage, 
1986, p. 17.
100
Firstly, in order to protect the interests of the Yaounde Associates, free entry was 
restricted by quota in the case of three products which competed with the exports of the 
Yaounde countries, that is, coffee, canned pineapple and cloves. Secondly, the three East 
African countries offered reverse preferences to the EEC but this was also limited, 
covering only one-sixth of EEC exports.*®® Finally, unlike the Yaoundé Convention, there 
was no provision for aid in the Arusha Accord.*®* A proposal by the East African 
countries to include aid in the Arusha Accord was abandoned when it threatened to 
jeopardise the negotiations.*®^
With regard to British Commonwealth relations, the Nigeria-EEC Agreement 
marked the first gesture of a Commonwealth country instituting a preference against 
Britain.*®^  However, actual discrimination against Britain was avoided due to the failure 
of the Agreement to enter into force. The Commonwealth East African countries similarly 
instituted a preference against Britain in the Arusha Accord. When the Accord came into 
effect, these events created an anomalous situation in the Commonwealth preference 
system in that the Commonwealth East African countries became associated to the EEC 
and granted preferences to the six original EEC member states and against the UK.*®^  The
*®®Mordechai E. Kreinin, "European Integration and the Developing Countries" in Bela 
Balassa, (ed.), European Economic Integration. Oxford: North-Holland, 1975, p.332.
*®*Joanna G. Moss, "The Yaoundé Convention, 1964-1975", Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
University Microfilms International, 1978, p. 143.
*®^ "The common market's backyard". The Economist. 6 May 1972, p.74.
*®^"In from the cold". The Economist. 17 July 1965, p.233.
*®^ Tom Soper, (Rapporteur of Conference), Britain, the EEC and the Third World. 
London: Overseas Development Institute, 1971, p.l4.
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preferences against Britain were probably not significant since the Arusha Accord was 
replaced a few years later by the ACP-EEC Lomé Convention.
On the whole, the relations which evolved in the 1960s among France, the 
Associates and the EEC on the one hand, and among Britain, the Commonwealth African 
countries and the EEC on the other, provided a basis for Eurafrican development 
cooperation. These relations also contributed to the strengthening of African negotiating 
positions and ACP diplomacy when different African, Caribbean and Pacific groups later 
came together to negotiate the first Lomé Convention with the EEC in the early 1970s. 
However, common ACP negotiation during the Lomé negotiations was not without 
difficulties.
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CHAPTER THREE:
DIFFERENCES AND COMMONALITY OF INTERESTS 
BETWEEN THE ACP COUNTRIES AND THE EEC
This chapter analyses the differences and commonality of interests among ACP 
countries on the one hand, and between them and the EEC on the other. ACP differences 
are examined through individual country, sub-regional or regional conceptions on 
ideological issues including self-determination, sovereignty, independence, association, 
partnership and economic development The nature of intra-ACP discord or agreement is 
considered in terms of issues involved in the first Lomé negotiations between 1972-1975. 
The origins of the divergences are traced to events which took place during the 1960s 
such as the various African conceptions on Eurafrican relations, the 1963 EEC Council 
of Ministers Declaration of Intent which categorised developing countries for the purpose 
of association with the Community into Associables and non-Associables. These origins 
are also traced to the inter-African divisions which emerged after the adoption of the OAU 
Charter in 1963. The discussion of these issues show African diplomacy at its early 
dynamic phase.
In spite of the enormous differences which exist between them, the EEC and the 
ACP countries have also been keen to continue their relationship. This chapter finally 
examines the attractions of cooperation for both the ACP countries and the EEC member 
states to show that both sides are equally motivated to promote partnership. This 
consideration is relevant to the aim in this study to place emphasis on both ACP and EEC 
factors in the analysis of the benefits of cooperation.
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3.1 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ACP COUNTRIES AND THE EEC
This section examines the differences between the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries which appeared in the early days of association between the EEC and Associated 
African States and Malagasy (AASM). There were considerable divergences of ideological 
opinions between the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries prior to the signing of the 
Lomé Convention, especially during the period 1963-1973. These divergences emerged 
once again during the early stages of the Lomé I negotiations. This section also examines 
differences between African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and the EEC which can most 
readily be found in social and economic indicators.
3.1.1 Differences between ACP Countries
As with most other groups of states, differences exist among the ACP countries.* 
However, contemporary inter-African differences with regard to relations with Europe can 
be traced to the 1963 EEC Council of Ministers Declaration of Intent. Other differences 
can be traced indirectly to different African colonial experiences and different political 
ideologies or economic priorities adopted by African and Caribbean leaders after 
independence. Further differences between African, Caribbean and Pacific countries range 
from geographical and climatic factors to their trading products and partners.
^Differences exist even among the EEC member states. And Williams has also 
demonstrated inter-state differences within the Group of 77: Marc Williams, Third World 
Cooperation: the Group of 77 in UNCTAD. London: Pinters, 1991.
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3 1.1.1 Conceptions of Eurafrican colonial relations and the 1963 EEC Council of 
Ministers Declaration of Intent
The effect of colonisation on Africa has been extensively explored. Gupta has 
convincingly demonstrated that colonisation adversely affected trade between two 
neighbouring African states where they happened to be under the rule of different 
metropolitan powers, and that colonisation obstructed the formation of natural markets, 
even within the framework of colonial divisions.^ Onimode has also argued that contact 
with Europe through slavery and colonisation is the root cause of Africa's 
underdevelopment. He pushes the argument to its extreme by drawing extraneous links 
to the internal causes of Africa's underdevelopment.^ The debate is interesting, however, 
it falls outside the scope of this study both in terms of time and approach. This study is 
based on the contemporary era (1957-1990) and looks to the future on the principle of 
Africa's ability to control her own destiny. In particular, the present section looks at inter- 
African differences through African post-independence ideologies.
Divergences among African post-independence leaders can be related to their 
different experiences under French, British and Belgian colonial administrations. The 
French colonial policy of assimilation focused on the ambitious strategy of making 
Frenchmen out of Africans. The British colonial system of indirect rule relied on limited
^Vijay Gupta, "The ECOWAS and West European Colonial Heritage" in K. B. Lall 
and H. S. Chopra (eds.) The EEC and the Third World. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: 
Humanities Press, 1981, pp.312-314.
^Bade Onimode, A Future for Africa - Bevond the politics of adjustment. London: 
Earthscan Publications Ltd, in association with the Institute for African Alternatives, 1992, 
in particular pp.8-12.
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contact between the British and a few African leaders who took orders and then passed 
them on to the local population. However, the Belgian colonial system, in the Congo, was 
quite similar to the racist policy in apartheid South Africa in that the Belgians controlled 
colonial affairs while avoiding direct contact with the local population. These different 
colonial systems had varying degrees of influence on the attitudes of post-independence 
African leaders. But, it must be said to the credit of Africa's post-independence diplomacy 
that these leaders, although often having directly opposing views, avoided direct 
confrontation over the interpretation of Eurafrican colonial relations, perhaps in the hope 
of realising an eventual African Unity which they all sought after - each one in his own 
peculiar way. The early stages in dynamic African diplomacy can already be discerned. 
And the African leaders did not spare a chance to express their individual views.
The French colonial policy of assimilation was largely based on France's mission 
civilisatrice (civilising mission) dedicated to the spreading of the French language and 
culture around the world. French colonisation was accompanied with teachings on the 
common destiny of all French-speaking peoples. In French colonies, school children 
recited passages which suggested that the Gaulois were their ancestors. Such 
assimilationist ideas later met with firm réfutai in the 1950s and 1960s even from French- 
speaking Negro-African writers such as Mongo Béti and Cheikh Hamidou Kane.^
^On the one hand. Mongo Béti, in Le Pauvre Christ de Bomba (Paris: Robert Laffont, 
1956), presents a missionary father from France who becomes exasperated with 
recalcitrant Africans whose souls he was dedicated to bringing to God. He subsequently 
abandons his mission when he is overwhelmed by "pagan" African practices such as 
dancing and polygamy, and returns to France.
On the other hand. Cheikh Hamidou Kane, in L'A venture Ambiguë (Paris: René 
Julliard, 1962), presents an African protagonist who embarks on the "ambiguous
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However, the cultural and economic presence of France in Africa was so pervasive that 
French-speaking African countries clearly showed a better understanding of the virtues of 
colonisation than did their English-speaking counterparts.
Firstly, as colonies of France, the French-speaking countries supported the efforts 
of France to associate them to the EEC through special provisions in Part IV of the Treaty 
of Rome. Leopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal, as deputy for French West Africa in the 
French National Assembly and member of the drafting committee of the European 
Community treaty, had said: "We are for the European Community and, by that it [is], for 
the Eurafrican Community."^ Secondly, with the exception of Guinea, the French-speaking 
countries all voted in favour of participation in the Franco-African Community in the 1958 
French referendum which also marked the beginning of the Fifth Republic. And thirdly, 
after independence, the French-speaking African countries signed the Yaoundé convention 
of association with the EEC in 1963.
Differences persisted throughout the 1960s between French- and English-speaking 
African countries. Senghor's lecture at Oxford in October 1961 provided an occasion to 
ponder on the Negritude philosophy and colonial rule, and by that, underlined the points 
of departure with the ideologies of Sékou Touré of Guinea as well as those of English- 
speaking African leaders, in particular. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Within the context
adventure" of studying in France as a means of assimilating European values. He tries to 
reconcile himself to the differences between African and European cultures but the futility 
of his efforts is symbolised by the abandonment of his studies and return to Africa.
^Personal translation from the French: ”Nous sommes pour la Communauté 
européenne et, par de la elle, pour la Communauté eurcfricaine”: Carol Ann Cosgrove, 
"The European Economic Community and the African Associates", Thesis, University of 
London, 1976, pp.29 and 33.
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of the Civilization o f the Universal, S onghor saw positive contributions in both British and 
French colonial rule:
"The policies of the former tended to reinforce the traditional native civilization. 
As for France's policy, although we have often reviled it in the past, it too ended 
with a credit balance, through forcing us actively to assimilate European 
civilization. This fertilized our sense of Negritude."^
Of course, certain aspects of colonisation were bad, and in drawing up the first 
Senegalese Four-Year Plan based on "African Socialism", Senghor and his advisers had 
to choose between the various aspects of colonial rule, the sum total of which showed that 
colonisation was a positive experience:
"... we had to eliminate the flaws of colonial rule while preserving its positive 
contributions, such as the economic and technical infra-structure and the teaching 
of the French language; inspite of everything the balance sheet of colonization is 
positive rather than negative."^
Senghor also maintained a conciliatory tone on the specific question of EEC 
association:
^Leopold Sédar Senghor, "Negritude and African Socialism" in Kenneth Kirkwood 
(ed.), African Affairs. Number Two, St Antony's Papers, Number 15, London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1963, p.l3.
"Ibid.. pp.18-19.
108
"I do not seek to deny, in this process of decolonization, the disinterested action 
of noble minds, of intellectuals, of teachers, of philosophers, spurred on by a high 
ideal of brotherhood. These men and women have saved Europe's honour, and 
made possible the co-operation between Africa and Europe which exists today."*
Guinea broke with the Franco-African Community, and the EEC, in 1958. 
President Sékou Touré regarded the Association Agreements as a form of collective neo­
colonialism, reinforcing the indirect control which France continued, in his view, to 
exercise in her former territories.^ Given Guinea's rejection of the Franco-African 
Community, it comes as no surprise that Sékou Touré's views on French colonisation 
differed from Senghor's. On the crucial questions of French assimilation and economic 
development, Touré argued that colonisation had distorted Africa's development:
"It is evident that if we impose upon a certain society structures which are 
incompatible with that society's conditions..., we not only distort the man of this 
society but we constrain him, we enslave him, we interrupt the development and 
fulfilment of his faculties in peace and harmony. This is the path of assimilation. 
We have categorically and definitely rejected this path."*®
*Ibid.. p. 17.
^James May all, "The Implications for Africa of the Enlarged European Economic 
Community" in Timothy M. Shaw and Kenneth A. Heard (eds.). The Politics of Africa: 
Dependence and Development. New York: Africana - Holmes & Meier, 1979, p.288.
*®Sékou Touré, "Africa's Destiny" in James Duffy and Robert A. Manners (eds), 
Africa Sneaks. London: D. Van Nostrand, 1961, p.41.
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Relishing in his freedom outside the Franco-African Community, Touré affirmed: 
"...Guinea prefers liberty in poverty to opulence in slavery..."”
As for the British indirect rule system, it had the advantage of leaving the culture 
of the Africans relatively intact. Leaving intact the culture of the English-speaking African 
implied the preservation of self-pride. In effect, while French-speaking African leaders 
such as Senghor were singing the praise of colonisation and justifying association with the 
EEC under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome, Kwame Nkrumah, along with other African 
leaders such as Sékou Touré, showed less appreciation for European colonisation, and 
were critical of association. Indeed, Nkrumah was concerned by the continued influence 
of Western powers in Africa after independence. In the same year that Senghor gave his 
lecture at Oxford, Nkrumah addressed the Ghanaian National Assembly and declared that 
the Treaty of Berlin of 1885 had found a successor in the Treaty of Rome:
"the former treaty established the undisputed sway of colonialism in Africa; the 
latter marks the advent of neo-colonialism in Africa... [and] bears unquestionably 
the marks of French neo-colonialism.'”^
In fact, Nkrumah considered Western activities in Africa after independence as 
"neo-colonialism", one of the consequences of which, in the context of the East-West
" Ibid.. p.44.
‘^ Nkrumah's address to Ghana National Assembly, May 30, 1961 in AH A. Mazrui, 
The Anslo-African Commonwealth - Political Friction and Cultural Fusion, London: 
Pergamon, 1967, p.72.
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conflict, would be the waging of wars by the super powers on the territory of others, 
usually small states which were under neo-colonial control. Nkrumah argued that African 
Unity was the only way to destroy neo-colonialism and thereby bring an end to 
imperialism in Africa. He affirmed: "...if Africa was united, no major power bloc would 
attempt to subdue it by limited war."'^
But, in contrast to both the British and French colonial systems, Belgium adopted 
a colonial system assorted with a veritable apartheid policy. In the Congo, Blacks were 
not allowed into European quarters without a pass and they were forbidden to enter into 
bars or restaurants reserved for Whites.*  ^Furthermore, punishment by whipping was not 
only administered on the local population, but also on elders and the sacred person of the 
customary Chief. This colonial practice inflicted shame on the tribe, and provoked a 
hatred which promised to turn to revenge in the future.’^  But, revenge was not far-fetched. 
On the occasion of independence on 30 June 1960 in the presence of King Baudouin of 
Belgium, one of Congo’s independence leaders, Joseph Kasa-Vubu expressed appreciation 
for the benefits of 80 years of colonisation. However, Patrice Lumumba, another 
independence leader, chose this unlikely occasion to castigate Belgium in the following 
terms to the utter astonishment of the Belgian delegation:
"No Congolese worthy of that name can ever forget that it is by struggle that
independence has been won, a continuous, ardent, and idealistic struggle in which
'^Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-colonialism - The Last Stage of Imperialism. London: 
Thomas Nelson, 1965, p.xi. See also p.259.
’^ Euloge Boissonnade, Le Mal Zaïrois. Paris: Editions Hermé, 1990, p.36.
'"Ibid.. pp.36-37.
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we spared neither our strength, our privations nor our blood. A noble and just 
struggle, inevitable to end the humiliating slavery which was imposed upon us by 
force... We have known mockery, insults, blows which we had to suffer morning, 
noon and night because we were niggers. Who will forget that to a Black person 
one used [the familiar] tu, not, certainly, as to a friend, but because the polite vous 
was reserved for only Whites."’^  (Suspension mine)
These sharply contrasting opinions on the merits of European colonisation and 
differences of conception about the nature of Eurafrican relations, while pointing to a 
certain dynamism in African diplomacy, also mitigated against joint African negotiations 
with the EEC during the first part of the 1960s. And, to a certain extent, these differences 
were also later reflected in African positions at the early stages of the first Lomé 
negotiations.
However, specific differences between developing countries with regard to EEC 
relations appeared in 1963. In April of that year, the EEC Council of Ministers adopted
’^ Personal translation from the French: ”Nul Congolais digne de ce nom ne pourra 
oublier que c'est par la lutte que l'indépendance a été conquise, une lutte de tous les jours, 
ardente et idéaliste, dans laquelle nous n'avons ménagé ni nos forces, ni nos privations, 
ni notre sang. Une lutte noble et juste, indispensable pour mettre fin  à l'humiliant 
esclavage qui nous était imposé parla force... Nous avons connu les ironies, les insultes, 
les coups que nous devions subir matin, midi et soir, parce que nous étions des nègres. 
Qui oubliera qu'à un Noir on disait "tu", non certes comme à un ami, mais parce que le 
"vous" honorable était réservé aux seuls Blancs.” Cited by Euloge Boissonnade, ibid.. 
p.47.
Compare Patrice Lumumba, "The Independence of Congo" in James Duffy and 
Robert A. Manners (eds ), on. cit.. pp.90-93.
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a Declaration of Intent concerning developing countries other than those which were 
signatories to the first Yaoundé Convention. The Declaration was aimed at countries with 
economic structures similar to those of the Yaoundé Convention countries. It was an 
invitation to these non-associated countries to enter into negotiations for special relations 
with the EEC. The Declaration offered three options for association to the eligible 
developing countries: i) full accession to the Association Convention; ii) some form of 
association including reverse preferences; or iii) trade agreements between a group of 
countries and the Community. The three options were later repeated in Protocol 22 of the 
Act of Accession when Denmark, the Republic of Ireland, Norway and Britain signed the 
EEC treaty in 1972.
In effect, the Declaration invited developing countries to associate with the EEC 
but on different terms. In other words, the EEC offer categorised the future ACP countries 
into "associables" and "non-associables". Furthermore, the EEC offer was formulated in 
such a way that only the third option was open to Commonwealth countries in Asia (India, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka). This implied a permanent separation between these and other 
Commonwealth developing countries with regard to EEC relations. It appears that the 
Declaration of Intent of 1963, and later Protocol 22 of the Act of Accession, were 
designed to ensure that Britain came into the EEC association with as few of her large and 
varied household of Commonwealth countries as possible.
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3.1.1.2 Differences in Post-Indeoendence African Ideologies
Examples of a unified coalition among the French-speaking African states in their 
relations with European nations, as indicated by the almost total acceptance of the Franco- 
African Community and Part IV of the Treaty of Rome, contrasted sharply with lack of 
consensus in their relations with other African countries In essence, despite their 
relatively unified relations with France and the EEC, differences persisted in inter-African 
relations. Indeed, the French-speaking African countries were able to present a common 
front only with respect to issues bordering on relations with France and the EEC 
Ideological differences emerged as a reflection of the political ideology and economic 
priorities of various African post-independence leaders. These differences can be situated 
on two levels: first, there was the desire for influence and, therefore, rivalry among 
French-speaking countries and, second, there were differences in the conception of 
political and economic issues between French- and English-speaking countries. Rival 
African blocs, to borrow Mayall’s apt phrase, "provided fertile soil for ideological 
dispute."*^
Although differences between the two linguistic groups were profound, great 
difficulties were also encountered in the presentation of a common French-speaking 
African front, especially during the period of the Yaoundé Conventions, due to different 
ideologies even within the Franco-African Community. In fact, differences in political 
ideology explain why "radical" French-speaking African countries such as Guinea, and 
Algeria in the North, were never associated under the Yaounde Convention. During
James May all, "The Implications for Africa of the Enlarged European Economic 
Community", p.287.
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colonisation and in the early days after independence, privileged relations with 
metropolitan France had been maintained by the French-speaking countries at the expense 
of good-African-neighbour relations. In most cases, rivalry and jealousy among 
Francophone leaders emerged as a direct outcome of participation in Afrique francophone.
In February 1965, the Presidents of thirteen ex-French Republics met at 
Nouakschott, the capital of Mauritania, and as a gesture to Pan-African solidarity after the 
creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, agreed to end the political 
life of their own group, but revived it as Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache 
(OCAM).** However, OCAM was plagued with divisions and schisms among its own 
members on the one hand and between the group and the more radical African states on 
the other. Disunity in OCAM reflected the differences between its "hard-core" members 
- members of the Conseil de l'Entente led by Félix Houphouêt-Boigny of Côte dlvoire and 
linking Niger, Volta (Burkina Faso), and Dahomey (Bénin) - and its other members. Even 
among these core members. Bénin left the fold for two years as a result of a quarrel with 
Niger, and on 6 July 1965 Mauritania, a founding member, decided to leave the 
organisation following the offer of membership to Moïse Tshombe of Congo 
(Leopoldville) - an offer which provoked strong reactions from both within and without 
the OCAM ranks.
Tshombe was disliked because, while Patrice Lumumba of Congo and other 
African leaders held pan-African views on economic development, Tshombe's rebel regime 
obtained assistance from Union Minière du Haute Katanga, a European multinational 
corporation, and tried to secede within a few weeks of Congo's independence. Lumumba's 
efforts to crush the secession became a symbol of African unity and resistance to neo­
**"Ex-French Africa: changing patterns". The Economist. 17 July 1965, p.233.
115
colonisation.'^ Lumumba's death in mysterious circumstances made him a martyr of Pan- 
Africanism and deepened the hatred for Tshombe. To make matters worse for Tshombe, 
Ben Bella's spokesmen bluntly told him that he was not welcome to the forth-coming, all- 
important Afro-Asian conference at Algiers in June 1965.^ ® Nkrumah who was foremost 
in the Pan-African movement later suggested that Moïse Tshombe and Joseph Kasa-vubu 
of Congo (Leopoldville) were American agents, a strong accusation in Nkrumahist anti­
imperialist terms, by describing them as supporters of Moral Re-Armament (MRA) an 
organisation founded in 1938 by the American, Frank Buchman.^'
Wider differences in the OCAM membership were demonstrated by the fact that 
the last-minute postponement of the Algiers conference in June 1965 averted a bigger split 
in its ranks. Its members attached widely differing importance to the conference with the 
result that some of them had accepted invitation to Algiers, others had rejected it and 
some would have only sent observers.^^ The inability of the French-speaking African 
countries to present a common front in these developing countries fora contrasted with 
their enthusiasm for cooperation with metropolitan France and the EEC. These ideological 
differences were reflected in squabbles, on a wider scale, between post-independence 
African leaders. The EEC did not discourage internal cooperation between the African 
countries, yet, there was little or no contact between members of the AASM and those of
Olisanwuche Esedebe, Pan-Africanism - The Idea and Movement 1776-1963, 
Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1982, p.210.
^°"Ex-French Africa: changing patterns". The Economist. 17 July 1965, p.233.
^'Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-colonialism - The Last Staee of Imperialism, p.248.
“ "Ex-French Africa: changing patterns". The Economist. 17 July 1965, p.233.
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the East African Community which were operating or negotiating forms of association 
with the EEC in Brussels during the late 1960s.
Indeed, one of the major stumbling blocks against total participation in association 
with the EEC and against united African positions in the run-up to the first Lomé 
negotiations was colonial legacies, which was sometimes reflected in different post­
independence ideologies in French- and English-speaking countries. One ACP diplomat 
has, however, stated that the so-called differences between the French- and English- 
speaking Africans was a "non-issue"^^. What initially seemed like differences soon 
dissipated once the two linguistic groups came to work closely together: it became clear 
that both groups had more characteristics in common (for example, smallness in the size 
of their territories and local markets, and the need for economic development) than there 
were differences between them.^^
While this claim of unity may have been relevant in the mid-1970s, the events 
which occurred in inter-African relations during the 1960s point to strong differences. Yet, 
these post-independence differences were clearly not based on simple linguistics, but were 
based on political ideology resulting, for example, in the division of African countries into 
the Casablanca and Monrovia groupings during the OAU negotiations.^^ And this explains 
in part why total African cooperation with the EEC was not achieved in the 1960s. The
^^Faux-problème.
^^Interview with M. A. N. Barry, Chef des Relations Publiques, Presses, Information 
et Protocol, ACP Secretariat, 28 January 1992.
^^Ghana and Nigeria, both English-speaking countries, belonged to the separate 
Casablanca and Monrovia groupings respectively. See "West African Reshuffle?" in The 
Times. 12 September 1962, p.9.
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separation between the French- and English-speaking countries was further deepened by 
the stance taken by France which although having agreed with her EEC partners to extend 
association to developing countries other than the Yaounde Associates had worked 
relentlessly to preserve the privileges of association for these Associates/^
Britain's relations with her former colonies after independence had continued to 
underline the desire to respect the autonomy of the newly independent states. For example, 
practices which tended to recall European colonial presence in Africa such as the CFA 
franc zone and limited trading partnership in the independent French-speaking countries 
were progressively abandoned in the Commonwealth African countries. African 
Commonwealth leaders were pleased with the level of autonomy thus given and, from a 
group diplomatic perspective, were wary of down-grading the common decision if joint 
participation with the EEC was accepted with the French-speaking Associates. The 
Nkrumah school of African thinking held the view that the African in the Commonwealth 
had greater sovereign dignity than the African in the Franco-African Community and that 
an amalgamation of the two groups was likely to pull down the Commonwealth African 
to the level of dependence of the French-speaking African rather than pull up even, say, 
the relatively advanced Côte d'Ivoire to the level of self-assertion open to Ghana.
In fact, Nkrumah and Houphouêt-Boigny had put up a wager against each other
^®The French indicated their willingness to let Commonwealth Africa join the EEC 
association but were unwilling to let the Caribbean because they did not want the whole 
regional set-up to be swallowed into a scheme of tariff preferences for the underdeveloped 
countries at large: The Economist. 16 May 1970, p.36.
^^ Ali A. Mazrui, "African Attitudes to the European Economic Community" in 
Lawrence B. Krause (ed.). The Common Market: Progress and Controversv. N.J.: Prentice 
Hall, 1964, p. 131 and Ali A. Mazrui, The Anglo-African Commonwealth, pp.65-66.
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on the success of competing Ghanaian and Ivorian approaches to development. In the area 
of economic development, Ghana had adopted the policy of structural transformation 
which emphasises reduction of dependence on the outside world and encourages state 
participation in the economy. Côte d’Ivoire, on the other hand, had adopted the policy of 
gradualism which emphasises outward-looking growth and gives a smaller role to the state 
in the development process.Nkrumah went on a state visit to Abidjan in April 1957, 
shortly after Ghana’s independence. On that occasion, his host Houphouët offered him a 
bet in which he said:
’’The dies are cast.
Let now God, Providence and the work of men determine the future of each of our 
experiments.
The better will influence incontestably and definitively Africans in their ceaseless 
struggle for the human and social emancipation of Africa.” ’^
In the 1960s, the schisms and suspicions which had existed among African leaders.
^*For a full discussion of these strategies, see Elliot J. Berg, "Structural 
Transformation versus Gradualism: Recent Economic Development in Ghana and the Ivory 
Coast" in Philip Foster and Aristide R. Zolberg (eds.), Ghana and the Ivorv Coast: 
Perspectives on Modernisation. Chicago: The Universitj^ of Chicago Press, 1971, pp. 187- 
230.
^^ Abidian-Matin. 8 April 1957 in I. Wallerstein, The Road to Independence: Ghana 
and the Ivorv Coast. Paris: Mouton & Co, 1964, pp.33 and 78. See also Immanuel 
Wallerstein, "Introduction" in Philip Foster and Aristide R. Zolberg (eds ), o p . cit.. p.3 and 
Elliot J. Berg, op. cit.. p. 187.
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in particular those between the Monrovia, Casablanca and Entente groups in the 1963 
OAU negotiations, once again emerged. And, by 1965 the chimera of political unity 
achieved by the OAU had receded farther than in 1962.^ ® In an attempt on the life of 
President Diori Hamani of Niger - a core member of OCAM - on 13 April 1965, the 
would-be assassin was branded a Ghana-trained terrorist by members of OCAM. The 
accusation heightened tension between these countries and Ghana more so as OCAM had 
embarked on an open counter-offensive against their more radical neighbours, in particular 
Ghana. Nkrumah promptly denounced the OCAM as promoting American imperialism in 
Africa by calling its members: "the American group of states in Africa."^'
Such was the level of divisions among African leaders in the 1960s. Strictly 
speaking, there was more a political than an economic or even a linguistic dimension to 
inter-African differences in the 1960s. Although differences were sometimes based on 
competing ideologies on economic development as witnessed by the challenge between 
Nkrumah and Houphouët, there were hardly any real conflicting economic interests. After 
all, the French-speaking Associates had lent their support to the ill-fated Nigeria-EEC 
Agreement in spite of the fact that favourable access for Nigerian produce into the EEC 
market could potentially have had trade diversion effects on their own exports to the 
Community. Inter-African differences underline attitudinal cleavages between the African 
countries. Attitudinal cleavages refer to different ideology and analysis of the political 
economy of trade and development. The presence of these cleavages explain the lack of 
full dynamism in African diplomacy during the 1960s to early 1970s.
With specific regard to the Yaoundé Convention, these rivalries further separated
°^P. N. C. Okigbo, Africa and the Common Market. London: Longmans, 1967, p. 163.
"Ex-French Africa: changing patterns". The Economist. 17 July 1965, p.233.
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the EEC Associates from the non-Associates. Incidentally, the core radical states were not 
Associates. However, the wide gap between the African leaders were soon to be bridged. 
Amidst name-calling and while "violent personal insults" continued to resound between 
the leaders, Houphouôt-Boigny and his old rival Senghor deployed a lot of energetic 
diplomacy to draw together the OCAM states. At the end. President Modibo Keita of Mali 
had a series of cordial meetings with Houphouêt-Boigny, Sekou Touré, his friend of 
yesterday, as well as the Presidents of Niger and Volta (Burkina Faso). Senghor, having 
successfully kept out of the war of words, also used his slightly detached position to 
conciliate Cameroon and other African states.
With the conciliation of their differences, African post-independence leaders now 
focused on relations with the developed world in the same manner as did other third world 
statesmen whose careers were devoted to reversing European colonial intervention, once 
independence had been achieved. These leaders worked to achieve these objectives in the 
area of economic relations through "attempts to derive an ethic of redistributive justice 
from the institutions of the Western international economy."”  It became imperative for 
the African leaders to find specific ways of achieving these objectives. Having agreed on 
the substance, differences however persisted between the EEC Associates and the 
Commonwealth non-Associates on how to advance towards these goals.
32Ibid.
” James Mayall, "International Society and International Theory" in Michael Donelan 
(ed.). The Reason of States - A Study in International Political Theory, London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1978, p.l35.
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3.1.1.3 Ideological and Socio-Economic Differences between African. Caribbean and 
Pacific Countries
Differences between African and Caribbean countries are based on political 
ideology, trading products and trading partners. Ideological differences of the type which 
have been demonstrated between Caribbean and Latin American conceptions on mass 
participation in the political process and decolonisation can also be demonstrated between 
African and Caribbean independence leaders.^  ^For Caribbean statesmen, the question of 
decolonisation involved the fundamental principle of self-determination and implied the 
right of the majority of the population to decide upon it. Decolonisation in the Caribbean 
did not seek radically different relations with Europe but implied a measure of political 
constancy. In this regard, it has been argued that the Caribbean élite to whom political 
power was bequeathed after independence remained faithful, for the most part, to the 
British Westminster model. The Caribbean political horizon was lifted only piecemeal as 
the programme for political change was carefully crafted to focus upon the Westminster- 
Whitehall model.^^
^Tor most Latin American statesmen, decolonisation was a question of freedom with 
regard to foreign domination, and a decision could be taken on this without consultation 
with the mass population. This approach contrasted with the Caribbean practice of 
consulting the people; Val T. McComie, "The Commonwealth Caribbean States and the 
Organization of American States" in Anthony T Bryan (ed.). The Organization of 
American States and the Commonwealth Caribbean Trinidad: University of the West 
Indies, Institute of International Relations, 1986, p.44.
^^Paul Sutton, "Constancy, change and accommodation: the distinct tradition of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean" in James Mayall and Anthony Payne (eds.). The fallacies of 
hone - The post-colonial record of the Commonwealth Third World. Manchester:
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Thus, from the perspective of the Caribbean leaders, their African counterparts 
wanted political autonomy at all costs and gave preference to particular post-independence 
policies, considering this to be desirable for the entire population. The local people were 
generally not consulted nor was public opinion considered. For instance, under Nkrumah 
the Ghanaian Foreign Ministry firmly established a policy of non-association with the 
European Community without conducting a study of association. It was only under the 
pressure of criticisms from the Associated states in various African meetings that 
Nkrumah agreed to the preparation of a study to enable the Foreign Ministry to answer 
the critics.^^
These differences in approach to political and ideological issues were later 
reflected in ACP group relations as the Caribbean, Indian and Pacific Ocean states feared 
too-predominant African interests and were wary of any sign that the Lomé link might 
foster a resurrection of the "Eurafrica” concept at the expense of ACP solidarity.^^ There 
were significant differences between these groups of countries which mitigated against 
coherent united policy stands. Indeed, they seemed to only really come together within the 
framework of relations with the EEC.^*
The African, Caribbean and Pacific countries also differ from one another in
Manchester University Press, 1991, pp. 107-108.
William Zartman, The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the 
European Economic Communitv - The Weak Confront the Strong, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1971, p.21, at footnote no. 15.
^^Carol Cosgrove Twitchett, A Framework for Development: The EEC and the ACP. 
London: Allen and Unwin, 1981, p. 10.
''Ibid.
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population and size, ranging from Tuvalu with a population of 8 000 and a land mass of 
26 km  ^ to Nigeria with a population of nearly 90 million and a land mass of 932 768 
km^/^ Geographically, the ACP countries are spread across three continents, with 46 
countries in Africa, 15 in the Caribbean, and 8 in the Pacific. The African member 
countries represent 97 per cent of the ACP population. Africa, therefore, remains the 
centre of gravity of the EEC's Lomé policy."*®
There are also differences in the trade of the ACP countries. Some ACP countries 
depend on petrol (Nigeria, Angola, Trinidad and Tobago), others depend on silver 
(Bahamas) while a majority of the remaining ACP countries focus their economic 
development on the export of primary products such as sugar, bananas, coffee, tea, cocoa, 
groundnuts, minerals. However, these countries all have a high level of dependence on 
earnings from export products.”** There are further differences between the African and the 
Caribbean countries in that a relatively low proportion of the working population of the 
Caribbean countries is engaged in agriculture and their economies are rather more 
diversified than those of the other ACP states."*^  Other differences between ACP countries 
can be found in per capita GNP which in 1987 varied from US$ 80 per year in Chad to
Appendix 3 gives population size and land mass of the ACP countries.
"*®Jean-Pierre Lutgen, Le Centre pour le Développement Industriel: radioscopie et 
évaluation dans le cadre des Conventions de Lomé. Bruxelles: Bureau d'informations 
Européennes S.P.R.L, 1991, p. 18.
**Ibid.
"*^ Carol Cosgrove Twitchett, A Framework for Development: The EEC and the ACP.
p. 10.
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US$ 7 138 in Trinidad and Tobago."
Further differences have also appeared between ACP countries in the realm of 
trade as the Caribbean members have generally been much less dependent on the EEC as 
a trading partner than other ACP states/^ The Caribbean states have access to favourable 
conditions in the large US market. Consequently, they were not keen on ACP-EEC 
commitments if these would compromise their links with North America.^^ Indeed, the 
Caribbean countries participate in concessionary arrangements such as the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI) and CARIBCAN. The CBI was instituted by the United States, within the 
context of the cold war, to stifle communism in the Caribbean sub-region, while 
CARIBCAN is an economic aid package provided by Canada for the Commonwealth 
Caribbean Community. However, the attenuation of superpower conflict has been reflected 
in the diminution of the importance of these arrangements. ACP-EEC cooperation has not 
been primarily based on the cold war conflict and the diminution of the scope of the 
North American-Caribbean arrangements has further underlined the need for closer 
cooperation between the Caribbean and African countries within the ACP group.
The foregoing considerations of the differences between the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries indicate that the old French- and English-speaking divide, while still 
important, is relatively much less significant than it was at the beginning of post­
independence inter-African relations. The main distinction now is between those ACP
^^Mary Sutton, "Le Groupe ACP - Informations Générales", Supplément de Lomé 
Briefing. N°8 Avril 1989.
"^Carol Cosgrove Twitchett, A Framework for Development: The EEC and the ACP. 
p.lO.
"% i d .
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countries which remain desperately poor and those which seem to be on the path to 
economic modernisation.^
3.1.2 Differences between ACP Countries and the EEC
Between the ACP and the EEC countries, there are also enormous differences. This 
fact is best underlined by socio-economic indicators. As a group, the average per capita 
GNP of the ACP countries in 1987 was about US$ 964 compared to US$ 7 994 for the 
EEC while life expectancy on the average is 56 years in the ACP countries and about 75 
years in the EEC. Again, the ratio of doctors to inhabitants is 1 to 13 000 in the ACP 
countries and 1 to 500 in the EEC; the rate of infant mortality from birth to 1 year is 8 
per cent in the ACP and less than 1 per cent in the EEC; but, on the other hand, 
population growth rate is 2.6 per cent in the ACP countries (4 per cent in Kenya and Côte 
d'Ivoire) while the rate is zero in the EEC/^
Equal development is not a stated aim of ACP-EEC cooperation yet the above 
figures indicate that the ACP countries are in a crisis situation when compared to their 
EEC partners. It therefore follows that efforts made towards sustained economic 
development and well-being of the populations of the ACP countries "through the 
satisfaction of their basic needs", as stated in the Lomé Conventions,'** have so far not 
been achieved.
'*^ Ibid.
'’^ Mary Sutton, on. cit.
*^Art. 4, Lome HI; and repeated in Art. 4, Lomé IV.
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3.2 COMMONALITY OF INTERESTS BETWEEN ACP COUNTRIES AND THE EEC
Despite the differences between the ACP countries and the EEC, there are several 
areas in which the interests of two sides coincide, at least in principle. We shall discuss 
the attractions of cooperation for both sides in order to emphasise both ACP and EEC 
factors in the Lomé partnership.
3.2.1 Attractions of Cooperation for ACP Countries
Despite the differences outlined in the previous sections, members of the ACP 
share some experiences and problems which encourage cooperation towards achieving 
common objectives. The focus of the ACP countries is on economic development, but 
their geographical conditions constitute an obstacle to development. A large number of 
ACP states in Africa are land-locked while many of those in the Caribbean and the Pacific 
are island states. Some sub-Sahara African states are affected by desert encroachment 
while island states in the Caribbean and the Pacific are often devastated by hurricanes and 
similar natural disasters. All these are problems which demand close cooperation and 
coordination of efforts among the affected countries.
Similarly, several ACP states in particular those belonging to the category of less 
developed countries are heavily indebted and suffer the effect of the world economic crisis 
since this has caused a reduction in earnings from the export of raw materials. Also, 
smallness in the size of the local market adversely affects many ACP states. As ACP 
states identify with some of these disadvantageous situations, they come together in the 
hope of finding some remedy through special relations with the EEC.
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Although divided by their colonial heritages, the Yaoundé Associates and the 
Commonwealth developing countries were, however, all confronted with the challenge of 
economic development/^ In effect, the diversity and peculiarity of their situations and 
problems constitute a constant challenge to the ACP countries. Meetings and discussions 
on these problems among the ACP countries and between the ACP and the EEC can be 
considered a useful means of confronting the problems and of forming consensus on these 
issues of common concern.
3.2.2 Attractions of Cooperation for the EEC
There are both economic and political considerations for the continuation of EEC 
development cooperation policy with the ACP countries. On the economic side, the EEC 
depends on Africa for the procurement of its raw materials; up to 65 per cent of its 
uranium needs. The EEC depends far more heavily on primary products for its 
development (75 per cent against 25 per cent for the United States and less than 10 per 
cent for the [former] USSR). The period of colonial pillage having passed, cooperation 
with developing countries becomes imperative for the EEC, all of the ACP countries being 
well endowed with primary commodities.^®
The EEC also imports several products (rubber, copper, coffee, etc.) which
'‘^ Carol Cosgrove Twitchett, A Framework for Development: The EEC and the ACP.
p.8.
^®Gérard Fuchs, "La Convention de Lomé et la coopération industrielle" in Revue 
d'Economie Industrielle - n°27, 1" trimestre 1984, p. 142.
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constitute a base for economic activity and for everyday European life/^ Again, for the 
Community the Lomé Convention was a logical extension of the Yaounde Association. 
This extension was necessary to take account of the Community's enlargement in 1973, 
and in particular Britain's numerous Commonwealth connections.^^ Trade in manufactured 
products between the EEC and developing countries is largely positive to the benefit of 
the EEC. In 1982, trade with all developing countries was worth ECU 69.8 billion of 
which 11.6 billion was with the ACP countries alone. The EEC is inclined to accept 
cooperation with the ACP countries because, as one liberal French opinion maintains, it 
can be deduced from the trade figures that, on the whole, EEC industrial exchanges with 
the developing countries create far more jobs in the Community than they cause to 
disappear.^^
On the political side, several non-EEC countries have continued to establish special 
association with the Community. One British Conservative criticism of development 
cooperation, however, contends that the West ought to be firm in resisting the economic 
demands of the developing countries, and Western donor countries should avoid making 
promises they cannot keep. For example, the donors accepted the aid target of 0.7 per cent 
of GNP recommended by the World Bank's Pearson Committee in 1969. But, by the end 
of 1976, the UK, for example, had not progressed beyond 0.38 per cent and Germany had
^^La Communauté Européenne et le Tiers-monde. Le Dossier de l'Europe n°15. 
Commission des Communautés Européennes, Bruxelles, octobre 87, p.4. Cited in Jean- 
Pierre Lutgen, 00. cit.. p. 16.
^^Hugh Reay, The European Communitv and the Develooine World: A Conservative 
View. London: European Conservative Group, February 1979, p.2.
^^Gérard Fuchs, oo. cit. p. 142.
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declined from its 1974 level of 0.37 per cent to 0.31 per cent.^ "* In fact, recent figures 
indicate that UK aid is down to 0.32 per cent of GNP,^’ despite the goodwill of the EEC 
which is apparent from declarations by relevant Community institutions. For example, 
within the context of Lomé II, the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly stressed that the 
industrialised countries, including EEC member states, should attain as soon as possible 
the objective of allocating 0.7 per cent of their GNP to development aid and to raise this 
to 1 per cent as quickly as possible.^^
In fact, on the conservative idea of refusing aid to developing countries, there was 
never a coherent suggestion by any of the six original EEC member states that the 
Common Market should simply ignore the demands of the developing countries. Indeed, 
the EEC does not ignore these requests because of the effect of such a negative reaction 
on bilateral relations between EEC member states and the country concerned. Furthermore, 
the EEC appears to favour cooperation with other countries because of the need to 
propagate the myth that the Community is outward-looking in order to avoid criticism of 
internal policy decisions.^^
'^’Hugh Reay, op. cit.. p. 13.
^^Lord Judd of Portsea, "Global Governance: A Cry for Action", Discussion Paner 2. 
London School of Economics: Centre for the Study of Global Governance, January 1993, 
p.9.
^^Document 1-522/80, PE 66.715/fin., European Parliament Working Documents 1980- 
81,30 October 1980, Report on the outcome of the proceedings of the ACP-EEC Joint 
Committee and Consultative Assembly, Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on 
Development and Cooperation, Rapporteur: Mr. V. Sable, p. 14.
^^Gordon L. Weil, A Foreign Policy for Europe? - The External Relations of the 
European Communitv. Bruges: College of Europe, 1970, p.35.
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Global EEC aid to the ACP countries only represents 10 per cent of the total 
public aid which they receive (but 51 per cent if Community aid is added to that of 
individual EEC member states)/^ A European Parliament report on Community aid in 
1981 proudly stated that the Community in that year provided 35,6 per cent of all 
development aid against 4.4 per cent for the USSR, 9 per cent for Japan, 19.6 per cent for 
the Organisation of Petrol Exporting Countries (OPEC), 20 per cent for the United States, 
and 11.0 per cent for other categories of donors.Com bined EEC aid figures look 
impressive and make good sense of joint Community development aid policy. 
Furthermore, against the background of both the history of Europe and the success of the 
Community, the EEC feels a moral responsibility to establish itself as a peace-loving 
organisation and to contribute towards the development of other parts of the world. This 
fact was emphasised when the European Parliament moved a motion stressing that the 
Community was established in the wake of two terrible World Wars which were European 
in their origins. The motion also stresses the need for the Community to continue
"to make a creative contribution to world peace... and that, as a regional 
community, it is particularly well qualified - and has a special responsibility - to 
strengthen inter-regional cooperation and thereby contribute to reducing tensions...
^*Hubert Ferraton, "De Lomé I à Lomé El: la coopération CEE-ACP en mutation", in 
Obiectif Europe. Nos 26-27, Décembre 1984, p.9.
^^ocument 1-605/83/E, PE 85.143/fin./II, European Communities, European 
Parliament Working Papers 1983-1984, Report on the context of the future ACP-EEC 
convention to follow Lomé H, Part U: Sub-reports by the individual rapporteurs and 
opinions of the committees asked for an opinion, 12 August 1983, Rapporteur: Mr. U. 
Irmer, p.95.
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to improve North-South co( peration." (Suspensions mine)
In the early 1970s, the EEC and ACP countries moved towards cooperation partly 
due to hopes, in the South, that this shift would finally open the door to a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO). It was hoped that the NEED would allow 
developing countries to negotiate the terms of international trade with the developed 
countries as equals, though, in the event, not all the expectations were fulfilled.®* Also, 
the need for development cooperation for the ACP countries was aptly demonstrated at 
the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the early 1970s. The conflict had led to 
massive oil prices and members of the OPEC had put billions of dollars into Western 
banks. With the notable exception of Nigeria, most potential ACP countries saw the 
prospects of the investment of petro-dollars in their economies by the West.
From their own perspective. Western governments were also keen on regulating 
the markets for other primary commodities in order to prevent the development of cartels 
likely to cause uncertainties similar to those produced on the oil market.®  ^The need for 
economic convergence and monetary union also became apparent in the EEC in the early
®®Document A 2-203/86, PE 109.430/fin., European Parliament Working Documents 
1986-87, Series A, 12 January 1987, Rapporteur: Mrs. K. Focke, p.5.
®*Marie Bittlestone, The EC and the Third World: the Lomé Agreement. The 
Polytechnic of North London: European Dossier Series No.4, 2nd ed., 1989, p. 10.
®^ Tom Glasser, "EEC-ACP cooperation: the historical perspective" in The Courier, no. 
120, March-April 1990, p.25.
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1970s when the United States suspended the convertibility of the US dollar.®^  That period 
coincided with the beginning of world wide monetary instability, aggravated by the oil 
crisis discussed above as well as the oil crisis of 1979. These events underlined the need 
for the Community to cooperate with developing countries.
The principle of Community development policy having thus been firmly 
established, it was up to the ACP countries to overcome their own divisions and 
differences in order to negotiate a favourable arrangement with the Community.
®^ Pascal Fontaine, Europe in Ten Lessons. Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 1992, p.6.
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CHAPTER FOUR;
AGP COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND 
IMPACT ON THE FIRST ACP-EEC NEGOTIATIONS
This chapter examines the coordination of African, Caribbean and Pacific positions 
and the negotiating strategy adopted before and up to the signing of the Lomé I 
Convention. During the first Lome negotiations analyzed in this chapter, the ACP had not 
been constituted as a group. This chapter therefore also examines the processes which led 
to the establishment of the ACP group in 1975. This chapter witnesses the second phase 
in the development of ACP diplomacy which shows dynamic ACP diplomacy at its zenith.
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4.1 INITIAL DIFFICULTIES IN ACP COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE 
DYNAMICS OF INFLUENCE
The "Great Debate" on the principle of Britain's entry into the EEC ended with a 
Parliamentary vote in October 1971 and the signing of the treaty of accession in January 
1972.* The treaty, or Act of Accession, entered into force in 1973. Protocol 22 of the Act 
of Accession concerned relations between the EEC and the Associates as well as non- 
Associated Commonwealth developing countries, and it renewed the three options offered 
by the 1963 EEC Council of Ministers Declaration of Intent. Annex VI of the Act of 
Accession lists twenty Commonwealth countries which could benefit from the provisions 
of the Protocol. There were thirteen of these eligible countries in Africa; four in the 
Caribbean; and three in the Pacific Ocean.^
The position of Britain in 1972 with regard to EEC relations and Commonwealth 
developing countries was quite similar to that which she had maintained in her initial EEC 
negotiations in 1961-1962. Britain wanted as many Commonwealth countries as possible 
to accept, if not welcome, her accession to membership of the Community and she sought
'Peter Tulloch, "Developing Countries and the Enlargement of the EEC" in Bruce 
Dinwiddy (ed.l Aid Performance and Development Policies of Western Countries - Studies 
in US, UK, E E C., and Dutch Programs, London: Praeger in association with the 
Overseas Development Institute, 1973, p.88.
^These were, in Africa: Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia; in the 
Caribbean: Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago; and in the Pacific: Fiji, 
Tonga and Western Somoa: Journal Officiel des Communautés européennes. Edition 
spéciale, 15e aimée n°L73, 27 Mars 1972, p. 137.
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for them as good trading terms as possible from the six original EEC member states. In 
the event, only Uganda, of all the British Commonwealth countries, opposed British 
membership.^ But, despite the similarities which have been discussed in the previous 
chapter, differences persisted between the Yaounde Associates and the non-Associates 
over the presentation of a common negotiating strategy in the negotiations with the EEC. 
However, the bigger African countries used their influence to coordinate the different ACP 
positions.
4.1.1 Reverse Preferences: Bone of Contention between African Associates and Non- 
Associates
Each associable country was asked to choose from the three options for 
association, and to respond to the Community by January 1973 with a statement of the 
option it had chosen so that negotiations with the EEC could start in August 1973.  ^The 
eighteen Yaounde Associates initially responded by choosing the first option to which, of 
course, they were already party.^ The Eighteen reiterated that given their economic 
relations with Europe and the benefits received under association, they chose to base their 
development programmes on cooperation with the EEC rather than seek economic success
^Hugh Reay, The European Communitv and the Developing World: A Conservative 
View. London: European Conservative Group, February 1979, pp.2-3.
"'EEC and Africa", West Africa. No. 2922, 11th June 1973, p.782.
^"Line-up for chaos". The Economist. 24 February 1973, p.55 and Joanna G. Moss 
"The Yaounde Convention, 1964-1975", Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms 
International, 1978, p. 149.
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through the United Nations development system or in UNCTAD where they had little 
influence.^ The Associates were also concerned about the possible loss of their privileged 
position and erosion of the trade preferences which they had under the Yaounde 
Convention. Their concern was justified since competing African countries did not make 
inroads into Community market under the Yaounde arrangements.^
The EEC's proposal for a system of reverse preferences, or reciprocity, applied in 
the Yaounde Convention was a bone of contention between the French- and English- 
speaking countries. The reciprocity system meant that the Yaoundé signatories accorded 
preferential treatment to the EEC countries in exchange for the preferences which they 
received. The French-speaking African countries argued that this clause should be 
maintained on considerations of political equality. In fact, the requirement of granting the 
EEC reverse preferences was accepted by the Yaounde leadership as a form of payment 
for EDF aid. Not granting the European reverse preferences would amount to asking for 
a "handout".* Senghor told the EEC Commission that reverse preferences provided the 
moral basis for association and that
"the Associates willingness to offer Europe something in return for what they get 
from the Community is all that keeps them from being beggars at the EEC's 
door"*
^"Yaounde and the new EEC", Africa Confidential. Vol 13, No 5, 3 March 1972, p.4. 
’Joanna G. Moss, on. cit.. p. 149.
*Ibid.. p. 150.
*"Adieu, Yaounde", The Economist 31 March 1973, p.52.
137
The non-Associated English-speaking countries, on the other hand, felt that given 
the inequality of the partners it was not conceivable for reasons of international morality 
to maintain the principle of reciprocity. The differences of opinions between the 
Associates and the non-Associates were persistent and time was running out for the future 
Associates to respond to the EEC offer.
4.1.2 Maioritv Influence: Role of Bigger ACP Countries
The concept of influence as an essential feature of collective action can be applied 
to group diplomacy. Two contrasting categories of influence situation have been identified. 
In the first, the source of influence is a majority and in the second, the source of influence 
is a minority.'® When the ACP countries first came together at the Lomé I negotiations, 
the Commonwealth African countries, in particular, Nigeria and the members of the East 
African Community (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) exerted a great deal of majority 
influence over the Associated French-speaking countries. Relatively developed economic 
base, relative trade independence from the six original EEC member states and bigger size 
of the internal market as a result of larger populations were factors which provided the 
basis of majority influence for the Commonwealth countries
The Commonwealth African countries criticised Yaounde-type arrangement as 
having been designed to induce them to accept conditions which they regarded as
'®Serge Moscovici, Gabriel Mugny and Eddy Van Avermaet, Perspectives on minoritv 
influence. London: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p.3.
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inconsistent with their economic underdevelopment and political independence. “ And they 
were unequivocal in their opposition to the principle of association with the EEC. Indeed, 
there were major disagreements between the Associates and the Commonwealth countries. 
In the realm of aid, the Commonwealth countries took exception to the policy of linking 
aid from the EDF with what they saw as the political condition of acceptance of the 
Yaounde model. They also rejected the requirement under Article 22 of the Yaoundé 
Convention to inform the Commission of their development programmes and to 
communicate later amendments. These requirements they felt were an infringement on the 
Associates' political sovereignty.
The Commonwealth countries further claimed that the Yaoundé provisions 
regarding the right of establishment and the movement of capital imposed too much 
external restrictions on the Associates. The institutions of the Association - Ministerial 
Council, Official Committee, Parliamentary Conference and the Court of Arbitration - 
were seen as political conditions the effect of which, given the disparity of economic and 
political power between the Community and the Associates, was to reduce the Associates' 
independence. Ironically, these institutional structures were created precisely to satisfy 
Associate demands that their sovereignty, equality and independence should be respected.*^
Nigeria, by far the largest African country both in terms of the size of her 
population and economy, took up the role of directing Commonwealth positions in the
"John Finder, "The Community and the Developing Countries: Associates and 
Outsiders" in Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. XU, No.l, September 1973, p.53 
in Joanna G. Moss, o p . cit.. p. 151.
James May all, "The Implications for Africa of the Enlarged European Economic 
Community" in Timothy M. Shaw and Kenneth A. Heard (eds.). The Politics of Africa: 
Dependence and Development. New York: Africana - Holmes & Meier, 1979, p.291.
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Lomé negotiations. Firstly, NigeriL rejected the terms of the EEC offer for herself. When 
the Associable countries came together, Nigeria made it known that the first two options 
of Protocol 22 (full association and partial association) would be rejected saying that any 
form of association which did not put them on an equal footing with Europe was 
unacceptable.*^ Nigeria moved and succeeded in letting Europe know that this was the 
stance of Commonwealth Africa in general.
Furthermore, Nigeria moved to cancel a meeting of the Associable Commonwealth 
countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific which had been scheduled to take place 
at the close of an ECA-sponsored meeting at Accra in February 1973. She also persuaded 
the other Commonwealth countries to steer clear of discussing the issue of association 
among the 41 member states of the ECA. Finally, the African Commonwealth countries 
agreed to set up a special secretariat under the aegis of the East African Community to 
coordinate their negotiations with the EEC.’^  Nigeria was able to spurn association and 
thereby place herself in a position to negotiate a fair trade agreement because of the size 
of her population and vast oil reserves. In contrast, the smaller Yaoundé countries were 
in an economic position which made it difficult for them to take a tough negotiating line 
with the EEC for fear of turning off the development aid tap.*^
Not surprisingly, the Yaoundé countries disagreed with the Commonwealth 
countries and their positions on these issues. But, they had little choice but to accept the
*^"Line-up for chaos". The Economist. 24 February 1973, p.55.
*% d .
‘^ "Nigeria as Associate", review of P. N. C. Okigbo, Africa and the Common Market. 
(London: Longmans, 1967) in The Economist 23 September 1967, p. 1102.
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turn of events.*  ^ Nigeria, the strongest political force in Africa, together with the East 
African states, and the Commonwealth grouping, of which these nations made up the 
leadership, represented twenty countries, outnumbering the Yaounde Eighteen. The 
Yaounde Eighteen were further outnumbered by their populations. Although some 
associated countries had large populations, such as Congo (Kinshasa) with 16 million 
people* ,^ the eighteen Associates were outnumbered by combined populations. The 
Commonwealth countries eligible for the EEC offers had a combined population of over 
100 million inhabitants, compared with 70 million for the Associated states.’* Furthermore, 
conservative estimates of the cancelled Nigerian population census of 1973 put the 
country's population at around 75 million people’^  thus making her population alone 
greater than that of all the eighteen Associates combined.
Nigeria was thus a force to be reckoned with in the Lomé negotiations both by the 
ACP and EEC negotiators. From an economic perspective, having oil and other natural 
resources and a substantial economic base, Nigeria had no real need for association. 
Nigeria had been in a strong enough political and economic position vis-à-vis Europe not 
to ratify the Lagos Agreement long after the Biafran civil war was over.^° It is generally 
believed that Nigeria did not stand to gain significantly from association. She rather lent
’^ Joanna G. Moss, o p . cit.. p. 154.
’^ Alassane D. Ouattara, "Trade Effects of the Association of African Countries with 
the Common Market", DPhil thesis. University of Pennsylvania: 1972, p.8.
’*"The common market's backyard". The Economist. 6 May 1972, p.74.
’^ "Sheikhs of black Africa", The Economist. 2 August 1975, p.70.
“^Joanna G. Moss, op. cit.. p. 154.
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her political weight to the negotiations to help the other, less prosperous third world 
countries to get a better deal. '^ However, a Nigerian diplomat in Brussels insists that the 
period 1972-75 was a missed opportunity for Nigerian diplomacy and argues that Nigeria 
should have used the influence she had during the first Lomé negotiations to achieve long­
term economic concessions in ACP-EEC relations/^
Be that as it may, Nigeria played other important and prominent roles in uniting 
the positions of the Associates and the Commonwealth African countries. From a group 
diplomatic perspective, it can be argued that Nigeria offered "side payments"^^ to the 
Associates in return for a change of stance in the negotiations in support of the 
Commonwealth African position. It has been shown that diplomacy of this kind is not 
impossible.^^ The Nigerian Government had indeed hinted that it would be prepared to 
accept some responsibility for dealing with the special problems of the weaker African 
states. This assurance may have allayed the fears of those Associates which had shown 
reservations about joint negotiations for fear that big countries such as Nigeria would 
cause the benefits of the aid which they received from the EEC to diminish. General
"'Ibid.. p.155.
""Mr. O. G. Nnaji, Head of Chancery, Nigerian Embassy, Brussels, in a personal 
interview, 12 May 1993.
"^See Theoretical Considerations section of this study for a discussion of the concept 
of side payments.
"^Gaddafi claimed in an interview to have brought about change of policy against 
Israel in several African countries: The Times. London, 25 Oct. 1973. Cited by James 
Mayall, "The Implications for Africa of the Enlarged European Economic Community", 
p.295.
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Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria had promised: "We shall be the last to call on our brothers to 
commit economic suicide in the face of unknown realities"^^
In the event, Nigeria did not ask to benefit from financial assistance from the EDF 
under the first Lomé Convention. Furthermore, it was General Gowon's letter to the EEC, 
written in his capacity as OAU Chairman, which was decisive in persuading the 
Community to accept a negotiation with the OAU, a formula which made it possible for 
Ethiopia, Liberia, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Sudan to participate in the 
negotiations.^® Guinea also participated. Thus, these countries joined the other African 
states although they were neither Yaounde signatories nor Commonwealth member 
countries.^^ Ethiopia and Liberia were non-colonial countries while Guinea had left the 
Franco-African Community in 1958. The Commonwealth members which had expressed 
fears of neo-colonialism noted the presence of countries which never had colonial ties 
with Europe and this weakened the fear of neo colonialism.^^
Yet, the Commonwealth African countries, all in all, refused the three options of 
Protocol 22 and instead began organising among themselves, to push for a new type of 
economic pact.^  ^Nigeria and the East African Community hastily called Commonwealth 
African Trade Ministers meeting in Lagos on 11 February 1973 and decided not to discuss
^^West Africa. 16 July 1973. Cited by James Mayall, ibid.. at footnote 27, p.314. 
®^West Africa. 10 February 1975, p.l51.
^^Carol Cosgrove Twitchett, A Framework for Development: The EEC and the ACP. 
London: Allen and Unwin, 1981, pp. 8-9.
^*Ellen Frey-Wouters, The European Communitv and the Third World: the Lomé 
Convention and its Impact. New York: Praeger, 1980, p.27.
^^Joanna G. Moss, o p . cit.. p. 153.
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Africa-EEC relations at the ECA-organised meeting at Accra. While consensus had not 
been reached between the Associates and the Associables, this decision was taken 
presumably to avoid further divisions over thorny issues such as reverse preferences. 
Nigeria took the initiative and suggested (and gained support from other African 
Commonwealth states) the establishment of a separate secretariat specially devoted to the 
issue of discussing African strategy vis-à-vis Europe.
4.1.3 Merits of joint negotiations between Associates and Non-Associates
Two factors had triggered off the growth of networks of preferential trading 
agreements in the 1960s and early 1970s. Firstly, the preferences which already existed 
between some European countries, notably France, and their former colonies were 
inherited by the EEC. Secondly, the sheer impact of the Common Market on world trade 
put pressure on some of the EEC's trading partners to try to get inside the EEC's common 
external tariff (CET). But, for the Associated countries, it was essentially a bread-and- 
butter issue. They reckoned they had more to gain from association with the EEC than 
they would ever gain from the United Nations and the multilateral agencies where their 
influence was negligible. As associates, the Yaounde countries received almost twice as 
much aid per head as did the British Commonwealth African states.
However, on the trade side, the African Associates were less happy for several 
reasons. Firstly, the Yaoundé Convention had not protected them against a progressive 
worsening in their terms of trade. Indeed, by joining the EEC association, the former 
French colonies had opted for far lower EEC prices and had given up higher export prices
^°"The common market's backyard". The Economist. 6 May 1972, p.74.
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on the French market guaranteed by the surprix system. Secondly, Germany and the 
Netherlands had essentially disengaged from their colonies since the end of the first World 
War. They had instead developed extensive economic relations with developing countries, 
particularly in Latin America. With already established trade networks, it made better 
economic sense for the two EEC countries to continue to import coffee and bananas from 
their traditional suppliers in Latin America in spite of the provisions in Part IV of the 
Treaty of Rome in favour of the Associated countries.
Thirdly, in the course of the Yaounde Convention, the six EEC member states on 
two occasions had to reduce tariffs on coffee and cocoa, two major tropical commodities, 
under pressure from other developing countries. Fourthly, the return from the Yaoundé 
preferences had been reduced by the introduction of an EEC Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) on industrial exports from all developing countries in 1971. Finally, the 
Yaounde associates stood further to lose from the agreement reached between Britain and 
the Six which would allow twenty Commonwealth countries, comprising Ghana and 
Nigeria, to negotiate special relations with the EEC. The admission of the Commonwealth 
countries would make the Yaounde preferences become so diluted as to be virtually 
meaningless for certain commodities, such as cocoa, where Nigeria and Ghana together 
accounted for 70 per cent of world production.^*
At a meeting of the Council of Association of the Six and the Eighteen in Brussels 
in December 1971, EEC ministers gave guarantees to the Associates that their privileges 
would in no way be infringed as a result of the enlargement of the Community from Six 
to Ten and the subsequent extension of association to the Commonwealth developing 
countries. In fact, the EEC ministers were merely recalling guarantees which had been
"*Ibid.
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written into the Yaoundé Convention at French insistence. But, although apprehensions 
remained among the Eighteen over the enlarged association, these assurances boosted the 
views expressed by Senghor that enlargement should be welcomed for its positive long 
term effects on African unity. President Houphouêt-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire and President 
Ahidjo of Cameroon also adopted the same idea.^  ^ These positions were favourable to 
coordinated African positions and paved the way for closer cooperation between the 
French- and English-speaking African countries.
In April 1972, the Coordinating Council of the eighteen Associates met in 
Nouakschott, the capital of Mauritania. The main purpose of the meeting was to prepare 
a common position for the Third UNCTAD Conference at Santiago de Chile, but the 
Associates also decided that they would negotiate alongside the Commonwealth 
Associables. Thus, the Associates agreed to participate "on an equal basis" with the 
English-speaking countries in the forth-coming negotiations with the EEC.^^
But, strong points of discord remained in inter-African relations despite the show 
of solidarity among the eighteen Associates in their relations with the EEC, the support 
they gave to Nigeria over the ill-fated Lagos Agreement, and the resolution on joint 
negotiation with the Commonwealth countries which the Associates had adopted in 
Nouakschott. Differences emerged, firstly, among French-speaking African countries and 
then, between French- and English-speaking countries. The differences were based partly 
on the reluctance of some African countries to participate in a supra-African Community
^^"The Market Game", West Africa. No. 2855, 3rd March, 1972, pp.241-242.
Adrien N'Koghe-Essingone, "Le Renouvellement de la Convention de Yaoundé", 
Mémoire pour le Diplôme d'Etudes Supérieures de Droit Public, Université de Rennes: 
Octobre 1974, p.3.
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and partly on divergence of opinions over the political and economic orientation of such 
a Community.
In June 1972, French-speaking West African states signed a treaty for the 
establishment of the Communauté économique de I Afrique occidentale (CEAO). In April 
1973, at the Abidjan Conference, these countries prepared protocols necessary for the 
operation of the treaty. However, at the end of the conference, Dahomey (Bénin) 
abandoned her seat on the membership of the CEAO to become an observer arguing on 
the need to develop economic relations with English-speaking countries such as Ghana 
and Nigeria.^ "*
In the course of 1973 two parallel movements seeking to create a Common Market 
in West Africa got under way. One movement comprised French-speaking countries which 
wanted to create the Common Market and then invite English-speaking countries to join 
and the other movement comprised countries which opposed such a plan. In March 1974 
the French-speaking countries met in Ouagadougou to discuss the next moves but Nigeria, 
meanwhile, established a special understanding with Togo to recommend the alternative 
approach of joint French- and English-speaking West African constitution of the Common 
Market from the star t .The negotiations for the creation of an Economic Community in 
West Africa were not concluded on this occasion. However, by stressing the need for 
common African organisations, and in view of the decision of the eighteen Associates at 
Nouakschott to cooperate with the Commonwealth countries in the negotiations with the
'^’Marc Penouil, "Problèmes Economiques Africains (1973)" in Année Africaine 1973. 
pp.290-291.
^^See Ali A. Mazrui, Africa's International Relations - The Diplomacy of Dependency 
and Change, London: Heinemann, 1977, pp.111-112.
147
EEC, Bénin, Togo and Nigeria war j proposing a project which would play an important 
part in presenting a uniried African position in the Lomé negotiations.
The determination of the Yaoundé Associates to negotiate the Lomé Convention 
alongside the Commonwealth countries can also be linked, ironically, to a vague condition 
of British entry into the EEC. This condition suggested that countries which were 
particularly dependent on the export of a single commodity would be borne in mind when 
Yaoundé was renegotiated. The Caribbean sugar producers and Mauritius were later to 
benefit from this condition when the enlarged EEC took over the Commonwealth sugar 
agreement after it ran out in 1974. In anticipation of the beneficial use of this condition,^** 
the Yaoundé Associates had decided to join forces with the Commonwealth countries.
United negotiations had several advantages. From the French-speaking African 
perspective, joint negotiations would represent a meeting between countries which had 
drifted away from the Franco-African Community such as Guinea and those which had 
remained faithful to the Community, with the reunion taking place under the control of 
the Africans. From a pan-African perspective, ten years after the OAU Charter was agreed 
upon in 1963, joint negotiations with the EEC would offer a new opportunity of 
convergence between the radical and the moderate African countries in the Casablanca and 
Monrovia groups.
For the Commonwealth African countries, Britain's entry into the EEC made the 
choice between a global and a regional trade and development strategy almost unavoidable 
because unless these countries reached an accommodation with the Community, from 1975 
onwards they would find themselves in a less favourable position in the British market
^^"The common market's backyard". The Economist. 6 May 1972, p.74.
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than the existing Associates.^^ Moreover, there was a psychological reason to be 
considered by the Commonwealth African countries in favour of cooperation with the 
French-speaking countries. At the beginning of March 1972, Mauritius started negotiations 
to become a member of the Yaounde association. The principle of Mauritian association 
was approved by various Community and Association institutions, more so as Mauritius 
although member of the British Commonwealth was also member of the French-speaking 
organisation, OCAM. With some French-speaking population Mauritius may well have 
been able to enter the Yaounde groupé® even from the start. Mauritius eventually 
completed her application and joined the second Yaounde Convention.
From the perspective of Commonwealth numerical superiority, the decision by 
Mauritius to join the Yaounde group was a balancing act in that the number of the 
Associates rose from eighteen to nineteen and by the same token the number of the 
Commonwealth countries fell from twenty to nineteen. From that point onwards, the 
Commonwealth countries could no longer remain obstinate on considerations of numerical 
superiority. Consequently, cooperation with the French-speaking countries became an 
attractive option in the Lomé negotiations.
James Mayall, "The Implications for Africa of the Enlarged European Economic 
Community", p.291.
^*"The Market Game", West Africa. No. 2855, 3rd March, 1972, p.242.
^^Carol Cosgrove Twitchett, A Framework for Development: The EEC and the ACP.
p.8.
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4.2 JOINT ACP NEGOTIATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The similarities between the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries were 
demonstrated in 1973-1975 during negotiations for the first Lomé Convention. In 1973, 
representatives of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific met in Brussels and decided for 
the first time to speak through a single representative in their relations with the EEC That 
decision marked the beginning of a process of collective bargaining which culminated in 
the formation of the ACP group when the Georgetown Agreement was signed in 1975.
4.2.1 Organisations for the coordination of African. Caribbean and Pacific positions
When several of the African countries became independent in 1960, the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), which was established in 1958, 
performed a number of important functions as the major African economic organisation. 
The ECA secretariat adopted positions on economic issues relating to Africa. For example, 
at the Geneva UNCTAD in 1964, the ECA supported the majority position and argued 
that it would be in the interest of Africa as a whole to see selective preferences 
abolished.'*® When the Organisation for African Unity (GAU) was established in 1963, it 
took on responsibility for Africa's international relations, especially on non-economic 
issues. The ECA continued to handle economic issues hence it was active in formulating
^ C A  Secretariat, "Activities of the Economic Commission for Africa Related to the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development" in Proceedings 1964. vol.Vn, 
p.248. Cited by Marc Williams, Third World Cooperation: the Group of 77 in UNCTAD. 
London: Pinters, 1991, p.42.
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African positions for the Lomé negotiations'*’ and in organising conferences on the 
implications of association for African countries.
Later, the ECA sponsored an African ministerial meeting in Accra in February 
1973. The meeting was called to discuss Africa's future relations with the EEC, and it was 
resolved that the African Commonwealth countries and the eighteen French-speaking 
Associates would negotiate with the EEC as a bloc. It was also decided that the OAU 
would serve as the organising body, holding summit conferences to establish common 
positions.'*  ^ Soon afterwards, there was however concern to merge the divergent roles of 
the ECA and the OAU. The Kenyan Finance Minister, Mwai Kibaki, suggested to the 
Accra Convention that all ECA resolutions should be submitted to the OAU summit, 
insisting that
"it was a mistake to divide economic and political matters as if they were two 
different components; there seemed to be a gap between economic analysis and the 
political will to implement ECA decisions."'*^
The decision to expand the OAU's role was a deliberate strategy on the part of the 
Commonwealth countries. African Commonwealth statesmen were jointly in favour of a 
concerted African approach in the Lomé negotiations. The OAU Secretary-General, Nzo 
Ekangaki, was anxious to form a coalition in the face of continued differences between
"’Joanna G. Moss, op. cit.. p. 147.
""Ibid.. p. 154.
"^ S. Cronje "What next for Africa and the EEC?" in African Development. May 1973, 
p .7. Cited by Joanna G Moss, o p . cit.. p . 155.
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the French- and English-speaking African countries over the economic issues discussed 
within the framework of the ECA. Prior to the Accra meeting, Nzo Ekangaki emphasised 
that it was necessary to arrive at a "common denominator" to ensure that a "united Europe 
deals with a united Africa and not with balkanised African groups.'"*^
In contrast to the African countries, the Caribbean coimtries were relatively more 
united on the formation of consensus at the first Lomé negotiations. Economic and 
structural differences and the two-tier division of the Caribbean into the so-called bigger 
and smaller countries were taken into account at the Eighth Summit Conference of 
Caribbean Heads of Government held in April 1973 in Georgetown, Guyana where a 
decision was taken to create a Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM).^^ 
The Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing CARICOM was signed on 4 July 1973 in 
Trinidad and Tobago, and it came into force on 1 October 1973. Considerations of the 
effects of the disparity in levels of development between the bigger^  ^ and the smaller^  ^
Caribbean countries were taken into account and a special regime was included in the 
CARICOM treaty for the smaller and lesser developed CARICOM members which were 
also members of the Eastern Caribbean Common Market (ECCM). These ECCM countries 
were allowed to grant to each other concessions which they did not have to extend to the
^^"The Market Game", West Africa. No.2908, 5th March, 1973, p.298.
’^John C. Mgbere, "Les Etats Caraïbes dans l'Intégration Américaine: Une Etude de 
Politique Régionale", Mémoire pour le D.E.A., IHEAL, Université de la Sorbonne- 
Nouvelle, Paris IQ: Octobre 1990, pp.11-15.
'•^Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, St. Christopher & 
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines.
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more developed members of CARICOM/*
Having thus settled their differences within the framework of CARICOM, the 
Caribbean countries were able to present a unified position during the Lomé negotiations. 
In effect, Caribbean unity was achieved in 1973 as the ACP countries were finding 
common grounds for negotiations with the EEC. The level of cooperation and 
understanding among the Caribbean countries at the Lome negotiations in 1973 can 
arguably be compared to the level of unity achieved by the African countries at the 
formation of the OAU in 1963. It is therefore easy to see how the Caribbean leaders were 
able to coordinate their positions via the new CARICOM with a minimum of friction.
As a result of their relative unity, the Caribbean countries were also foremost in 
pushing for a unified ACP approach in the Lome negotiations. At a conference of the 
Non-aligned Movement (NAM) in Guyana in August 1972, that country's Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Shridath Ramphal, called an informal meeting of countries eligible for 
association with the EEC.'*^  Explaining the exploratory nature of the talks to his colleagues 
on the Council of Ministers of the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA), Mr. Ramphal 
said;
"...These are not formal discussions. They are not secret discussions. They are just 
talks to see if we can get other people to pool their resources with ours in relation
"**For a more detailed discussion of the history and legal framework of CARICOM, 
see Hans J. Geiser, Pamela Alleyne, Carroll Gajraj, Legal Problems of Caribbean 
Integration - A Studv on the Legal Aspects of CARICOM. Trinidad: UWI, Institute of 
International Relations, 1976.
'‘^ a b e l Ogechukwu Akosa, "The diplomacy of the ACP states in their relations with 
the EEC", Ph.D thesis. University of London: 1985, p.33.
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to the negotiations that lie ahead. «50
The Pacific countries were also present at the first Lomé negotiations and, like the 
CARICOM countries, they showed relative cohesion. Two factors explain their unity. 
Firstly, there were only three Pacific countries involved in the negotiations.^' It was 
certainly easier for three countries to reach consensus than it was either for the eighteen 
Associates or the thirteen African Commonwealth Associables to do so. Secondly, and 
again like the CARICOM members, the Pacific countries had just completed the formation 
of their own regional organisations prior to the start of the first Lomé negotiations. As the 
Prime Minister of Fiji, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, recalled at the negotiation opening 
conference in Brussels in July 1973, the South Pacific Forum was established in 1971 and 
the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC) was instituted in 1972, with 
the participation of these countries. It was therefore to be expected that the unity which 
they had achieved would be reflected in coherent Pacific positions at the Lomé 
negotiations. In contrast to the unity of the Caribbean and Pacific countries, during this 
period, negotiations between the French- and the English-speaking West African countries 
over the creation of ECOWAS had still not been resolved.
The OAU eventually became the organisation for the coordination of African 
negotiating positions with the EEC, performing both economic and political functions. 
Countries such as Guinea, Nigeria, and even Ghana, all originally opposed to participation.
“^Shridath Ramphal, "The ACP/EEC Negotiations: A lesson in Third World Unity", 
Guyana: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 1975, p.5. Cited by Mabel Ogechukwu Akosa, 
ibid.. p.44.
^'These were Fiji, Tonga and Western Somoa.
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were willing to participate once it became clear on the African side that the negotiations 
could be handled under the auspices of the OAU. From a pan-African ideological 
perspective, joint negotiations with the EEC united African countries - as Senghor had 
argued it would - and provided them with their first real opportunity since 1963 to 
demonstrate their solidarity in negotiations with a group of major industrial powers. Thus, 
the enlargement of the European Community to include Britain promoted African unity 
because of the impact it had in encouraging joint negotiations between the French- and 
English-speaking African countries.^^
In May 1973, African Minsters of Trade, Finance and Development met at an 
OAU-sponsored conference. African Heads of State met at Addis Ababa at the Tenth 
OAU summit held in May 1973. The summit meeting produced an Economic Charter 
which contained eight guiding principles on trade and cooperation which defined the basic 
principles governing individual or collective action of the African states. These principles 
were:
1) non-reciprocity for trade and tariff concessions given by the EEC;
2) extension on a non-discriminatory basis towards third countries of the provision 
on the 'right of establishment';
3) revision of rules of origin to facilitate the industrial development of Africa;
4) revision of the provisions concerning the movements of payments and capital 
to take account of the objective of monetary independence in African countries;
5) the dissociation of EEC financial and technical aid from any form of
^^James Mayall, "The Implications for Africa of the Enlarged European Economic 
Community", p.291.
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relationship with the EEC;
6) free and assured access to EEC markets for all African products whether or not 
they are subject to the common agricultural policies of the EEC;
7) the guaranteeing to African countries of stable, equitable and remunerative 
prices in EEC markets for their main products; and
8) any agreement made with the EEC should not adversely affect intra-African 
cooperation/^
Agreement on the eight points of the African meeting did not however spell the 
end for divisions and schisms. Many of the French-speaking countries continued to favour 
reverse preferences^^ even though point one of the African Economic Charter stressed non­
reciprocity in trade and tariff concessions. However, at the end, the Ministers agreed that 
these eight principles would form the basis of their discussions with the EEC. This 
meeting, therefore, marked another bridging gap between the French- and the English- 
speaking African positions.
Despite long estrangement from both France and the EEC, Guinea was represented 
at a Lagos meeting of OAU Trade and Economic Ministers held in July 1973. On that 
occasion General Lanfane Diane prefaced a resolution calling for the creation of an 
African Common Market - a revival of one of Nkrumah's favourite projects - with the 
suggestion that this should be an essential counterpart, if not precondition, to any
^^ Ibid.. at footnote no. 17, pp.312-313. 
Joanna G. Moss, op. cit.. p. 158.
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agreement with the EEC/^ Also, at these meetings, the Commonwealth Associables in the 
Caribbean, Indian and Pacific Oceans were invited to liaise with the OAU-sponsored 
African group/^ Prime Minister Michael Manley of Jamaica sent a note to the meeting 
calling for a ministerial conference of all the countries concerned by the EEC association, 
thus inteijecting the Caribbean and the Pacific states into the discussion/^
4.2.2 United African. Caribbean and Pacific front and negotiating strategy
Despite the conceptual differences which had existed between African and 
Caribbean countries, there was convergence of interests on the question of joint 
negotiations with the EEC. Cooperation between the Commonwealth countries in Africa 
and the Caribbean was clearly easier than it had proved to be between the French- 
speaking and the Commonwealth African countries. Throughout the 1960s, and especially 
after the formation of the OAU in 1963, the West African French- and the English- 
speaking countries could not find a common ground on several of the ideological and 
economic issues which confronted Africa.
In contrast, the English-speaking African and Caribbean countries appeared to 
agree on the issues which were involved in the negotiation of the first Lomé Convention, 
for example, the principle of partnership and non-reciprocity. Apart from the obvious
^^James Mayall, "The Implications for Africa of the Enlarged European Economic 
Community", p.294.
^^Carol Cosgrove Twitchett, A Framework for Development: The EEC and the ACP.
p.9.
^^Joanna G. Moss, op. cit.. p. 156.
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explanation of the English-speaking countries all having had similar colonial experiences 
and all belonging to the Commonwealth, the closeness of these English-speaking countries 
can be understood against the background of long-established amicable interactions. For 
example, George Padmore, the journalist from Trinidad, had served in Nkrumah’s cabinet 
in Ghana while Sir Arthur Lewis, the West Indian economist, had been an advisor to the 
Ghanaian and Nigerian governments. In effect, colonial links only explain in part why 
African states chose or refused to cooperate with one another.
The African, Caribbean and Pacific countries began to converge with regard to the 
EEC starting with a negotiation opening conference which was called in Brussels from 25- 
26 July 1973 between the EEC, the Associates and the Commonwealth Associable 
countries. At this conference, the position of the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of 
countries were presented by a representative for each region The Nigerian Minister for 
Trade, Mr. Wenike Briggs, speaking on behalf of the African group, told the EEC that the 
eight-point African declaration on trade and cooperation would form the basic principles 
of African positions. The declaration, of course, included non-reciprocity. The Yaounde 
Associates supported the declaration and this could be seen as the final gesture of 
abandonment of reverse preferences as a principle of the negotiations with the EEC.
The formal abandonment of the reciprocity principle reflected other sets of 
considerations.^* First, it became clear that its abandonment was likely to be decided over 
the heads of African statesmen as part of a deal between the United States and the EEC 
In his speech at Punta del Este, US President Johnson implied a collective responsibility 
of the industrial states in providing a stimulus to the manufactured exports of developing
*^See James Mayall, "The Implications for Africa of the Enlarged European Economic 
Community", pp.304-307.
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countries. In other words, the principle of universality of preferences was to be 
maintained. But, the scheme depended on the phasing out of existing preferential 
arrangements in general and in particular of the reciprocal arrangements favouring the 
EEC in the markets of its Associates. The American position hardened as the Americans 
faced up first to a continuing trade deficit, secondly, to the implications of the EEC 
enlargement and finally, to ramifications of the energy crisis.^^
In his Trade Reform message to Congress in April 1973, President Nixon proposed 
measures to help build a new international economic order and to further American 
interests.®® He also proposed that the Generalised Trade Preferences (GTP) should be 
extended to developing countries. But although he maintained the commitment in principle 
he went on to say that
"on the basis of international fair play we would take into account the actions of 
other preference granting countries, and we would not grant preferences to 
countries which discriminate against our products in favour of goods from other 
industrialized nations unless these countries agree to end such discrimination."®^
®%id.. p.305.
®®"Message from President Nixon to Congress on his proposed Trade Reform Bill, 10 
April 1973" in James Mayall and Cornelia Navari (eds.). The End of the Post-War Era: 
Documents on Great-Power Relations. 1968-1975. pp.589-590.
®‘US Department of State, Bulletin. Ixviii, 1766, 30 Apr. 1973, pp.513-22 in James 
Mayall, "The Implications for Africa of the Enlarged European Economic Community", 
p.305.
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On the European side, following the enlargement of the Community, the 
abandonment of the reciprocity provisions was offered by the Commission in response to 
requests by American officials that a gesture was needed from Europe to offset the rising 
tide of protectionism in the United States and to convince the American administration of 
the good faith of the EEC in future trade negotiations. For the EEC this was after all a 
relatively painless gesture to make. Indeed, all that appeared to be necessary was a 
clarification, not a change at all. Thus the Deniau Memorandum published in April 1973 
concluded that the future Association agreement, as in the past, should conform with the
G a t t .62
The second reason which encouraged the Associates to endorse the majority 
position on reciprocity was that they sensed the possibility of strengthening their 
bargaining position in areas in which they were already dissatisfied with the working of 
the Yaoundé Convention and where there were opportunities for united African action. 
One such area was commodity price stabilisation, another area was improving the market 
for commodities such as the various kinds of vegetable fats and oil seeds which were 
denied duty-free access into the Community because they competed with products covered 
by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).®^
At the 25-26 July 1973 Brussels conference, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, Prime 
Minister of Fiji, spoke on behalf of the Pacific group and noted that direct contact 
between Pacific countries was undermined during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries due to influence and struggle for domination by the colonial powers. However, 
since independence, contacts have been renewed and regional cooperation has been
®^ James Mayall, ibid.. pp.305-306. 
""Ibid.. p.307.
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reinforced thanks to the South Pacific Forum established in 1971 and the SPEC instituted 
a year later. Speaking on behalf of the Caribbean group, Mr. S. S. Ramphal, Guyanese 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, recalled that the history of the Caribbean states had been 
determined by European powers but that these states were now devoted to coordination 
and union with African and Pacific countries as autonomous states. Mr. S. S. Ramphal 
later declared at the Third Conference of OAU Trade ministers held in early October 1973 
at Dar-es-Salaam that the Caribbean states were making contacts at all levels in order to 
achieve union with African countries. This preparatory conference paved the way for 
regular contacts between the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.
At the October 1973 Dar-es-Salaam meeting, the African countries were 
conclusively able to overcome any smouldering differences between them with specific 
regard to the first Lomé negotiations. The concordance was achieved thanks to calls from 
President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Babacar Ba, the President of the Council of 
Ministers of the Associated States.^ '* President Julius Nyerere's speech to the African Trade 
Ministers who were involved in the negotiation of the Lomé Convention reflects the mood 
of the African leaders who, on the one hand, were desirous to obtain a fair deal from the 
international economic system and the EEC in particular and, on the other hand, were 
intent on obtaining reparations for past exploitation of Africa’s human and economic 
resources. At the October 1973 meeting, the Tanzanian President noted that Africa had 
spoken with one voice at the exploratory meeting with the EEC in July 1973 and he 
suggested that, in the negotiations with the EEC, the efforts of the African Ministers 
should be directed towards obtaining
'^‘Seydina Oumar Sy, "La naissance du Groupe ACP" in Le Courier. n° 93, septembre- 
octobre 1985, p.53.
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”... remunerative trading arrangements in a dynamic context, through a 
scientifically worked out built-in mechanism within the framework of international 
trade and exchange, and full reparations for past neglect imposed on us by 
colonialism.”®^
By alluding to the principles of international trade, Nyerere was reiterating the 
agreed stance of the African countries against preferences from developing to developed 
countries, and by asking for reparations, the Tanzanian leader was making a claim which 
has now been revived by other African statesmen.®®
On the whole, the independent countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
sought to present a common front and thereby benefit from their historical links with 
Europe. At a ministerial meeting for the Lomé negotiations later held in Brussels on 17-18 
October 1973, Namwisi Ma Koye, Zaire's Minister for Foreign Trade was chosen as the 
spokesman for the three ACP groups. He stated the principles, aims and aspirations of all 
the ACP countries as earlier cited by each ACP sub-group. This action was seen by all 
parties involved as the final success of their unified approach. It was a new situation 
which aimed to modify the power relationship between the EEC and the three ACP groups
®®"United in Brussels?”, West Africa. 15 October 1973, p. 1443. See also James 
Mayall, "International Society and International Theory" in Michael Donelan (ed.). The 
Reason of States - A Study in International Political Theory, London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1978, p. 141.
®®An international conference on reparations to Africans and Africans in Diaspora 
called by Chief M. K. O. Abiola was held in Lagos, Nigeria, in December 1990. It was 
attended by personalities of African descent from all over the world. See "Cost of 
Suffering", West Africa. 4-10 February 1991, p.l43.
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and, ultimately, to reinforce to a considerable extent the negotiating power of the ACP 
group of countries.
4.2.3 Minority Influence: ACP collective bargaining and EEC difficulties
The concept of minority influence in group consensus formation implies that under 
the threat of splitting the coalition, stronger members of a group may be inclined to 
redefine their positions or actions to appease the less powerful members. Thus, stronger 
members could lean to pressure however tacit from their less powerful partners.®  ^For the 
purpose of this discussion, we can view the EEC and the ACP countries at the Lomé I 
negotiations as constituting a group since they all had the common objective of 
negotiating a trade agreement. And, without suggesting that the ACP countries cannot 
exercise predominant bargaining influence, we can view the ACP countries as representing 
the minority partner from the perspective of their underdeveloped resources. Once we 
accept these premises, it becomes clear that during the Lomé I negotiations the ACP 
countries exercised predominant minority influence over the EEC because they pressured 
the Community into granting most of their economic demands.
The international climate of the 1970s (oil crises, EEC dependence on primary 
commodities from the ACP countries, the cold war and the often unstated political need 
for EEC presence in the ACP countries) gave an impetus to ACP influence. The most 
important factor in ACP influence and collective bargaining at the first Lomé negotiations 
was the fact that the negotiations took place against the backdrop of the oil crisis in
^^Serge Moscovici, Gabriel Mugny and Eddy Van Avermaet, Perspectives on minoritv 
influence, pp. xi-xii, 3 and 18.
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Europe. Europe was unprepared for this turn of events, while these factors added strength 
to the unity of the ACP countries. Throughout the negotiations the recurrent shock waves 
of the tripling of oil prices in 1973 and the uncertainty over future European oil prices 
made the EEC nations vulnerable to ACP demands. This was especially true since many 
of the ACP states do have oil.^ *
Nigeria was the world's eight largest producer of oil, and Gabon, Congo 
(Brazzaville), Zaire and, in the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago controlled 1 300 million 
tonnes of proven oil reserves. Furthermore, oil companies have been exploring in the 
Cameroons, Bénin, Ghana, Senegal, and Ethiopia. Hence, the changes in the international 
enei gy picture strengthened the ACP position especially when compared to the impotence 
of the Yaounde Eighteen. The European need for these and other primary products put 
them in a more compromising position vis-à-vis the Africans than during earlier 
negotiations.®  ^ The energy crisis further created difficulties for the EEC where its nine 
members could not find a common ground on the strategy to adopt in the international 
energy negotiations.^®
European unity and strength in front of the ACP countries were also diminished 
for other reasons. The Europeans were weakened by the recurrent internal divisions of 
opinion on how to deal with the Africans. Specifically, the German and French differences 
that were present during the Yaoundé negotiations emerged once again. Also, the 
expanded EEC and Britain's presence added a particular element of difficulty since these
®*Joanna G. Moss, op. cit.. pp. 159-160.
®®Ibid.. pp.160-161.
^®"United we stand?". The Economist 8 February 1975, p.58.
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were the first negotiations with all nine members present with the Associates and the 
Commonwealth African, Caribbean and Pacific countries/^ Britain had her own specific 
interests to protect in the Commonwealth countries, for example, in the area of sugar 
supply. Meanwhile, the world commodity crisis and the resulting rise in "producer power" 
in petroleum and other commodities brought the realisation to the developing countries 
of the power to be exercised by collective bargaining.^^
The Deniau Memorandum prepared by the European Commission presented the 
EEC proposals for the negotiations. Broadly speaking, the EEC proposals covered three 
subject areas. The first related to concessionary trade relations between the Community 
and the eligible Associates, and did not rule out the possibility of reverse preferences. The 
second was the stabilisation of export earnings for a number of products: sugar, 
groundnuts, palm products, cotton, cocoa and bananas. Finally, the third area covered by 
the memorandum was financial and technical cooperation aimed at the industrial 
development of the Associated countries to be achieved partly through the funding of 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).^  ^Apart from areas where the EEC proposals 
coincided with ACP demands, the Deniau Memorandum and the negotiating position of 
the EEC were no match for the determination of the ACP countries.
^ J^ohn Pinder, "The Community and the Developing Countries: Associates and 
Outsiders" in Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. XU, No.l, September 1973, p.71 
in Joanna G. Moss, op. cit.. p. 159.
^^Joanna G. Moss, ibid.
^^Marc Penouil, oo. cit.. pp.291-292.
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4.2.4 Outcome of the Negotiations
Based on the prescription in the Yaoundé Convention, negotiations for the first 
ACP-EEC Convention which replaced the second Yaoundé Convention lasted eighteen 
months. During the course of the negotiations, 493 coordinating meetings of the ACP took 
place, 183 negotiation sessions were held between the EEC and the ACP, and 350 joint 
documents were drawn up. A total of eleven months of working days went into the 
creation of the Convention.^^ The Convention was signed in Lomé on 28 February 1975. 
The following were its main provisions:
1. Duty-free access for ACP exports into the EEC without 
reciprocity;
2. A stabex fund of 375m units of account (UA);^^
3. Financial aid of 3 000m UA from the EDF and 390m UA 
from the European Investment Bank (EIB);
4. Provisions for industrial and technical cooperation;
5. Joint ACP-EEC institutions for policy implementation;
^ I^sebill V. Gruhn, "The Lomé Convention: inching toward interdependence" in 
International Organization. Spring 1976, Volume 30, Number 2, p.248 and West Africa. 
10 February 1975, p.l53.
^^The EEC Council of Ministers, by its decision of 21 April 1975, defined the EDF 
resources in European Units of Account (EUA), as did the Governors of the EIB: 
Commission of the European Communities, Information - the EU A, 114/76, pp.l and 2. 
Discussed by Carol Cosgrove Twitchett, A Framework for Development: The EEC and 
the ACP. p.62.
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6. Protocol 3 on special concessions for 1.4m tonnes of ACP sugar per year to 
the EEC market.
The outcome of the first Lomé negotiations was a triumph for the combined efforts 
of the former EEC Associates and the non-Associates because, alone, the French-speaking 
Associates would have been in a much weaker bargaining position.^® The success of the 
Convention is, arguably, to be found in the three historical circumstances of close colonial 
ties between the ACP and the EEC countries, Britain's entry into the Community, and the 
growing militancy in the early 1970s of developing countries in the quest for a NIEO 
which was made against the backdrop of the oil crisis of 1973-74 and the recurring 
monetary crises which accompanied that event.^  ^ However, although the ACP countries 
wanted almost £4 billion over five years, they settled for only about £1.7 billion because 
they had no wish to beg. Part of this sum was for the financing of Stabex on twelve 
primary commodities (cotton, tea, coffee, bananas, sisal, groundnuts, copra, hides and 
skins, palm and timber products and - the only mineral - iron ore).^*
But, above all, the issue of reverse preferences which was the biggest bone of 
contention between the Lomé negotiators was resolved satisfactorily for all parties 
involved.The agreement on reverse preferences allowed the ACP countries the
‘^^ Joaima G. Moss, op. cit.. p. 156.
^^See Peter C. J. Vale, "The Lomé Conventions: From Sundav Charitv to a New 
International Economic Order?. Braamfontein: The South African Institute of International 
Affairs, January 1980, p.2.
^*"You can please them all". The Economist. 8 February 1975, pp.58-59.
' "Ibid.. p.58.
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possibility of building trade links with other developing countries. Article 7, para 2(a) and 
(b), of the Lomé I Convention stipulates that in trade with the EEC, the ACP countries 
shall grant to the Community treatment "no less favourable than the most-favoured-nation 
treatment" but that the most-favoured-nation treatment "shall not apply in respect of trade 
or economic relations between ACP States or between one or more ACP States and other 
developing countries". The ACP countries considered this a big concession since the EEC 
had been reluctant to meet their expectations throughout the negotiations.
Two factors appear to have been of particular importance in enabling the ACP 
states to secure significant concessions without the offer of formal reciprocity. First, not 
only was the group of states much larger than in the previous Association negotiation, but 
the ACP position was strongly influenced by the economically more influential state, 
Nigeria, which had consistently shown itself intent upon extracting maximum trade and 
aid concessions from the EEC.*® Secondly, it seems clear, as earlier stated, that against the 
background of the energy crisis and shortages of other raw materials, the EEC was more 
sensitive than in the past to the need to protect future supplies.*'
Non-signatories to the Lome Convention also appeared satisfied with the outcome 
of the first ACP-EEC negotiations. It was clear in general United States policy statements 
that the US was pleased at the removal of reverse preferences. To some extent this was 
a position of self interest. The US was able to penetrate the markets of its Southern 
trading partner, Latin America, without the benefit of preferential tariff arrangements
*®Nicholas Hutton, "Africa's changing relationship with the EEC" in The World Todav. 
Vol.30, No. 10, October 1974, p.426.
*'James Mayall, "The Implications for Africa of the Enlarged European Economic 
Community", pp.307-308.
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because of its general economic strength, and it could only benefit from a chance to 
compete on equal terms for the African market*  ^ if the EEC did not receive special 
preferences. India's Prime Minister, Madame Indira Gandhi, in an address to the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government assembled at Kingston, from 29 April to 6 May 
1975, welcomed the Lomé Convention while India's Ambassador to the EEC expressed 
the hope that the Lome provisions on South-South cooperation would encourage the ACP 
countries to call on the expertise of relatively advanced developing countries such as India 
to participate in ACP industrial cooperation.”
Three broad conclusions follow from the discussion of ACP-EEC Lomé I 
negotiations in this chapter. First, the conclusion of the Lomé I Convention and the 
resolution of the differences which preceded it provided the French- and the English- 
speaking West African states with an opportunity to create their own Common Market. 
It is more than a simple coincidence that these countries finally settled their differences 
over the modalities of such a common market, and that the ECOWAS was created in 
1975, the year in which the Lomé Convention was signed. Second, from both the 
ideological and economic points of view, the negotiations stimulated inter-African 
cooperation. Numerous conflicts of interest, of course, persisted but since Britain's entry 
to the Community meant that Commonwealth preferences would be abolished after 1975
*^ I. William Zartman, "An American Point of View" in "The Lomé Convention and 
Third Countries: As seen by Outsiders" in Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau, (ed.). The 
Lomé Convention and a New International Economic Order. Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 
1977, p.135.
”K. B. Lall, "An Indian Point of View" in "The Lomé Convention and Third 
Countries: As seen by Outsiders" in Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau, (ed.), ibid.. pp.145 
and 150.
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there was, practically, little alternative but to attempt to resolve these conflicts within the 
context of a single agreement, or at least a related series of agreements.*"* Finally, the 
Lomé I negotiations presented an occasion of united negotiations which encouraged the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries to establish an ACP group.
4.2.5 Formation of the ACP Group: the Georgetown Agreement
During the Lomé negotiations, the African group in its Council of Ministers 
meeting held at Addis Ababa from 20-22 February 1974 decided that the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries should adopt a common position vis-chvis the EEC. 
Following this decision, at a meeting held in Brussels with the EEC on 27 March 1974, 
Babacar Ba, speaker for the African group declared:
"...the results of the Ministerial Conference at Addis Ababa have reinforced and 
consolidated our group. It is for this reason that you have before you no longer 
three groups expressing harmonised positions with one voice, but a single group 
of the ACP countries..."*^
From then on the ACP countries have established the practice of expressing their 
positions through only one spokesperson. After the Addis Ababa Conference in February 
1974, other Ministerial Conferences were held in Dakar (June and December 1974) and
*"*See James Mayall, "The Implications for Africa of the Enlarged European Economic 
Community", p.308.
*^Seydina Oumar Sy, on. cit.. p.53 and The Courier no. 120, March-April 1990, p.25.
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Accra (February 1975). Also, following the Brussels preparatory conference between the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific regions and the EEC, other joint meetings were held in 
Kingston (July 1974), and Brussels again (January 1975). The next meeting to follow this 
was held in Lomé on 28 February 1975 for the signing of the first in the series of 
Conventions which bear the name of that city. Negotiations for the Lomé Convention had 
proved a valuable experience for the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries since they 
were able to present a common front with regard to the EEC.
These countries therefore decided to maintain the momentum attained during the 
Lomé negotiations and to institutionalise their group. On 6 June 1975, just over three 
months after the signing of the first Lomé Convention, the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries signed the Georgetown Agreement in Guyana. The first article of the Agreement 
states:
"There is hereby formally established the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group
of States which shall be known as the "ACP Group".
The Georgetown Agreement sets out eight objectives for its members. These 
include the promotion and reinforcement of the existing solidarity between the ACP 
countries in order to contribute to the development of economic, trade and cultural 
relations between the ACP member states in particular and among developing countries 
in general. Some of the other objectives of the group are to contribute to the promotion 
of regional and inter-regional cooperation between these countries, to reinforce links 
between regional organisations of which these countries are members and to promote a
*^ See Appendix 1 for a text of the Georgetown Agreement.
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NIEO. The objectives of ACP group cooperation are based on economic relations and can 
be summarised into three categories. Firstly, economic cooperation among members of the 
newly institutionalised ACP group; secondly, to develop relations between members of 
the group and other developing countries with a view to promoting a NIEO and, thirdly, 
to continue economic cooperation with the EEC through the Lomé Convention.
The Georgetown Agreement constitutes the most important document in the 
development of the ACP group because it formally created the Group. However, other 
documents relating to ACP cooperation have been adopted to enhance ACP group 
diplomacy. In April 1977, the ACP Council of Ministers adopted the Suva Declaration on 
the programme of action for intra-ACP cooperation.*^ The Suva Declaration deals with six 
principal sectors of intra-ACP cooperation, namely transport and telecommunications, 
trade, development of intra-ACP industrial enterprises, development finance, technical 
assistance, and cultural scientific and educational cooperation. The Montego Bay Plan was 
later adopted in July 1980. The Plan contains a series of decisions and programmes aimed 
at the effective implementation of the Suva Declaration.** A similar Programme of Action 
was adopted in Harare in 1985.*^
In conclusion, it is worth noting that, unlike during the pre-Lomé era when the 
Yaoundé Associates liaised with the EEC on several issues, these programmes and 
measures were adopted at the initiative of the ACP countries. This also suggests that.
*’See Appendix 2 for a text of the Suva Declaration.
**N. M. C Dodoo, "L'organisation et le développement du Groupe ACP", in Le 
Courier n® 93, septembre-octobre 1985, p.57.
*^ary  Sutton, "Le Groupe ACP - Informations Générales", Supplément de Lomé 
Briefing. N°8 Avril 1989.
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henceforth, the ACP group has established its capacity to operate on the same terms as 
the EEC. Above all, ACP diplomacy was dynamic and the ACP countries were pro-active 
in confronting the issues of cooperation with the EEC as well as that of institutionalisation 
of their group. The success of the ACP countries in achieving most of their aims and 
objectives during this period stands to emphasise the gains to be derived from dynamic 
and pro-active ACP group diplomacy.
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PART n  - MANAGEMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP:
ACP ORGANS. EEC INSTITUTIONS AND PROVISIONS OF THE
LOMÉ CONVENTION
This part of the study (comprising Chapters 5, 6 and 7) examines ACP-EEC 
cooperation and ACP diplomacy in practice through the organisation of ACP organs, EEC 
departments and joint ACP-EEC institutions. It also examines specific institutions for 
policy management, for example, the EDF as well as general issues elaborated in the 
Lomé Convention, for example. Trade Preferences and Regional Cooperation. The choice 
of the Lomé issues discussed in this study is not exhaustive; however, the issues discussed 
in these chapters are selected because they highlight the procedures involved in ACP-EEC 
cooperation and ACP diplomacy. This part of the study highlights the current phase in 
ACP diplomacy. In effect, current ACP diplomacy is mainly reactive over bread-and-butter 
issues such as aid and trade cooperation with the EEC. This is due to relative small 
representation in ACP organs and lack of expertise in relation to the EEC. However, ACP 
diplomacy has also known fits of dynamism when it comes to life-and-death issues such 
as toxic waste dumping in Africa and environmental degradation. But, as aid and trade 
discussions are at the centre of ACP-EEC cooperation, the discussions on those issues in 
this part of the study will lead us to the conclusion that ACP diplomacy is essentially 
reactive.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
ACP-EEC ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS FOR POUCY COORDINATION
This chapter discusses the working and internal coordination of AC? organs to 
show how AGP group diplomacy is facilitated or constrained by institutional 
arrangements. This chapter also evaluates EEC institutions which participate either directly 
or indirectly in the elaboration of Community's development cooperation policy. 
Discussion of these relevant Community institutions is intended to show the strength of 
the EEC in relation to their AC? partners. This discussion is also intended to demonstrate 
the scale to which AC? diplomacy would need to develop to meet the objectives of ACP- 
EEC cooperation.
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5 1 ACP ORGANS
Protocol 5 of the Lomé I Convention provides for the establishment of a 
coordinating body for the ACP states. Protocol 5 further provides that this body is to be 
made up of a Council of Ministers and a Committee of Ambassadors both of which are 
to be assisted by a Secretariat. The Georgetown Agreement which later institutionalised 
the ACP group, at its Article 3, reaffirms the provisions of the Lome protocol concerning 
the ACP organs. These organs are analysed to highlight the procedures involved in the 
elaboration of ACP group diplomacy
5.1.1 ACP Council of Ministers
The Council is the executive organ of the ACP group. It is composed of a member 
of government or a designated representative of each ACP member state, but headed by 
a president who is the principal spokesperson for the ACP group and who is empowered 
to make statements on behalf of the group. The Council defines the main line of action 
to be taken in the pursuance of the objectives of the ACP group. The president of the 
Council calls meetings after consultation with the members of the Council. The Council 
meets in plenary twice a year. However, one of these plenary meetings precedes the joint 
ACP-EEC Council of Ministers meeting and so it is usually primarily concerned with 
matters of joint ACP-EEC concern while the other meeting deals mainly with intra-ACP 
affairs. Each plenary session is attended by representatives of all 69 member countries of 
the ACP group, with one member having one vote.
Some of the smaller ACP countries do not have representation in Brussels and,
176
consequently, cannot participate fully in the regular activities of the ACP group. A 
Directory of the ACP countries shows that six Caribbean ACP states (Antigua and 
Barbuda, The Bahamas, Belize, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines) and one Pacific ACP country (Tonga) have their representation to the EEC 
based in London. Two African ACP countries (Comoros and Equatorial Guinea) have their 
EEC representations based in Paris; and one (Cape Verde) has her representation based 
at The Hague. Finally, three Pacific ACP countries (Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu) do not 
have any representation based in the EEC.* Representatives of these countries do travel 
specifically to attend the plenary where draft resolutions, including those from the 
Committee of Ambassadors are adopted. However, the inability of the smaller ACP 
countries to maintain permanent representation at the centre of policy coordination in 
Brussels often delays or even hampers joint ACP decision in some cases when discussions 
are re-opened for the benefit of non-resident members. Inability to maintain representation 
in Brussels reflects the wider problem of financial constraint on some ACP countries. This 
constraint undermines ACP group diplomacy as resources necessary for the formulation 
of common positions, recruitment of staff or financing of studies are often inadequate.
The president of the Council summarises the conclusions reached at various 
meetings of the Council. The summary submitted by the president is then regarded as the 
decision of the Council on any given issue. The decision of the Council is reached by 
consensus. The procedure for the elaboration of decisions of the Council is stated in 
Article 10 of the Georgetown Agreement:
^Information on ACP representations based on readings from the directory 
Representation des Etats d'Afrique, des Caraibes et du Pacifique (Rev. 93 SN 1400/93), 
Secrétariat ACP, Bruxelles: 1er février 1993.
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"Decisions made by the Council of Ministers shall be arrived at on the basis of a 
consensus of the members. However, under special circumstances and after 
consultation, decisions may be arrived at by a majority of two-thirds of the 
members of the Council."
However, if a reservation is expressed, and if it is only for record purposes, it will 
not affect consensus. But, the reservation may mean that a country which is not disposed 
to accept a compromise or the common point of view can disrupt the decision-making 
procedure based on consensus. On certain occasions, the Council has had recourse to 
voting. But, voting is not obligatory. Consequently, when the Council cannot arrive at a 
decision by consensus it is not initially constrained to carry out a vote. It can consider 
other possibilities, including consultation to arrive at a consensus or compromise. If voting 
is decided, the Council will indicate that the problem being considered constitutes an 
exception. As indicated in Article 10 of the Georgetown Agreement, a decision taken in 
such circumstances must be obtained by a two-thirds majority of the members of the 
Council of Ministers.
The work of the Council is facilitated by a bureau which sifts through reports of 
the Committee of Ambassadors before the plenary sessions of the Council. The bureau is 
elected for six months and is made up of six members, representing the three ACP regions 
as follows: four for Africa, one for the Caribbean and one for the Pacific. For this 
purpose, Africa is sub-divided into four regions: West, East, Central and Southern Africa. 
The Council of Ministers elects its president from among the six members on a rotational 
basis between the three main regions, that is, African, Caribbean and the Pacific. The 
decisions of the bureau are mere recommendations calling for the attention of the Council
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to a particular subject
Ironically, regional representation in the bureau, and in the presidency of the 
Council of Ministers, reinforces the division of Africa into regions. But, it is worth noting 
that in this case the division is at the initiative of the Africans themselves. It is also worth 
noting, in conclusion, that in this arrangement, the previously separated French- and 
English-speaking West Africans belong in a single sub-division.
From a group diplomatic perspective, these ACP institutional arrangements, in 
particular, equal membership and voting in the Council of Ministers, have eroded the 
preponderant position of the bigger-size ACP countries. The dominance of bigger-size 
countries such as Nigeria and other Commonwealth countries was witnessed at the Lomé 
I negotiations in 1975. However, one member-one vote procedures are adopted in ACP 
institutions and this ensures that a small size ACP country wields as much influence as 
does a big size country - at least in principle. This in turn implies that a couple of small 
countries with a negligible combined population or economic strength can exert 
considerable minority influence in intra-ACP relations. But, minority influence through 
the ballot box may not be so rampant since ACP decisions are reached by consensus and 
not by voting. Hence, it is still the case that a good deal of old-fashioned bargaining 
remains in vogue in intra-ACP decision-making procedures.
5.1.2 ACP Committee of Ambassadors
The second organ of the ACP group is the Committee of Ambassadors. The 
Committee is made up of an Ambassador or designated representative of each ACP 
member state. Article 13 of the Georgetown Agreement provides that the Committee of
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Ambassadors shall "assist the Council of Ministers in the performance of its functions and 
shall carry out any mandate entrusted to it by the Council of Ministers." Consequently, 
the Committee of Ambassadors presents reports to the Council on its activities. The 
Council in turn examines the reports in relation to the objectives of the ACP group. The 
report of the Committee of Ambassadors concerns the activities undertaken within the 
framework of ACP-EEC cooperation or intra-ACP cooperation. Other duties of the 
Committee of Ambassadors relate to the internal functioning of the ACP Secretariat. The 
Committee of Ambassadors also assists the ACP representatives of the ACP-EEC Joint 
Assembly.
A chairman is appointed from among the members of the Committee of 
Ambassadors. The chairman of the Committee is the ACP spokesperson who announces 
the common positions of the group at the Committee of Ambassadors level. As with the 
Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors elects a bureau every six months. 
The bureau is made up of six members representing the ACP regions who elect a 
chairman from among themselves on a rotational basis from each region in the following 
order: West Africa, the Caribbean, East Africa, Central Africa, the Pacific, Southern 
Africa. The bureau coordinates the work of the Committee of Ambassadors, but does not 
have decision-making power. In effect, the bureau system implies proportional 
representation of the ACP countries, but since the participation of the Pacific countries is 
minimal, the three bigger Pacific countries (Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Western Samoa) 
can be expected to benefit from a quicker turnover in the chairmanship of the bureau. Yet, 
the bureau system has its advantages. Since members of the bureau are also members of 
the Committee of Ambassadors, placing a report in their hands before moving on to a 
plenary session will allow them to check and modify the report according to the prevailing
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mood in the Committee of Ambassadors. In turn, this will promote group cohesion 
because the report will become more acceptable in the plenary Committee. A similar 
system of check is offered by the bureau of the Council of Ministers. This double-check 
facility certainly promotes compromise and maintains ACP group cohesion.
The Committee of Ambassadors meets on average twice a month but, as the 
Council of Ministers meets only twice a year, the Committee of Ambassadors is 
effectively the only organ through which the objectives of the ACP group are carried out 
between the sessions of the Council. Concerning the procedure for arriving at decisions. 
Article 16 of the Georgetown Agreement states that decisions of the Committee of 
Ambassadors are arrived at on the basis of a consensus of its members. In this regard, the 
Committee of Ambassadors operates in a way similar to the Council of Ministers 
although, unlike Article 10 on the Council of Ministers, there is no provision in Article 
16 for voting in the Committee of Ambassadors.
The Committee of Ambassadors carries out its work through nine sub-committees. 
These sub-committees deal with different areas of interest within the objectives of the 
ACP group, namely:
a) trade cooperation and customs,
b) stabex,
c) sugar,
d) financial and technical cooperation,
e) less developed, land-locked and island countries,
f) industrial cooperation including sysmin,
g) agricultural cooperation,
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h) intra-ACP cooperation,
i) establishment and finance.
The first seven sub-committees govern the practical application of the Lomé 
Convention. The sub-committee for intra-ACP cooperation takes measures and initiatives 
considered necessary for furthering the ambitions of the group in that area, including 
cooperation within ACP regions. The sub-committee for establishment and finance deals 
with questions affecting the Secretariat, including staff recruitment and budget.
A d  hoc committees or groups of experts are sometimes set up by the sub­
committees themselves, or in some cases, directly by the Committee of Ambassadors. And 
sometimes, there are permanent working groups within the sub-committees. For example, 
there are permanent working groups within the sub-committee on trade cooperation which 
deal with rum, bananas, the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) and the promotion 
of ACP-EEC trade. Each sub-committee has its own chairman and two vice-chairmen.
However, the sub committees, unlike the Committee of Ambassadors which they 
represent, do not have executive powers: they only make reports and recommendations on 
their work to the Committee of Ambassadors which has competence to make final 
decisions and to report to the Council of Ministers. Since the Council of Ministers meets 
only twice a year, it has delegated its executive function for day-to-day implementation 
of the Lomé Convention to the Committee of Ambassadors. In essence, therefore, the sub­
committees deal with issues on a technical level and make recommendations to the 
Committee of Ambassadors while the Committee acting on behalf of the Council of 
Ministers, does have executive powers.
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5.1.3 ACP Secretariat General
It is pertinent to note that the ACP group does have a Secretariat unlike other 
developing countries' fora which do not have a secretariat for coordinating positions both 
before and during international conferences.^ This section therefore examines the origin, 
structure and working of the ACP Secretariat General to determine whether or not its 
existence has facilitated the formation of group consensus in ACP group decision-making.
The Secretariat goes back to the first Yaoundé Convention. From 1964, and for ten 
years, a small secretariat based in Brussels managed the affairs of the Associated States. 
It had only six members of staff, headed by the Malian, M. Djim Sylla. But, the period 
preceding negotiations for the first Lome Convention witnessed the creation of an African 
Secretariat, assisted by small Caribbean and Pacific units. The different bodies later joined 
forces to form an ad hoc ACP Secretariat, run by 12 staff, which monitored the 
negotiations leading up to the signing of the Lomé I Convention in 1975. Article 3 of the 
Georgetown Agreement in 1975 established an ACP Secretariat General which was 
officially constituted in 1976. The Secretariat had 73 staff in 1987 but is now run by a 
total of 83 staff.^
^Williams has stated, for example, that the Group of 77 does not have a secretariat 
which coordinates positions both before and during international conferences: Marc 
Williams, Third World Cooperation: the Group of 77 in UNCTAD. London: Pinters, 1991, 
p.7.
^E. W. Carrington, "Le rôle du Secrétariat Général ACP" in Le Courier n°102, Mars- 
Avril 1987, p. 12.
''The current figure is based on an informal interview with ACP personnel.
183
In the structure of the ACP, the Secretariat was created to assist the ACP organs 
and it is not an ACP organ in itself. However, there have been debates on the status of 
the Secretariat. The Secretariat is financed mainly by the contributions of ACP member 
states although experts who deal directly with matters relating to the implementation of 
the Lomé Convention are financed by EOF funds. The prevailing consideration within the 
ACP is that if the Secretariat is given the status of an organ of the group, it would be able 
to access EDF funds in its own right and, perhaps eventually, it would receive full funding 
from the EDF. That eventuality would establish a certain independence of the Secretariat 
and permit it to function with a large degree of autonomy from the ACP states. As the 
Secretariat was established to service the ACP group, it is argued that the Secretariat has 
no reason d'être other than as such a functional body. Consequently, it can have no 
specific objectives of its own and, therefore, can only be viewed as a subsidiary arm of 
the ACP group subject to the political control and policy direction of the group.^
Article 19 of the Georgetown Agreement defines the functions of the Secretariat 
which are to monitor the implementation of the Lomé Convention, to service the organs 
of the ACP group and the joint institutions established under the Lomé Convention, and 
to carry out such tasks as may be assigned to it by the Council of Ministers and the 
Committee of Ambassadors. In keeping with these objectives, the Council adopted a 
decision concerning the organisation of the Secretariat. The decision was debated at the 
meeting of the Council of Ministers in Georgetown in June 1975 and was finally adopted 
in Malawi in December of the same year. The text emphasises the role, functions and 
responsibilities of the Secretariat as well as its place in the hierarchy of the ACP bodies.
^Based on discussions with His Excellency James Matheson, former Ambassador of 
Guyana to the EEC.
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Some of the functions of the Secretariat stated in this text, but not stated in Article 19 of 
the Georgetown Agreement are:
to ensure the development and application of the Georgetown Agreement, and to 
carry out studies and make propositions likely to help in promoting regular intra- 
ACP cooperation in all areas, particularly in international trade and generally in 
the development of cooperation with other developing countries.
In its hierarchy, the ACP Secretariat is headed by a Secretary General appointed 
by the Council of Ministers. The Secretariat is currently headed by Dr. Ghébray Berhane, 
former Ethiopian Ambassador to the EEC. Dr. Berhane succeeded Mr. Edwin Carrington 
who had been elected to the position in 1985. Article 10 of the Georgetown Agreement 
provides that voting in intra-ACP relations can be carried out "under special 
circumstances" and it is significant to note that this provision has been used only with 
regard to the election of the Secretary General. This fact emphasises both the importance 
and the contentiousness of the election to the post of ACP Secretary General.
At the election of Mr. Carrington in 1985, a decision had been taken to appoint 
three Assistant Secretaries General (ASGs) from each of the three ACP regions to replace 
the existing position of Deputy Secretary General (DSG). However, the problems which 
had arisen from the election of the Secretary General in 1985 and the strong, almost 
divisive, feelings which these problems had engendered made the ACP states and the new 
Secretary General quite reluctant to broach the actual selection process for the ASGs.^ At 
the end, rather than run the risk of reviving old ACP divisions, not only was the issue of
"Ibid.
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electing the ASGs allowed to die a natural death but the position of DSG was also left 
vacant from February 1985 onwards. However, the position of DSG was re-introduced in 
the ACP structure in 1992 and it is now occupied by Mr. Carl Greenidge. These 
discussions point to a certain dynamism in internal ACP diplomacy which in this case has 
averted long-term dissension or, perhaps in its extreme conception, demise of the group. 
Thus, although ACP group diplomacy is mainly reactive as a result of small size in ACP 
manpower and financial resources, ACP diplomacy at its current phase can still be active 
on some intra-group issues as demonstrated here.
The Secretary General is answerable to the Council of Ministers or, outside the 
sessions of this body, to the Committee of Ambassadors. He directs the administration of 
the ACP group and helps the sub-committee on establishment and finance in staff 
recruitment by drawing up a list of candidates. The auxiliary staff, secretaries and local 
agents are also appointed by the Secretary General. Senior personnel of the Secretariat 
General are, however, appointed by the Committee of Ambassadors on the 
recommendation of the sub-committee on administration and finance. The Secretary 
General also manages the budget of the Secretariat.
The ACP Secretariat General has three principal divisions:
a) development cooperation division,
b) administration division, and
c) trade division.
Organogram 1 shows the structure of the ACP Secretariat General.
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Apart from the three principal divisions, there are also financial and legal divisions 
at the Secretariat. Furthermore, there is a section for public relations, information and 
protocol which is directly attached to the Secretary General’s office. Each of the three 
main divisions of the ACP Secretariat is further divided into sub-divisions according to 
sector which correspond to the relevant sub-committees of the Committee of Ambassadors. 
For example, the administration division of the Secretariat is responsible for personnel and 
staff recruitment and also handles the organisation of conferences, linguistic and secretarial 
services. But it also follows closely the work of the sub-committee on establishment and 
finance of the Committee of Ambassadors.
During negotiations for each Lomé Convention, the divisions and sub-divisions of 
the ACP Secretariat work closely with the corresponding ad hoc sub-committees of the 
Council of Ministers and Committee of Ambassadors, providing expert and consultancy 
back-up to the Ambassadors and Ministers. But, the divisions and sub-divisions of the 
Secretariat also operate on a permanent basis both within and outside Convention 
negotiations, and there is little doubt that their permanency and indeed that of the 
Secretariat itself provides a level of continuity in ACP diplomacy which is lacking in 
other developing countries' fora. The virtue of this arrangement was underlined by former 
ACP Secretary General, Edwin Carrington, when he said that the ACP Secretariat has the 
best developed structures which can enable it to serve as a secretariat to all developing 
countries.* We may add that the ACP group has a commendable institutional framework 
although it would definitely need increased manpower to meet the challenge of serving 
developing countries at large.
Each year, the Secretary General presents the budget estimate and programme of
*E.W. Carrington, "Le rôle du Secrétariat Général ACP", p. 16.
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action of the Secretariat to the Committee of Ambassadors which studies it, and after 
approval, passes it on to the Council of Ministers for study and adoption. The budget is 
financed in part by contributions from ACP member states and, since 1977, in part from 
the EDF within the framework of the Lomé Convention. The ACP Secretariat plays a 
central role in the coordination of the ACP side of ACP-EEC cooperation. However, the 
Secretariat is plagued with the problem of lack of finance. Indeed, lack of finance is 
identified as a hindrance to the effective operation of its activities. The Secretariat finds 
it difficult to collect enough monies for its operations.^
Contributions due from ACP member states are often late in arriving so the 
Secretariat has taken on the additional task of chasing up payments. During a visit to the 
ACP Secretariat in February 1993 by the President of Gabon, M. Omar Bongo, the 
Ambassador of Mauritius, Raymond Chasle in his capacity as President of the Committee 
of Ambassadors called on the Gabonese President to ask his ACP colleagues to meet up 
their financial commitments to the ACP Secretariat.’® Also, Ambassador Chasle has 
described in an interview to this writer the difficulties involved in the collection of dues.” 
Several measures have been contemplated including the possibility of preventing defaulters 
from participating in ACP meetings. But that option was abandoned for fear that it would 
split the ACP coalition. On the whole, difficulties relating to ACP contributions reflect 
the wider problems of financial instability and insufficient foreign exchange earnings in 
several ACP countries. ACP countries which are currently experiencing crises such as
%id.
’®Jeune Afrique Economie. N° 165, Mars 1993, p. 137.
’’Personal interview with His Excellency Raymond Chasle, Ambassador of Mauritius 
to the EEC, 21 May 1993.
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famine and civil wars (Ethiopia, Somalia, Liberia) cannot be seriously expected to make 
effective contributions towards the operation of the ACP Secretariat. In the meantime, 
ACP diplomacy is adversely affected by insufficient manpower and finance.
A conclusion to be drawn from the analysis on the ACP Secretariat General in this 
section is that the existence of a Secretariat and structures which complement its operation 
are expedient for ACP diplomacy. However, as a result of lack of manpower and finance 
to research and initiate proposals, the nature of ACP diplomacy can only be reactive to 
proposals from negotiating partners of the ACP such as the EEC.
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5.2 EEC INSTITUTIONS AND DEPARTMENTS
Several EEC institutions take part in the elaboration of the Community's 
development policy. Our interest in these institutions derive from their relevance to ACP- 
EEC cooperation and ACP group diplomacy. Examination of these Community institutions 
is intended to show the strength of the EEC in relation to their ACP partners and to 
emphasise the level to which ACP diplomacy would need to develop to meet the 
objectives of ACP-EEC cooperation.
It is perhaps worth stating that the European Community became the European 
Union (EU) following the entry into force of the Maastricht treaty on 1 November 1993.*^  
However, the change has not had a fundamental impact on the organisation of EEC 
institutions concerned with development cooperation. Apart from giving us such possible 
new phrases as the "ACP-EU" Joint Assembly or DG VUI of the EU Commission, the 
European Union maintains the role of these institutions. Besides, the present study focuses 
on the period from 1957-1990. The prospects of the new relationship are discussed in the 
Conclusion to this study.
It is not possible in the EEC institutional structure to assign legislative, executive, 
administrative and political functions to a particular EEC institution.'^ Each EEC 
institution is important and plays a part in the overall activities of the Community. The 
European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament have an
'^"Disunion greets birth of the European Union", Financial Times. October 30-31 
1993, p.3.
'^lan Thomson, The Documentation of the European Communities. A Guide. London: 
Mansell, 1989, p.30.
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overlapping and interrelating range of functions. The Commission (as well as the Council 
of Ministers) can issue Regulations and Decisions which automatically become 
Community law and are binding on the member states, enterprises, or individuals to whom 
they are addressed; Directives which are binding on member states as to the ends but not 
the means (national authorities are to pass appropriate legislation); Recommendations and 
Opinions which have no binding force.
Where necessary, legislation initiated by the Commission is subject to amendment 
after consultation with the European Parliament or the Economic and Social Committee. 
In general, both the Council and the Commission can adopt legislation but only the 
Commission implements them. The Commission also has the duty of explaining 
Community policies to the population at large. Nearly 90 per cent of the Community 
documentation, including those relating to relations with the ACP group, originate from 
the Commission. A large percentage of this is generated by the process of carrying out 
the formal tasks of the Commission.*^ Apart from the Commission Directorate-Generals 
(DGs), the Council of Ministers, the European Council and the European Parliament have 
often come up with proposals designed to strengthen Community efforts in relation to 
development cooperation*** in general and ACP-EEC cooperation in particular. The
*'*T. C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Communitv Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1981, pp.81-86 discusses classification and characteristics of Community legislation; 
See also Vacher's European Companion. May 1992, p.55, and The European Communities 
Encvclonedia and Directorv. 1992, Decision-Making Procedure ("organogram") on p.xviii.
*^ In 1981, it was estimated that the Commission accounted for 86 per cent of EEC 
publications other than the Official Journal: Ian Thomson, on. cit.. p.32.
*^ en  Years of Lomé A Record of EEC-ACP Partnership 1976 to 1985. Brussels: EC 
Commission Directorate-General for Development, September 1986, p.65.
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implication of this level of coordination in EEC institutions is that ACP diplomacy can 
bear the brunt of combined EEC proposals at one time or another.
EEC institutions concerned with development cooperation can be broadly classified 
into two categories. The first category comprises institutions the operation of which 
indirectly affects Community development cooperation policy. Institutions in this category 
include the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT). The 
second category relates to EEC institutions the functioning of which directly affects 
Community development cooperation policy. This category is made up of the European 
Commission of which DG VUI retains direct responsibility for development cooperation. 
The Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty are both important in this 
consideration. The Act, which came into force in 1987, made some amendments to the 
legislative process and introduced a new cooperation procedure between the institutions. 
The Treaty introduces even more radical changes in the Community decision-making 
procedures and these will have an impact on Community development cooperation policy.
5.2.1 EEC Institutions with indirect responsibilitv for development cooperation
EEC institutions with indirect responsibility for development cooperation include 
the Council, the European Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee, and the Consultative Committee. The case for examining these institutions is 
that this study is based on ACP and EEC cooperation so there is a need to throw some 
light on all EEC institutions which have an affect on development cooperation.
The Council is the main decision-making institution. It is made up of Ministers
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from each EEC member state with responsibility for the policy area under discussion at 
a given meeting; foreign affairs, agriculture, industry, transport, environment. The 
presidency of the Council rotates among EEC member states, changing hands every six 
months. The main issues raised during each EEC member state's presidency reflect to 
some extent the political and economic preoccupations of that member state. Thus, EEC 
countries which favour ACP-EEC cooperation work hard to achieve set goals in 
development cooperation during their presidency. For example, negotiations for the second 
Lomé Convention started in September 1978, but soon after France took up the presidency 
of the Council in January 1979, she expressed optimism about concluding the negotiations 
by ApnF\ i.e. during her tenure. That would have been an achievement for ACP-EEC 
negotiations which take eighteen months on average to conclude. In the event, the second 
Lome negotiations were concluded in October 1979.
Under Article 145 of the EEC Treaty, the Council is responsible for coordinating 
the general economic policies of the member states by adopting Community legislation 
(regulations, directives and decisions). The Council is the Community's legislature as it 
were, although in certain areas specified by the Single Act and the Maastricht Treaty it 
shares this function with the European Parliament. The Council and Parliament also have 
joint control over the Community's budget, but the Council adopts international 
agreements negotiated by the Commission.’* Thus, Lomé agreements are subject to 
approval by the Council. For instance, although the Commission for all practical purposes 
led Community negotiations at the Lomé II negotiations, it was the presidency of the
’^ Ecomonde Service, le 17 janvier 1979, partie IV, p.l.
’^ Pascal Fontaine, Europe in Ten Lessons. Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 1992, p. 8.
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Council which was involved in signing final agreements. The Lomé II Convention was 
signed on 31 October 1979 by Michael O'Kennedy, then Foreign Minister of the Irish 
Republic, which held the presidency of the Communities at the time.'^
The European Council evolved from the practice, dating back to 1974 (soon after 
Britain's entry into the Community), of organising regular meetings of Heads of State or 
Government and their Foreign Ministers. Initially the idea was to formalise the summit 
meetings which had been called periodically by one EEC member state or another since 
1961. But as European affairs became more and more important in the political life of the 
member states, it became clear that there was a need for national leaders to meet to 
discuss the important issues being examined by the Community. The arrangement was 
formalised by the Single Act in 1986. Since then, the European Council meets at least 
twice a year and the president of the Commission now attends in his own right. As a 
launch pad for major political initiatives and a forum for settling controversial issues 
blocked at ministerial level, the European Council soon hit the headlines, thanks to its 
high-profile membership and its dramatic debates. The European Council also deals with 
current international issues through European Political Cooperation (EPC), a mechanism 
devised to allow member states to align their diplomatic positions and present a united 
front.^° Thus, the EPC provides an internal mechanism for arriving at consensus at 
Community level on issues of interest to EEC member states, including development 
cooperation.
The European Parliament is one of the most important Community institutions and
^^aul Taylor, The Limits of European Integration. London: Croom Helm, 1983, 
pp. 125-126.
^®Pascal Fontaine, op. cit.. p.8.
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has legislative power over a wide range of issues. Its Secretariat General is located in 
Luxembourg. Brussels is the usual venue for the meetings of its 19 committees and the 
political groups all of which prepare the ground for its plenary meetings. To further 
complicate the picture, the Parliament meets in plenary session in Strasbourg. Elections 
into the Parliament are held every five years (the first were held in June 1979). Members 
of European Parliament (MEPs) are elected to 518 seats. The four most populous countries 
(France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom) each have 81 seats, Spain has 60, the 
Netherlands 25, Belgium, Greece and Portugal 24, Denmark 16, Ireland 15 and 
Luxembourg 6. In spite of the allocation of seats to different EEC member states, MEPs 
usually operate within cross-national ideological groupings such as Socialists, Liberals, 
Greens, etc. all of which are supported by the Parliament's secretariat as well as research 
units created to reinforce the work of the groupings. It should be noted that these MEPs 
also participate in the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly. Yet, the ACP group does not have a 
single secretariat officer with responsibility for Joint Assembly matters. This example 
demonstrates the poor resource base of the ACP in relation to the EEC.
Parliament provides a democratic forum for debate, plays a part in the legislative 
process, and has a watchdog function. Parliament shares the legislative function with the 
Council; it has a hand in the drafting of directives and regulations, proposing amendments 
which it invites the Commission to take into account.^’ The foundation of the European 
Parliament's involvement in development cooperation is its power over the EEC budget, 
and its right to be consulted on all new Commission proposals. Hence it has greater 
formal responsibilities for development policies that are financed out of the budget (e.g. 
food aid, aid to non-Associates and CAP subsidies) than for extra-budgetary policies (e.g.
^%id.. p.9.
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Lomé) or those without direct budgetary implications (e.g. aspects of trade policy). For 
this reason the Parliament has urged that Lomé be 'budgetised' (i.e. financed out of the 
ordinary EEC budget).^^
Thus, an important area which eludes Parliament's control is the disbursement or 
administration of the EDF approved under the Lomé Convention. Once the EDF has been 
approved through the normal Community procedures, its disbursement and administration 
are left with the Commission-DG VIII. As a DG Vm official explained, the Parliament 
may be able to block the Commission's budget under Community procedures but these 
arrangements preclude similar control over the EDF/^ Regarding how the ACP countries 
view the absence of Parliament's control over the EDF, we can note that there is already 
a feeling of apprehension within the ACP over Parliament's general tendency to influence 
EEC development cooperation policy. We are therefore inclined to believe that the ACP 
countries would prefer the current arrangements whereby the EDF eludes Parliament's 
control.
Much of Parliament's work since 1979 has been devoted to producing capacious 
reports and resolutions designed both to influence the Commission and, perhaps more 
importantly, to contribute to the debate on development policy. '^* The Committee on
^^Christopher Stevens, "Renegotiating Lomé" in Christopher Stevens (ed ), EEC and 
the Third World: A Survev 4 - Renegotiating Lomé, London: Hodder and Stoughton in 
association with the Overseas Development Institute and the Institute of Development 
Studies, 1984, Box 2, p. 10.
^^Personal interview with Mr. James Moran, Commission of the European 
Communities, DG VIQ-Development, 30 April 1993.
'^’Christopher Stevens, "Renegotiating Lomé", Box 2, p. 10.
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Development and Cooperation of the European Parliament, currently presided over by 
Henry Saby, contributes actively - with a level of enthusiasm reminiscent of Commission 
DG v m  - to debates on projects aimed at promoting North-South interdependence. The 
scope of the Committee is not limited to the Lomé Convention but several of its 
resolutions and reports by its rapporteurs constitute a body of recommendations on which 
is built the foundation of ACP-EEC cooperation.
Parliament has focused on the maintenance of a consistent Community 
development policy since an incident in 1980. On 28 February 1980 in Arusha the Joint 
Committee of the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly unanimously adopted a declaration 
on sugar.^  ^In paragraph 1 of the declaration, the Joint Committee approved the proposals 
of the Commission on Community sugar quotas. However, during the agricultural prices 
debates which took place a month later on 26 March 1980, the Commission proposals 
were rejected by the European Parliament. In her report as rapporteur, Mrs Focke said in 
apparent frustration: "Your rapporteur declines to comment on this change of course 
between 28 February and 26 M a r c h . I t  was thought that such contradictions reflected 
unfavourably on the European Members of the Joint Committee. It was therefore decided 
that henceforth reports on ACP-EEC joint parliamentary bodies shall be presented to the 
European Parliament to avoid conflicting approaches in Community policy towards the
25(CA/CP/142/fm).
^^ocument 1-522/80, PE 66.715/fin., European Parliament Working Documents 1980- 
81, 30 October 1980, Report on the outcome of the proceedings of the ACP-EEC Joint 
Committee and Consultative Assembly, Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on 
Development and Cooperation, Rapporteur: Mr V.Sable, p. 12.
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ACP countries/^
Reports of the Parliament's Committee on Development and Cooperation have the 
principal objective of facilitating common Community policy with regard to the ACP 
countries. As stated in the 1988 report, a coordinated approach between the ACP-EEC 
Joint parliamentary Assembly and the European Parliament is only possible if the 
decisions of the Joint Assembly are taken into account in the work of the parliamentary 
committees whose decisions have a different bearing on the social and economic situation 
in the ACP countries.^* A Report of the Parliament relating to the ACP-EEC debate on 
the favourable treatment of ACP migrant workers and students in the Community pointed 
accurately to the interactions between the various Community institutions when it stated 
that responsibility for following up the resolution on that issue was left with the ACP-EEC 
Consultative Assembly and its Joint Committee. The Report continued;
"But the European Parliament is also involved to tlie extent that some of the 
objectives laid down in the resolution depend to a large extent on the goodwill of 
the Community, but first and foremost the Commission and the Council. The 
European Parliament must therefore, through its responsible committees 
(Committee on Social Affairs and Employment and Committee on Youth, Culture, 
Education, Information and Sport), keep track of developments so that it can
""Ibid.. p.6.
"^Document A 2-0281/88, PE 126.362/fin., Series A, European Parliament Session 
Papers 1988-89, 29 November 1988, Report of Committee on Development and 
Cooperation on the results of the work of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly in 1988 in Lomé 
and Madrid, Rapporteur: Mrs R-C.Rabbethge, p.9.
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endorse the recommendations of the Consultative Assembly and monitor the policy 
pursued.
Parliament provides democratic control in the Community institutional system. It 
can dismiss the Commission by a vote of censure supported by a two-thirds majority of 
its members - a power it has yet to use. It comments and votes on the Commission's 
programme each year, and monitors implementation of the common policies, relying for 
its information on reports produced by the Court of Auditors. It also monitors the day-to- 
day management of these policies by means of oral and written questions to the
Commission and the Council. Foreign Ministers, who are responsible for European
Political Cooperation, also answer MEPs' questions, giving them an account of their 
stewardship and briefing them on action taken in response to Parliament's resolutions^® on 
Community external affairs. Officials of Commission-DG V m  answer Parliament's 
questions on issues relating to development cooperation. It is clear so far that the 
Community has structures and institutions which are unequalled by the ACP organs.
In EEC and Euratom matters, the Council and the Commission are assisted by the
Economic and Social Committee. This consists of 189 members, representing various
sectors of economic and social life. It must be consulted before decisions are taken on a 
large number of subjects, and is also free to submit opinions on its own initiative. In 
ECSC matters, the Commission is assisted by a Consultative Committee, which has 96 
members representing various interest groups in the coal and steel industries. It too must 
be consulted before decisions are taken on a large number of subjects and it can also
^^ocument 1-522/80, PE 66.715/fin., pp. cit.. p. 10. 
^°Pascal Fontaine, oo. cit.. pp.9-10.
200
submit opinions on its own initiative/' EUROSTAT compiles reports for the Community 
which form a useful reference on the achievements or failures of ACP-EEC cooperation. 
Through these Committees, European nationals effectively take part in the elaboration of 
Community policies.
ACP contribution to policy elaboration similar to that of the Committees discussed 
above is provided through the non-governmental efforts of a few organisations and 
individuals interested in the ACP countries. For example, the Club of Dakar presided over 
by M. Mohamed T. Diawara, former Minister of Planning of Côte divoire, met in 
Libreville, Gabon in November 1978 during negotiations for Ix)me II The Club proposed 
a series of measures for the improvement of ACP-EEC cooperation.^^ Also, a joint 
international conference opened by former Nigerian President General Olusegun Obasanjo 
in Brussels in April 1989 evaluated the impact of Europe 1992 on West Africa.^  ^From 
a Caribbean focus, the West India Committee hosted a conference in London from 30 
September to 1 October 1988, two weeks before the formal opening of the Lomé IV 
negotiations. The theme of the conference was the completion of the European Single 
Market in 1992 and implications for the Caribbean region.^ "*
These ACP initiatives may carry some political weight especially given the profile
" 'Ib il, p .ll.
^^ Ecomonde Service, le 14 mars 1979, partie IV, p. 1.
^^Papers from that conference were later published in Olusegun Obasanjo and Hans 
d'Orville (eds.). The Impact of Europe in 1992 on West Africa. London: Crane Russak, 
1990.
^^Tony Fairclough, "1992 and the Caribbean" in The Courier, no. 113 - January- 
February 1989, p.6.
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of the individuals who participate in them. However, m the absence of proper 
documentation, it is difficult to ascertain the full extent of ACP private contribution to 
ACP-EEC cooperation. This also makes it difficult to make a comparison with the 
Community pressure groups in particular and institutions with indirect responsibility for 
development cooperation in general.
5.2.2 EEC Commission Departments with direct resnonsibilitv for development 
cooperation
The Commission is the key Community institution with responsibility for 
development cooperation. A single Commission for all three Communities (the ECSC, the 
EEC and Euratom) was created when the Treaty merging the executives entered into force 
on 1 July 1967. The number of Commissioners was increased to 17 on 1 January 1986 
(two each for France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, and one each for the other seven 
EEC countries). Commissioners are appointed by the member states by common accord. 
Under the Maastricht Treaty their term of office will increase (from four) to five years and 
their appointment will have to be approved by Parliament. The Commission represents the 
Community interest and the Commissioners take no instructions from individual member 
states.^^
The 17-member Commission is backed by a civil service, provisionally 
headquartered in Brussels and Luxembourg. The number of Commission staff has 
increased from 11 000^ ® to 17 000 in about ten years. There is a high level of policy
^^Pascal Fontaine, oo. cit.. p. 10. 
C Hartley, o p . cit.. p. 10.
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coordination between EEC institutions and so, to the 17 000 Commission staff, we can 
also add a further 7 000 staff from other EEC institutions such as the European 
Parliament/^ The European Community is thus formidably strong in comparison to the 
ACP group where the Secretariat staff has evolved from a mere 73 persons to a mere 83 
in nearly the same period. Of course, DG Vm  alone within the Commission negotiates 
directly with the ACP group. But since there is a great deal of policy coordination 
between Community institutions, it can be argued that the ACP countries can be affected 
by a section of the colossal Community structure at one time or another.
The Commission comprises 23 departments, called Directorates-General or DGs, 
each responsible for implementation of common policies and general administration in a 
specific area. In contrast to the secretariats of conventional international organisations, the 
Commission enjoys financial autonomy and can spend its budget as it sees fit. The 
Commission has sole right of initiative and can intervene at any stage in the legislative 
process to facilitate agreement within the Council or between the Council and Parliament. 
It also has an executive function in that it implements decisions taken by the Council.^^
The Commission has significant powers in relation to the conduct of common 
policies in areas such as research and technology, regional cohesion and development aid. 
Formal responsibility for the actual conduct of negotiations with developing countries 
varies according to the subject. In the case of the Lomé Convention, the groundwork is 
prepared by the Commission on the basis of a Council mandate, but Ministers from the 
member states become directly involved at critical stages in order to facilitate
^^The European. 18-21 March 1993, p.l gives these figures of the current staff of EEC 
institutions.
“^Pascal Fontaine, op. cit.. p. 10.
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compromise/^
As in the national administrations of most member states, there is a section of the 
EEC Commission with titular responsibility for development - the Directorate-General for 
Development (DG VIII). However, this section deals with only one comer of the wide 
range of policies that affect developing countries. The Directorate-General for External 
Relations (DG I) has responsibility for many trade issues (e.g. it led the renegotiation of 
the multi-fibre agreement), while the Directorate-General for Agriculture (DG VI) is the 
all powerful guardian of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and hence, for example, 
is in charge of negotiations on the international wheat agreement, of implementing the 
ACP sugar protocol, and of mobilising food aid once DG V m  have negotiated a 
programme."*®
5.2.2.1 Directorate-General I for External Relations. Directorate-General VI for Agriculture
The policies adopted by DG I and DG VI have far-reaching implications for ACP- 
EEC development cooperation. DG Vi's response to pressure to allow EEC entry for off 
season mediterranean tomatoes, for example, will affect imports of those commodities 
from the ACP countries. Similarly, DG I is responsible for EEC economic relations with 
all non-Lome countries including South Africa, the Mediterranean countries, Australia, 
New Zealand, Japan, China and other Asian countries. North America, Latin America. DG 
I also runs a programme of technical assistance to the former Soviet Union, the PHARE 
programme of aid to Central and Eastern Europe, and keeps a high profile in international
^^Christopher Stevens, "Renegotiating Lomé", Box 2, p. 10. 
"®Ibid.. p.3.
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economic relations (GATT, OECD).
As a result of the high profile and extensive range of activities of DG I, it is likely 
that if the proposal to merge or re-organise DG I and DG Vm  materialises, DG VUI, and 
hence development cooperation, will lose out when, for example, budget is reduced or 
staff are moved to a more promising department, product of the shake-up.^' The 
preponderance of DG I (External Relations) in such an arrangement has already been 
hinted by a report which states that Hans van den Broek (EEC Foreign Affairs 
Commissioner), Sir Leon Brittan (Foreign Trade) and Manuel Marin (Development) have 
agreed, more or less, that something akin to a foreign ministry will emerge, headed by Mr 
Van den Broek/^
5.2.2.2 Directorate-General VIII for Development
Despite the limitations discussed above, DG Vm  has a wider portfolio than do 
most if not all of the aid departments of member states. It has a complex structure 
unmatched by the ACP Secretariat both in terms of manpower and finance. As custodian 
of the Lomé Convention, for example, it has direct responsibilities for trade as well as 
aid."*^  The organogram of the Commission shows an extensive organisation of DG VUI.^
' '^Partly based on discussions with Dr. Christopher Stevens (Institute of Development 
Studies, University of Sussex) and an interview with Mr. James Moran (Commission DG
vm ).
42»Kitchen capers". The Economist. March 6th 1993, p.30.
43Christopher Stevens, "Renegotiating Lomé", p.3.
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The current political head of DG Vm, i.e. EEC Commissioner for Development, is the 
Spaniard Manuel Marin who assumed a second four-year term in January 1993. At the 
administrative head of DG VUI is a Director-General. Dieter Frisch occupied this position 
until his resignation in early 1993."*^  The Director-General of DG VUI is assisted by two 
officials. One official, Peter Pooley, is in charge of the coordination of Directions A, B 
and C and the other, Philippe Soubestre, is in charge of the coordination of Directions D, 
E and F.
The Directions refer to sectors of EEC development activity. Directions A to C 
deal with the instruments of development cooperation and relate to Development Policy 
(including primary commodities, compatibility of trade policy with other Community 
policies); Management of the Instruments (including Stabex, Sysmin, food aid, joint 
financing with NGOs, private investments); and Financing (including evaluation and 
management of the EDF). Directions D to F, on the other hand, deal specifically with 
individual ACP countries by region. The regions are further sub-divided into individual 
countries or group of small countries called desks each headed by a DG VUI official.
In identifying and preparing projects and programmes, the ACP states in particular 
the least-developed countries receive assistance from the Commission which also provides 
delegates for expert advice and submits a list of consultants from which the ACP states
"*^Organigramme de la Commission des Communautés européennes. Luxembourg: 
Office des publications officielles des Communautés européennes, février 1992, pp.69-72 
gives full organisational details of DG Vm
^^ New African. December 1993, p.26.
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choose the provider of the servicer.^ From the perspective of the Commission, the EEC 
delegation in ACP states offer the opportunity for close policy implementation. As the 
former EEC Development Commissioner Natali explained, the delegates represent the 
European Commission in each ACP state.^  ^ But whatever their good intentions, the 
presence of the EEC officials has been viewed by some ACP countries as interference in 
their internal affairs. Despite the ambiguous role of the Commission in the ACP countries, 
the internal administration of DG Vm certainly affords the Commission a closer 
understanding of the particular problems faced by each ACP country.
In conclusion to the discussion of the EEC institutions, it must be stated, firstly, 
that an intra-ACP arrangement similar to these Community structures will be difficult to 
realise because the ACP countries, having known political independence for a relatively 
short time, may be unwilling to give up part of their sovereignty to supranational 
institutions - not even those which may promote ACP group diplomacy. Finally, it should 
be noted that the legal arrangements of the Community institutions effectively tie the 
hands of those Commission officials who may be disposed to promote development 
cooperation. It can be assumed that, as professionals and civil servants. Commission 
officials involved with development would harness their efforts in ACP-EEC cooperation 
if only to advance the prestige of their departments. But, their good intentions may well 
be hampered by the system of interdependence operating among Community institutions.
^^COM (84) 398 final. Commission of the European Communities, Report to the ACP- 
EEC Council of Ministers on the administration of financial and technical cooperation in 
1983, under the Lomé Convention, Brussels: 17th July 1984, pp.9-10.
^^Jacques Ferrandi, "Lorenzo Natali m'a dit...". Interview in Marchés Tropicaux et 
Méditerranéens. N°2194, 43® Année, 27 Novembre 1987, p.3142.
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5.3 ACP-EEC JOINT INSTITUTIONS
Title VI of the first Lomé Convention established joint ACP-EEC institutions 
which include the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers, the ACP-EEC Committee of 
Ambassadors, and the Consultative Assembly. Starting with Lome TU, the Consultative 
Assembly was, however, replaced by the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly. This section evaluates 
the relationship between these joint institutions in order to determine how their 
organisation promotes or hinders ACP group diplomacy.
5.3.1 ACP-EEC Council of Ministers and ACP-EEC Committee of Ambassadors
The functions, structure and composition of these two institutions are similar to 
those of the comparable ACP organs except for the obvious fact that the joint institutions 
are made up of both ACP and EEC representatives. In essence, most of the points earlier 
raised with regard to the ACP Council of Ministers and the ACP Committee of 
Ambassadors also apply to the joint institutions and it is not necessary to repeat those 
points here. Organogram 2 presents the inter-relationship of ACP-EEC joint institutions 
including the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Ambassadors.
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Oraanoaram 2^^ 
Inter-relationship of ACP-EEC Joint Institutions
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Ministers
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Ad hoc 
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ACP
Secretariat
General
^*Sources: ACP 14th Anniversary. 1989, p.4; Actualités. Numéro 2, Décembre 1990, p. 12; 
and Interview with ACP experts.
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It can be inferred from Organogram 2 that, in the pyramid of the ACP-EEC joint 
institutions (Council of Ministers, Committee of Ambassadors or Joint Assembly), the 
joint institution itself sits at the top followed equally and severally by the ACP and the 
EEC institutions, then by the sub-committees and finally by the specialised working 
parties. The broad base of the pyramid would correspond to the wide range of topics 
discussed by the working groups some of which are abandoned as the issues move 
upwards towards the top of the pyramid. We have an image of contentious issues being 
dropped down a chart from the top. The issues drop all the way down to the bottom of 
the chart and re-bounce to the top ready for adoption by the joint ACP-EEC institutions. 
The pyramidal structure has a positive effect in that ACP-EEC differences are straightened 
out as they progress upwards. They then become, arguably, more easily resolved when 
they reach the joint institutional level.
The ACP-EEC Council of Ministers and Committee of Ambassadors work closely 
together, but the Council is the highest joint institution. It is supposed to undertake the 
joint decision-making promised by the Convention, but since this has never lived up to 
expectation, neither has the C o u n c il.F o r example. Article 267 of the Lomé HI 
Convention and Article 340 of Lome IV stipulate that the office of the president of the 
Council of Ministers shall be held alternately by a member of the Council of the European 
Communities and a member of Government of an ACP state. But as there are 12 EEC 
member states and 69 ACP countries, the rate of turnover in the presidency would be far 
higher in the EEC than it would be in the ACP group. This event might put some 
additional pressure on ACP diplomacy as the ACP countries would spend much time 
trying to choose one candidate among several others to represent them in the presidency
^^Christopher Stevens, "Renegotiating Lome", p. 11
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of the Council.
The work of the Council is facilitated by an Annual Report prepared by the 
committees of ACP-EEC joint institutions. The aim of the annual report is to allow the 
ACP-EEC Council of Ministers to review progress made towards the objectives of ACP- 
EEC financial and technical cooperation. But, as one of these Reports itself laments:
"The timing of the exercise is not in fact ideal, in that the aims of cooperation
remain unchanged from year to year, and the reasons for success and causes of
difficulties will also be essentially the same."^°
Thus, a yearly report is likely to make monotonous reading, there being no 
dramatic changes, generally speaking, from one year to the next though, at least, the 
figures change!^*
5.3.2 ACP-EEC Joint Assemblv
Lomé I and II had a Consultative Assembly with a Joint Committee which 
prepared its meetings but Article 22 of Lomé m  introduced the Joint Assembly as a single 
parliamentary institution.
The Joint Assembly is made up of one representative for each ACP state and of
% 0 M  (84) 398 final, on. cit.. p.l. 
^%id.. pp.2 and 5.
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equal number of members appointed by the European Parliament/^ The Joint Assembly 
meets alternately in an ACP country and an EEC country and the proceedings are chaired 
by two co-presidents elected by the Assembly (1 ACP, 1 EEC), while these co-presidents 
together with 20 vice-presidents (10 from each side) who are also elected, form the Joint 
Assembly's bureau. These arrangements show that the Joint Assembly is governed by rules 
of procedure based on parity and democracyHowever, it can be argued that this 
democracy is not based on equality since 69 representatives from 69 ACP countries sit 
opposite 69 MEPs from 12 EEC member states. Still, the efforts are commendable 
because the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly, as proudly stated in its information pamphlet, is 
the "only international assembly where the representatives of different countries regularly 
gather together with the sole aim of promoting North-South interdependence."^^ The 
bureau of the Joint Assembly meets several times a year to discuss topical economic and 
political issues.
A d hoc committees and working parties are also set up to facilitate the work of the 
Joint Assembly. The working parties in the Joint Assembly have a function similar to that 
of the committees in the European Parliament.^^ The working parties are set up to deal 
with specific problems or issues, hence at its meeting held in September 1985 at Inverness
^^Document A 2-206/86, PE 109.176/fin, Series A, European Parliament Working 
Papers 1986-87, 9 January 1987, Committee on Development and Cooperation Report on 
the outcome of the Joint Assembly proceedings. Rapporteur; Mr. F. Condesso, p. 13.
ACP-EEC Joint Assemblv: Shared Democracv. Go Between series, published by the 
European Parliament, circa 1990-93, p.2.
‘^*Ibid.. p.l.
^^Document A 2-0281/88, PE 126.362/fin., Series A, op. cit.. p.9.
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the Joint Assembly decided to set up three ad hoc working parties: women and population, 
headed by Mrs Wanihiu from Kenya; rural development and environmental problems (Mr 
Sene, Senegal), and the problem of indebtedness in developing countries (Mr Iroha, 
Nigeria)/^ Similarly, at its meeting in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1987 the Joint Assembly 
decided to set up three working parties: the problem of commodities; refugees and 
displaced persons; technology, training and development/^ These working parties perform 
a technical function, yet they are informal, and often meet twice a week and into the night 
as well/*
The work and negotiating procedures of joint ACP-EEC institutions and the 
evolution of ACP-EEC issues from committee meetings into the Lomé Convention can 
be pictured through ACP-EEC negotiations within the Joint Committee. The subject of 
negotiations was migrant workers, students and trainees. A working party on migrant 
workers was set up following a decision taken by the Joint Committee at Maseru 
(Lesotho) in December 1977. The working party submitted an interim report on the 
problem of ACP migrant workers at the meeting^’ in Bordeaux at the end of January 1979. 
After considering and discussing the report, the Joint Committee adopted a declaration on 
"respect for and protection of the rights of citizens, students, trainees and migrant workers 
originating in the ACP countries..."^ In paragraph 2 of this joint declaration, the Joint
^^Document A 2-206/86, PE 109.176/fin, Series A, o p . cit.. p p .2 1-22. 
^Document A 2-0281/88, PE 126.362/fin., on. cit.. p. 10.
"*COM (84) 398 final, oo. cit.. p.5.
^^ocument 1-522/80, PE 66.715/fin., op. cit.. p.8.
^CA/CP/96/fin, Annex 1.
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Committee requested that
"in negotiations on the future ACP-EEC Convention, the signatory parties should 
undertake to conclude, within a given time limit, an agreement on the protection 
of the rights and improvement of the living conditions of ACP migrant workers 
resident in the Member States of the Community."
Subsequently, the negotiators of the Lomé II Convention in 1979 annexed a "joint 
declaration on workers who are nationals of one of the contracting parties and are residing 
legally in the territory of a Member State or an ACP State."®' In that declaration, the 
Community and the ACP states agreed on the reciprocal arrangements of according fair 
treatment with regard to working conditions, pay structures, social security benefits, etc. 
to migrant workers and their families. In this way, the issue of migrant workers had 
evolved from committee meetings to become an annex in the Lome Convention.
But, although the arrangements were clearly reciprocal, and it was possible to have 
more nationals of an EEC member state residing in one ACP country than nationals of 
that ACP country residing in the particular EEC member state, the European Parliament's 
Committee on Development and Cooperation in one of its Reports stated that
"it is nevertheless clear that the Joint Committee and the Consultative Assembly 
are primarily concerned with ACP migrant workers resident in the Community."®^
®'Lomé n, Aimex XV.
®^Document 1-522/80, PE 66.715/fin., o p . cit.. pp.8-9.
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This stance underlines the Community's disposition towards ACP-EEC cooperation 
which appears to be constantly suggesting, wrongly indeed, that the ACP countries have 
more to gain from cooperation than their EEC counterparts.
At its meeting in Luxembourg at the end of September 1980, the Consultative 
Assembly considered a draft report which had been adopted by the Joint Committee at its 
meeting in Arusha (Tanzania) in February 1980. The negotiations on workers having been 
concluded, this report concerned ACP students and trainees in the Community. A 
resolution finally adopted by the Consultative Assembly on 26 September 1980 contained 
various recommendations aimed at protecting the rights of migrant workers, students and 
trainees.^^
The ACP-EEC Joint Assembly and its working groups which replaced the old 
Consultative Assembly and the Joint Committee exemplify in many ways the working of 
the joint institutions. The order of session of the Santo Domingo Joint Assembly in 
February 1992 (Table 1) replicates the structure and interaction of other joint institutions 
such as the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Ambassadors.
% d . .  p.9.
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Table 1^^
Order of session of ACP-EEC Joint Assemblv held at 
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, from 17 to 21 February 1992
Thursday 13 and Friday 14 February
Meeting of ACP members
Saturday 15 February
10 a.m. Fisheries Working Group
3 p.m. Structural Adjustment Working Group
3 p.m. AIDS Working Group
Sunday 16 February
Programme of visits organised by
the Dominican authorities
6.30 p.m. Bureau meeting
Monday 17 February
9 a.m. Separate meetings, ACP members and
European members
11 a.m. Formal opening session
3 p.m. Start of work by the Joint Assembly
Tuesday 18. Wednesday 19 and Thursday 20 February
9 a.m. and 3 p.m. Joint Assembly
Friday 21 February
9 a.m. End of Joint Assembly session
^Source: Doc.ACP-EEC/539/92, ACP-EEC Joint Assembly, Working Documents. Draft 
Agenda, 7 January 1992, p.2.
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Thus, the February 1992 Joint Assembly meeting, like other Assembly meetings 
and like Council of Ministers and Committee of Ambassadors meetings, reproduces 
precisely the interaction between the various internal organs Working from the bottom 
of the pyramid upwards, the working groups met separately on Saturday 15 February to 
discuss issues bordering on their area of concentration. This was followed the next day 
by a meeting of the bureau. Separate meetings of the ACP and EEC members were held 
on Monday 17 February later followed by the actual Joint Assembly which continued for 
three days until the end of session on Friday 21 February.
The Joint Assembly eventually focused on human rights, democracy and 
development - quite appropriately - given the close proximity of the Dominican Republic, 
venue of the Assembly, to Haiti where a military coup d'état had ousted elected President 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide.^^ In one of its final votes, the Assembly jointly appealed to the 
international community "to maintain and reinforce the embargo on Haiti for as long as 
unlawful military rule continued and democratic order had not been restored”.^ It can be 
argued that the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly which has a pyramidal structure, like the other 
joint institutions, is effectively designed to facilitate consensus at the high political level.
Article 27 of the Joint Assembly's Rules of Procedure provides that the Assembly 
shall lay down its financial regulation on the basis of proposals from the bureau. On the 
basis of this provision it was decided that from 1987 the European Parliament's budget 
will include a special 'Joint Assembly' section subdivided as follows:
^^Doc_EN/ACP/206767, ACP-EEC Joint Assemblv. Santo-Domingo, 17-20 February 
1992, Luxembourg: European Parliament, Directorate-General Information & Public 
Relations, p.5.
^Ibid.. pp.6-7.
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- the two annual Joint Assembly meetings
- the annual meeting with the economic and social partners
- the meetings of the working parties
- the meetings of the Bureau in connection with the Joint Assembly sessions.®^
On the ACP side, the most active ACP representatives within the parliamentary 
institutions are in fact the Ambassadors stationed in Brussels/'^ The reason for their 
activeness is obvious: they are located close to the centre of operation of ACP-EEC 
cooperation. This also suggests that location away from Africa, the Caribbean and the 
Pacific is disadvantageous for ACP group diplomacy. This is particularly the case with 
a good number of ACP countries, especially for the smaller ones which may experience 
difficulties in maintaining a fairly large number of diplomatic staff in Brussels, and 
certainly for the ACP countries which do not have representation at all in Brussels.
One criticism of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly is that it is supposed to represent 
parliamentarians, but as some ACP states do not have Parliaments the MEPs on the 
Assembly often sit opposite ACP Ambassadors. Indeed, there is a considerable overlap 
of the people who attend all these joint fora which only adds to the outside observer's
^^Document A 2-206/86, PE 109.176/fin, Series A, o p . cit.. p. 13.
®*Document 1-605/83/11, PE 85.143/fm./ll, European Communities, European 
Parliament Working Papers 1983-1984, Report on the context of the future ACP-EEC 
convention to follow Lomé 11, Part 11: Sub-reports by the individual rapporteurs and 
opinions of the committees asked for an opinion, 12 August 1983, Rapporteur: Mr. U. 
Irmer, p.80.
218
confusion.^^ Again, as noted in a report by the European Parliament, the Assembly is 
supposed to be a parliamentary body but as most ACP countries have one-party systems, 
there could be no real confrontation between ACP parties and the European parties/^ One 
way towards greater effectiveness in ACP diplomacy is to have a healthy debate in the 
joint institutions. With the wave of démocratisation in Africa, it can be hoped that MEPs 
will sooner rather than later experience the sense of fulfilment that should come with 
sitting across the bench from ACP parliamentarians.
The broad conclusion that can be drawn from the discussion of ACP-EEC joint 
institutions in this section is that the ACP group and the EEC have worked towards the 
presentation of a façade of converging ACP group interests via the organisation of their 
joint institutional structures. And this is in spite of possible differences which may emerge 
among the ACP countries. Intra-ACP differences may emerge over a given issue, but the 
joint institutional structures allow ACP members to "talk things over" among themselves 
such that sooner or later they arrive at a "common ACP position". From then on, any 
residual differences can be quite conveniently described as existing between the ACP 
group and the EEC
It can be further argued that this structural group presentation has reduced the 
growth of influence within the ACP as the radical, or at least vocal, ACP member states 
are permanently silenced. Thus, such ACP states are unable to express themselves 
individually on ACP-EEC issues in a way, for example, that dissenting EEC member 
states can do on European issues. Quite often, we have heard what one EEC member state 
or another makes of EEC development policy, but hardly ever do we hear individual ACP
Christopher Stevens, "Renegotiating Lomé", p .ll.
Cocum ent 1-605/83/II, PE 85.143/fm./n, on. cit.. p.80.
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views. This scheme of things certainly helps to maintain ACP group cohesion but it also 
prevents the development of influence in ACP group diplomacy. This perhaps also 
explains why countries such as Nigeria and the members of the Commonwealth East 
African Community (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) which had been influential prior to 
Lomé I now play a relatively limited role in intra-ACP relations.
2 2 0
5.4 ACP-EEC INSTITUTIONS FOR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: IMPACT ON ACP 
GROUP DIPLOMACY
The Lomé Convention is a framework convention for ACP-EEC cooperation. A 
framework convention contains guiding principles for the paiticipants who are at liberty 
to choose one specific area or several areas of emphasis for the advancement of their 
aims. This means, in effect, that the Lome Convention defines broad areas of intra-ACP 
or ACP-EEC cooperation. In principle, it is left to the ACP countries and member states 
of the EEC to choose particular sectors of interest and to create specific institutions 
necessary for the operation of those chosen sectors. Claude Cheysson, former EEC 
Development Commissioner, liked to speak of the Lome Convention as a "tool box" for 
every one to make the best use.’’ With the passage of time, the EEC and the ACP 
countries have established institutions with the purpose of facilitating administrative 
cooperation.’^
Several ACP-EEC institutions have, therefore, been established for policy 
implementation. The European Development Fund (EDF) was established at the signing 
of Part IV of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. However, it was not until the signing of 
Yaoundé I in 1963 that the European Investment Bank (EIB) became directly involved
Boite à outils": à chacun d'en faire le meilleur usage”. Cited by Hubert Ferraton, 
"De Lomé I à Lomé HI: la coopération CEE-ACP en mutation" in Obiectif Europe. Nos 
26-27, Décembre 1984, p. 10.
André Auclert, "La Coopération Administrative entre la CEE et les Etats d'Afrique, 
des Caraïbes et du Pacifique dans le cadre de la Convention de Lomé" in Revue française 
d'Administration Publique. N°50, Avril-Juin 1989, pp.89-101 treats the interaction between 
these institutions as administrative cooperation.
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with development cooperation when its funds were included in the financial protocol for 
projects in the OCTs. Since the signing of Lomé I in 1975, several other joint institutions 
including the Foundation for ACP-EEC Cultural Cooperation have been established for 
policy coordination. These joint institutions are discussed in this section for their relevance 
to ACP diplomacy.
5.4.1 European Development Fund (EDFl and ACP-EEC Administrative Cooperation
The European Development Fund was set up to finance development projects that 
fall within the areas covered by ACP-EEC cooperation. The first EDF (EDF I) was 
allocated under the association agreement in Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. Since then 
there has been regular allocations of one EDF every five years. But, the five year time- 
scale has been criticised as being too long especially since other aid payments, for 
example IDA replenishments, are nominally for three years.^  ^Still, the EDF has come to 
be a guaranteed source of foreign capital for the ACP countries. EDF I had resources for 
ECU 581 million although there was no additional provision from the EIB. The EDF 
under Yaoundé I (EDF II), however, had resources for ECU 666 million and an additional 
ECU 64 million from the EIB. Yaoundé II (EDF IQ) provided for ECU 843 million and 
an additional ECU 90 million from the EIB.^^
^^Adrian Hewitt, "The Lomé Conventions: Entering a Second Decade" in Journal of 
Common Market Studies. Volume XXIII, No. 2, December 1984, p. 105.
'^‘The European Currency Unit (ECU) came into use in ACP-EEC relations from Lomé 
n. Prior to that, EEC finance was quoted in US dollars or European Units of Account 
(UA). As at 31 December 1991, 1 ECU = £0.72: Vacher s European Companion & 
Consultants' Register. Number 80 May 1992, p. 156.
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Table 2""
Financial Provisions under the Lomé Conventions (I-FV^
in million ECU
Lomé I Lomé n Lomé m Lomé rV
EDF IV EDF V EDF VI EDF v n
EDF 3072 4724 7400 10800
EIB loans 390 685 1100 1200
Total 3462 5409 8500 12000
The negotiation of the first Lomé Convention marked a phase of full commitment 
to development cooperation between the ACP group and the EEC Table 2 shows the 
allocation of financial resources under the Lome Conventions. At the signing of each 
Convention, an increased EDF was approved so that each new EDF nominally provided 
for more funds than the previous one. EDF IV under Lome I had resources totalling a 
little over ECU 3 billion. But by the time EDF VU was approved for Lome IV, the 
resources had increased to ECU 10.8 billion. The ACP achieved a relatively good deal on 
EDF rV at Lome I However, EDF V under Lome II, at ECU 4.7 billion, was worth about
’^This table was prepared using tables and information from Ten Years of Lomé A 
Record of EEC-ACP Partnership 1976 to 1985. o p . cit.. pp 14-15; and the Lomé HI and 
Lomé rV Conventions.
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25 per cent less in real per capita terms given the extension of ACP membership. 
Although EDF IV was itself worth 20 per cent less than EDF HI (Yaoundé II) in real per 
capita terms, it was still a good deal in political terms.^ ® Tliat is to say, the unity and 
cohesion which was achieved for ACP diplomacy in 1975 more or less compensated for 
the insufficiency of funds.
The bulk of EDF aid is allocated to individual national indicative programmes 
(NIPs) to be implemented in each of the ACP countries. In general it is used to finance 
development projects across a wide range of economic and social sectors (roads, ports, 
electrification and energy projects, hospitals, schools and factories). In the past the largest 
share of the EDF has gone to transport and infrastructure such as buildings, although this 
has been matched by the funds allocated to agro-industry and the production of foodstuffs 
and export crops. Most of the funds allocated to NIPs take the form of outright grants or 
loans with low rates of interest.
Financial provisions under each Lomé Convention have a separate duration (5 
years under Lomé I to Lomé HI and 10 years with two 5-year financial protocols under 
Lomé IV). However, there is no requirement that the aid allocated be disbursed, or even 
committed, during the period of validity of a particular Lomé Convention. The EDF 
outlives the convention up to any time when all the resources have been allocated. For 
example, 40 per cent of EDF IV (the core of Lomé I aid) had not been disbursed and 9 
per cent had not been committed by the end of 1981, almost two years after the
Adrian Hewitt, "The Lomé Conventions: Entering a Second Decade", p. 105 and 
footnote.
^^ Comment - The Lomé Negotiations. London: Catholic Institute for International 
Relations, April 1984, p.8.
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Convention had ended/* The added ingredient with the EDF is the implication in the 
Convention, deriving from the joint partnership arrangements and its contractual nature, 
that the sum agreed belongs rightfully as much to the ACP as it does to the Community. 
Thus, for instance, tenders for EDF contracts are formally opened and decided upon by 
ACP governments, not by the donor.^’
Furthermore, the principle of equal opportunity for bidders in the EEC and in the 
ACP states is applied to competition for EDF contracts. Contracts are awarded by the 
ACP country where the project will be carried out, with the approval of the European 
Commission. Normally, a bid takes the form of open international tendering, but a lower 
bid may be approved by the Commission if it is judged to be economically the most 
advantageous to an EEC member state. This guideline may suggest the exclusion of more 
interesting offers from non-EEC developed countries such as the United States. In order 
to benefit ACP bidders, an accelerated tendering procedure may be applied to contracts 
under ECU 3 million and a considerable percentage preference is accorded on works and 
supply contracts given to ACP firms.
Finally, co-fmanced projects between EEC and ACP countries are highly 
encouraged. All these points show that a company registered in an EEC member state, and 
operating in partnership with another company registered in an ACP country, stands a 
good chance of obtaining funds from the EDF for a project within an ACP state. However, 
some regions of the ACP attract a larger part of EDF financing than others for a 
combination of political and economic reasons.
78
79
Christopher Stevens, "Renegotiating Lomé", p. 17.
Adrian Hewitt, "The Lomé Conventions: Entering a Second Decade", p. 105.
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ACP-EEC Administrative Cooperation
Although we have repeatedly emphasised the insufficiency of Lomé funds, it 
remains to be said that whatever aid is actually allocated is still not easily spent ACP- 
EEC administrative cooperation in fact underscores the preponderance of the EEC and the 
ineffectiveness of ACP diplomacy in joint policy implementation. This perhaps also 
emphasises the argument that ACP diplomacy is not merely reactive on ordinary issues 
in ACP-EEC cooperation but it is positively dormant.
The bulk of the aid is technically channelled through the EDF. In addition, the EIB 
provides loans both under and outside the Convention. But, responsibility for 
administering aid is split between the Commission (under particular responsibility of DG 
Vm) and the EIB on a sectoral basis. DG Vm  is responsible for most sectors, for which 
it normally provides grants, and for Stabex and Sysmin. The EIB handles projects in the 
field of industry, tourism, mining, agro-processing and some infrastructure, on the 
assumption that these sectors are more likely to sustain "bankable" projects. It uses EDF 
money either to soften the terms of a commercial loan, or as risk capital to provide a soft 
loan or acquire an equity holding. Immediately after the Convention is signed, the 
programmable part of the EDF (i.e. excluding Stabex and Sysmin) is divided up, with an 
allocation to each ACP state and for regional projects involving two or more states. Each 
country's allocation is decided by the EEC on the basis, in theory, of purely objective 
criteria (population, GNP, etc.), but in practice normative considerations also intrude, 
giving the Commission some leeway. The difference between the possible upper and lower 
limits for each state is called the fourchette^^
^^Christopher Stevens, "Renegotiating Lome", pp. 17 and 18.
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Having done this, the EEC sends programming missions to each ACP state to 
agree a NIP which forms the framework for implementation. During Lomé I the missions 
sought to identify and cost the projects to be aided but this proved too inflexible so that 
under Lome U only the broad sectoral division of aid was agreed. Once the indicative 
programme is agreed, the selection and submission of projects can begin. There is 
supposed to be a precise division of responsibility between the two sides which is an 
essential element in the claim that Lome is a partnership of equals. The ACP alone decide 
on the project to be financed and are the client for all works (hence, they have 
responsibility for preparing all appraisals and documentation, and for signing contracts), 
while the EEC signs the cheques when it is satisfied that the projects are well-prepared. 
However, the EEC has acted like other donors and used its power of the purse to 
influence the choice of projects.*’
The approval of projects tends to be slow, partly because there are so many fingers 
in the pie. The ACP submit their proposals to the EEC Delegation stationed in the 
respective ACP countries. The Delegation makes an appraisal, and then forwards it to 
Brussels. The staff in DG VXII make their own appraisal, and then put the project to the 
EDF Committee, on which sit representatives of the EEC member states. The EDF 
Committee is supposed to be an advisory body, but in actual fact the committee's opinions 
are never ignored by DG VIII. Hence, each project has to surmount three separate hurdles 
(Delegation, Commission, and EDF Committee). At the implementation stage there is a 
similar dichotomy between theory and practice. In principle, the ACP state is solely 
responsible for implementation. In reality, the Commission has numerous opportunities to 
effect its will. It prescribes the tendering procedures and the contract conditions, vets the
" Ibid.. p. 18.
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tender dossiers to ensure that there is no discriminatory provision which might favour the 
tenderers of one country above those of another and, through the Delegation, vets the ACP 
state's decision on the award of contracts. This grey division of responsibilities frequently 
causes delay.
To express it schematically, the following procedural steps are required prior to 
EDF implementation:
1. - Decision is taken on financial allocation to each ACP state;
2. - Preparation of national indicative programmes, i.e. sectors for EDF financing, 
by the ACP states in consultation with the Commission and the EIB;
3. - Financial proposal submitted by ACP state to EEC Delegation which submits 
to Commission, then EDF Committee, for opinion and back to Commission for 
approval;
4. - Preparation of proiects by the ACP states and examination and approval of 
these projects by the Commission;
5. - Financial proposal then signed by ACP state and financial agreement, or 
primary commitment (that is to say, approval by the Commission of a proposition 
for project financing after consultation with the EDF Committee) is prepared and 
concluded;
6. - Primary commitment may contain several projects to be covered by secondarv 
commitment (that is to say, project execution plan) pursuant to which funds are 
released;
7. - Transfer of the funds. The whole process from the financial allocation to 
""Ibid.
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secondary commitment may take several months or even years/^
It is clear from the above discussions that a high level of administrative resources 
and technical expertise would be required to successfully complete the EDF procedural 
steps. Consequently, the efforts that go into the preparation of EDF programmes could 
have a disintegrative effect on ACP collective diplomacy as each ACP country becomes 
too engrossed in her individual project. The bulk of the EDF goes to the NIPs, but the 
remainder is allocated to a variety of other uses. Under Lomé H, for example, nearly 
US$3 00m was allocated to the EIB as "risk coital" to support commercial investments, 
largely in the 12 or so ACP countries sufficiently developed to generate commercial 
opportunities. These countries include Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon and Zimbabwe. 
And, over US$200m was allocated for emergencies and natural disasters.*^ In the 
administration of the EDF, three implementation organs are put in place: the ordonnateur 
principal (principal authorising officer) responsible for EDF resources at the Commission 
level, ordonnateur national (national authorising officer) representing each ACP state in 
the management of all operations financed by the EDF and the Commission delegate who 
follows up the implementation of EDF projects in each ACP s t a t e .T h e  principal
^^Schématisation of stages in EDF implementation based on readings from Christopher 
Stevens, "Renegotiating Lome", p. 18; "Bilan de la coopération financière et technique 
ACP-EEC 1976-1985" in Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens. N°2138, 42® Année, 31 
Octobre 1986, p.2741; and Bruce Zagaris, "Application of the Lomé IV Convention to 
Services and the potential opportunities for the Barbados International Financial Sector" 
in Bulletin 1991. Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, p.300.
^^ Comment - The Lomé Negotiations, on. cit.. pp.9-10.
André Auclert, o p . cit.. p.96.
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authorising officer decides on tendering procedures, commitment of EDF funds and takes 
other financial measures necessary for the proper execution of approved projects. The 
principal officer can reject decisions taken by the national authorising officer and, in that 
case, the ACP state concerned bears the financial consequences of the rejected decision.*^ 
The procedure of joint policy implementation is therefore a delicate one; and procedural 
problems have highlighted the casual and uncooperative attitude of the EEC within the 
joint ACP-EEC institutions.*^
The national authorising officer is designated by each ACP state and the profile 
of the designate varies from country to country. It ranges from senior civil servants in 
most Caribbean countries to ministers in most African states. The portfolios of the 
ministers also vary: from Planning, Economy or Trade to Finance or Foreign Affairs. In 
some cases such as the Bahamas, Grenada, Jamaica, Burundi (and certainly in the smaller 
Pacific countries), the EDF is administered from the Prime Minister's office.** The high 
profile of the designates reflects the importance attached to development cooperation by 
the ACP states although, quite clearly, the use of the Prime Minister's office in the smaller 
ACP states may be simply due to limited manpower and other resources. Nigeria, one of 
the biggest ACP states which has variously designated Ministers of Trade or Finance, has 
recently created a special institution, the National Planning Commission, for EEC
*^Alain Massiera et Luc Pagacz, L'Europe renforce sa coopération: Lomé FV. Paris: 
Editions L'Harmattan, 1992, p. 139.
*^Guy Martin, "African-European Economie Relations under the Lomé Convention: 
Commodities and the Scheme of Stabilization of Export Earnings" in African Studies 
Review, vol. 27, no. 3, September 1984, p.62.
88See André Auclert, op. cit.. pp.96-97.
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relations.*^ So far, the triangular "ordonnateur principal - delegate - ordonnateur national" 
arrangement appears to be satisfactory in ACP-EEC administrative cooperation and the 
model has been reproduced in European Community agreements with other geographical 
regions. This is the case with accords between the Community and the South and East 
Mediterranean (Maghreb and Mashrek) countries and Israel.
On the crucial subject of aid effectiveness in the ACP countries, an early study has 
shown that, overall, the political and institutional components of the Lomé Convention 
were beneficial to one ACP country, namely Malawi. Furthermore, in cases of policy 
disagreements with the IMF or the World Bank, the study concluded that, as a least 
developed, land-locked and poor country, Malawi would be better placed with the EEC's 
preferential mantle than without.^' A similar study on Sierra Leone suggested that the EEC 
was slow in project appraisal and that slow tendering procedures delayed project 
execution. The conclusions of the study also suggest that the Sierra Leonean Government 
must take some share of the blame for delays in the appraisal process in view of its 
tendency to try and "package and sell" projects, to the length of actually misinforming the 
Commission on costings, and in view of an attempted misappropriation of funds which
®^formation based on personal interview with Mr. O. G. Nnaji, Head of Chancery, 
Nigerian Embassy, Brussels, 12 May 1993.
90André Auclert, o p . cit.. p.98.
’^Adrian Hewitt, "Malawi and the EEC: the First Seven Years" in Christopher Stevens 
(ed.), EEC and the Third World: A Survev 4 - Renegotiating Lomé, London: Hodder and 
Stoughton in association with the Overseas Development Institute and the Institute of 
Development Studies, 1984, pp. 140 and 141.
231
was also responsible for holding up progress on EDF implementation.^^
These facts, in some ways, correspond to the argument in this thesis that ACP 
efforts and their impact on the group's diplomacy can play an important role in the 
development, or underdevelopment, of the ACP countries.
5.4.2 European Investment Bank (EIB)
The EIB, or Bank as it is generally known, is another institution for policy 
implementation of ACP-EEC cooperation. At the beginning, the Bank's mission, as laid 
down in Article 130 of the Treaty of Rome, was to contribute to the balanced 
development of the European Common Market. However, as part of the Community's 
cooperation agreements under the Financial Protocols of the Wme Convention, the Bank 
now also finances specified projects in ACP countries. The EIB also finances projects in 
Central and Eastern Europe as part of the Community's policy of supporting countries in 
the region that are establishing market economies.”  But as we shall see presently, 
financing of ACP projects is only a small fraction of the Bank's overall activities and that 
perhaps indicates that the ACP group is not even near the top of the Bank's priority 
financing areas. The unattractive position of the ACP countries implies that ACP 
diplomacy would need extra coordination to reap comparative benefits from the Bank's 
operations.
Each EEC member state subscribes to the Bank's capital of ECU 57.6 billion. 7.5
” Trevor W. Parfitt, "EEC Aid in Practice: Sierra Leone" in Christopher Stevens (ed.), 
ibid.. p. 164.
” Vacher's European Companion. May 1992, p. 156.
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per cent of the subscribed capital is paid in or due to be paid in with the remaining 92.5 
per cent acting as guarantee capital. Investment by small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) are financed through global loans in cooperation with banks and other financial 
intermediaries but finance for larger projects are negotiated directly with the Bank. Loans 
for industrial projects are given for about 4 to 12 years while loans for infrastructure 
projects can be given for 20 or more years. When approved, the Bank's funds are 
disbursed in single currencies or in currency mixes according to the borrower's preferences 
and the Bank's holdings. In 1991 the Bank provided finance totalling over ECU 15.3 
billion for investments within the Community and ECU 916 million for investments 
outside the EEC, including the ACP and other developing countries.
Article 1 (b) of the Financial Protocol in Lomé IV stipulates that the Bank shall 
provide ECU 1.2 billion in the form of loans over a period of five years commencing 1 
March 1990 for projects in the ACP countries (see Table 2). Calculated on the basis of 
equal yearly disbursements, the ACP countries in 1991 received just about ECU 240 
million, representing a small proportion of the Bank's commitments outside the 
Community in that year which was ECU 916 million. However, it is worth re-stating that 
the Bank's provisions are in addition to the EDF allocated to the ACP countries under the 
Lomé Convention. As noted earlier on, the current EDF VII provides for ECU 10.8 billion 
and this adds to the Bank's resources to make total provisions of ECU 12 billion to 
various ACP projects up to the end of 1994.
The Bank has participated in the ACP poorer countries not with its own capital but 
with risk capital at terms far more favourable (in most cases an interest rate of 2 per cent 
over 20 years) than the conditions governing loans from the Bank's own resources (5 to 
8 per cent, after allowing for interest rate subsidies from EDF resources, over 10 to 15
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years). The EIB often resorts to the procedure of co-financing operations in the ACP 
countries to spread the risk wider and to mobilise more resources. From 1981 to 1983, 
contracts on 30 projects with an investment value of 2 300m EUA were concluded, the 
EIB providing 10 per cent, the remainder coming from banks in the Community's member 
states, Arab funds, the World Bank and other financial institutions.’  ^ The following 
projects also benefitted from co-financing: development of the Senegal river, hydroelectric 
construction at Haute Tana and a railway line in the Congo.’^
Micro-projects also witnessed a spectacular development under Lomé 1 and 11. 
However, the procedures for the execution of micro-projects were later reviewed by the 
technical working party of the Article 108 Committee. Under the old rules, each individual 
micro-project was separately costed before it could be entered in an annual programme, 
with the danger that estimates could turn out to be too low by the time the decision on 
the whole programme was taken. The new system, however, allows for micro-projects to 
be approved in the form of an indicative programme designating sectors but not individual 
projects. Yet, there is an inherent problem with micro-projects: they are scattered over 
wide areas.’® Under Lomé 1, 39 ACP countries presented 2 000 projects and under Lomé 
n, 40 ACP countries presented 8 000 to the value of ECU 80 million. The development 
and construction of social infrastructure in urban areas have been the two main areas of
’^Ansgar Eussner, "Agro-Industrial Co-operation Between the European Community 
and the ACP Countries in Journal of Common Market Studies. Volume XXV, No. 1, 
September 1986, pp.53 and 55.
’®"Bilan de la coopération financière et technique ACP-EEC 1976-1985", o p . cit.. 
pp.2722-23.
96COM (84) 398 final, op. cit.. p.42.
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focus. Again, under Lomé I, 1 664 financing agreements were signed for a total of ECU 
1 946 million, and under Lome II, the figures were 586 agreements for ECU 2 195 million 
and 55 contracts for ECU 300 million respectively.^^ True to its form, the EIB does not 
act as a development bank and it has been criticised for the unproductive methods of its 
operation in the ACP countries. This merely leads us to the same conclusion as Adrian 
Hewitt that for the Lome cooperation package to be meaningful, the ACP countries require 
a development bank.^* Resources from such a bank can be then be partly utilised to 
finance proper coordination of ACP diplomacy.
It is clear from the above accounts that financial and technical cooperation under 
the Lome Convention is not limited to the mere sums stipulated in the Convention and 
those from the EDF and the EIB. Financial and technical cooperation in ACP-EEC 
relations involve administrative cooperation and include other kinds of aid. In fact, it 
covers sums provided by the general budget of the Community in the form of food and 
emergency aid, and cooperation aid with NGOs. But there are two underlying principles 
of cooperation: the safeguard of acquired rights and preferences and the equal treatment 
of all ACP countries. Deriving from the concept of equality of the ACP states, this implies 
a special regime of exemptions for the less developed, island and land-locked states.”  
With regard to the theoretical considerations in this study the tendency to show 
consideration for these states reflects two significant concepts. First, ACP group
” "Bilan de la coopération financière et technique ACP-EEC 1976-1985", o p . cit.. 
p.2723.
” Adrian Hewitt, "The Lomé Conventions: Entering a Second Decade", p. 108.
” See "Bilan de la coopération financière et technique ACP-EEC 1976-1985", op. cit.. 
p.2721.
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diplomacy which is usually responsive to EEC proposals also succumbs to intra-group 
minority influence. Finally, by emphasising the safeguard of acquired rights and by 
promoting equal treatment of ACP members, ACP diplomacy also does promote an 
integrative bargaining strategy which ensures group cohesion.
5.4.3 Foundation for ACP-EEC Cultural Cooperation
The history of the formation of the Foundation for ACP-EEC Cultural Cooperation 
not only underscores the awkward posture of the ACP countries when they knock at the 
EEC door with requests but also highlights an occasion when reactive ACP diplomacy 
was brought to a level of retortion. Following the first Report on ACP-EEC Cultural 
Cooperation which raised the idea of a cultural foundation, the ACP-EEC Consultative 
Assembly at its meeting in Luxembourg on 28-30 September 1981 adopted a Resolution 
on the creation of such a foundation. In 1983, the third Report and the Resolution of the 
Consultative Assembly at its meeting in Berlin on 19-21 September of the same year 
proposed to the Lomé HI negotiators the establishment of a cultural foundation. However, 
due to the reluctance of the Community to raise the volume of the EDF funds, the project 
for a cultural foundation was not even proposed by the ACP countries at those 
negotiations. The Foundation for ACP-EEC Cultural Cooperation was however established 
in Brussels on 19 June 1986, about two and a half months after the entry into force of 
Lome in. Article 141 of the Lome IV Convention later confirmed that the Foundation for 
ACP-EEC Cultural Cooperation was set up to conduct research and apply measures 
necessary to promote the cultural identities of the ACP and the EEC peoples.
At the outset of negotiations to formally incorporate the Foundation for ACP-EEC
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Cultural Cooperation into the Lomé IV Convention, the ACP group maintained that the 
Foundation should have its role expanded and its budget increased. But, the EEC showed 
some reservation to the idea of developing yet another instrument of cooperation, stressing 
that there were already too many in Lome HI. The Community maintained that it would 
be better to put the provisions already in place to more effective use. Besides, the 
application of the socio-cultural dimensions of cooperation depends up to 90 per cent on 
the ACP countries themselves.'®®
The Foundation is one of the most recent and the smallest of the joint ACP-EEC 
institutions. It has Ambassador Chasle of Mauritius as Secretary-General, and only two 
other staff! Yet, ironically, it has the widest range of interests. Herein lies the dilemma 
of ACP diplomacy. In effect, under the heading "Cultural and social cooperation". Title 
XI of the Lomé IV Convention states that the human and cultural dimension of 
development "must embrace all areas and be reflected in all development projects and 
programmes" (Article 139). This implies that for the negotiators of Lomé IV, cultural 
cooperation covers everything that constitutes the result of die interaction between man 
and his environment.'®' The news and information covered in the Cultural Bulletin of the 
Foundation for ACP-EEC Cultural Cooperation mirror the areas of interest of the 
Foundation. These range from reports on Conferences of African Ministers of Culture 
through ACP Short Story Competitions to cultural displays and theatrical plays in various
'®®Jean Tanguy, "Au coeur de la future convention de Lomé: la coopération culturelle" 
in Développement et Coopération. N°4/1989, p.25.
'®'row/ ce qui constitue le résultat de l'interaction entre l'homme et son milieu: Jean 
Tanguy, ibid.. p.25.
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ACP countries.*®^  In a similar perspective, a conference organised in conjunction with the 
Foundation was held in Brussels in March 1993. The theme of the conference was 
"Cultural Dialogue: Do we speak the same language?"’®^
The ACP and the EEC appeared to concur on the principles of the social and 
cultural dimensions of development in the Lomé Convention. However, they disagreed on 
the procedures for achieving these principles. This disagreement makes it difficult to 
transform the general ideas on social and cultural cooperation into a precise legal 
document. At the Lome IV negotiations, under the umbrella of cultural dialogue, one 
subject which in the past was considered a taboo, that is, population control - a question 
directly linked to cultural practices and to cultural systems, was openly discussed. Dieter 
Frisch, Director-General of Development at the Commission had said that Community 
intervention should only be seen as a support to the population programmes of the ACP 
countries.
However, there appeared to be a hitch in the cultural dialogue mainly on two 
subjects tackled in vain during the Lome HI negotiations: the status of ACP students in 
Europe (should they be accorded the same treatment as their European colleagues?) and 
the return of cultural objects (should former colonial powers return African or other art 
objects which they took possession of during colonisation or should ACP researchers at
'“ See, for example. Bulletin of the Foundation for ACP-EEC Cultural Cooperation, 
Quarterly Nr 0, circa 1990, and Cultural Bulletin of the Foundation for ACP-EEC Cultural 
Cooperation, Quarterly Issue Nr 1, July-September 1992.
'“ H E. Raymond Chasle (General Secretary of the ACP-EEC Foundation for Cultural 
Cooperation), Henry Saby (President of the Committee for Cooperation and Development 
at the European Parliament) and Prof. Pierre Salmon presented papers at the conference. 
See Public Lectures and Seminars section of Bibliography.
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least not be allowed access to thes? archives?). The Community responded to the ACP 
requests with essentially legal arguments. Besides, the Community sometimes added, 
would these art objects not be better preserved in European museums against the ravages 
of time than in precarious infrastructures in the ACP countries? Maybe so, replied the 
ACP group, but does the Community have the right to unilaterally decide to retain these 
objects? In a way, yes!, replied the EEC: to the extent that these objects form a part of 
the common heritage of mankind.’®^
At the end, however, the ACP countries and the EEC were able to insert Aimex 
XXIV to the Lomé IV Convention. Annex XXIV invites the EEC member states to 
cooperate in the drawing up of an inventory of ACP cultural objects in the Community 
with a view to returning them. But, the apparent concession on the part of the EEC is 
matched by Annex XXV which deals with the respect for and promotion of copy-rights. 
Since the EEC member states are technologically more advanced than the ACP countries, 
it is reasonable to expect that they will stand better to benefit from Aim ex XXV In terms 
of the effectiveness of ACP diplomacy, it can be said that the ACP countries came off 
relatively worse off in the specific negotiations on the return of cultural objects. This is 
because the provision on copy-rights arguably can be more readily applied to detrimental 
effect, for example, on the transfer of much-needed technology from the EEC to the ACP 
countries, than the provision on cultural objects can facilitate the return of cultural objects 
to their ACP owners.
^^Jean Tanguy, op. c it.. pp.25-26.
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5.4.4 ACP-EEC Institutional Arrangements and Impact on ACP Group Diplomacy
The analysis of ACP and EEC institutions in this chapter has shown that the 
Community has a body of highly developed institutions for policy coordination unmatched 
by the ACP organs. Although there is no evidence to suggest that the ACP-EEC 
relationship has machiavellian implications, the might of the EEC opposite the ACP 
remains disturbingly obvious at least from an ACP perspective. For example, figures on 
ACP-EEC trade are compiled by EUROSTAT, although the figures are subject to 
endorsement by the ACP s ta te s .T h e  issue is certainly not that the figures are compiled 
by EUROSTAT but that group decision might be adversely affected while the ACP 
countries wait for statistics from EUROSTAT.
But, the absence of independent ACP reports on the impact of ACP-EEC 
cooperation is clearly a reflection of the wider problems of inadequate management of 
manpower and resources in the ACP countries. And this lack of administrative competence 
has been identified as a major obstacle which constrains ACP diplomacy in the effort to 
reap benefits from relations with the EEC/^ Without independent statistics, some bigger- 
size ACP countries (Nigeria, for example) are unable to evaluate the real and potential 
benefits of participation in joint ACP cooperation with the EEC and bilateral relations 
with the EEC respectively. In other words, the question of whether, in her relations with
ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, Second Annual Report of the ACP-EEC Council 
of Ministers (1 April 1977 - 28 February 1978), Commission Report to the ACP-EEC 
Council of Ministers on the administration of finance and technical co-operation in 1977, 
Brussels: 14 March 1978, p.7.
’^ Mr. O. G. Nnaji, Head of Chancery, Nigerian Embassy, Brussels in a personal 
interview, 12 May 1993.
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the EEC, a relatively advanced ACP country is better off within or outside the ACP group 
remains unanswered as a result of lack of internal individual or collective ACP 
investigations.
Further problems relating to lack of proper internal ACP group coordination have 
been highlighted in the interactions between the representatives of the ACP countries 
based in Brussels and those involved in international negotiations in Geneva or 
Washington. One editor who followed the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations in 
Geneva in 1991 told this writer that, in some instances, negotiators from the ACP 
countries, in order to affirm their professional independence, would rather send queries 
to their country's capitals (with all the communications problems that could be involved) 
than contact their country's representatives in B ru s s e ls .I t  all sounds well so far, 
especially in view of the thesis in this study that the ACP countries should rely on 
themselves for policy coordination and implementation. The sad ending to the story, 
however, is that sometimes the queries have to be forwarded from the country capitals to 
the representatives in Brussels and then returned to the capitals before being forwarded 
again to the negotiators in Geneva. Ambassador Chasle of Mauritius concedes that there 
are problems of coordination but insists that ACP diplomats in Brussels and the ACP 
Secretariat have on occasion prepared reports, for example on sugar, for their counterparts 
negotiating in Geneva.’®* But, it is still evident from the above accounts that a 
considerable amount of time and precious ACP resources are wasted as a result of lack
’®^ This account is partly based on discussions with My ham Vander Stichele, editor of 
Lomé Briefing.
’®*Personal interview with His Excellency Raymond Chasle, Ambassador of Mauritius 
to the EEC, 21 May 1993.
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of proper internal ACP coordination. To say the least, the delay caused by such events can 
be disadvantageous to ACP group diplomacy.
Other pertinent questions need to be addressed by both the ACP and the EEC 
negotiators: What is the use of open competition for EDF projects between ACP and 
European businesses when the European companies are much better established than their 
ACP counterparts? A more equitable procedure in ACP-EEC cooperation should 
encourage the growth of ACP businesses by ensuring that bidding for certain contracts are 
reserved exclusively for ACP registered businesses, possibly working closely with EEC 
partners. That is one way in which ACP and joint ACP-EE(] institutional arrangements 
can contribute to economic growth in the ACP countries. Given adequate manpower and 
finance ACP group diplomacy should formulate these and other proposals aimed at 
enhancing effectiveness of ACP-EEC cooperation.
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CHAPTER SIX: ISSUES IN ACP-EEC COOPERATION AND 
ACP DIPLOMACY UNDER LOMÉ I AND U
This chapter examines some of the issues which first entered into ACP-EEC 
relations during the Lomé I and II negotiations. The implied principles of ACP-EEC 
cooperation, that is trade and aid preferences, formed the basis of these early negotiations. 
The issues examined include both those which were negotiated prior to the signing of the 
Lome Convention in 1975 and those discussed after the signing of the Convention. For 
example, the EEC's GSP became a subject of EEC development policy in the late 1960s 
at a time when the Yaounde Associates were the only participants in ACP-EEC 
development cooperation. This scope of analysis is justified on the grounds that the 
present study covers the period from 1957 to 1990. Thus, our discussion of any aspect of 
ACP-EEC cooperation goes as far back towards 1957 as possible. With regard to ACP 
diplomacy, this chapter further demonstrates the reactiveness of ACP diplomacy on aid 
and trade issues. The concepts of aid and trade preferences are discussed with reference 
to ACP collective bargaining and the GSP introduced by the EEC in 1971.
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6.1 THE EEC GENERALISED SCHEME OF PREFERENCES (GSPV THE COMMON 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY (CAP). FOOD AID AND SPILL OVER EFFECT ON ACP 
DIPLOMACY
The debate over the Community's GSP started in the late 1960s while the EEC 
association comprised only the French-speaking Associated African countries. Consequent 
to this fact, the Associated countries stood alone against other developing countries in 
arguing for the safeguard of the margin of preferences which they enjoyed under the 
Yaounde Convention. However, the arguments of the Associates were later supported by 
developing countries such as Jamaica which received preferences in the markets of other 
developed countries. (Jamaica received preferences in the market of Britain). This event, 
in turn, helped the development of ACP diplomacy by bring together Caribbean and 
French-speaking African views.
6.1.1 The GSP and Soill over Effect of the negotiations on ACP Diolomacv
Concessionary trading arrangements were the basis of Eurafrican relations and the 
move by the EEC to extend preferences to all developing countries in the late 1960s 
understandably aroused a high level of interest in the Associated countries. In 1966, 80 
per cent of the exports of the Associated African States and Malagasy (AASM) to the 
Community were either agricultural or mineral products. Exports of minerals such as 
copper, diamonds, iron ore, aluminium, phosphates, petroleum, manganese, uranium, tin 
and wolfram entered the Community market duty-free from all sources and the AASM 
therefore received no preferences on them. But, the principal AASM exports were, in
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descending order of importance, coffee, saw logs and veneer sheets, cocoa beans, cotton, 
groundnuts, palm oil and oilcakes, cocoa butter and pineapples. These agricultural 
products benefitted from preferential access ranging from 4 per cent for palm and palm 
kernel oils to 32 per cent in 1969 for canned pineapples and pineapple juice. Yet, most 
of those which could be counted as processed agricultural goods (principally groundnut 
oil, palm and palm kernel oils, cocoa butter and canned pineapples) were products in 
which the main competition for AASM producers came from other developing countries. 
The Associates were, therefore, expected to press against the introduction of a GSP 
scheme by the Community.’ In group diplomatic terms, such concerted pressure by the 
Associates against the EEC would represent integrative bargaining since the pressure 
would foster group cohesion among the Associates.
A comprehensive preference scheme, covering all processed and semi-processed 
goods as well as "manufactures" strictly defined, was likely to deprive the eighteen 
Yaounde Associates of preferential trading advantages which many of them regarded as 
significant. The Associates were not only concerned to maintain existing preferences, but 
also to create conditions under which any new export-oriented processing or 
manufacturing ventures they might sponsor would still be assured of better terms in the 
Community market than those of other developing countries.^
The potential conflict between the preferential access given by the EEC to exports 
from its African Associates and the EEC aim of creating a wider preference scheme for
’Peter Tulloch, The Politics of Preferences - EEC Policy Making and the Generalised 
System of Preferences, London: Croom Helm in association with the Overseas 
Development Institute, 1975, p.66.
%id.. p.65.
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all developing countries was made even sharper by the timing of the negotiations. The 
first Yaounde Convention which had come into force on 1 June 1964, was due to expire 
and be renewed in 1969, when the OECD and UNCTAD discussions on the GSP were 
coming to a head. Clearly, the question of how a generalised system would affect the 
special preferences of the Associates was certain to be a live issue in the 1968-69 
Association talks. The African Associates were in a better position than any other group 
of developing countries to make their views known to the Community authorities through 
diplomatic missions in Brussels and through direct participation in joint institutions with 
the Community.^
The 1968-69 Association renegotiations formally began on 19 December 1968 in 
Brussels. The initial position of the Associates, supported by the Association Committee, 
was that the tariff preferences extended in their favour by the Community should be 
maintained, even strengthened. An Association Committee report originally adopted in 
October 1968 and sent to the EEC-AASM Parliamentary Conference meeting in January 
1969 stated that
"it would be desirable at least to maintain the present preferences in favour of 
Associates, preferences which have not in fact hindered the normal development 
of Community trade with other developing countries... If there was a generalisation 
of preferences for finished and semi-finished products from all developing 
countries, it would be desirable that preferential treatment be reserved for the
%id.. pp.65-66.
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Associated States.
The Parliamentary Conference itself stressed that regional preferences should not 
be reduced except in exchange for corresponding advantages. Within the Community, 
France was the main supporter of this view. The President of the Council of Ministers, 
Mr Gaston Thom of Luxembourg also lent support to this position. In May 1969, in a 
private intervention in the Association Parliamentary Conference, he made a vigorous plea 
against the tendency to dissolve the association in a world preference system.^
The coincidence in time of the peak of the GSP negotiations with those for the 
renewal of the Yaoundé Convention certainly brought the issues involved even more 
sharply into focus. Not only was the attitude of the Associates to the GSP involved; the 
debate opened up the division within the Community itself between those member states, 
mainly the Netherlands and Germany, which wanted to make the ties of the Association 
more flexible in favour of a world approach to the problem of development, and those, 
led by France with its close ties with the majority of the associated states, which preferred 
to keep most of the Community's trade concessions for the AASM.® In effect, the 
discussions over the EEC's GSP reflected the history of trade relations between the EEC 
and developing countries which, in sum, contained two approaches regarding the conduct 
of these relations, namely the globalist and regionalist approaches. The former approach 
adopted a view that trade and aid benefits should be offered to a wide range of developing
^EEC/AASM Parliamentary Conference Report January 1969. Cited by Peter Tulloch, 
ibid.. p.70.
A^gence Europe. 23 May 1969 in Peter Tulloch, ibid.. pp.70-71.
®Peter Tulloch, ibid.. p.69.
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countries and the latter favoured economic relations with developing countries on a 
discriminatory basis to the benefit of countries having historical and political ties with the 
EEC/
Other developing countries enjoying preferential access to major Western markets 
later refused to accept the potential loss of their own privileged treatment. This event was 
a boost to ACP group diplomacy because it provided a basis for concerted efforts among 
affected countries. The EEC African Associates were the most militant group,* but they 
received strong support from some Commonwealth countries, in particular, the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. Jamaica's position with regard to the preferences she received 
in the British market was comparable to the stance of the Associates with regard to the 
preferences they received in the EEC market. The Jamaican Minister of Trade and 
Industry declared:
"In all frankness we cannot identify ourselves with the proposal to dismantle all 
the existing preferences for the developing countries... we would strenuously resist 
any effort to bring about the removal of the preferences we now enjoy so long as 
Britain is prepared to continue their application."^
With regard to subsequent developments in ACP diplomacy, this statement re-
^Delsie M. Gandia, The EEC's Generalised Scheme of Preferences and the Yaounde 
and Other Agreements. New Jersey: Allanheld & Osmun, 1981, p.3.
*Marc Williams, Third World Cooperation: the Group of 77 in UNCTAD. London: 
Pinters, 1991, p.118.
Proceedings 1964. vol.II, p. 192. Cited by Marc Williams, ibid.
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emphasises the fact that the much-discussed differences between the French- and English- 
speaking countries were not based exclusively on linguistics but were also based on 
divergences in the historical and economic links of these countries to Europe. In other 
words, arguments for and against certain concepts in ACP-EEC trade relations (reverse 
preferences, association, etc.) could be linked directly to the benefits that each country 
hoped to gain from one arrangement or the other.
There was a spill over effect in the bargaining processes over the GSP. The 
negotiations were affected by membership of other organisations and this had both 
negative and positive impacts on concerted African, Caribbean and Pacific diplomacy. 
Under Article 12 of the first Yaounde Convention, the Associates and the Community 
agreed to keep each other informed on matters of commercial policy. Three areas were 
particularly stressed: the suspension, alteration or abolition of customs duties, the granting 
of tariff quotas at reduced or zero duties, and the introduction, reduction or abolition of 
import quotas with respect to third countries, if these measures were likely to harm the 
interests of any EEC member state or Yaounde Associate. The extension of GSP fell in 
the centre of the area covered by this Article, and the EEC had to take account of the 
views of the Associates in framing the GSP.'® To that extent, the extension of GSP had 
a negative effect on joint African diplomacy because African interests appeared to be 
conflict: the French-speaking countries as Associates had preferential access to the EEC 
market and the other countries represented a threat to the preferential position of the 
Associates in the EEC market.
Furthermore, at UNCTAD II, the Yaounde group had endorsed the Charter of 
Algiers. The Charter discussed generalised preferences and included two provisions
'®Peter Tulloch, o p . cit.. p.69.
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relating directly to the interests of this group. Firstly, it stated that any GSP should be 
constructed in such a way that the least advanced among developing countries might 
benefit from it. Secondly, it stated that any GSP should ensure at least equivalent 
advantages to developing countries which already benefited from preferences in developed 
countries (i.e. mainly the Commonwealth and Yaounde countries) to enable these special 
preferences to be suspended.” In this respect, the African Associates of the EEC were able 
to use both their diplomatic missions in Brussels and the institutionalised structure of the 
association to put pressure on the EEC to safeguard their special interests. The 
preferences granted under the Yaounde Convention were later extended into the Lomé 
Convention in 1975. Here again, developing countries which were not signatories to the 
Lome Convention, particularly the Latin American countries, complained about the 
discrimination instituted by the ACP-EEC arrangements. However, the existence of ACP 
members within the Latin American Group (of the G77) was important in reducing a 
cleavage between the ACP and other developing countries over the EEC's association 
system. The Commonwealth Caribbean countries vigorously defending the Lome 
Agreement in the Latin American Group were effective in moderating that group's 
hostility.’^  To the extent that the preferences granted under the Yaoundé Convention were 
extended into the Lomé Convention which benefited a greater number of ACP countries, 
it can be argued that the extension of preferences in this consideration had a positive
” Charter of Algiers, Programme of Action, Section B, paras (f) and (g) respectively, 
UNCTAD n. Proceedings, Vol.I, p.434. United Nations, 1968 in Peter Tulloch, ibid.. 
pp.69-70.
*^Marc Williams, o p . cit.. p. 116.
'"Ibid.. p.143.
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impact on ACP diplomacy. This was demonstrated by ACP efforts to defend the group 
interest at the Lomé I negotiations.
Another example of a spill over effect of the EEC association on other 
international relations was presented during the multi-Abre negotiations and expressed 
positively on a joint ACP-EEC level. The Community's position in the negotiations was 
outlined at a meeting of the ACP-EEC Sub-committee on Trade Cooperation on 4 
November 1977, and it suggested that ACP countries would not be accorded preferential 
treatment if they were significant suppliers of "sensitive" multi-fibre products. However, 
it was decided that the ACP countries were not significant suppliers of these products. 
But, in the spirit of cooperation and solidarity, and as pre-emptive consultation against 
unfavourable protective measures, the Community apprised the ACP states of the list of 
products which would attract duties in the event of a sudden increase in imports.
Again, at its meeting in Fiji in 1977, the ACP Council of Ministers had expressed concern 
at the Commission proposal for the setting up of a European agency for trade cooperation 
with developing countries at large. Following the positive pressure of concerted ACP 
diplomacy, the Council of Ministers agreed that if set up, the operation of such a body 
should in no way jeopardise the interests of the ACP states. One further example 
underlines the spill over effect of ACP-EEC cooperation into other international relations. 
In February 1978, the Committee of ACP Ambassadors requested the Community and its 
member states to contribute to the setting up of the UN Special Fund for Landlocked
ACP-EEC Convention of Lome, Second Annual Report of the ACP-EEC Council 
of Ministers (1 April 1977 - 28 February 1978), Commission Report to the ACP-EEC 
Council of Ministers on the administration of finance and technical co-operation in 1977, 
Brussels: 14 March 1978, pp. 12-13.
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for Landlocked Countries.*^ Several ACP countries (44 under Lomé IV, Article 330) fall 
in the category of less developed, island and land-locked states, and the ACP proposal was 
another positive manifestation of collective ACP diplomacy. It is so far clear that, on the 
whole, discussions on trade preferences tend to have a positive effect on integrative ACP 
diplomacy when these countries perceive their interests to be similar. On the other hand, 
trade discussions had a negative effect on concerted African diplomacy at the outset of 
Eurafrican association when economic ideology in the African countries were perceived 
to be in conflict.
Closely related to the ideological differences discussed in previous chapters of this 
study, the GSP negotiations were arguably the second most important factor which pulled 
the EEC Associates and the non-Associates further away from each other for the better 
part of the 1960s. Earlier debates over preferences had indeed turned into a running battle 
between the Associates and the non-Associates as the >var over the principle of 
preferences was fought out in the UNCTAD. The non-Associates had voted as a bloc in 
favour of calling the first UNCTAD in 1963. But, the Associates had supported the 
Western view that the conference should be held in 1964. They felt that the earlier date 
was an implicit criticism of their association with the EEC, since one of the reasons for 
the proposed early date was an attempt to conclude the conference before the proposed 
British entry into the EEC.’* Thus, behavioural cleavages emerged between the 
Francophone and the Anglophone African states. Behavioural cleavages refer to voting 
patterns, organisational membership and support for group cohesion. The presence of these 
cleavages explains lack of support to third world positions by the Francophone countries
’%id.. pp.26 and 67.
’^ Marc Williams, o p . cit.. p.34.
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and their support to the EEC.
The Francophone African states produced a further note of dissension when they 
abstained en bloc over the inclusion of the Cairo Declaration on the agenda of the 
committee. The Cairo Conference was called from 9-18 July 1962 to discuss the Problems 
of Economic Development and was an event of paramount importance in the shaping of 
Third World solidarity on economic issues. However, the Francophone countries had not 
been invited to the Cairo meeting and so they argued that the Cairo Declaration was 
unrepresentative of Third World view s.A gain, an initial draft resolution submitted by 
thirty-nine developing countries proposed the elimination of preferential arrangements 
between developed and developing countries, but the Associates refused to accept such 
a formulation since it meant the loss of the preferences they enjoyed under the Yaounde 
Convention. A compromise was, however, finally found in support of the abolition of 
selective preferences with the proviso that compensation would be provided for those 
countries whose preferential market access would be phased out.’*
The EEC's GSP was eventually introduced in 1971. To the extent that none of the 
Associates' major processed agricultural exports were included in the scheme introduced 
in 1971, the pressure which the Associates, supported by France, brought to bear on the 
EEC association through their participation in other fora may be said to have succeeded. 
But, it should also be noted that the provisions of the second Yaounde Convention on 
AASM preferences were phrased in much less specific terms than those of the first 
Convention. This left the way open for the extension to other developing countries of 
tariff preferences given by the Community to the Associates, subject only to consultations
’"Ibid.. pp.33-34.
’*Ibid.. p.46.
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within the Association Council.*’
The conclusion of the GSP debates, however, set in motion the procedures for 
consultation promised in the Lomé Convention. It should said that in contemporary ACP 
diplomacy, voting pattern and organisational membership in the ACP has actually 
promoted cohesion as the countries have all stood in support of issues which are 
favourable to members of their organisation. The ACP states at the Council of Ministers 
meeting in Fiji in 1977 declared their support for the EEC's GSP in favour of developing 
countries. However, they emphasised the specific nature of the ACP group of states which 
embraces most of the "least advanced countries" in the world. Moreover, the international 
community, at the 7th Special Session of the UN General Assembly and at UNCTAD IV, 
had recognised the need to safeguard the preferences which the ACP states already 
enjoyed.^ ** The ACP states therefore requested that consultations be opened and 
mechanisms be put in place for the monitoring of the GSP through ACP-EEC 
cooperation.^*
The Community agreed to the proposal of the ACP states and a Joint Working 
Party (ACP-EEC Working Party on the effects of the EEC generalised preferences system) 
was set up. At its meeting on 23 November 1977, the Committee of Ambassadors
*’Peter Tulloch, op. cit.. p.71. The provisions are stated in Article 15, Yaoundé II 
Convention.
^°The Resolution of the UN General Assembly was adopted on September 19, 1975: 
See K. B. Lall, "An Indian Point of View" in "The Lomé Convention and Third Countries: 
As seen by Outsiders" in Alting von Geusau, Frans A. M. (ed.). The Lomé Convention 
and a New International Economic Order. Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1977, p. 149.
*^ ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, Second Annual Report of the ACP-EEC Council 
of Ministers (1 April 1977 - 28 February 1978), o p . cit.. p.8
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indicated its agreement to the name, terms of reference and composition of this working 
party. The working party held its inaugural meeting on 17 January 1978 when it 
determined its working methods and list of products to be given particular consideration. 
The list included wood products, in particular plywood; and fruit and vegetables, 
especially tinned pineapple or products facing competition from Mediterranean countries. 
As it is usually the case with such working parties, its members met as often as necessary 
to prepare documentation and then to report to the Sub-committee on Trade Cooperation.^ 
The Sub-committee on Trade Cooperation held a meeting on this issue on 4 
November 1977 and the ACP states submitted specific comments and requests relating to 
the Community preferences scheme. At the meeting of the Committee of Ambassadors on 
23 November 1977, the Community gave information on the progress in the discussions 
of the schemes for 1978, including particular references to the amendments made to the 
Commission proposal to accommodate the requests of the ACP states. Meeting in Lusaka 
in December 1977, the Ministers of the ACP States reaffirmed the ACP-EEC Committee 
of Ambassadors consultations concerning the setting up of a joint Working Party. The 
Committee of Ambassadors gave its agreement, at its meeting on 23 November 1977, to 
the desirability of close consultation between the Community and the ACP states, either 
in Brussels or Geneva, in connection with the negotiatio*ns. In this context, the Community 
gave information at the meeting of the Sub-committee on Trade Cooperation on 31 
January 1978, on progress made and problems arising.^^
However, despite the Community's GSP and efforts made towards the extension 
of preferential access for manufactures, Africa's trade remains very fragile and still
%^ d .. p.9. 
^^ Ibid.. pp. 10-11.
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depends heavily on the Community market as an outlet for primary products. In 1987-88, 
primary products represented 57 per cent of Mali's exports, 47 per cent of Benin's, 45 per 
cent of Liberia's, 35 per cent of Central African Republic's, 31 per cent of Burkina Faso's, 
28 per cent of Chad's, and 16 per cent of Cameroon's. The fragility of most African 
economies is demonstrated by the fact that, following the fall in commodity prices, loss 
from foreign exchange earnings reached $19 billion - representing a third of the earnings 
of African states - in 1986 alone. The accelerated erosion of the trade preferences 
accorded to ACP countries under the double effect of the extension of the GSP to all 
developing countries and the Uruguay Round of GATT talks promises to cause a further 
disequilibrium in commodity trade^  ^ to the disadvantage of the ACP countries.
Although ACP internal diplomacy has achieved remarkable success in maintaining 
group cohesion through integrative bargaining (that is, negotiating for common benefits 
of members), ACP diplomacy with regard to the EEC has appeared to be only reactive 
(that is, it only responded to EEC initiatives over the GSP which at any rate related to all 
developing countries). However, ACP reactiveness with specific regard to the GSP debates 
was possibly due to lack of experience of negotiating as an ACP group at these early 
stages of joint cooperation with the EEC.
Amadou B. Touré, "Les pays africains face à l'échéance européenne de 1992" in 
Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens. N°2400, 47® Année, 8 novembre 1991, p.2837.
^^ The Uruguay round of GATT talks was concluded on 15 December 1993. It has 
been argued by many commentators that Africa's trade will be \vorse off under the new 
GATT arrangements.
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6.1.2 The CAP and Food Aid
We have said that ACP diplomacy is generally reactive on bread-and-butter issues. 
In this regard, the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and food aid are two areas 
which illustrate this type of ACP diplomacy. The CAP is one issue which traditionally 
divides the EEC side in ACP-EEC cooperation. The policy involves the granting of 
special subsidies to EEC farmers and the imposition of high tariffs on agricultural exports 
to the EEC in order to protect local producers. CAP subsidies absorb 65 per cent of the 
Community's budget yet the policy has also raised Community food prices by eliminating 
market competition.^^ EEC debates over the CAP are often very heated and French 
farmers are quick to litter the streets with farm produce in protest against any moves by 
the EEC Commission to tamper with the agricultural sector. Furthermore, in ACP-EEC 
relations, the CAP is a no-go area and products covered by the policy have become 
characteristic exceptions to the list of ACP products which can be allowed duty-free entry 
into the Community. Thus, ACP diplomacy is virtually unable to address the issue of 
products covered by the CAP
In the mean time, the food situation in Africa - and therefore for a large part of 
the ACP countries - has not ceased to deteriorate, with a 1 per cent reduction in per capita 
production every year. This situation endangers the lives of millions of people. In view 
of these realities, there is compelling evidence that the Lomé Convention has not been
®^See Dermot McAleese, "External Trade Policy of the European Community" in 
Dermot McAleese et al..., Africa and the European Communitv after 1992. Washington, 
D. C : Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, 1993, p.20.
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effective in preventing deterioration in living standards.^^ The food problem in Africa was 
highlighted by the former ACP Secretary General, Edwin Carrington, when he stated that 
for every 100 units of food produced in sub-Sahara Africa in 1970 only 85 units were 
produced in 1980 whereas for every 100 units imported, 225 were imported in the same 
period.^* The Caribbean Regional Food Strategy and the Lagos Plan of Action adopted in 
1980 suggest a new understanding of the need to promote agricultural development and 
to develop the agro-industrial sector,^ ® but remain ineffective in countering the food 
problem in ACP countries.
During the Lomé IV negotiations, the ACP countries demanded for further 
preferential tariffs on the exports of products subject to the Communty's CAP The ACP 
countries met with a certain amount of sympathy from Britain, Germany and the 
Netherlands, all EEC member states which do not grow the crops in question, e.g. figs, 
early strawberries and citrus fruits. However, the South European countries, in particular 
Spain, Greece and Italy, were not willing to reduce their own sales prospects by granting 
further concessions to ACP producers. They argued, instead, for an increased EDF/° Thus,
^^Gérard Fuchs, "La Convention de Lomé à l'épreuve" in L'Eurooe en formation. 
N°256 - Avril/Juin 1984, p.77.
^*Edwin W. Carrington, "Lomé HE: un troisième essai de coopération économique et 
sociale entre une moitié des nations du monde - développées et en développement: un 
premier aperçu" in Obiectif Europe. Nos 26-27, Décembre 1984, p. 15.
^^Ansgar Eussner, "Agro-Industrial Co-operation Between the European Community 
and the ACP Countries in Journal of Common Market Studies. Volume XXV, No. 1, 
September 1986, p.51.
“^Jûrgen Nôtzold and Klaus Freiherr von der Ropp, "Lomé IV: A Chance for Black 
Africa's Return to the World Economy?" in Aussen Politik. Vol.41, No.2/90, p. 185.
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the southward expansion of the EEC into Greece in 1982 and Spain and Portugal in 1986 
created unfavourable conditions for ACP agricultural exports to the Community. The 
Northern EEC member states consider barriers against ACP agricultural exports as 
unnecessary; the Southern member states regard them as insufficient. The pressures 
exerted by the Southern EEC member states over agricultural debates and EEC 
programmes such as the CAP which favour them combine to reduce investments, 
especially in the agricultural sectors, of the ACP states. To illustrate the negative impact 
of this trend towards de-investment, it is pertinent to recall that most of the ACP countries 
depend on agricultural exports for a large percentage of their foreign exchange earnings. 
Yet, financial aid to ACP countries, both within the framework of the Lomé Convention 
and in bilateral arrangements, is competing with new EEC interests aimed at expanding 
economic cooperation into all of Europe including Southern and Eastern Europe.
EEC agricultural surpluses, a by-product of heavy farm subsidies in the framework 
of the CAP, are transmitted as food aid to needy parts of the world including the ACP 
countries. But food aid has far-reaching implications. In instances of natural disasters such 
as drought, desertification, flooding, etc. food aid can certainly provide welcome relief, 
and in this case, it is referred to as emergency aid. However, traditional food aid is quite 
similar to financial aid in that it forces strong conditionalities and there are high economic 
prices to be paid for undue dependence on it. Consequently, food aid occasions the 
inconveniences associated with financial aid as scathingly described by Teresa Hay ter and 
Catharine Watson.^^
"%id.. p.191.
^^Teresa Hayter and Catharine Watson, Aid: Rhetoric and Realitv. London: Pluto 
Press, 1985. Definitions of aid are given in Chapter 1 and an analysis of the World Bank
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By its very nature, food aid has a wide-ranging impact on the agricultural sector - 
the main stay of most ACP economies. In essence, the so-called food aid provides a 
perfect example of dumping, a practice which is against the principles of the GATT. For 
example, a study has shown that EEC beef dumping in West Africa floods the market 
with cheap produce and threatens local butchers for whom sales from beef is the only 
source of livelihood.Similarly, an on-going study on the effect of the CAP on the 
foreign exchange earnings of six developing countries (Brazil, the Philippines, Burkina 
Faso, Guyana, Jamaica and Zimbabwe) - which includes four ACP countries - will tend 
to show that surplus agricultural commodities transmitted by the EEC onto world markets 
reduce market shares of developing countries and depress world prices. These heavily 
subsidised EEC surpluses further undermine food systems in developing countries, reduce 
household incomes of staple food producers and discourage government investment in 
agriculture.^^
The problems with the CAP and food aid are compounded by the downturn in 
world economic growth and by the attitudes of the ACP countries which, as a result of 
stagnant economic growth, have become increasingly dependent on food aid for the 
nutritional needs of their populations. Not so long after the entry into force of the first
strategy in the agricultural sector is provided in Chapter 8.
^^Peter Madden, "Brussels Beef Carve-up - EC beef dumping in west Africa" in 
Viewpoint No.3 April 1993, Christian Aid Policy Unit. At a lecture in December 1993, 
Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, former President of Zambia, also stated that wheat farmers in 
Zambia could not harvest and market their produce in 1993 because cheaper produce from 
the EEC (financed by the CAP) had entered into the Zambian market.
^^ West Africa. No.3966, 27 September - 3 October 1993, p. 1720.
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Lomé Convention, the ACP states renewed their interest in the possibility of obtaining 
supplies of surplus agricultural products from the Community on favourable terms/^ In 
these circumstances, it is difficult to blame the CAP and the EEC for the negative effects 
of food aid on the economies of the ACP countries any more than we should question 
ACP dependence on this source of food supply. This reasoning also relates to one of the 
themes in this thesis that ACP diplomacy should be self-reliant in terms of policy study 
and prioritisation of objectives.
As part of the discussions on policy dialogue, it became possible during the Lomé 
m  negotiations to link the problems in the agricultural sector with the overall development 
strategy of an ACP country. The argument could be related to the concept of self-reliant 
development. The Lomé HI negotiators addressed a certain number of questions relating 
to the effectiveness of development cooperation. For example, what use, at the end of the 
day, is it to construct an irrigation system in a region where the unchanging peasant 
tradition is that of dry farming, or to construct an ultra-modem factory which after a few 
years will run at 50 or 30 per cent of its capacity due to the scarcity of spare parts which 
a poor country will be unable to replace as result of shortage of foreign exchange? It was 
argued that funds were sometimes wasted as a result of the lack of a global conception 
of projects to integrate the social and cultural dimensions of development. New ideas and 
new approaches appeared necessary and they were articulated in a new strategic concept:
ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, Annual Report of the ACP-EEC Council of 
Ministers (1 April 1976 - 31 March 1977), Commission Report to the ACP-EEC Council 
of Ministers on the administration of finance and technical aid in 1976, Suva, 14 April 
1977, p.25.
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that of self-centred development.^**
In terms of occasional dynamism in ACP diplomacy, the concept of self-centred 
development had been adopted by the OAU in the Lagos Plan in 1980. The EEC took this 
concept into account in the Lomé HI negotiations, which pointed to a fundamental change 
in approach. In economic terms, the adoption of this concept suggested "reasoning not 
merely in terms of particular projects, but in terms of strategies''^^ Two illustrations have 
been given of self-centred development in the key sectors of industrialisation and 
agriculture. In the area of industrialisation, for example, apart from some obviously big 
projects for the transformation of certain natural resources to allow the producing country 
to benefit from a maximum value-added, the problem of industrialisation becomes one 
mainly of the promotion of SMEs, capable of satisfying through simple technologies, basic 
consumer needs in the food sector (preservation of foodstuffs, fertilisers for higher 
agricultural yields), housing (affordable construction materials), equipment (supply of pure 
water), and so on. The role of foreign capital will be no less indispensable, although rural 
savings can be encouraged by means of remunerative agricultural prices. But, much more 
than big international co-financing, it is soft-lending to local development banks which 
can prove useful.^*
In the agricultural sector, it will no longer be sufficient to build a particular 
irrigated zone, but to answer a certain number of questions on the best ways for a given 
country to move towards greater self-sufficiency in food production. Hence, the new
^^Gérard Fuchs, "La Convention de Lomé à l'épreuve", p.77.
Raisonner non plus uniquement en termes de projets précis, mais en termes de 
stratégies”: "Gérard Fuchs, ibid.. p.78.
^*Gérard Fuchs, ibid.
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approach will lead to an examination of various crucial questions concerning adequate 
remunerative prices to be paid to peasants, the possible effects of these prices on urban 
consumers, the adaptation of new technologies to the specific social and cultural 
environment, the type of training to be given in response to these new technologies, and 
so on. And, in all these efforts, traditional food aid will only appear as one instrument 
among several others which should be generally replaced by new forms of cooperation.^’ 
In all, although ACP diplomacy demonstrated dynamism through the adoption of 
the Lagos Plan of Action and the Caribbean Regional Food Strategy, the overall impact 
of ACP efforts was undermined by the fact that these programmes depended to a large 
extent on the goodwill of the EEC and other Western institutions for the transfer of 
adequate technology for their implementation. Hence, ACP diplomacy, although well 
articulated in the Lomé IV negotiations, was not sufficient in bringing about an 
improvement in the food situation of the ACP states. In the mean time, ACP diplomacy 
could only retort to EEC actions over the CAP and food aid
% i d .
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6 2 FINANCIAL AID AND TRa DE RELATIONS: MIXED BLESSING FOR ACP 
DIPLOMACY
ACP-EEC cooperation consists of two elements: financial aid and trade 
preferences. These elements have had a considerable impact in splitting ACP coalition to 
the extent that some ACP countries benefit mainly from aid while others benefit mainly 
from trade. However, aid has earned its place overall as the traditional element and it has 
gained weight in EEC development cooperation, both on its own merit and in relation to 
trade preferences. EEC trade preferences to the ACP countries have lost much of their 
significance as tariff liberalisation under GATT has continued in the post-World War II 
period and the EEC has extended tariff preferences in manufactures to all developing 
countries'*® since 1971. This section looks at the effect of different aid and trade benefits 
on ACP diplomacy.
6.2.1 Financial Aid and ACP-EEC Trade Relations
Relations with the EEC is the raison d'être of the ACP group and financial aid and 
trade relations are vital ingredients of these relations. The importance of aid and trade in 
ACP-EEC cooperation can, therefore, not be over-emphasised. It also follows that a close 
examination of aid and trade relations is indispensable in the analysis of ACP diplomacy.
'*®Enzo Grilli and Markus Riess, "EC Aid to Associated Countries: Distribution and
Determinants" in Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv. Vol. 128 1992, p.202.
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6.2.1.1 Financial Aid
When considered against the background of the increase in the number of countries 
participating in ACP-EEC cooperation, it becomes clear that EEC financial aid to the ACP 
countries has not recorded a high level of increase. Bilateral EEC aid to developing 
countries totalled $12.8 billion in 1988, or 0.3 per cent of the Community's GNP, as 
compared to $1.58 billion, or nearly 0.5 per cent, of GNP in 1963. On the other hand, 
multilateral EEC aid in 1988 amounted to $2.5 billion, equivalent to 0.06 per cent of the 
combined GNP of EEC member countries, while in 1963 it was negligible.^*
However, it should be noted that while the Lomé Convention holds a special place 
in ACP-EEC cooperation, it is not the only source of Community funds for the ACP 
countries. In 1982, they received over ECU 1 500m, almost 70 per cent of the total 
Community bilateral official development assistance, excluding direct Community 
financing, through bodies such as the UN."*^  Still, the share of bilateral aid in total EEC 
aid declined considerably after the establishment of the Community. In 1960, bilateral 
EEC assistance still accounted for 99 per cent of the total. Fifteen years later (in 1975),
’^Bilateral EEC aid refers to financial assistance directly distributed by EEC member 
states and multilateral EEC aid refers to financial assistance directly distributed by the 
Community as an institution (and administered by the Commission). Contributions of 
member states to organisations such as the World Bank and the regional development 
banks are not included in these definitions: Enzo Grilli and Markus Riess, ibid.. at 
footnote, p.202.
^^COM (84) 398 final. Commission of the European Communities, Report to the ACP- 
EEC Council of Ministers on the administration of financial and technical cooperation in 
1983, under the Lomé Convention, Brussels: 17th July 1984, pp.4-5.
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its relative weight had fallen to 83 per cent. Since then, however, it has remained 
relatively stable at around 85 per cent of the total. Bilateral aid, therefore, still 
predominates."*^
It must be stressed, however, that the decline in bilateral aid has more or less 
corresponded to an increase in multilateral aid. This trend may be as a result of the 
percentage of bilateral aid distributed by certain EEC countries being replaced by 
contributions from other non-traditional EEC countries towards multilateral EEC funds. 
Yet, bilateral aid is by nature "tied aid" which results in large volumes of parallel 
economic activities taking place between traditional EEC and ACP partners irrespective 
of the principles of joint ACP-EEC cooperation enunciated in the Lomé Convention. As 
noted in earlier chapters, public and private enterprises of certain EEC member states, in 
particular France and Belgium, had already been implanted in preferred ACP countries and 
special bilateral relations have continued outside multilateral ACP-EEC relations. In some 
cases, for example in relations between France and the French-speaking African countries, 
this event plays against ACP group cohesion because it implies divergence of interests 
between the preferred ACP countries and others left out in the cold.
EEC aid to associated developing countries is rather unevenly distributed and, as 
shown in Tables 3 and 4, ten countries received more than 50 per cent of both bilateral 
and multilateral EEC aid in 1985-87. Thus, unequal distribution of bilateral aid is not 
compensated for by multilateral aid from each recipient country perspective. This tendency 
of assistance from multilateral agençies not compensating for the unequal country 
distribution of bilateral aid has been found to apply to the aid distribution of most
"*^ Enzo Grilli and Markus Riess, "EC Aid to Associated Countries: Distribution and
Determinants", p.203.
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industrial countries/^ The above characteristic also applies to EEC aid distributed to the
ACP countries.
^ Ibid.. pp.204-205.
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Table 3^^
Bilateral EEC Aid Distribution to ACP Countries 1985-1987
RECIPIENT COUNTRY AID RECEIVED 
in $m
% of total Cum %
Top 20 Recipients
Tanzania 268.50 6.97 6.97
Zaire 214.53 5.57 12.53
Somalia 204.57 5.31 17.84
Senegal 199.03 5.16 23.00
Sudan 197.73 5.13 28.13
Kenya 194.90 5.06 33.19
Ethiopia 189.27 4.91 38.10
Mozambique 185.27 4.81 42.90
Mali 155.93 4.05 46.95
Côte d'Ivoire 136.60 3.54 50.49
Zambia 124.17 3.22 53.71
Cameroon 116.97 3.03 56.75
Zimbabwe 111.73 2.90 59.65
Niger 108.17 2.81 62.45
Madagascar 100.03 2.60 65.05
Congo 88.90 2.31 67.65
Chad 85.53 2.22 69.57
Rwanda 79.03 2.05 71.62
Central African Republic 77.90 2.02 73.64
Mauritania 70.03 1.82 75.46
Bottom 15 Recipients
Tuvalu 5.03 0.13 99.25
Belize 4.43 0.12 99.36
Kiribati 4.20 0.11 99.47
Fiji 4.20 0.11 99.58
Dominica 3.37 0.09 99.67
Western Somoa 2.40 0.06 99.73
Grenada 1.77 0.05 99.78
St. Kitts 1.53 0.04 99.82
St. Lucia 1.50 0.04 99.86
Tonga 1.33 0.03 99.89
St. Vincent 1.20 0.03 99.92
Barbados 1.07 0.03 99.95
Antigua 1.00 0.03 99.98
Guyana 0.83 0.02 100.00
Bahamas 0.10 0.00 100.00
^^Source: Enzo Grilli and Markus Riess, "EC Aid to Associated Countries: Distribution
and Determinants", p.217. This writer's categorisation of recipients.
Table 4^^
Multilateral EEC Aid Distribution to ACP Countries 1985-1987
RECIPIENT COUNTRY AID RECEIVED 
in $m
% of total Cum %
Top 20 Recipients
Ethiopia 94.97 11.25 11.25
Uganda 88.20 10.45 21.70
Sudan 67.77 8.03 29.73
Senegal 48.23 5.72 35.45
Tanzania 33.40 3.96 39.41
Mozambique 28.17 3.34 42.74
Mali 26.20 3.10 45.85
Côte d’Ivoire 25.83 3.06 48.91
Papua New Guinea 24.77 2.93 51.84
Chad 24.50 2.90 54.75
Niger 24.37 2.89 57.63
Zambia 21.77 2.58 60.21
Zaire 21.53 2.55 62.77
Ghana 20.90 2.48 65.24
Madagascar 20.03 2.37 67.62
Kenya 18.70 2.22 69.83
Malawi 18.47 2.19 72.02
Rwanda 17.23 2.04 74.06
Cameroon 16.00 1.90 75.96
Mauritania 13.27 1.57 77.53
Bottom 15 Recipients
Dominica 2.17 0.26 98.48
Tonga 2.03 0.24 98.72
Grenada 1.57 0.19 98.90
Trinidad 1.50 0.18 99.08
Djibouti 1.40 0.17 99.25
Surinam 1.27 0.15 99.40
Kiribati 1.23 0.15 99.54
St. Vincent 0.97 0.11 99.66
St. Kitts 0.93 0.11 99.77
Barbados 0.77 0.09 99.86
St. Lucia 0.70 0.08 99.94
Bahamas 0.30 0.04 99.98
Tuvalu 0.20 0.02 100.00
Belize 0.03 0.00 100.00
Antigua 0.03 0.00 100.00
^Source: Enzo Grilli and Markus Riess, "EC Aid to Associated Countries: Distribution
and Determinants", p.218. This writer's categorisation of recipients.
Multilateral aid only partially offsets the unevenness in the country allocation of bilateral 
aid. For instance, fifteen of the twenty largest ACP recipients of EEC multilateral aid were 
also among the twenty largest recipients of bilateral aid in 1985-87. The twenty countries 
together received over 75 per cent of EEC aid.
Another point worthy of note is that the fifteen bottom recipients of both bilateral 
and multilateral EEC aid are all non French-speaking countries which historically have not 
maintained strong aid links with the Community. This may indicate that ACP-EEC aid 
relations are relatively more beneficial to those ACP countries which have traditional aid 
links with the EEC. This fact recalls the point made earlier on that French companies won 
mo;jt of the first EDF contracts as a result of being implanted in French-speaking African 
countries prior to the ACP-EEC association. Conversely, it will come as no surprise that 
more than half of the top twenty bilateral and multilateral EEC aid recipients are ACP 
countries which have been members of the EEC association since the Yaoundé 
Convention in 1963.
In the perspective of ACP group diplomacy, we shall note that notwithstanding the 
uneven distribution of EEC aid as outlined above, ACP-EEC negotiating procedures 
ensure that the ACP group adopts integrative bargaining over the volume of financial aid 
allocated under the Lomé Convention. The volume of aid to be allocated to each ACP 
country is not known at the outset of negotiations so the ACP countries put in a concerted 
effort to demand for increased aid in the hope that each ACP country would be rewarded 
with a reasonable volume of financial resources. Certainly, the ACP countries always 
receive far less than they ever bargain for. At the Lomé II negotiations, they were united 
in their requests for a total aid package of 10 billion UA from the EEC^  ^but at the end
^^ Ecomonde Service. N®41, le 17 Janvier 1979, Partie IV, p.l
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they received only 5.227 billion UA"** - a little more than half of the requested sum. 
Again, at the Lomé HI negotiations, they asked for ECU 10 billion'’® but after intense 
negotiations they settled for just ECU 8.5 billion.
It soon became clear that discussions over the volume of the Lomé aid were 
inherently contentious. Henceforth, in order to avoid recurrent stalemate in the Lomé 
negotiations, the negotiators adopted the practice of leaving the question of the volume 
of financial aid until nearer the end of the negotiations. During the Lomé IV negotiations 
which started in late 1988, discussions on the volume of financial aid were not even raised 
until October 1989^ ® - three months before the Convention was signed in December. 
However, in these negotiations, the ACP countries also asked for ECU 15.3 billion^* - 
more than the EEC was willing to concede. But after vehemently rejecting two previous 
EEC offers, they settled for ECU 12 billion. However, in all these instances, integrative 
bargaining clearly promoted ACP group cohesion.
Except for Ghana, most of the non-Yaoundé countries among the top twenty EEC 
aid recipients are countries which would normally fall into the category of "land-locked, 
island, and least developed countries". The number of these states has increased from 24 
under Lomé I through 35 (Lomé II) and 43 (Lomé HI) to 44 under Lomé IV. Comprising 
43 per cent of the total population of the ACP countries, they benefit from 64 per cent of
%^ id.. N®61, le 4 Décembre 1979, Partie IV, p.l.
"®Ibid.. N®164, le 4 Juillet 1984, Partie IV, p.l4.
% id .. N°280, le 17 Octobre 1989, Partie I, p.4.
’^ibid.. N°281 le 2 Novembre 1989, Partie I, p.26.
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the available financial resources/^ Ihese countries receive special concessions within the 
Lomé Convention as a result of the fragile nature of their economies, and this may explain 
why they are so favoured in EEC aid distribution. Non-Yaoundé countries within the ACP 
group which have fairly advanced economies - in relative terms to other ACP countries - 
for example, Nigeria, Trinidad and Jamaica among others, are absent from the list of the 
top twenty recipients. Furthermore, several of the non-Yaounde island countries fall in the 
category of bottom recipients of both bilateral and multilateral EEC aid.
From the foregoing, we can say that ACP countries which traditionally do not 
maintain special relations with one or more EEC member states or which do not fall 
comfortably into the category of "land-locked, island, and least developed countries" have 
their chances of access to EEC financial aid greatly reduced. However, we must qualify 
this claim by stating that some of the ACP countries which appear to be left out in the 
cold do have other lucrative sources for the procurement of foreign exchange and, 
consequently, do not feel the need to scramble for limited EEC funds. Nigeria and 
Trinidad, for example, depend on oil exports for their foreign exchange earnings. Nigeria 
earns well over 90 per cent of her foreign revenue from oil. Besides, several ACP 
countries depend on specific commodities such as sugar, bananas, beef and veal which 
gain duty-free access to the EEC market through special provisions in the Lomé 
Convention or through specific protocols annexed to the Convention. In essence, the Lomé 
arrangements appear to offer something to every ACP participant. Consequently, in terms 
of ACP group diplomacy, each country has an overall interest in working towards unity 
and group cohesion.
^^"Bilan de la coopération financière et technique ACP-EEC 1976-1985" in Marchés 
Tropicaux et Méditerranéens. N°2138, 42® Année, 31 Octobre 1986, p.2722.
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But, despite the uneven distribution of EEC aid, multilateral and bilateral EEC 
development policies are only loosely harmonised. EEC member states have generally 
resisted attempts to achieve stricter coordination of aid goals and distribution criteria made 
by the Commission. Whatever drift of bilateral aid towards the same group of developing 
countries which has occurred over the years may be credit more to the natural 
demonstration effect that resulted from the common aid practices at the Community level 
on member countries' behaviour than to a specific and a volitive attempt by members to 
bring national policies in line with those of the Community.^^
Two conclusions can be drawn from the discussions on aid in this section. First, 
in ACP-EEC cooperation, as the ACP group does not allocate the aid budget, the members 
of the group can be easily united in formulating demands from the EEC and there would 
be less controversy within the ACP group over the allocation of funds in comparison to 
the Community where the member states have to decide on allocation. Finally, in ACP 
diplomacy, since the ACP is a large group of countries with a commonality of economic 
interests, it can be argued that the ACP group coordinates its negotiating positions by 
using the highest common denominator (negotiating something for every one - for 
example, commodities such as sugar, bananas, beef and veal for some and financial aid 
for others). This approach tends to minimise group dissension.
^^Enzo Grilli and Markus Riess, "EC Aid to Associated Countries: Distribution and
Determinants", p.205.
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6.2.1.2 ACP-EEC Trade Relations
In theory, the Lomé Convention sits at the top of the Community's pyramid of 
trade preferences with developing countries.In practice, however, geographical regions 
other than the ACP have enjoyed more favourable treatment in the Community market 
than the ACP countries. But, the crucial question of what the position of the ACP 
countries would be in the absence of the Lomé Convention is left to the imagination as 
a result of the futile nature of a speculative search for an answer. However, the relative 
success of the middle economies of the Maghreb and the Machrek countries in attracting 
more EIB funds than the ACP countries may indicate that middle ACP economies, for 
example Nigeria's, would have a fairer chance of economic success either with EEC 
bilateral arrangements or special concessions within the Lomé Convention.^^
Furthermore, the merits of the Lomé Convention have often been emphasised and 
the institutional structures remain unmatched elsewhere in North-South relations, but trade 
preferences and financial assistance in ACP-EEC cooperation remain clearly inadequate.
'^’Christopher Stevens, "The European Community and Africa, the Caribbean and the 
Pacific" in Juliet Lodge (ed.). Institutions and Policies of the European Communitv. 
London: Pinter, 1983, pp. 142-143 and Christopher Stevens, "Renegotiating Lomé" in 
Christopher Stevens (ed ), EEC and the Third World: A Survev 4 - Renegotiating Lomé, 
London: Rodder and Stoughton in association with the Overseas Development Institute 
and the Institute of Development Studies, 1984, p. 10.
^^The Maghreb countries (includes Morocco and Tunisia) and the Machrek countries 
(includes Egypt) received EIB loans of 152.7m and 327.6m ECU in 1983 and 1984 
respectively compared to 137.7m and 160.7m ECU respectively in the same period for the 
ACP countries: Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens. N°2048, 41® Année, Vendredi 8 
février 1985, p.312.
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The Community Mediterranean policy is contracted through 12 cooperation accords^® but 
the relation with the 69 AGP states is recorded in only the Lomé Convention. There is no 
definite disadvantage with this arrangement except the distortion created by the fact that, 
despite the façade of multilateral relations. Community cooperation with the AC? 
countries is more bilateral than European. An example is AC? debt where the EEC as a 
body is the creditor of only 1.5 per cent and has no competence in the fora which decide 
upon it.^ ^
Again, the content of ACP-EEC aid and trade relations promises to be diluted by 
the political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe. In the absence of East-West 
conflict, there is less need for the unprofitable financing of ideological allies in the ACP 
countries, and the ACP countries are now exposed to open competition from other 
developing countries. Furthermore, with market reforms in Eastern Europe, the ACP 
countries face competition for scarce European investments and possible trade diversion. 
In terms of trade, the above considerations indicate that ACP diplomacy needs to be 
directed at checking the potential negative impact on ACP-EEC cooperation of reforms 
in Eastern Europe.
A report on the first EEC/ACP/Central Europe professional meeting on 
Agricultural Commodities confirms certain concerns. It stated: i) that good quality local
^^Maria Pérez Ribes, "La Politica Preferencial no Europea de la CEE: las relaciones 
con los paises mediterraneos y los ACP-PTUM" in Informacion Comercial Esoanola. 
Revista de Economia. No. 667, Marzo 1989, p.76.
^^Sophia Mappa, "Les relations Nord-Sud dans les migrations des Pays ACP vers la 
CEE: défis et impasses de la coopération" in Sophia Mappa, (sous la direction de). 
Ambitions et Illusions de la coopération Nord-Sud: Lomé IV. Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 
circa 1990, p.240.
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produce, notably in the case of fruits (apples, pears, cherries, peaches, etc.) compete with 
ACP tropical fruits - even though the two sets of products are not identical - because 
weak spending power of Central European consumers forces them to choose between, say, 
apples and pineapples; and ii) that East European countries receive supplies of more 
competitive tropical produce, notably bananas, from Latin America.^* Eastern Europe 
stands to benefit from these new developments in investments and trade flows. It has been 
suggested that with its historical, cultural and political links to Western Europe, Eastern 
Europe will get preference in the distribution of EEC financial aid.^ ® Even European 
nations such as France which in the past had openly showed concern for the African 
countries appear now to be turning towards Eastern Europe, just as concern for the poorer 
South European nations is rising within the Community itself. It is instructive to note in 
this regard the enthusiasm and, sometimes, extravagance with which the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was established.^
In conclusion to this section of our discussions, we can state that the differential 
treatment of the ACP countries in EEC aid distribution and trade relations is a mixed 
blessing for ACP diplomacy. On the whole, EEC aid flows which favour a particular 
group of ACP countries at the expense of other ACP members, or trade concessions
*^The Courier N®132 - March-April 1992, Yellow Pages, p.Xn.
^^Jûrgen Notzold and Klaus Freiherr von der Ropp, "Lome IV: A Chance for Black 
Africa's Return to the World Economy?", p. 192.
^ o t  long after its establishment, the EBRD announced its stake in the purchase of 
the Czech airline: Financial Times. 8 January 1991; and, in it first Annual Report, the 
Bank pleaded for EEC countries to access markets in Eastern Europe: Financial Times. 
31 March 1992.
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accorded only to certain ACP producers have the potential of jeopardising ACP group 
cohesion. Indeed, alignments have developed within the ACP on the basis of Lomé aid 
and trade. For example, the Caribbean countries are often active in negotiations over 
commodities, in particular, sugar. On the other hand, the French-speaking African 
countries are often active in the negotiations on the volume of Lomé aid. ACP diplomats 
have sometimes responded to these tendencies by nominating Caribbean nationals in 
commodities negotiations and French-speaking nationals in Lomé aid negotiations. 
However, it is still possible that group support may not be given to a common position 
which tends consistently to benefit only a few members as commodities do to the 
Caribbean and aid does to the French-speaking countries.
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6.2.2 Stabex. Svsmin. and Bananas
The Stabex, Sysmin and bananas are aspects of ACP-EEC cooperation which can 
further underline the working of the ACP-EEC relationship and ACP diplomacy. It is 
perhaps possible to draw examples of ACP-EEC cooperation and ACP diplomacy from 
the discussion of other areas covered by the Lomé Convention. However, we feel that an 
examination of Stabex, Sysmin and bananas will be sufficient to show the working of the 
ACP-EEC Lomé relationship.
Stabex
The Stabilisation of Export Earnings Scheme (STABEX) was established under the 
first Lomé Convention and remains one of the most impressive elements of ACP-EEC 
trade cooperation. The Stabex has been portrayed as one of the most unique features of 
ACP-EEC cooperation, and it has become, in effect, a strong uniting factor in ACP group 
diplomacy as ACP countries have tenaciously demanded an increase in Stabex funds at
each negotiation of the Lomé Convention. The ACP countries consistently demand for an
increase in order that the amounts they receive under the funds could correctly reflect their 
favoured status as signatories to the Lomé Convention.
As defined in Article 16 of Lomé I, the Stabex is
"a system for guaranteeing the stabilization of earnings from exports by the ACP 
States to the Community of certain products on which their economies are 
dependent and which are affected by fluctuations in price and/or quantity."
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The stabilisation system covers a wide range of products deriving from groundnuts, 
cocoa, coffee, cotton, coconut, wood, palm oil and kernel, hides and skins (Article 17, 
Lomé I). Article 17 further states that the system will apply to any of these products if 
during the year preceding the year of application, earnings from the export of the product 
to all destinations represented at least 7.5 per cent of its total earnings from merchandise 
export.
Stabex, however, remains a flexible system at least as far as the products involved 
are concerned. In 1977, the Council of Ministers took note of a Community statement to 
the effect that
"where an ACP State reports difficulties due to a year characterized by exceptional 
events, the seriousness of which has been recognized by the international 
community, the Community declares itself ready to seek on a case-by-case basis, 
in conjunction with the ACP State concerned, a solution to these difficulties..."®*
Thanks to concerted ACP diplomacy, the list of commodities qualifying for the 
Stabex was extended in 1977. The ACP-EEC Council of Ministers Decision No 3/77 of 
14 April 1977 extended the stabilisation system to cover the following products: vanilla, 
cloves, pyrethrum, wool, mohair, gum arabic, ilang-ilang.®  ^Only three months after the 
entry into force of the first Lome Convention, the Commission which is responsible for 
managing the Stabex system, announced the signing of agreements on actual Stabex
®* ACP-EEC Convention of Lome, Second Annual Report of the ACP-EEC Council
of Ministers (1 April 1977 - 28 February 1978), o p . cit.. p.32.
% id .. p.33.
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transfers for exports affected during the previous trading year. A total of 72 137 562 Units 
of Account (UA) were transferred to 17 ACP states, viz. Bénin, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Upper Volta 
(Burkina Faso), Niger, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Samoa.®^
Like the rest of the provisions in the Lome Convention, the Stabex has been 
improved (in financial terms) in each successive Convention. 390m UA was set aside for 
Stabex under Lomé I and 550m UA was set aside under Lomé II. Financial cooperation 
was subsequently defined in the ECU and ECU 925m was earmarked for Stabex transfers 
under Lomé HI while ECU 1.5 billion was set aside for a similar purpose under Lomé IV. 
However, as with other areas of Lomé aid, the Stabex funds have been insufficient in 
meeting the needs of even eligible ACP states. But it must be said that although ACP 
diplomacy is reactive even in this case, demands for increased Stabex funds is a source 
of unity which becomes apparent at negotiations for the renewal of financial provisions 
within the Lomé Convention.
Svsmin
The Stabilisation Scheme for Earnings from Mining Products (SYSMIN) was 
established under the Lomé II Convention and it further shows the working of ACP 
diplomacy. The object of Sysmin is to restructure, with the help of co-financing, viable 
industries in the mining sector of relevant ACP economies. This process involves special 
lending facilities, usually of 40 year duration, with a 10-year period of respite, and interest
ACP-EEC Convention of Lome, Annual Report of the ACP-EEC Council of
Ministers (1 April 1976 - 31 March 1977), oo. cit.. pp.28-29.
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rates of 0.75 per cent to 1 per cent for SMEs. Through the Sysmin facilities, ECU 83m 
and ECU 40m respectively have been paid out to Zambia and to Zaire, the two main 
beneficiaries for copper and cobalt. Next comes Guyana for bauxite (ECU 3m) and 
Rwanda for tin (ECU 2.8m).^
The Government of Liberia later asked for rubber to be included in the list of 
products covered by the Stabex system and this is an indication of unilateral effort in the 
advancement of ACP group diplomacy. However, the Community stated that in view of 
discussions at international level, it would be preferable not to go beyond the 
implementation of the Council of Ministers Resolution that rubber, copper and phosphates 
should form the objects of ACP-EEC consultations, thus ensuring that necessary 
collaboration took place between the ACP states and the Community in international 
discussions on rubber.
Following the request by the Government of Liberia, the ACP group formulated 
requests for certain minerals (copper, phosphates) and rubber to be included in the Stabex 
system. Then, the Council of Ministers adopted a Resolution on the attainment of common 
objectives regarding commodity exports. This resolution was with reference to 
international commodity agreements to be concluded between the industrialised and the 
developing countries. It stated in particular that the parties to the Lomé Convention would 
take account of their mutual interests at international level and ensure that necessary 
collaboration took place between them in order to identify possible solutions to the
^"Bilan de la coopération financière et technique ACP-EEC 1976-1985", on. cit.. 
pp.2722 and 2741.
ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, Second Annual Report of the ACP-EEC Council
of Ministers (1 April 1977 - 28 February 1978), op. cit.. p.34.
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problems presented by the supply and marketing of commodities.^
In general terms, the Community and the ACP countries were in fact anxious to 
bring their arrangements in line with the international norms in this sector. On the whole, 
it was obvious from the ACP-EEC discussions over the Sysmin that, in their contemporary 
relations with third countries, the Community and the ACP countries do strive to work 
together to maintain common positions on issues which have any bearing on their 
relationship. This would suggest that cohesion of the ACP-EEC coalition, even within a 
larger international context, is of primordial importance to the partners. But credit must 
be given to ACP diplomacy for being innovative in pushing forward the deliberations on 
Sysmin.
Bananas
The discussions on bananas is a further testimony to ACP group diplomacy. The 
inaugural meeting of ACP-EEC Council of Ministers was held on 14-15 July 1976 in 
Brussels led, on the ACP side, by Mr C^orge A. King, Minister for Trade and Consumer 
Protection of Guyana who was also President-in-Office of the ACP Council of Ministers. 
Community delegation was led successively by Mr Max van der Stoel, Netherlands 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and President-in-Office of the Council of the European 
Communities, and Mr L. J. Brinkhorst, State Secretary, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.^^ But, right from this first Council meeting, the ACP Ministers were united in
""Ibid.. p.33.
"^ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, Annual Report of the ACP-EEC Council of
Ministers (1 April 1976 - 31 March 1977), o p . cit.. p.4.
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formulating the problems faced by ACP banana producers as a result of competition from 
the so-called dollar bananas.®* In a statement, the ACP Ministers:
i) expressed the fear that the arrangements for banana imports applicable in the 
UK might be jeopardized if, as a result of free movement of goods within the 
Community, dollar zone bananas could enter the UK and thus compete with ACP 
bananas,
ii) pointed out that the issue of import licences for dollar zone bananas in Italy 
could damage exports of Somali bananas to the Italian market,
iii) stated the fact that in at least one Member State of the Community exports of 
ACP bananas were not in fact benefitting from a tariff preference over imports 
from the dollar zone.®^
But, the Community replied that the drop in exports of Somali bananas to the 
Italian market was due to a drop in total production and expansion of exports to the 
Middle East, and that the Italian government had, however, introduced quotas for imports 
from third countries to protect the market share of Somali bananas. Furthermore, the 
Community had offered aid to Somalia under the stabilisation system and granted aid to 
improve the marketing of bananas. Somali exports later recovered during 1976.
®*The term dollar bananas refers to bananas imported mainly from Central America. 
These bananas are considered to be available in the EEC at prices more competitive than 
ACP bananas.
®^ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, Annual Report of the ACP-EEC Council of
Ministers (1 April 1976 - 31 March 1977), o p . cit.. p. 12.
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With regard to Caribbean bananas, the Community noted that the UK accorded 
priority to bananas from its traditional ACP suppliers even though the price of such 
bananas was often higher than that of bananas of the same quality imported from third 
countries.’® For nearly 20 years, ACP and EEC differences on bananas seemed 
irreconcilable. However, thanks to ACP persistence and well coordinated diplomacy on 
the issue, the negotiators appear to have seen the light at the end of the tunnel. In 
February 1993, Dame Eugenia Charles, Prime Minister of Dominica, pointed to the 
difficulties caused by the unresolved negotiations over bananas.’' After several years of 
negotiations, the Council finally adopted a Decision on the common organisation of the 
market for bananas to become effective from 1 July 1993.’^
’®Ibid, p.l3.
’'"Banana Split Threatens Caribbean", The Sundav Observer. 15 November 1992.
’^Règlement (CEE) N° 404/93 du Conseil du 13 février 1993 portant organisation 
commune des marchés dans le secteur de la banane in Journal officiel des Communautés 
européennes. N® L 47, 25.2.93, Article 33, p. 10.
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Table 573
Traditional Quantity of ACP Bananas
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN QUANTITY 
(net weight/in tonnes)
Côte d'Ivoire 155 000
Cameroon 155 000
Suriname 38 000
Somalia 60 000
Jamaica 105 000
St. Lucia 127 000
St.Vincent & the Grenadines 82 000
Dominica 71 000
Belize 40 000
Cape Verde 4 800
Grenada 14 000
Madagascar 5 900
TOTAL 857 700
^^Source: Annexe, Règlement (CEE) N° 404/93 du Conseil du 13 février 1993, ibid.. 
p . l l .
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Table 5 shows the traditional quantity of ACP bananas to the EEC. 857 700 tonnes 
of ACP bananas will qualify for duty-free access into the Community during the first year 
of application of the new Council Decision. 12 countries are eligible for the scheme but, 
out of these, four countries alone (Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Jamaica and St. Lucia) 
account for over half of the approved quantities. However, Germany has protested over 
the Decision and this is certain to delay its application in the Community.
The discussions in this chapter have shown the fragility of ACP-EEC cooperation 
and the difficulties faced by the ACP coalition. In view of EEC aid and trade policies 
Wiich tend rather to have a divisive potential and in view of ACP dependence on aid and 
trade cooperation with the EEC, ACP diplomacy remains standing on a reactive and 
delicate footing.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: MORE RECENT ISSUES IN ACP-EEC COOPERATION 
AND ACP DIPLOMACY UNDER LOMÉ HI AND LOMÉ IV
This chapter examines some of the issues which dominated ACP-EEC discussions 
at the Lomé HI and IV negotiations. Examined issues range from human rights and private 
European investments in the ACP countries to toxic waste dumping in Africa, protection 
of the environment and regional cooperation. However, these issues were not conEned to 
the Lome m  and IV negotiations. Some of them, for example, private European 
investments and regional cooperation, had been discussed in ACP-EEC Lome I and II 
negotiations and had even been included in the Convention. However, they were also 
consequently revised and re-inserted into later Conventions and this justifies their study 
here under Lome HI and IV. With regard to the ACP countries, this chapter although 
showing reactive ACP diplomacy also records fits of dynamism as in the discussion on 
toxic waste dumping and the environment. This suggests that ACP diplomacy has a 
potential for dynamism on life-and-death issues.
Regional Cooperation was incorporated into contemporary ACP-EEC relations at 
Lomé I. But, its discussion here in the last chapter of the study is symbolic. Regional 
cooperation is one of the underlying concepts of ACP-EEC cooperation which has been 
reiterated in successive Lomé Conventions. Yet, its objectives have not been fully 
achieved. Consequently, by discussing regional cooperation in this last chapter, we intend 
to emphasise that issues in ACP-EEC cooperation are not mutually exclusive nor are they 
confined to time and space. Several of the issues elaborated in ACP-EEC cooperation are 
ever-present, ever-relevant yet ever-elusive.
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7.1 Human Rights and Policy Dialogue
The ACP group and the EEC kept a low profile on political issues during the ten- 
year period covered by the first two Lomé Conventions from 1975 to 1985 and so ACP 
diplomacy was not initially directed towards addressing political debates in ACP-EEC 
cooperation. The ACP countries favoured the low profile stance to safeguard their 
sovereignty. In areas where agreement on development programmes and financial 
assistance would be related to the political record of the recipient countries, the ACP 
countries rejected political discussions on the grounds that they were a trespass on their 
domestic policies.’ For their part, the EEC member states initially favoured a low profile 
approach on political issues in order to avoid giving the impression of exerting control 
over the ACP countries. In fact, the European Community avoided acting towards the 
ACP countries in any manner that could be considered "tutelage" or interference in their 
domestic affairs.^
Besides, during ACP-EEC negotiations at Lome I and II, political questions such 
as human rights did not have an entirely humanitarian connotation. It was at that time 
possible to use humanitarian arguments for ideological ends. The Dutch government had 
in fact announced that it would withdraw aid to socialist developing countries such as
’The ACP countries rejected political dialogue on the grounds that it was a trespass 
on their domestic policies: Edwin W. Carrington, "Lome HI: un troisième essai de 
coopération économique et sociale entre une moitié des nations du monde - développées 
et en développement: un premier aperçu" in Objectif Europe. Nos 26-27, Décembre 1984, 
p.24.
O^bjectif Europe, ibid.. p.5.
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Tanzania/ The irony of it all was that, at the same time, the Community was calmly 
disbursing untied EDF foreign exchange and Stabex transfers to Idi Amin's regime in 
Uganda"* while the Director-General of the Commission's DO Vm  was slated to attend the 
coronation of Emperor Bokassa of the then Central African Empire. Only an in-flight 
incident prevented the Director-General from actually attending the ceremony.^
The European Commission later reacted to the Amnesty International Report on 
human rights violations in the Central African Empire by recalling the EEC Council 
Resolution of 21 June 1977 which stated that the Community would take all necessary 
measures aimed at ensuring that its aid under the Lomé Convention was effectively 
utilised in meeting the needs of the population and not misused by the authorities. Also 
influenced by the Idi Amin regime, the Community sought to have a human rights regime 
incorporated into the Lomé Conventions at Lomé H / But, attempts were made 
unsuccessfully by the EEC during these negotiations to have a human rights clause 
inserted in the Convention.^ Another related issue which was to be blended into the debate
^Tony Hill, "Un Nouveau Souffle pour Lomé" in Objectif Europe. Nos. 26-27, 
Décembre 1984, p.33.
"*Tony Hill, ibid.: and Adrian Hewitt, "The Lomé Conventions: Entering a Second 
Decade", in Journal of Common Market Studies p.96.
^Adrian Hewitt, ibid.
^Michael K. Addo, "Some issues in European Community Aid Policy and Human 
Rights" in Legal Issues of European Integration, 1988/1, p.71.
’Christopher Stevens, "Renegotiating Lomé" in Christopher Stevens (ed.), EEC and 
the Third World: A Survev 4 - Renegotiating Lomé, London: Hodder and Stoughton in 
association with the Overseas Development Institute and the Institute of Development 
Studies, 1984, p. 15.
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on human rights and policy dialogue at the initiative of the ACP countries, namely the 
treatment of ACP students and migrant workers, became the subject of an ACP-EEC Joint 
Committee statement in 1977. Following from the unity achieved in ACP diplomacy at 
Lomé I in 1975, ACP initiative here demonstrated pro-activeness in ACP diplomacy. At 
the close of its meeting held in Maseru, Lesotho, from 28 November - 1 December 1977, 
the Committee adopted a statement on the situation of students, trainees and migrant 
workers from the ACP states.® However, as negotiations progressed during Lomé II and 
IQ in the 1980s, ACP diplomacy generally speaking soon lost its 1970s level of 
responsiveness and became reactive to EEC proposals.
Meanwhile, on the specific issue of human rights, efforts in Africa had been 
channelled into the elaboration of a Resolution on Human Rights which was adopted by 
the OAU in Monrovia in July 1979.’ Again on the EEC level, the Commission expressed 
its support for the African initiative. The African Charter on Human Rights was 
subsequently adopted by the OAU in 1981.'° With these concrete moves already made in 
Africa, it was certain that human rights would become an important issue in the third 
ACP-EEC negotiations in 1983-84. One other factor also favoured the introduction of the 
human rights debate into the 1983-84 negotiations: the attenuation of the perceived threat
® ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, Second Annual Report of the ACP-EEC Council of 
Ministers (1 April 1977 - 28 February 1978), Commission Report to the ACP-EEC 
Council of Ministers on the administration of finance and technical co-operation in 1977, 
Brussels: 14 March 1978, p.72.
’Ecomonde Service. N®56, le 17 Septembre 1979, Partie IV, p.4.
'°Edmond Jouve, "La protection des droits de l'homme et des peuples en Afrique" in 
Afrique contemporaine. 131 - juillet-août-septembre 1984 - 23® année, p. 17.
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of world communism in the mid- to late 1980s. The Cold War period was based on 
strategic interests when financial aid was invariably linked to political ideology. In this 
regard, support to the ACP countries was justifiable on the consideration that they were 
mainly former European colonies which generally adopted Western models of political and 
economic development.’^
Yet, it was assumed, rather implausibly, in the EEC that Community development 
policy could not be based on considerations of political ideology. The non-political 
argument was based on the reasoning inside the Commission that
"not being a State, the Community does not have a strategic vision, nor does it 
have an historical past. [And that] not partaking in the political passions of the 
States, only the Community can elaborate a development aid policy that can be... 
politically neutral."’^
But, the foundation of this argument is flawed. The history of the Community 
cannot be dissociated from the political history and economic policies of the composite 
member states. Furthermore, the argument appears to be an apology of the events in ACP- 
EEC relations (as demonstrated in Chapter 6) where bilateral EEC aid by far outweighs 
multilateral EEC aid. It seems to us that financial commitments can lead to concern over
“There was, of course, an exception such as Uganda under Idi Amin. However, the 
eventual linking of aid to a country's record on human rights arguably reflects the 
Community's desire to place ideological excesses under stricter control.
’^ E. Pisani, La Main et l'Outil. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1984, p.20. Cited by Enzo R. 
Grilli, The European Communitv and the Developing Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993, p. 102.
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the particular political system in operation in the host country. Consequently, the apparent 
absence of political constraints in EEC development policy can be more convincingly 
explained by lack of full-hearted financial commitments in the ACP countries than by lack 
of history. In any case, the ACP countries at the third Lomé negotiations in 1984 hardly 
accepted the argument that the Community was not seeking to influence them politically. 
But, if the extent of political control in Community development policy was debatable up 
to the mid 1980s, the disintegration of the former Eastern bloc from 1989 onwards clearly 
lessened the importance of the ACP countries from both the strategic and economic points 
of view and, thereby, exposed them to undisputable control by the Community.
EEC concern to include human rights in the Lomé negotiations was voiced at the 
Jamaica Joint Committee in February 1983.*  ^ The Lomé HI negotiations started in the 
Autumn of 1983, and as it was the case in the Lomé n  negotiations'\ the EEC and the 
ACP at the outset of the Lomé 111 negotiations created joint specialised negotiating groups 
charged with examining or reviewing specific aspects of ACP-EEC cooperation. At its 
fifth session in Brussels on 21 December 1983, the ACP side of the negotiating group on 
policy dialogue was virulent in its attack on the notion of policy dialogue. The ACP 
negotiators firmly criticised the EEC whose aid was like "peanuts" in comparison to aid 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for trying to use similar conditionalities as
'^Christopher Stevens, "Renegotiating Lomé", p .ll.
'''Three working groups were set up during the Lomé negotiations charged respectively 
with examining 1) trade cooperation and Stabex, 2) industrial cooperation, fishing, energy 
sector and customs, 3) financial, technical, agricultural and regional cooperation. A fourth 
working group, the presidential group, was charged with negotiating the inconclusive 
human rights issue at Lomé 11: Ecomonde Service n°41, le 17 janvier 1979, Partie IV, p.l.
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the IMF/"
In ACP circles, it was widely held that the British, German and Dutch negotiators 
strove for a procedure that would be rather similar to the IMF practice in granting credits. 
But, the ACP group also found it difficult to evolve common negotiating positions in a 
group diplomatic context. Not only did lack of expertise in comparison to the EEC come 
to bear on the group, but the ACP Secretariat also performed worse than in the past. 
Furthermore, it became evident in 1983-84 that the ACP had no generally recognised 
spokesman, unlike in previous years when Nigeria and Jamaica fulfilled that function.*^ 
But, even more than in previous rounds of discussions, the third negotiations in 1983-84 
were also adversely affected by the difficulties which the European nations themselves had 
in coordinating their positions. This was evident in the discussions on the substance of 
policy dialogue. The French term dialogue politique is ambiguous: it could be translated 
either as "policy” or "political" dialogue depending on the purpose of the negotiating side. 
While the Community did not address the various connotations of the term, the ACP 
countries emphasised the political meaning. This forced the EEC to adopt the more 
descriptive and less ambiguous "dialogue on policies".’^
However, the underlying aim of the EEC was constant: policy dialogue meant the 
exchange of views in the development sector between the Community and individual ACP
"^Ecomonde Service n°152, le 14 janvier 1984, Partie IV, p. 16.
'^Jurgen Notzold and Klaus Freiherr von der Ropp, "Lomé IE: New beginning for 
EEC/ACP Cooperation" in AussenPolitik. Vol.36, No.3 1985, p. 179.
Dialogue sur les politiques.
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states/* The form to be taken by this exchange of views was open to debate. The EEC 
Development Commissioner during the negotiations, Edgard Pisani, conceptualised the 
Community position on the subject. He urged new approaches to partnership and 
cooperation. It was maintained, though not always convincingly, that Pisani and most of 
the EEC member states envisaged something that would differ fundamentally from the 
conditionality applied to IMF loans.’®
But, the ACP countries interpreted policy dialogue as a way of giving the EEC 
greater control, or even the power, in making part of the Lomé aid conditional on the 
ACP countries altering sectoral policies in areas which did not suit the Community. ACP 
fears were based on the reasoning that the ever diminishing aid package would be 
available only to those states which complied with stringent EEC conditions. This could 
be done by setting an upper and lower cash limit in each ACP indicative aid programme, 
with the upper limit being available only to successful dialogists. The evidence is that at 
least some of the EEC member states saw policy dialogue as a vehicle for increasing 
donor control in order to improve the effectiveness of Lomé aid since the relative freedom 
of the ACP to set spending priorities had been associated in some states with a dismal 
record of poorly applied aid.^ ° Policy dialogue was therefore a counter measure by which 
the Community would be given an opportunity to examine for itself the feasibility of ACP
’*Jurgen Notzold and Klaus Freiherr von der Ropp, "Lomé HI: New beginning for 
EEC/ACP Cooperation", pp. 179 and 183.
’®Ibid.. p. 179.
^^Christopher Stevens, The New Lomé Convention: Implications for Europe's Third 
World Policv. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, Papers No. 16, 1984, p. 17.
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policy proposals.^' Development Commissioner Pisani emphasised that "full effectiveness 
requires coordination and dialogue”.B u t ,  the response from Mr Agne of Senegal to this 
statement mirrored the concern of the ACP countries. Mr Agne said:
"I regard this dialogue as excessively one-sided, I feel that it is always the EEC 
calling for dialogue and setting out the terms of that dialogue, and perhaps that is 
why many ACP states find it difficult to accept and adapt to the concept of 
dialogue on policies.
It is worth the reminder that the Lomé Conventions were not meant to be human 
rights treaties, but their significance in that direction cannot be denied. Human rights 
therefore have to be dealt with as part of the general economic relations undertaken by 
the Conventions. '^*
The position of the European Commission, at least at the outset of the negotiations, 
was that the whole controversy was a "storm in a teacup". The Commission argued that 
the Community had no intention of interfering in ACP sovereignty, but merely wanted 
detailed discussion of ACP plans for those sectors for which Community aid was
^'Michael K. Addo, op. cit.. p.78.
“Document 2-1104/84, PE 93.106/fin., European Parliament Working Documents 
1984-1985, 28 November 1984, Report of the Committee on Development and 
Cooperation on the achievements of the ACP-EEC Joint Committee and Consultative 
Assembly, Rapporieur: Mr. F.Wurtz, p. 12.
“ Ibid.. p.l3.
“ Michael K. Addo, o p . cit.. p.82.
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requested. Both sides could then agree on how best to insert Community aid into this 
framework.^^ The idea was to prevent EEC aid, according to the imagery of Commissioner 
Pisani, from being used to "build sand castles in the desert".
Two illustrations can be given to show the difficulties which emerged in the 
discussions over policy dialogue and human rights. Typically, in the old ACP-EEC 
dialogue, an ACP state arrived with a "shopping list" of proposed projects (a road, a dam, 
a factory, etc.). The EEC then accepted some of these projects and rejected others 
depending on the financial resources allocated to that ACP state. Replacing this dialogue 
with what Pisani called "dialogue on policies", represented a fundamental change in ACP- 
EEC cooperation. In effect, each ACP state had to be able to explain how the road, the 
dam, or the factory fits into a precise development plan. Hence, a legitimate concern on 
the part of the ACP countries over this method of dialogue. Tlie ACP countries wondered 
whether the Community would not give itself a new right to observe the external political 
choice of the ACP states.^  ^But, the Community calmed those fears by stressing that the 
sovereignty of the ACP states would be respected.
The second area of difficulty was over human rights which sought to integrate into 
the debate the social and cultural dimensions of development. In the ACP-EEC 
discussions, deliberations on the question of human rights implied that the success of a 
given project depended on the participation of the people for which the project is designed
^^Christopher Stevens, The New Lomé Convention: Implications for Europe's Third 
World Policv. p. 18.
^^Pour bâtir des cathédrales dans le désert. Cited by Gérard Fuchs, "La Convention 
de Lomé à l'épreuve" in L'Europe en formation. N°256 - Avril/Juin 1984, p .ll.
’^Gérard Fuchs, ibid.. p.79.
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as much if not more than it does on the technical quality of the project. The issue of 
human rights therefore raised new concerns, and sparked off an ideological counter­
offensive from the ACP countries which sought to place an emphasis on the right to 
development rather than on the need for human rights especially in circumstances where 
people were dying from starvation and malnutrition. More importantly, the ACP countries 
questioned the Community's trade relations with racist South Africa.^*
Thus, in group diplomatic terms, the ACP group sought to turn the human rights 
and political dialogue arguments against the Community. The group sought to use these 
politically-charged issues against the Community. This effectively happened when, in 
response to Community human rights and political dialogue arguments, the ACP countries 
retorted that the treatment of ACP migrant workers and students within the Community 
and the cordial relations which existed between the EEC member states and apartheid 
South Africa rendered the Community unqualified to pass human right judgements on the 
ACP countries.^^
Following the recommendations of the Commission, the Community sought to 
directly incorporate into the Convention provisions linking its activities in the ACP 
countries, especially aid, to human rights performance of its ACP partners. In this case, 
the Community called inter alia for the creation of a link between the advantages offered 
to ACP countries and the observance of certain international labour standards.^® But, there
"% id.
^^ony Hill, on. cit.. p.33.
^®Com., Doc. (78) 492 of Nov. 1978, Commission of the ECs, "Development 
Cooperation and the Observance of Certain International Standards Governing Working 
Conditions" in Michael K. Addo, o p . cit.. p.72.
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seemed to appear some issues bordering on the absence of good faith. To begin with, not 
all the Community member states had in fact ratified all the ILO Conventions the 
compliance of which they sought from the ACP states.
There was also the case of the Community's relations with South Africa - a country 
which had a deliberate official policy designed in all forms and manner to violate the most 
basic human rights - which the Community did not seem keen on addressing. These 
surrounding circumstances coupled with the confusion relating to the links sought between 
trade and human rights on the one hand and those between aid and human rights on the 
other as though they were inseparable proved unacceptable to their ACP partners. There 
was a fear shared by the ACP states that the nature of the links designed by the 
Community were capable of abuse and to be used as a pretext for intervention in their 
domestic affairs.^  ^It is significant to point out that there was not adequate evidence to the 
effect that the ACP states did object to a human rights link per se but rather to the use 
of any link capable of sparking off feelings of paternalism and neo-colonialism. At the 
end, both parties adopted declarations affirming their adherence to the principles of the 
UN charter on human rights.”
In conclusion, an innovation in ACP pro-active diplomacy was evident in the 
human rights and policy dialogue arguments since ACP initiatives directed the discussions.
^'Com., Doc. (78) 492 of Nov. 1978, Commission of the ECs, "Development 
Cooperation and the Observance of Certain International Standards Governing Working 
Conditions", para.9, p.9 in Michael K. Addo, ibid.
” D o c . N o . CA/47/48/49/fm., Proceedings of ACP-EEC Consult. Ass. (2nd Annual 
Meeting), p.27 in Michael K. Addo, ibid.. p.73.
” Michael K. Addo, ib il
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However, the EEC found it easy to use ACP tools to tighten the bolt around the ACP 
countries themselves/'* The ACP countries bargained for the right to development, but 
they got arrangements on policy dialogue which could potentially be applied as a check 
against their choice of development strategies. At the end, however, not only did ACP- 
EEC efforts in the promotion of human rights appear to have begun to pay off but ACP 
fears on the unsuitability of policy dialogue also proved to be founded. Thus, it would 
appear that overall pro-activeness in ACP diplomacy in the human rights and policy 
dialogue debates had been well formulated and could later be related to real developments 
in ACP-EEC cooperation. We shall give some examples. On the initial success of the 
efforts on human rights, first, the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly eventually decided to 
nominate Mr. Nelson Mandela for the 1987 Nobel Peace prize^  ^ in recognition of his 
struggles against the apartheid regime in South Africa. Second, the Lomé IV provision on 
human rights has been put into practice in Haiti where, following the military coup against 
democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the EEC has suspended all non­
humanitarian aid under the Lome Convention to that country.Finally, on the difficult 
take-off of policy dialogue, it is significant to note that the EEC Director-General for
'^‘Note that the African ACP countries adopted the Charter on Human Rights in 1981. 
Their effort, it could be argued, partly paved the way for a re-introduction of the human 
rights debate into the 1983-84 Lome negotiations.
^^Document A 2-206/86, PE 109.176/fin., Series A, European Parliament Working 
Papers 1986-87, 9 January 1987, Committee on Development and Cooperation Report on 
the outcome of the Joint Assembly proceedings. Rapporteur: Mr. F. Condesso, p. 19.
^^Francisco Granell, "El acceso de Haiti y Republica Dominicana a las ayudas del 
Convenio de Lomé" in Revista de Instituciones Eurooeas. Vol. 18, N.°3, Septiembre- 
Diciembre 1991, p. 894.
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Development, Mr. Dieter Frisch, resigned his position in early 1993 over the Community's 
"tendency to withdraw some AGP functions which give countries a greater say in the 
national economic programmes"/^
^^"ACP Countries cry 'Foul'", New African. December 1993, p.26.
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7.2 Private European Investments in the ACP countries
An account of evolving ACP and EEC positions in the negotiations over private 
European investments in the ACP countries emphasises the negotiating strategies of the 
two sides and underlines determination in ACP concerted diplomacy.
The subject of private investments was not given due consideration during the 
Lomé I negotiations. However, at the outset of the second ACP-EEC negotiations in 1978, 
the European Commission started a serious campaign to encourage private European 
investments in developing countries to counter the efforts of the United States and Japan, 
and at the same time to guarantee the EEC's supply of raw materials.^* The focus of the 
EEC debates was on the promotion of private investments in the Community's cooperation 
agreements, including the Lomé Convention.
ACP-EEC negotiations on the issue were situated on four levels: Commission, 
Council of Ministers, ACP group, and European Private Sector. The Commission 
communicated its plan of action to the Council of Ministers in January 1978. The plan 
announced that in order to protect private European investments in developing countries 
the Commission would negotiate in all development cooperation agreements basic rules 
to be applied to foreign investments and specific rules for investments in the mining and 
energy sectors. These rules would cover transfer of profits and guarantees against 
nationalisation. France, Germany and the UK did not receive the proposal favourably and 
declared themselves indisposed to commit Community funds to the protection of private
^^Sylvain Camara, "La Convention de Lomé et les investissements étrangers dans le 
Tiers Monde" in Afrique Contemporaine. 132 -octobre-novembre-décembre 1984 - 23e 
année, pp.3-4.
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investments. They argued that their bilateral arrangements were sufficient to encourage 
European investments abroad.^^
The ACP countries, for their part, expressed concerns on the safeguard of their 
own sovereignty. They complained that the Commission was merely concerned with the 
procurement of raw materials for European industries. The ACP countries further 
complained that the Commission proposals relating to investments in mining, for example, 
would not have a positive effect on the economies of the host ACP countries.
In July 1978, the "Group of 7" investors in ACP countries published a 
memorandum proposing measures for the promotion and guarantee of investments. 
Unrelated to the G-7 group of industrialised countries, the Group of 7 comprises 
representatives of seven specialised committees representing 1 200 European enterprises 
operating in Africa.'*® More far-reaching than the Commission proposals, the Group of 7 
memorandum underlined the importance of SMEs in the industrial sector of the host 
country and suggested that the Guarantee Fund set up against non-trade risks should be 
made an ACP-EEC institution. On 24 November, the Permanent Conference of Chambers
"% id.
^®The Group of 7 comprises specialised Committees from Belgium (Chambre de 
Commerce belgo-africaine), Germany (Afrika-Verein), The Netherlands (Afrika Institut), 
Britain (West Africa Committee and East Africa Association), Italy (Assafrica), France 
(CIAN-Comité International pour l'Afrique noire): "Une nouvelle politique de coopération 
privée CEE-ACP" in Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens. 41® année - N® 2048, 
Vendredi 8 février 1985, at footnote, p.309.
There is also a new member, ELO, from Portugal. The West Africa Committee 
alone has 130 members which include banks, oil and construction companies: Gerald 
Blakey, "Statements" in Olusegun Obasanjo and Hans d'Orville, (eds ). The Impact of 
Europe in 1992 on West Africa. London: Crane Russak, 1990, p.77.
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of Commerce and Industry gave its own opinion which rebuked developing countries for 
not appreciating that a system of protection was a definite means of encouraging 
investments.
Ironically, the intervention of the European private sector pushed the ACP 
countries to harden their negotiating position with the EEC. It would appear that the ACP 
group resented non-governmental intervention from the Community industrial sector. 
Hence, the ACP countries hardened their negotiating position by showing themselves less 
disposed to accept the Commission, or indeed the European private sector, proposals. 
France, Germany and the UK later accepted the idea of a system for the protection of 
investments but were still opposed to the proposal to establish Enancial guarantees for the 
mining and energy sectors. Denmark, on the other hand, supported the Commission 
proposal and in fact recommended that the guarantee should be extended to investments 
in all sectors.^*
EEC positions, however, began to converge in May 1979 but there were still 
fundamental disagreements between the ACP and the EEC. In an effort to bridge the gqj 
between the two sides, the Commission proposed the signing of speciEc agreements on 
the protection of investments and the inclusion of the most favoured nation (MEN) clause 
in such an agreem ent.This would, of course, mean that an EEC member state would 
automatically benefit from advantages accorded by an ACP state to another EEC member 
state in the protection agreement. It was further proposed that such an agreement should 
have retroactive effect. It appears that the Commission proposal was intended to guide the 
negotiators back to the original goal of spreading guarantees to all EEC and ACP
 ^Le Monde. 11 mai 1979, p.38. 
^^Sylvain Camara, o p . cit.. p.5.
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countries. This would have been made possible, first, by allowing the new Commission 
proposal to be used by more enthusiastic EEC and ACP countries to promote bilateral 
negotiations on a preferential level. Then, the MEN clause would later have enabled the 
other EEC member states to claim retroactively for themselves the guarantees already 
accorded between the more enthusiastic EEC and ACP countries.
The positions of the ACP and the EEC countries appeared to converge in a 
meeting held in June 1979. The EEC side even thought that the debate had been 
concluded. But, in the early Autumn, the ACP states cast a doubt in every one's mind by 
arguing that they did not agree on the MEN clause. They maintained that each EEC 
member state should sign an independent agreement with the host country."*^  Erom a group 
diplomatic perspective, the ACP group position had the prospect of maintaining equal and 
fair treatment for members of the group which would be in a better position to achieve 
greater advantages while negotiating together than they would if negotiating individually. 
If the option were left with individual ACP countries to negotiate investment protection 
agreements, the possibility would be left open for an EEC member state to go to a willing 
ACP country and make extensive protection arrangements. Having thus negotiated a 
favourable agreement, that same or another EEC country could, at a later date, demand 
similar favourable arrangements from a more reluctant ACP country which perhaps offers 
better investment potentials.
On 8 October 1979, the ACP group publicly declared that it stood by its position 
in rejecting the MEN clause. The discussions seemed for a while to have reached a 
deadlock. However, at an ACP-EEC meeting held in London on 14 October, a 
compromise was reached on the principle of non-discrimination. But, on arrival at Lomé
""Ibid.
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in late October for the signing ceremonies of the new Convention, the EEC member states 
were shocked to discover that the text of the Convention was different from that agreed 
in the London compromise. The new text suggested that the principle of non­
discrimination would be discussed after the entry into force of the Convention. The EEC 
promptly rejected the text, and negotiations started all over again and continued through 
the night of 30 to 31 October. A new compromise was reached. The final text of Lomé 
n  took account of the concerns of the ACP countries without ruling out retroactivity. It 
was agreed that specific agreements would be concluded to encourage investments in the 
mining and energy sector and that non-discriminatory treatment would take effect from 
the entry into force of the Convention.^^
The discussions in this section have shown how compromise was reached in ACP- 
EEC negotiations over private European investments in the ACP countries. In effect, 
between two extremes, on the one hand, the EEC proposal that the protection clause 
should have retroactive effect and, on the other hand, the ACP proposal that it should be 
discussed after the entry into force of the Convention, an agreement was reached that the 
protection clause should take effect from the entry into force of the Convention. Thus, 
both the Community and the ACP group gave some ground and converged in the middle. 
This can be seen as one happy ending to another contentious debate in ACP-EEC 
relations. But given the relative smallness of ACP manpower and financial resources as 
discussed in earlier chapters, the middle ground adopted by the ACP and the EEC in this 
debate should be viewed as a triumph for ACP concerted diplomacy. Following after 
Lomé n, Lomé HI included a call out to private investors in the ACP states. The Group 
of 7 responded favourably to this call. In a communiqué published in Brussels on 18
^^ Ibid.. pp. 5-6.
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October 1984, the French Committee declared its support for the ACP-EEC position, 
thus lending credence to the implied contribution of the ACP countries to EEC 
development cooperation.
'‘^ "Une nouvelle politique de coopération privée CEE-ACP", op. cit.. p.309.
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7.3 Toxic Waste dumping and Protection of the Environment
This is yet another issue which emphasises the negotiating priorities of the EEC 
and the ACP countries. But it strongly underscores dynamism in ACP diplomacy. In the 
late 1980s, toxic waste disposal had become a major problem for several ACP countries 
in Africa and at least one casualty had been reported in connection with this practice. As 
toxic waste dumping posed inherent danger to lives, African response both at the OAU 
and joint ACP-EEC levels had been pro-active throughout the debates. This determined 
stance supports our argument that ACP diplomacy can be dynamic on life-and-death 
issues. In 1987, there were at least nine cases of toxic waste dumping involving over 19 
million tonnes of industrial waste shipped to Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Bénin. In 1988, there were at least 11 cases, 
involving contracts totalling $830 million to Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, Cape Verde and Bénin. The waste exporting companies concerned were from the 
United States, Britain, France, Italy and Australia. Under one scheme foiled by the 
European Environmental Alliance, Guinea-Bissau was going to host 10 per cent of 
Europe's industrial waste.'*^
As a result of these and other incidents, the African countries took the initiative 
against the export of waste and poisonous substances to Africa in May 1988 when the 
OAU Summit of Heads of State and Government decided to terminate all waste dumping 
agreements. The OAU Summit adopted Resolution 1225(L) on control of transboundary
N. M. Sonko, "Toxic waste dumping in West Africa" in New African. January 
1993, p.24.
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movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal in Africa/^ Nigeria, which led this 
move, followed it up the next month at the ECOWAS Summit and ensured that waste 
dumping in West Africa was declared a criminal offence/^ Nigeria’s leadership efforts on 
the toxic waste issue is reminiscent of the old days of ACP dynamic diplomacy at the 
Lomé I negotiations in 1975. At country level, Gambia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea- 
Bissau, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Togo and Côte d'Ivoire officially prohibited the 
use of their territories for waste dumping. In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, legislation 
provides for imprisonment of up to 20 years and a fine of $1.6 million to boot. Outside 
the scope of government, private consumer organisations from eighteen African countries 
met in Nairobi in June 1988 and called on their governments and international agencies 
to help put an end to waste dumping."*^  In the Caribbean, the first CARICOM Ministerial 
Conference on the Environment held in Trinidad and Tobago from 31 May - 2 June 1989 
adopted the Port of Spain Accord on the Management and Conservation of the Caribbean 
Environment.^®
In ACP-EEC relations, initiatives against toxic waste disposal and environmental
^^Wordsworth Filo Jones, "The Evolution of the Bamako Convention: An African 
Perspective" in Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policv. Vol.4, 
1993, p.335. Jones also chronicles several international incidents of what has been referred 
to as "toxic terrorism": pp.325-329.
"'Ibid.. p.335.
"®K. N. M. Sonko, op. cit.. p.24.
^®Bruce Zagaris, "Application of the Lome IV Convention to Services and the 
potential opportunities for the Barbados International Financial Sector" in Bulletin 1991. 
Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, p.290.
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protection were of ACP origin and that is credit to ACP dynamic diplomacy. The 
protection of the environment became a specific convention issue in ACP-EEC relations 
at Lomé IV. A conference organised in Brussels in October 1988 on the theme "Lomé IV 
and the environment" was attended by 170 participants representing Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) in various EEC and ACP countries. Participants at this conference 
proposed that a chapter on Urban Development be included in the Lomé IV Convention.^^ 
Although the response to this specific request was not on the scale expected it was 
certainly in the direction anticipated.
Apart from the African and Caribbean efforts discussed above, ACP dynamic 
diplomacy can also be underlined by the fact that several EEC member states were toxic 
waste producers which had no real interest in promoting anti-waste dumping policies. 
Thus, there was a consideration of self-interest in the reluctance of the EEC to take on 
board the toxic waste debate. However, thanks to well coordinated diplomatic efforts, the 
ACP countries were intent on pushing forward the debate in the ACP-EEC joint fora. On 
19 May 1988, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution similar to the OAU 
Resolution 1225(L) on control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes. But, 
while EEC Environmental Ministers had not reached a unanimous decision on the subject, 
the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly at its meeting in Madrid in September 1988 adopted a 
Resolution calling for a ban on the export of poisonous substances from the EEC to the 
ACP countries. The Resolution also recommended that the principle of non-export of
^*"Lomé IV et l'environnement: les propositions des associations européennes" in 
Transnational Associations. No.4, Juillet-Août 1989, p.204.
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poisonous substances be reflected in the forthcoming Lomé IV Convention/^
In November 1988, EEC Environmental Ministers finally moved against toxic 
exports. In view of the argument that ACP diplomacy was dynamic and pro-active on the 
environmental debate, it is significant to note that the move by the EEC Environmental 
Ministers came several months after the OAU Resolution against hazardous wastes had 
been adopted in May 1988. Later, in 1989, the EEC, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the 
UK ratified the Basel Convention for controlling the international movement of hazardous 
w astes.The Lomé IV Convention (Articles 33-41) subsequently incorporated provisions 
on environmental preservation and control of the international movements of hazardous 
waste, radioactive waste and the safe use of pesticides and other chemical products. 
However, the African countries had levied several criticisms against the Basel Convention. 
The principal of these criticisms was that the Basel Convention is aimed not at banning 
the traffic of hazardous substances but at regulating its movement from one jurisdiction 
to another. Yet, the Lomé definition of "hazardous waste" (Art. 39, para 3) refers to that 
of the Basel Convention. Hence, African diplomacy within the ACP group rested neither 
on Basel nor on Lomé but continued to channel efforts into the elaboration of a separate 
Convention. African efforts came to fruition with the signing of the Bamako Convention 
at the end of the Pan-African Conference on the Environment and Sustainable
^^ocument A 2-0281/88, PE 126.362/fin., Series A, European Parliament Session 
Papers 1988-89, 29 November 1988, Report of Committee on Development and 
Cooperation on the results of the work of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly in 1988 in Lomé 
and Madrid, Rapporteur: Mrs. R-C. Rabbethge, p. 13.
^^ Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretarv-General. Status at 31 December 
1992, New York: United Nations, 1993, p.831.
310
Development held under the auspices of the OAU in Mali from 23-30 January 1991/'*
The Bamako Convention aims at banning all imports of hazardous and nuclear 
wastes into Africa. To that extent. Article 4 stipulates that contracting parties shall take 
appropriate legal, administrative, and other measures to prohibit the import of all 
hazardous wastes from non-contracting parties into Africa and that such import shall be 
deemed to be illegal and shall constitute a criminal act.^  ^An OAU Resolution maintains 
the African position which is that the Bamako Convention should be signed and ratified 
by African states before any similar instruments, in particular the Basel Convention.^** This 
stance can explain the reluctance of the ACP countries as a whole to join the Basel 
Convention.^^
The discussion of toxic waste dumping and protection of the environment in this 
section has shown ACP pro-active diplomacy at work. Since toxic waste dumping 
endangers lives in the ACP countries, these countries have applied concerted efforts in 
bringing environmental issues onto the agenda of ACP-EEC cooperation. However, as the 
issues have not been satisfactorily addressed in the ACP-EEC fora, they have transcended 
ACP-EEC cooperation into the Bamako Convention. Due to continuing international 
consciousness on environmental issues, it is likely that the debate on toxic waste dumping
Africans ban hazardous and nuclear waste dumping", OAU Press Release, OAU 
General Secretariat, ESCAS Dept , Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29 January 1991, p.l.
^^See Wordsworth Filo Jones, o p . cit.. p .3 3 7 .
Africans ban hazardous and nuclear waste dumping", on. cit.. p.4.
 ^By the end of 1992, only four ACP countries had joined the Basel Convention. 
Nigeria joined in 1990; and the Bahamas, Mauritius and Senegal joined in 1992: 
Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary-General, o p . cit.. p.831.
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and protection of the environment will be re-opened at future ACP-EEC discussions. 
Having already been put in a legal framework thanks to ACP dynamic diplomacy via the 
Lomé and Bamako Conventions, we can expect that if as a result of the renewal of the 
Lome Convention in the year 2000, the environment appears as a subject of interest, 
African initiatives will be re-introduced - with a view to being cemented - in ACP-EEC 
cooperation.
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7.4 Regional Cooperation under the Lomé Convention
This section surveys the difficulties in intra-ACP regional cooperation as a 
reflection of the problems with ACP group diplomacy. Development theory has 
maintained for years that small, poor states must coordinate, if not integrate, their 
development effoits to compensate for the disadvantages normally associated with 
smallness in size of their populations and internal markets. This, for example, was one of 
the principal arguments put forward in favour of establishing the Caribbean Community 
and Common Maiket.^* Thus, development theory has argued that common markets, 
custom unions, cun ency clearing mechanisms, transport and communication facilities and, 
indeed, industrial development ought to take place on a regional basis. The European 
Community is often cited as a model of regional development by the developing countries. 
Yet the history of post-independence Africa and, to some degree, the Caribbean and the 
Pacific, is littered with non-functional "paper" regional organisations.^^
However, the development since the 1970s of ECOWAS in West Africa, SADCC 
in Southern Africa, Mano River Union and several other efforts elsewhere - even though
^*Sidney Chemick (coordinating ed.). The Commonwealth Caribbean: the Integration 
Experience. Washington: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, p.5 and John C. 
Mgbere, "Les Etats Caraïbes dans l'Intégration Américaine: Une Etude de Politique 
Régionale", Mémoire pour le D E A., IHEAL, Université de la Sorbonne-Nouvelle, Paris 
ni: Octobre 1990, pp. 17-18.
^^sebill Gruhn, "Lomé Convention Renegotiations: Litmus Test for North-South 
Relations" in Robert Boardman, Timothy M. Shaw, Panayotis Soldâtes (eds.) Europe. 
Africa and Lomé III. London: University Press of America, Dalhousie African Studies 
Series 3, 1985, p.30.
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these are largely fledgling institutions - makes some sense for the North to notice these 
attempts and to give special support and attention to such inter-state development efforts.^ 
The earmarking of a small proportion of funds for regional cooperation under the Lomé 
Convention can be seen as both a symbolic and a tangible boost to regional efforts which 
is certainly preferable to many other forms of "conditionality."®'
Indeed, under the Lome Convention, a proportion of financial aid transfer funds 
is specifically targeted for ACP regional development. Regional Cooperation as defined 
in the Lome Convention essentially entails cooperation between ACP states in the form 
of joint transnational projects. Such a joint action can be undertaken either directly 
between ACP states, or through regional organisations acting on behalf of the ACP states. 
According to Article 102 of the Lome III Convention, regional cooperation can also take 
place between an ACP state and neighbouring developing countries. Thus, the Lomé 
Convention expressly encourages regional and South-South cooperation. Article 109 
further stipulates that, in that case. Community involvement will cover the responsibilities 
of the ACP country in such a joint effort. This arrangement appears to be a system of 
prise en charge whereby the Community takes up some of the responsibilities of the ACP 
countries in a joint operation with other developing countries. The ACP region most likely 
to benefit from this provision is the Caribbean which is situated within close proximity 
of other developing countries, namely the Latin American nations.
The EEC was in favour of regional cooperation in the ACP states right from the
®®See list of Abbreviations and Acronyms at the beginning of this dissertation for the 
full names of the organisations discussed in this section.
®'lsebill Gruhn, "Lomé Convention Renegotiations: Litmus Test for North-South 
Relations", p.30.
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start of ACP-EEC cooperation at Lomé I. It has been argued that the Community stance 
was consistent witii the fact that the Community itself is a regional organisation. It was 
considered thus iiatural that the Community should respond favourably to the 
establishment of regional cooperation links with regard to the administration of 
development aid in other regions of the world.®^  In the context of decolonisation, the 
massive increase in the number of independent countries and subsequent rise of some 
great leaders of international repute such as Nasser and Nkrumah contributed to creating 
a Third World "pressure group" which was formed notably within and around the 
structures of the Ifnited Nations: UNCTAD, G77, NAM. In an atmosphere of shifting 
positions between combativeness and frustration, the new states demanded from the 
industrialised countries a radical improvement in their conditions and at the same time 
turned inwards to ihemselves in a spirit of solidarity and self-reliance in order to resolve 
their problems together. South-South cooperation finds its roots in these developments. 
The climax of this movement the objective of which was to create a NIEO through North- 
South dialogue and collective self-reliance among developing countries was reached in the 
mid-1970s, precisely at the moment of the signing of the first Lome Convention.®^
But, as with other aspects of financial aid in the Lome Convention, with the 
exception of the national indicative programmes (NIPs), the ACP states do not all benefit 
to the same degree or in a predictable nianner, from the regional cooperation funds. Some
®^ Jürgen Kôppen, "L'Appui de la Communauté Européenne à la Coopération Régionale 
dans le Tiers Monde - le cas de la coopération régionale entre les Etats d'Afrique, des 
Caraïbes et du Pacifique (Etats ACP) dans le cadre de la convention de Lomé" in Revue 
du Marché Commun. n°308. Juillet 1987, p.390.
®"lbid.. p.391.
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ACP states or groups of states meet the requirements for regional funds more easily than 
others, and this splits the ACP coalition as the ACP countries have not all been in favour 
of any particular increase in the Regional Cooperation funds. Thus, in a group diplomatic 
context, the failure of the funds to be distributed equitably among the ACP states and the 
dissatisfaction and lack of interest subsequently caused by this development splits common 
ACP positions in the demand for additional financial assistance. This specific point 
underscores the importance which the ACP as a group should give to an equitable 
distribution of funds in general. During the Lomé HI negotiations, it was at one time 
proposed that Regional Cooperation funds should be increased by 14 to 25 per cent of the 
total EDF, but they were at the end raised to ECU 1 billion, more or less proportionately 
to the increase in total Lome aid.^
The procedure for the execution of regional programmes are exactly the same as 
for cooperation in the framework of the NIPs of each country (as discussed in Chapter 
5.4). However, regional programmes involve many countries, perhaps too many. For this 
reason, they are à priori more complex to set up both at the preparation and execution 
stages. Although aid to regional organisations is not ruled out in the Lomé Convention, 
the ACP states have tended to retain their sovereign powers over the use of regional 
cooperation funds, only calling upon the established structures of their respective regional 
organisations when necessary. Thus, regional organisations have often been involved at 
the request of the ACP states.
In the absence of alternative Government parastatals and also as a result of some 
of the difficulties earlier discussed with regard to policy coordination in the ACP states, 
regional organisations which have already been established can be considered to be more
""Ibid.. p.392.
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efficient in coordinating regional development programmes within the framework of the 
Lomé Convention. When ACP regional organisations become involved in regional 
development programmes, their roles vary, ranging as the case may be, from one of 
simple coordinator to that of principal executor of the programmes. In this way, the 
Community has helped a large number of regional organisations, either by direct 
institutional aid, or by financing their projects.
For example, at the regional Caribbean level, comprehensive support programmes 
focusing on the development of tourism, marketing and related activities were 
implemented under Lomé I and II which amounted to more than ECU 9m. The Lomé m  
Caribbean regional programme allocated approximately ECU 17m to tourism and trade, 
supplemented by other resources.^  ^ Regional cooperation has achieved a high level of 
refinement in the Caribbean. Caribbean regional cooperation covers several areas of 
human endeavour from business (the sub-regional Leeward Islands Air Transport) to 
Sports (West Indies Cricket Team) to education (the University of the West Indies). It is 
clear that Lomé regional cooperation funds when channelled through these established 
regional institutions would be more efficient in meeting the desired objectives of 
development projects than any new institutions which may be put in place for the 
occasion. Other ACP regional organisations have benefitted from Lomé regional funds. 
They include organisations with a wider spectrum of activities, for example, CARICOM, 
CEAO®®, ECOWAS, SPEC, SADCC, UDEAC, PTA as well as those with a more
®^ Bruce Zagaris, on. cit.. p.293.
^^CEAO (Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest) is composed of only 
French-speaking West African states and is different from the ECOWAS whose French 
acronym is CEDEAO (Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest).
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specifically defined programme, for example, CILSS and IGADD. Other organisations 
which have benefitted from regional cooperation funds include research and regional 
training institutes.^'
Article 112 of the Lomé HI Convention earmarks ECU 1 billion for the financing 
of regional projects and programmes. Table 6 presents EDF disbursements at the 
beginning of 1989 and covers ECU 817m, that is, over 80 per cent of total regional funds 
under Lome HI. Seven ACP regional organisations or groups of states benefitted from the 
disbursement of the funds. SADCC received ECU 210m mainly to finance transport and 
the food security sectors; SPEC received ECU 34m for the development of natural 
resources (agriculture, fishing, energy) and transport; CARISEC and OECS jointly 
received ECU 72m for the development of tourism, trade, transport, agriculture and the 
rural areas; and the IOC received ECU 26m for the priority development of maritime 
resources, inter-island cooperation, as well as research and training.
Jürgen Koppen, op. cit.. p.394.
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Table 6
EDF Disbursemeiits for Regional Programmes under Lomé III
Recipient Region 
or Organisation
Amt disbursed 
in mECU
%
of total
Sector 
of Finance
West Africa 210 25.70 Desert control 
Research and 
development of 
transportation
SADDC 210 25.70 Transportation 
Food security
East Africa 185 22.64 Transport
corridors
and
Desert control
Central Africa 80 9.79 Rural devt 
Transportation 
Forestry and 
Fishing
CARISEC and OECS 72 8.82 Tourism, trade 
Transportation 
Agric & Rural 
Development
SPEC 34 4.17 Transportation 
and Natural 
Resources 
(fishing, etc)
IOC 26 3.18 Sea resources 
Inter-island 
cooperation
TOTAL 817 100
Kev to Abbreviations:
SADDC
CARISEC
OECS
SPEC
IOC
Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
Caribbean Community Secretariat 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation 
Indian Ocean Commission
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Three groups of ACP states, all in Africa, received substantial sums for specific 
projects. West Africa was allocated ECU 210m for desert control and development of 
transportation betv een the countries of the Sahel, development of transport as well as 
research and training in the coastal states; East Africa received ECU 185m for the 
construction of transport corridors and for desert control; finally. Central Africa was 
allocated ECU 80m for the development of transport, forest and fishing resources and the 
rural areas.®*
West Africa and SADDC both absorbed over 50 per cent of EDF disbursements 
for regional programmes under Lomé m . This trend may be a reflection of both the 
tecnnical content and the humanitarian implications of the projects involved, namely desert 
control in West Africa and food security in Southern Africa. However, the favoured sector 
overall for funding of regional projects was the transport sector. But, concentration of 
particular projects in other sectors also reflects the preoccupation of a given region. For 
example, tourism is conspicuously cited for the CARICOM Secretariat and the OECS 
countries while fishing resources is cited for coastal states in particular those in the Indian 
and Pacific oceans
In 1992, regional projects generated commitments or payments of ECU 130m.®^  
However, by the end of 1992, ECU 824m or 93 per cent of the total Lome HI regional 
funds had been decided upon. It is worth noting that there was little progress made from
®*Ecomonde Service, le 20 janvier 1989, N°264, Partie I, p.4.
®^Commission des Communautés Européennes, Direction Générale du Développement, 
Notes d'information VÜI/C/l-Vin/6, "Bilan Synthétique de la Coopération Financière et 
Technique mise en oeuvre en 1992 dans le cadre des Conventions de Lomé", 22 mars 
1993, p.8.
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ECU 817m to 824m between 1989 and 1992. But this trend can be explained by the fact 
that, with the Lomé HI funds almost completely disbursed, new programmes relating to 
projects of any sizeable importance during this period were submitted for consideration 
within the framework of Lomé IV. On the whole, the commitment or payment of a total 
of ECU 824m by 1992 makes the global Lomé III regional programme of ECU 1 billion 
nearly expended.
Regional cooperation within the Lome Convention has been evaluated with regard 
to some ACP countries, namely Barbados on the one hand and Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic on the other. The basic assumption is that the regional character of the Lome 
agreement, especially when contrasted with the bilateral nature of counterpart regimes 
such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), provides a useful guarantee against any risk 
of domination. The adoption of a five-year financial package which allows estimates vital 
to sustained development efforts to be made, and which enables the planning of 
development assistance programmes over a reasonable period of time is seen as another 
positive feature of the Lome Agreement.
More specifically, Lome IV allows Barbados to mine a relatively successful 
regional integration organisation for ideas, assistance and business. For example. Article 
40 of the Lome IV Convention on the control of the international movements of hazardous 
waste provides an opportunity for CARICOM and Barbados to obtain technical assistance 
and funding in achieving some of the goals of the Port of Spain Accord. In particular, the 
emphasis in Lome IV on the environment can assist in the achievement of Barbados' 
national priorities and programmes on the environment, such as the formulation of a 
national conservation strategy, the protection of important natural habitats and coastal
^°Bruce Zagaris, o p . cit.. p.289.
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conservation protection.’*
Benefit from the Regional Cooperation funds is another positive feature of the 
Lomé Convention for Barbados. Joint projects that are conducted in Barbados and for 
which Barbadians can benefit will qualify for EDF assistance under Lomé IV whereas 
individual Barbados projects may not qualify for funding from the regional cooperation 
funds. Another enlightened feature of the Lomé Convention is the explicit recognition and 
assistance given to tourism and the meaningful amount of financial assistance given to a 
broad range of activities. The positive disposition of the Lomé Convention towards the 
development of tourism in the Caribbean region contrasts with the negative attitude in the 
United States where for six years Congress refused to allow the United States Travel and 
Tourism Agency (USTTA) to participate in technical assistance or to complete a report 
on Caribbean tourism. The Reagan Administration had threatened to abolish the USTTA 
and so members of Congress from tourism states responded by directing the 
Administration not to use any money whatsoever for any project outside the United 
States.’^
The rules of origins were too strenuously defined under previous Lomé 
Conventions.’  ^ They have, however, been simplified under Lomé IV. A single list of
’*Paper of Barbados representative, the Hon. N. K. Simmons, Minister for 
Employment, Labour Relations and Community Development at the 1989 Port of Spain 
Conference on the Environment. Cited by Bruce Zagaris, ibid.. pp.289-90.
72Bruce Zagaris, ibid.. p.293.
’^Rules of origin define the ratio of ACP input necessary in order to qualify a product 
as "originating" from an ACP country for the purpose of duty-free entry to the EEC 
market.
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exceptions, based on the new customs nomenclature (the Harmonised System) has 
replaced the "negative” and "positive" lists of Lomé HI. The requirements concerning the 
degree of processing or working has been made more flexible by doubling the margin of 
tolerance for non-originating inputs (10 per cent), abolishing the double-threshold rule for 
a number of products and lowering the percentage of value added required for others.’"* 
This relaxation of the rules of origins would be of potential benefit to the development 
of the industrial sector in Barbados.
Certain advantages of membership in Lome have also been identifled for Haiti and 
the Dominican Republic, the two most recent members of the ACP group. Spill over 
benefits of membership of ACP-EEC cooperation could be considered an important 
consideration for Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Spill over benefits refer to benefits 
to be realised at a later stage of association with the group or to be realised within a 
related association Admission to the Lome Convention gives Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic access to finance from the EDF and the EIB for regional projects. In other 
words, these countries can participate in regional projects along with traditional 
CARICOM beneficiaries. Again, the two countries previously were excluded from taking 
part in CARICOM projects partly on the grounds that they did not share a common 
political history with the members of CARICOM all of which belong to the British 
Commonwealth. However, since joining the Lome Convention, former Jamaican Premier 
Michael Manley has suggested that the possibility was now open for cooperation between 
the two countries and CARICOM.’^
’"*Bruce Zagaris, on. cit.. p.291.
’^Michael Manley stated that Jamaica would be pleased to work in the Caribbean 
Forum with Surinam, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the English-speaking CARICOM
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From an AC'P-EEC perspective, participation in the Lomé Convention allows Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic favourable access to the EEC market via preferential tariff 
arrangements, and it brings them closer to securing bilateral agreements with one or 
several EEC member states through ACP-EEC institutions for industrial cooperation. 
Finally, membership in the ACP-EEC partnership enables Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic to participate in joint ACP-EEC institutions.’  ^ Important policies affecting 
developing countries of which these two are part and parcel are often deliberated upon in 
the joint ACP and EEC fora. Participation in these institutions enable the ACP countries 
in general to make a positive contribution to the wider North-South debate. Thus, there 
are several benefits to be derived from effective intra-ACP regional cooperation on of 
which is better coordinated ACP diplomacy.
The discussion in this second part of the study of ACP-EEC cooperation and ACP 
diplomacy in practice shows that the ACP group, in spite of all the odds that are stacked 
against it, has managed to evolve a negotiating strategy in its relations with the EEC. This 
was most firmly demonstrated in the debates over policy dialogue, human rights and the 
environment. However, as developing countries with a poorly managed resource base in 
terms of manpowei and finance, and also due to the diversity of ACP members' interests, 
ACP diplomacy is generally only reactive to EEC proposals. Still, the transcendency of 
African initiatives in the debate over toxic waste dumping in Africa and protection of the 
environment (which resulted in the Bamako Convention) points to the potential dynamism 
of ACP diplomacy In sum, ACP diplomacy is essentially reactive; however, it can indeed
countries within the framework of the Lome IV Convention: Actualités - Journal 
périodique du Groupe ACP, Numéro 2 - Décembre 1990, p.l.
’^Francisco Granell, op. cit.. p.886.
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be dynamic when the debate moves from bread-and-butter matters to life-and-death issues.
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CONCLUSION
This study lias examined ACP-EEC cooperation and AGP diplomacy from 1957- 
1990 through the organisation of AGP organs, EEG institutions and joint AGP-EEG 
structures for policy implementation within the framework of the Lomé Gonvention. The 
examination of the AGP-EEG association has been based on the need for cooperation 
between the two parties and for the AGP countries to adopt an inward-looking negotiating 
strategy. The study has thus focused on the AGP countries and theoretical concepts 
pertaining to group diplomacy, coalition formation, influence, conflict and cleavages have 
been used where possible to analyze some of the procedures involved in the negotiation 
of common AGP positions. The concern here, however, was not with testing these 
concepts, but rather it was with using them to arrange our thoughts on AGP-EEG 
relations.
The investigations on the AGP group have shown that AGP diplomacy is primarily 
reactive over aid and trade cooperation issues with the EEG. This is due to relative small 
representation in AGP organs and lack of expertise in relation to the EEG. However, AGP 
diplomacy has also known bouts of dynamism when it comes to life-and-death issues such 
as toxic waste dumping in Africa and environmental degradation. But, as aid and trade 
discussions are at Ihe centre of AGP-EEG cooperation, the discussions in the thesis have 
led us to the general conclusion that AGP diplomacy is essentially reactive.
Indeed, the study has pointed to a certain number of problems with AGP-EEG 
cooperation and AGP diplomacy. But, it has also enabled us to draw some conclusions on 
the prospects for the relationship. The picture we have is gloomy indeed. But, it is perhaps 
worth stating that the discussion of the problems of AGP-EEG cooperation and the
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difficulties with ACP diplomacy is not intended to obscure several of the desirable 
features of North-South relations which are already incorporated in the Lomé Convention. 
On the contrary. The discussion of the problems merely indicates that there is need for 
further work to be done to bring the ACP-EEC relationship closer to the ideal. Presently, 
there are several problems with ACP-EEC cooperation and ACP diplomacy. These 
difficulties can be broadly classified into two categories. The first category relates to the 
organisation of EEC institutions, ACP organs and joint ACP-EEC structures. The second 
relates directly to coordination of ACP diplomacy both on the intra-group and regional 
levels.
The resurgence of European internal dynamism and the organisation of EEC 
institutions have had some negative impact on ACP diplomacy. At the outset of Eurafrican 
cooperation, development policy was advanced as one of the more substantial vehicles for 
demonstrating European unity. Former EEC Development Commissioner, Edgard Pisani, 
even described the policy towards developing countries as a "cornerstone of European 
integration."’ It is symptomatic of the subsequent change that development is now not 
even the exclusive concern of one EEC commissioner. Development Commissioner 
Manuel Marin holds the portfolios of both development cooperation for the ACP countries 
and fisheries, the latter a subject of considerable concern to his native Spain. There is also 
a possibility that m  impending restructuring of the EEC Commission would bring about 
a further reduction in the capacity of DG VXII (Development) to deal adequately with 
development cooperation. A report has stated that in the proposal to re-organise the
’Christopher Stevens, "The Impact of Europe 1992 on the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan 
Africa" in Dermot McAleese et al..., Africa and the European Communitv after 1992. 
Washington, D. C Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, 1993, pp.74-75.
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Commission, Hans van den Broek (EEC Foreign Affairs Commissioner), Sir Leon Brittan 
(Foreign Trade) and Manuel Marin have agreed, more or less, that something akin to a 
foreign ministry will emerge, headed by Mr. Van den Broek.^ DG Vm, and hence 
development cooperation, could lose out when, for example, its budget is reduced or staff 
are moved to a more promising department, product of the re-organisation. Due to 
inadequate manpower and finance undue pressure might be brought to bear on ACP 
diplomacy if the ACP countries are forced to contend with new, revamped or unfamiliar 
structures within the Commission. The recent changes in Eastern Europe have added yet 
another area of competition for EEC interests. Trade and financial aid with ACP countries, 
both within the framework of the Lomé Convention and in bilateral arrangements, is 
competing with new EEC interests aimed at expanding economic cooperation into all of 
Europe including Southern and Eastern Europe.
On a comparative level, an observation of EEC institutions and ACP organs shows 
that the partners are far from being the equals they had set out to be/ On consideration 
of numbers, the JiEC Commission employs over 17 000 persons. And, since EEC 
institutions are closely coordinated, we may also add 7 000 staff of other Community
^"Kitchen capers". The Economist. March 6th 1993, p.30.
^When Britain joined the EEC in 1973, the Community had affirmed to African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries which were wary of the EEC association that "to become 
an Associate does not mean joining the Community; it means organising on an equal 
footing with the Community a shared framework of economic and development 
cooperation ": Prolocol 22 Doc no. COM (73) 500f, Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 4 April 1973, p.4. Cited in Carol Cosgrove 
Twitchett, A Framework for Development: The EEC and the ACP. London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1981, p.8.
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institutions such as the European Parliament to the overall strength of the EEC 
Commission. By contrast, the ACP Secretariat which for all intent and purpose is the ACP 
group's equivalent of the EEC Commission employs only 83 persons. Some may be 
tempted to argue tiiat of all the EEC institutions DG Vm within the Commission alone 
negotiates with the ACP group. Even if this were the case, DG Vm's strength vis-à-vis 
the ACP group can still be illustrated by recalling that it has so many more staff than the 
ACP group that it can afford not only to administer the general provisions of the Lomé 
Convention (EDF, Food Aid, etc.) but also runs nearly as many desks responsible for 
individual ACP countries as there are members of the ACP group.
Yet, as if DG Vm's strength were not enough to overcome the ACP's tiny 
resources, in addition, it has to face up to the colossal Commission and indeed EEC 
institutions as a whole. In effect, DG Vm  seeks specialist advice and liaises with other 
EEC departments in its relations with the ACP countries. For example, in matters relating 
to the agricultural sector such as food aid and duty-free entry into the Community of 
certain agricultural products (tomatoes, bananas, etc.) which may compete with similar 
products originating in the territories of EEC member states, DG VI (Agriculture) is 
consulted and provides information which cannot be ignored by DG VIII. Similarly, the 
powers of the European Parliament in development cooperation matters increases 
constantly to the bewilderment of ACP officials who have to face up to ever increasing 
pressure from various sections of the Community to justify the development aid funds 
which they receive. Thus, the strength and effective coordination of existing Community 
structures adds further pressure on ACP diplomacy.
On consideration of technical expertise, the EEC is also in a more favourable 
position than the ACP group. The EEC employs several resident experts while the ACP
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Secretariat cannot afford to keep an adequate number of experts on its payroll. The 
Secretariat only hires expert services when critically needed, for example, during 
negotiations. Again, the Secretariat often finds it difficult to meet the expenses involved 
in this exercise and, consequently, has to look up to the EEC for help in paying for the 
experts. The low financial standing of the ACP Secretariat is aggravated by the fact that 
contributions from ACP countries are often late in arriving - if and when they do arrive. 
Needless to say the Community will not be overly motivated to bankroll ACP diplomacy 
especially where the ACP group seeks to extract concessions from the Community.
A critical look at joint ACP-EEC structures further gives a lie w the argument that 
ACP-EEC cooperation is based on the principle of equality of the partners. A case in point 
is the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly which promises that representation of the EEC and the 
ACP countries shall be based on the principle of parity. This claim poses two problems. 
First, it implies that the EEC which has numerically fewer member states, i.e. 12, presents 
the same number of parliamentarians to the Joint Assembly as the 69 ACP countries. The 
second problem is more fundamental: many ACP countries do not have a parliament at 
all, and are therefore represented in the Joint Assembly by ambassadors or other 
government officials while the EEC side is represented by Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs). There is no doubt that the EEC side, made up of career 
parliamentarians, would be more committed to debates in the Assembly than the ACP 
representatives who may, quite naturally, have other professional preoccupations. The fore­
going is an example of a case in which the good intentions of ACP-EEC arrangements 
may not benefit both sides equally. Conversations with ACP experts confirm that MEPs 
come to the Joint Assembly meetings with well revised resolutions as well as full research 
and secretarial sup])ort whereas ACP members of the Joint Assembly are often left in the
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dark as to the substance of deliberations until motions are ready to be adopted. These 
events - occasioned by lack of expert and administrative support on the ACP side - also 
have a negative impact on ACP group diplomacy as resolutions cannot be properly 
discussed beforehand by the ACP representatives under those circumstances.
Another case in which joint ACP-EEC arrangements do not benefit both sides 
equally can be found in tendering procedures for EDF and Lome-related contracts. Based 
on the principle of equality of the partners, contracts are open for tenders from companies 
registered either in an EEC member state or in an ACP country. Co-tendering is 
encouraged in the Lomé Convention but such a procedure will hardly benefit ACP- 
registered businesses which in most cases may be less technologically advanced than their 
EEC counterparts. The solution is certainly not to glorify mediocrity. But it would go a 
long way towards promoting ACP-EEC industrial cooperation if contracts for certain 
projects were reserved exclusively for one or more ACP-registered enterprises, possibly 
with technical assistance from EEC operators. Such a procedure would be consistent with 
ACP-EEC efforts aimed at alleviating the burden of technological limitations of the ACP 
countries. From an ACP standpoint, the procedure could also boost intra-group diplomacy 
because, given their minimal technological capabilities, the ACP countries might be likely 
to pull resources together towards lucrative ventures.
One last problem to be mentioned with regard to the comparison of ACP and EEC 
structures is that ACP diplomacy relies on statistics from the EEC partners or from 
individual ACP state capitals. There is no equivalent in the ACP of the EEC-own 
statistical sources. The ACP group and most ACP countries rely on statistics from 
EUROSTAT for policy coordination. This arrangement could have been acceptable on the 
principle of ACP-EEC solidarity except that valuable time is lost in the decision-making
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process and group coordination is delayed while the ACP pieces together information from 
different EEC sources and from the various ACP state capitals. Non-availability of ACP- 
own data implies that ACP governments may have to rely on the same source of 
information as the general public for the implementation of important policies. In fact, 
lack of independent ACP statistics relates to the difficulties in the coordination of ACP 
internal diplomacy
Thus, ACP diplomacy presents several problems of coordination. The lack of 
independent ACP data can be linked to difficulties in the coordination of development 
policy at both the mtra-group and ACP regional levels. The difficulty extends into ACP 
group relations, and is also reflected in regional cooperation, or rather, in the lack of it. 
The inability of the ACP countries to put Lomé provisions relating to regional cooperation 
to beneficial use points to wider problems on a regional level. With a few exceptions, 
notably in the Caribbean, these problems include lack of efficient regional transportation 
and telecommunications links, particularly better roads, railroads, and air transportation.^ 
It is evident from current world events that regional groupings will lead international 
economic relations into the 21st century. The European Community itself is a concrete 
example of this tendency towards regional integration. Burgeoning regional groups already 
exist in Asia (ASEAN) and others are forming in the Americas (NAFTA). The ACP 
countries cannot afford to be mere spectators while what we perceive as the future of 
international economic relations takes shape. ACP diplomacy has much to gain from 
effective regional cooperation. Yet, apart from the Caribbean where some efforts have 
been made towards cooperation in air transportation, sports and education, it appears that
^Dermot McAleese et al..., Africa and the European Communitv after 1992. 
Washington, D. C. Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, 1993, pp.x-xii.
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little or no consideration is given to the benefits which ACP countries might achieve in 
ACP-EEC relations through better regional economic integration. Several political and 
economic groupings do exist (ECOWAS, SADDC, PTA, etc.), but they have insufficient 
political commitments from their members, and therefore generate little in terms of 
economic cooperation or group coordination.
In the consideration of the prospects of ACP-EEC cooperation and ACP 
diplomacy, as it is often the case in Eurafrican relations, these prospects will tend to 
depend on the internal evolution of the Community itself.^ It is significant to note in this 
regard that the European Community evolved to become the European Union (EU) 
following the entry into force of the Maastricht treaty on 1 November 1993.® Already, 
phrases such as ACP-EU Joint Assembly and DG VUE in the EU Commission are coming 
into usage. If the EEC, or the EU, further evolves towards a common currency, we can 
envisage the establishment of an African currency with a fixed parity to such a European 
currency. In this perspective, it has been suggested that in the event of a fully 
operational European Monetary Union (EMU), the CFA franc could possibly be the first 
currency to be tied to the ECU or some other eventual European currency.^ The extension 
of the principles of convertibility of this Euro-african currency system to other African
®Note that the participation of France in the Treaty of Rome in 1957 on the one hand, 
and the signing of the Act of Accession by Britain in 1972 on the other, pushed the ACP 
countries into negotiating special relations with the EEC.
^"Disunion greets birth of the European Union", Financial Times. October 30-31 1993,
p.3.
^Amadou B. Touré, "Les pays africains face à l'échéance européenne de 1992" in 
Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens. N°2400, 47® Armée, 8 novembre 1991, p.2839.
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countries can also be expected, although it is yet to be determined how the system will 
be financed. It is however clear that rethinking the franc as a result of the impending 
monetary union of Europe would enable the countries of Anglophone Africa to become 
members of the zone should they choose to do so.* Such a development would enhance 
inter-African diplomacy in the short term and might even alleviate the financial constraints 
in inter-ACP diplomacy in the long run if other ACP regions should choose to subscribe 
to a fully convertible currency bloc. Financial constraints would be alleviated for example 
in the operation of the ACP Secretariat General where ACP financial contributions could 
jump the hurdle of convertibility.
French businesses are enthusiastic about the opportunities that such a development 
would offer, especially in terms of penetration into the markets of English-speaking 
African countries.^ There may be incentives too for Britain's traditional African trading 
partners to peg their currencies to a Eurafrican currency system if Britain joins the EMU.’° 
These hypotheses blend in well with the hopes expressed within the Community on the 
need for greater global exchange rate stability and realistic exchange rate policies of
*Paul Collier, "Africa's External Economic Relations 1960-1990" in Douglas Rimmer 
(ed.), Africa 30 Years On. London: The Royal African Society in association with James 
Currey Ltd, 1991, pp. 162-63.
^Amadou B. Touré, on. cit.. p.2839.
^°Patrick Guillaumont and Sylviane Guillaumont, "The Implications of European 
Monetary Union for African Countries" in Journal of Common Market Studies. Volume 
XXVm, No. 2, December 1989, pp.139-153.
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Community trading partners.’’ The appeal of the monetary system can be appreciated 
against the consideration of guaranteed convertible currencies at a fixed parity for both 
the European investor and the African host country.
Not only might the development of a Eurafrican currency bloc promote inter- 
African diplomacy (monetary cooperation would bring the French- and English-speaking 
countries even closer together) but it will also be welcome to compensate for the possible 
adverse effects of the defacement of the traditional hallmarks of Eurafrican cooperation 
such as Franco-African monetary cooperation, a convention signed within reasonably short 
intervals and close Commonwealth relations. Firstly, the CFA franc which has had a fixed 
parity of 50 to 1 vith the French franc since 1947 has now been devalued.’^  If France's 
historical support for the African countries is taken into account, this event can be viewed 
as symbolising the abandonment of the traditional tenets of Eurafrican cooperation. In 
other words, the devaluation of the CFA franc implies that the African countries now 
stand alone and should no longer expect France or other industrialised countries to act on 
their behalf as they did after independence in the 1960s. As the franc zone has sometimes 
been criticised for undermining the independence of the French-speaking African 
countries, here is perhaps an opportunity for the Europeans and the Africans together to 
devise a new, and more acceptable, monetary cooperation system. The new system which
’’Dermot McAleese, "External Trade Policy of the European Community" in Dermot 
McAleese et al..., Africa and the European Communitv after 1992. Washington, D. C.: 
Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, 1993, pp. 19-20.
’^ Under pressure from a French government no longer prepared to subsidise its former 
colonies, 13 of the 14 CFA countries devalued their currency on 12 January 1994 by 50 
per cent with the 14th limiting its devaluation to a third: Africa Research Bulletin. 
Volume 30 Number 12, December 16th 1993-January 15th 1994, p.ll535.
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should maintain competitive exchange rates for the eventual African currency may then 
help to reverse the trend in Community trade which tends towards diversification of 
procurement sources of raw materials: cocoa from Malaysia; bananas from Latin America. 
This trend has caused the volume of ACP trade to fall progressively. ACP exports to the 
European market (in percentage of the total) was 9 per cent in 1960, 7.7 per cent in 1980 
and only 4.1 per cent in 1987.’^  Declining terms of trade, Africa's debt and debt service 
payments, divestment and disinvestment of foreign capital to areas of higher priority such 
as Eastern Europe are resulting in net annual transfers of capital to the rest of the world. 
Loss of resources undermines concerted ACP diplomacy. Secondly, the Lomé Convention 
which had been renewed every five years is now due for renewal after ten years, Lomé 
rv  being valid from 1990 to the year 2000. This may suggest an EEC fatigue with 
development cooperation: it has been indicated to this writer that the Community 
unilaterally set the validity of the Lomé Convention to ten years.
Thirdly, closer interactions between Britain and other EEC member states has 
already begun to undermine the solidarity of the Commonwealth. An opinion poll has 
suggested that increasing contact with, and awareness of, European countries has 
contributed to break down age-old barriers of distrust and suspicion between Britain and 
other European countries. This has had the effect, when coupled with the loosening of the 
special ties that in the past have bound Britain to the Commonwealth, of making the 
British feel increasingly closer to the people of Europe.’"* Britain may feel less emotional
’^ Amadou B. Touré, op. cit.. p.2837.
’^ Neill Nugent, "British Public Opinion and the European Community" in Stephen 
George (ed.), Britain and the European Communitv - The Politics of Semi-Detachment, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 193.
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about her Commonwealth connections in Africa and elsewhere but the less powerful 
Commonwealth countries no doubt appreciate the occasions presented within the 
Commonwealth to coordinate their diplomacy on some of the international issues which 
concern them. Consequently, a shift of emphasis in Britain away from the Commonwealth 
and towards the European Union can be viewed as a loss in diplomatic strength of the 
Commonwealth developing countries. However, the ACP countries might still choose to 
re-organise group diplomacy and advance their development objectives around the relevant 
structures of the Commonwealth. The evolution and long-term impact of changes in the 
Commonwealth and the EEC could form the subject of further research on ACP-EEC 
cooperation and ACP diplomacy.
Towards a more effective ACP diolomacv
ACP-EEC cooperation as embodied in the Lomé Convention is commendable but 
does not make adequate provisions for the ACP countries to reap high benefits from the 
relationship. It is also clear that as the EEC, or the EU which replaces it, turns its focus 
away from development cooperation as an essential feature of external relations, it can no 
longer be expected to initiate proposals which take fully into account the interests of the 
ACP countries. The ACP countries must therefore take their destiny in their own hands 
by evolving a more consistently dynamic group diplomacy.
The development and consolidation of sub-regional and regional ACP organisations 
should be a matter of urgency. In Africa, due to the possible initial difficulties of 
coordinating continental negotiating strategies which may be due to poor communications 
links, it would be a good start to integrate resources on a sub-regional level (West,
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Central, East and Southern Africa) with a view to coordinating with the other sub-regions 
and then other ACP regions in the near future. As economic and political integration is 
explored and indeed implemented in the Americas, Asia and Europe in anticipation of the 
challenges of the next century, surely the opportunity has presented itself once again for 
African leaders to bring to fruition one of Africa's age-old yearnings - that for Pan-African 
integration. Individual countries will be too weak to deal with the EU and other regional 
groupings. Once the principle is accepted, the new Pan-Africanism should be formulated 
to respond to current world realities. As a first step, African governments should eliminate 
barriers to an intra-African flow of capital, manpower resources and goods. Other related 
aspects of Pan-African integration should aim at self-sufficiency in food production on a 
sub-regional basis. Political style and economic management can be a serious constraint 
upon the further development of economic cooperation within a region and, in view of 
donor conditionalily, upon the flow of direct foreign investment from abroad. Political 
adjustment should therefore form a part and parcel of economic adjustment on both 
national and sub-regional levels. The move towards democracy in the ACP countries 
would be propitious for inward-looking negotiating strategies as development issues could 
be publicly debated under such circumstances.
ACP-EEC relations could pose some threats in the future. European protectionism 
may result in an increase in trade barriers in the form of high environmental and health 
standards, quotas and restrictive rules of origin. The declining relative importance of the 
ACP countries due to the Community's current focus on making internal adjustments and 
on assisting Eastern Europe to make the transition to market economies and democratic 
governments will be also reflected in reduced levels of resources, including intellectual 
resources through technical assistance, for ACP economies.
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But, ACP-IiEC relations could also offer some opportunities in the future. The 
creation of an economic union in Europe could provide benefits for the ACP countries 
which would largely be attributable to increases in the Community's rate of economic 
growth. High grow th rates would translate into increased imports, particularly of primary 
products, but also of some manufactures. Economic growth in the Community should 
point to the need for the ACP countries to develop the manufacturing sector in order to 
increase the value-added of traditional primary exports and improve their foreign exchange 
earnings. Increased competition within the Community might result in the availability of 
cheaper capital goods and costs of services which the ACP countries could afford if they 
are able to increase their foreign exchange earnings through concerted efforts and well 
coordinated diplomacy. Some damage may already have been done as a result of years of 
uncoordinated ACP diplomacy. However, the growth of the Community presents further 
possibilities for the ACP countries. This time, the opportunities must be taken at ACP-own 
initiative. Herein lies our hope for the future.
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EPILOGUE
"It must be recognised that co-operation is the greatest word of the century. With co­
operation we can command peace, goodwill and concord. Without: chaos, confusion and 
ruin. But there can really be no co-operation between inferiors and superiors. Try as they 
may, there must come a time when the elements of superiority will seek to dictate, and 
the inferior ones \^ 411 resent such dictation. It logically follows, therefore, that unless an 
honest effort is made to raise the inferior up to the prestige of the superior, and the latter 
can suffer it, all our talk of co-operation is so much empty gas..."
- Words spoken by J. Casely-Hayford in 1925:
The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah 
(London: Panaf, 1973), pp. 168-169.
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APPENDIX 1
THE GEORGETOWN AGREEMENT"
Guyana, 6 June, 1975
THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC STATES, 
hereinafter called the "ACP Group",
HAVING CONTRIBUTED, through united and concerted endeavours to the acceleration 
of the process of solidarity of developing countries,
HAVING REGARD to the ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé,
TAKING into account the objectives of the international and regional organisations to 
which the ACP States belong,
DESIROUS of consolidating and strengthening the existing solidarity of the ACP Group, 
RESOLVED to promote and develop greater and closer trade and economic relations 
between the ACP States,
DETERMINED to promote effective regional and inter-regional co-operation among the 
ACP States,
DETERMINED to ensure that the Convention of Lome contributes fully to the realisation 
of the common aspirations of countries of the developing world,
RESOLVED to establish the Group of the African, Caribbean and Pacific States to 
achieve the above objectives as a process towards the realisation of the new international 
economic order,
HAVE AGREED as follows:
"Source: The Courier no.93 - September-October 1985, pp.54-55.
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Hie oiiganisation and objectives of the ACP Group
Article I 
H ie Group
There is hereby formally established the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of 
States which shall be known as the "ACP Group".
The Members of the ACP Group shall be the African, Caribbean and Pacific States 
which are signatory to the Convention of Lomé and to this Agreement.
Any other State which accedes to the Convention of Lome may become a member 
of the ACP Group in accordance with Article 22 of this Agreement
The ACP Group shall have legal personality. It shall have the capacity to contract, 
acquire, and dispose of movable and immovable property and to institute legal 
proceedings.
Article 2 
H ie Objectives o f  the AGP Group
The objectives of the ACP Group shall be as follows:
(a) to ensure the realisation of the objectives of the Convention of Lome,
(b) to co-ordinate the activities of the ACP States in the application of the Convention of 
Lome,
(c) to determine joint positions of the ACP Group vis-a-vis the EEC on matters covered 
by the Convention of Lome,
(d) to promote and strengthen the existing solidarity of the ACP Group,
(e) to contribute to the development of greater and closer trade, economic and cultural 
relations amongst the ACP States and amongst developing countries in general, and to this
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end to develop the exchange of information amongst the ACP States in the fields of trade, 
technology, industry and human resources,
(f) to contribute to the promotion of effective regional and inter-regional co-operation 
amongst the ACP States and amongst developing countries in general, and to strengthen 
the links between the respective regional organisation to which they belong,
(g) to promote the establishment of a new world economic order.
Chapter n  
Oigans o f the group
Article 3
The organs of the ACP Group shall be the Council of Ministers and the 
Committee of Ambassadors.
The Council of Ministers shall take steps to ensure a liaison with the members 
of the ACP States in the Consultative Assembly set up by the Lomé Convention.
The Organs shall be assisted by a General Secretariat of the ACP Group.
The Council o f Ministers
Article 4
The Council of Ministers shall consist of a member of the Government of each 
of the ACP States or of a representative designated by the latter.
Article 5
The Council of Ministers shall define the broad outlines of the work to be
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undertaken for the attainment of the objectives specified in Article 2 of this 
Agreement.
It shall periodically review the attainment of the objectives set out in Article 2.
Article 6
The Council of Ministers may delegate to the Committee of Ambassadors any 
of its powers.
Article 7
The Council of Ministers shall elect its Bureau at the end of each ordinary 
session of the Council of Ministers.
The Bureau shall be composed of six members designated as follows:
- four from Africa,
- one from the (Caribbean,
- one from the Pacific.
The Council shall elect its President from among the members of the Bureau on 
a rotation basis belween Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific Groups.
A rticle 8
The Council of Ministers shall meet in ordinary session once in each six 
months.
In addition the Council may meet in special session whenever necessary on the 
decision of the President after consultation with all the members of the Bureau.
Article 9
The acts of the Council of Ministers may take the form of a decision, resolution 
or recommendation.
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Article 10
Decisions made by the Council of Ministers shall be arrived at on the basis of a 
consensus of the members.
However, under special circumstances and after consultation, decisions may be 
arrived at by a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Council.
Article I I
The Council of Ministers shall adopt its rules of procedure.
H ie Committee o f Ambassador
Article 12
The Committee of Ambassadors shall consist of an Ambassador or other 
representative of each of the ACP States.
Article 13
The Committee of Ambassadors shall assist the Council of Ministers in the 
performance of its functions and shall carry out any mandate entrusted to it by the 
Council of Ministers.
In particular the Committee of Ambassadors shall ensure the implementation of 
the Lomé Convention.
The Committee of Ambassadors shall present to each meeting of the Council of 
Ministers a report of its activities.
Article 14
There shall be a Bureau of the Committee of Ambassadors which shall co­
ordinate the work of the Committee of Ambassadors.
The Bureau of the Committee of Ambassadors shall be composed of a
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Chairman and five Vice-Chairmen who shall hold office for a period of six months.
Article 15
The acts of the Committee of Ambassadors shall take the form of a decision, 
resolution or recommendation.
Article 16
Decisions made by the Committee of Ambassadors shall be arrived at on the 
basis of a consensus of the members.
Article 17
The Committee of Ambassadors shall adopt its own rules of procedure.
Chapter III 
The ACP General Secretariat
Article 19*
The ACP Cfeneral Secretariat for servicing the organs of the ACP Group shall 
be located in Brussels, Belgium.
Article 19
The ACP General Secretariat under the authority of the organs of the ACP 
Group shall:
- monitor the implementation of the Lomé Convention,
- service the organs of the ACP Group and the joint institutions established under 
the Lomé Convention, and
- carry out such tasks as many be assigned to it by the Council of Ministers and the
*This author's note: Should read "Article 18".
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Committee of Ambassadors.
Article 20
The Council of Ministers, on the proposal of the Committee of Ambassadors, 
shall determine the organisational structure of the ACP General Secretariat; and define 
its staff regulations.
Article 21
The Council of Ministers shall establish the financial regulations and the budget 
of the ACP Genend Secretariat.
Each ACP State shall contribute to the budget in accordance with provisions 
established by the Council of Ministers.
Chapter IV 
Final and general provisions
Article 22
A State which accedes to the Lomé Convention may accede to this Agreement, 
with the approval of the Council of Ministers. The new State shall assume all the 
rights and the obligations arising from this Agreement.
Article 23
Regional bodies of the ACP States shall be entitled to participate as observers 
in the meetings of the organs of the ACP Group.
Article 24
The provisions of this Agreement may be amended by a decision of the Council 
of Ministers.
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Article 25
The working languages of the ACP Group shall be English and French. A 
delegation may oppose the examination of any text if it has not been drawn up in both 
languages.
Article 26
This Agreement is open for signature at the ACP General Secretariat from the 
Sixth day of June, 1975, being the date on which the approved text, in the English and 
French languages, was initialled in Georgetown, Guyana.
This Agreement shall come into force two months after signature thereof by at 
least two-thirds of the Member States of the ACP Group.
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APPENDIX 2
THE SUVA DECLARATION*
Fiji, 14 April, 1977
THE ACP COUNCIL OF MINISTERS:
RECALLING the declaration of Heads of States, Head of Governments and 
Government Ministers of ACP Countries manifesting the political will of the ACP 
States to strengthen cooperation among themselves for their individual and collective 
benefit;
CONSIDERING the steps already taken to consolidate and strengthen the existing 
solidarity of the ACP Group in the conclusion of the Georgetown Agreement formally 
establishing the A(]P Group;
MINDFUL of the need to translate into practical action the principles of collective 
self-reliance and of self-determination by the ACP countries to reinforce their unity 
and capacity for joint action;
HEREBY DECLARES THE ADOPTION OF THE FOLLOWING PROGRAMME OF 
ACTION
The Action Programme for 
Intra-ACP Cooperation
The Action Programme deals with six major sectors of cooperation among ACP 
countries, viz.:
(1) Transport, communications and other services;
'Source: The Courier no.93 - September-October 1985, pp.55-56.
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(2) Trade;
(3) Development of Intra-ACP Enterprises and Cooperation in production;
(4) Development finance;
(5) Technology, know-how, and technical assistance;
(6) Cultural, Scientific and Educational Cooperation.
1. Transport, communications and other sendees 
An essential complement to the development and strengthening of trade 
cooperation, as well as to the development of intra-ACP enterprises and cooperation in 
production, is the implementation of appropriate measures in the service sectors, 
particularly shipping, air and land transport, communications and banking, insurance 
and credit.
In respect of shipping and shipping services, the ACP would need to examine 
and to identify the particular measures necessary for assisting the following main areas:
(i) the expansion of trade between the ACP countries;
(ii) intra-ACP cooperation in production;
(iii) the stimulation of exports from ACP countries to third countries;
(iv) cooperation in import policy and practice among ACP countries.
Related studies on alternative means of transport and the creation, improvement, 
or adaptation of port facilities, will also have to be undertaken.
The question of transportation is fundamental to the development of intra-ACP 
cooperation. With regard to new trade flows between the ACP countries, much will 
depend on the availability and cost of the transport services. Thus the ACP will need 
to determine to what extend the lack of these services or their cost constitutes a barrier
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to the expansion of trade in ACP commodities. The ACP would also need to examine 
the existing and potential trade routes and the cargo flow estimates to determine the 
traffic demands in relation to the existing shipping tonnage owned by ACP States.
With respect to the stimulation of exports from ACP to third countries, and the 
coordination of export policies and practices by ACP States, studies will initially centre 
around the considerable savings that might be made by ACP countries from 
cooperative efforts in the bulk handling of homogenous cargoes moving in large 
quantities and the aggregation of mixed liner cargoes on a regional or sub-regional 
basis. Such investigations should also illustrate the economic feasibility of establishing 
or strengthening regional shipping lines serving the different areas of the ACP. The 
importance of communications networks between the ACP countries as a basic 
precondition for the development of intra-ACP cooperation in trade production, is all 
but equalled by that of the services such as insurance, banking and credit. The 
machinery for increased functional cooperation between these sectors of the ACP 
States should therefore be considered at an early stage.
2. Trade
Having regard to the need for a fair distribution of the benefits of such a 
programme among the regions of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, measures in 
this area must be designed with a view to:
(i) the strengthening of the collective bargaining power of the ACP countries in their 
export and import trade with the industrialised countries and their ability to exploit 
more fully available opportunities in the markets of those countries;
(ii) the liberalisation of trade among the ACP countries and between the ACP
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countries and other developing countries. The mechanism for such trade liberalisation 
would be the adoption of an ACP-wide scheme for the provision of a distinct margin 
of advantage in favour of ACPs and other developing countries' supplies from 
developed countries care being taken to ensure an equitable distribution of the costs 
and benefits of the scheme among the individual participating countries. The scheme 
need not necessarily aim at full trade liberalisation but could be restricted to immediate 
and realistic targets;
(iii) the full utilisation of those measures in the Lomé Convention (eg. as in Article 7
(2)(b) of Title I) which offer direct support to the expansion of ACP trade, of the 
GATT protocol of December 8, 1971 relating to Trade Negotiations among Developing 
Countries and other international arrangements providing special support for intra- 
developing countries' trade;
(iv) the adoption of active measures of trade cooperation between the ACP States such 
as the conclusion of medium and long-term contractual arrangements as a means of 
directly expanding intra-ACP trade flows and of developing new trade flows. These 
arrangements can involve commitments to supply and purchase specific commodities 
within mutually agreed price ranges over given periods of time;
(v) the strengthening of cooperation between ACP producers for joint action aimed at 
improving and stabilising prices, at cooperation in processing, at product improvement, 
at providing technical support and at direct marketing distribution and shipping. Such 
efforts would have the result of reducing the traditional dependence on the marketing 
systems and distribution channels of the developed countries, especially those 
organised through the intra-firm transactions of transnational corporations and through 
commodity markets or exchanges controlled by the developed countries; and of
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increasing the share of the value-added retained by ACP countries. Joint ACF 
marketing and market intelligence services should also be contemplated in this regard;
(vi) the full exploitation of the provisions of the Lomé Convention relating to the 
accumulation of processing and cumulative treatment in respect of exports to the 
European Community;
(vii) the identification of the possibilities for the production of and the trade in goods 
deriving from the particular specialisation of ACP States and the scope for 
complementarity between various sectors of different ACP countries;
(viii) the identification of specific obstacles to the initiation and expansion of trade 
between the ACP countries and taking the necessary steps to overcome the obstacles;
(ix) the initiation of effective intra-ACP cooperation in developing a system of 
payments arrangements for trade, by means of a network of clearing arrangements at 
the regional and sub-regional levels, by the development of closer linkages between 
these arrangements, and by the development of closer links between the central banks 
of ACP countries with a view to furthering the principle of collective self-reliance.
3. Hie development of intra-ACP enterprises 
and cooperation in production
Central to the strategy for the achievement of the objectives of intra-ACP 
cooperation is the development of multinational Intra-ACP Enterprises for production. 
The development of such complementary productive capacity is a major precondition 
for the satisfactory development of the resource endowments of many ACP States, for 
the expansion and diversification of intra-ACP trade, as well as for the enhancement of 
the position of ACP trade in the markets of third countries.
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Article 8(a) of Protocol No 2 of the Lomé Convention makes basis provision 
for financial support in the setting up of "regional and interregional enterprises"; such 
initial impetus as represented by these resources should be fully utilised in the 
achievement of this major objective.
The process of identifying opportunities for establishing such enterprises should 
be given immediate expert attention so that there can be early initiation of intra-ACP 
collaboration and negotiations for the establishment of appropriate intra-ACP 
enterprises in the fields of natural resources, technology, management, finance, 
markets, etc. The balancing of the interests of participating countries should not be 
overlooked and emphasis might be more wisely placed on factor complementarity 
rather than on equity financing in the creation of these enterprises.
Collaboration should also be strengthened in relation to the development of 
infrastructure and services such as hydro-electric plants, road networks, 
telecommunications, water development, airline and shipping services, insurance, 
finance and banking institutions and technological and research services. Special 
concern for the benefits of the least developed, island and land-locked countries should 
continue to be a major preoccupation of such collaboration.
Regional and sub-regional plans for the production of food for home 
consumption should also be the subject of exchanges and collaboration between ACP 
countries.
As a first step, inventories of possible Intra-ACP Enterprises in all these fields 
should be drawn up in cooperation with regional and sub-regional financial institutions 
- and if possible with national development banks. The gathering of technical data 
essential to this exercise must be undertaken immediately, together with the organising
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and updating of relevant data available in U.N. Agencies and financial institutions, 
such as the World Bank Group.
4. Development finance
In the field of development finance, provisions already exist in the Lomé 
Convention under which direct financial support is available for the furtherance of 
intra-ACP cooperation. Apart from this, an early start should be made within the ACP 
Group to ensure greater collaboration and cooperation in respect of the individual aid 
programme now being established under the Lomé Convention. In addition, machinery 
can be instituted within the ACP Secretariat for maximising the benefits to ACP 
enterprises arising out of the provisions of the Convention relating to invitations to 
tender in respect of EEC-financed projects.
Other measures aimed at improving the availability of capital on terms more 
favourable to the ACP countries might be contemplated, and whenever possible, with 
the cooperation of other developing countries. Intra-ACP cooperation, in the context 
of cooperation with other development countries, could:
(i) provide for balance-of-payments adjustments assistance,
(ii) support stabilisation of commodity export prices at equitable and remunerative 
levels and
(iii) serve as a framework for long-term development finance.
Experience regarding monetary and financial measures now in existence or 
under contemplation in various regions or sub-regions of the ACP could be shared on a 
systematic basis with a view to their deepening and widening for the benefit of the 
ACP States jointly and severally.
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5. Technology, know-how and technical assistance 
Intra-ACP technical cooperation projects are a vital part of Intra-ACP 
cooperation. They are already envisaged under the Lomé Convention and this can be 
used as a basis for the development and expansion of technology transfer among the 
ACP States. The measures to achieve this could include;
(i) Increased flow of technologies and know-how evolved within the ACP or other 
developing countries;
(ii) Exchange of information and expertise in respect of available technologies;
(iii) Technical assistance, in particular through the exchange of experts, advisory 
services and training courses;
(iv) the utilising of the services of engineering design and consultancy firms in ACP 
or other developing countries which could provide the appropriate technology and 
ensure the maximum component of indigenous equipment;
(v) Collective efforts at joint projects for the acquisition and development of 
technologies for utilisation in more than one country;
(vi) The elaboration of preferential arrangements for the development and transfer of 
technology among themselves and the establishing of regional and sub-regional centres 
for development and transfer of technology which could serve as essential links with 
centres in other countries.
A start can be made by preparing files on available expertise within the ACP 
countries, such files drawn up with the assistance of the regional and sub-regional 
groups as well as the information now available in regional and international 
organisations.
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6. Cultural, scientific and educational cooperation
The development of programmes and the establishment of machinery within the 
ACP Group for educational, scientific and cultural exchanges must be contemplated at 
an early date. In this regard, the ACP Secretariat, in collaboration with appropriate 
regional institutions, might initially be used as a clearing house for the exchange of 
information as to possibilities in this field.
As far as practicable, the initial steps in the realisation of these measures should 
give emphasis to and be built on regional cooperation.
In all undertakings in the context of the Action Programme, the problems of the 
least developed, landlocked, semi-landlocked and island countries must continually be 
borne in mind and therefore efforts must be made to define the measures which would 
be of benefit to those countries within the action programme of intra-ACP 
Cooperation.
THE ACP STATES ACCEPT THE ABOVE AREAS AND METHODS OF 
COOPERATION AS CONSTITUTING THE FOUNDATION OF THEIR EFFORTS 
AT COOPERATION AND SELF RELIANCE, A FOUNDATION ON WHICH THEY 
WILL STRIVE TO BUILD A STRONG AND UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF 
NATIONS.
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APPENDIX 3"
LIST OF ACP COUNTRIES BY REGION, INDICATING STATE CAPITALS, 
POPULATION SIZE, LAND MASS, AND FIRST TREATY OR CONVENTION
SIGNED WITH THE EEC
Africa (46 ACP countries)
Angola (Luanda, 9 230 000, 1 246 700km^ Lomé IV)
Bénin (Cotonou, 4 300 000, 112 622km^ Treaty of Rome)
Botswana (Gaborone, 1 170 000, 581 730km\ Lome I)
Buridna Faso (Ouagadougou, 8 310 000, 274 200km\ Treaty of Rome)
Burundi (Bujumbura, 5 000 000, 27 834km\ Yaounde II)
Cameroon (Yaounde, 10 860 000, 475 422km^, Treaty of Rome)
Cape Verde (Praia, 350 000, 4 033km\ Lome II)
Central-African Republic (Bangui, 2 700 000, 622 984km^, Yaounde I)
Chad (N'Djamena, 5 270 000, 1 284 000km\ Treaty of Rome)
Comoros (Moroni, 470 000, 2 171km\ Lomé II)
Congo (Brazzaville, 1 840 000, 342 OOOkm^ , Treaty of Rome)
Côte dTvoire (Abidjan, 11 140 000, 322 462km^, Treaty of Rome)
Djibouti (Djibouti, 370 000, 22 OOOkm^  Lomé II)
Equatorial Guinea (Malabo, 410 000, 28 051km^, Lomé I)
*Main source: The Courier. No. 120, Special Issue - Lomé IV Convention, March-April 
1990, pp.20-22.
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Ethiopia (Addis Ababa, 46 180 000, 1 221 900km^, Lomé I)
Gabon (Libreville, 1 060 000, 27 667km\ Treaty of Rome)
Gambia (Bangui, 790 000, 11 295km^ Lome I)
Ghana (Accra, 13 700 000, 238 537km\ Lome I)
Guinea (Conakry, 6 380 000, 245 857km\ Treaty of Rome)
Guinea Bissau (Bissau, 920 000, 36 125km\ Lome I)
Kenya (Nairobi, 22 940 000, 582 656km^, Lome I)
Lesotho (Maseru, 1 620 000, 30 355km^, Lomé I)
Liberia (Monrovia, 2 350 000, 111 369km\ Lomé I)
Madagascar (Antananarivo, 10 890 000, 587 041km^, Treaty of Rome) 
Malawi (Lilongwe, 7 500 000, 118 484km^, Lomé I 
Mali (Bamako, 8 680 000, 1 240 OOOkm^  Treaty of Rome) 
Mauritania (Nouakchott, 1 860 000, 1 030 700km^, Treaty of Rome) 
Mauritius (Port Louis, 1 000 000, 1 860km\ Yaoundé II) 
Mozambique (Maputo, 14 550 000, 783 030km\ Lomé III)
"Namibia (Windhoek, 1 740 000, 824 292km\ Lomé IV)
Niger (Niamey, 6 490 000, 1 267 OOOkm^ , Yaoundé I)
"Nigeria (Lagos, 101 910 000, 932 768km\ Lomé I)
Rwanda (Kigali, 6 530 000, 26 338km^ Treaty of Rome)
"Source: ACP Diplomatic Directorv. Brussels: Sicotrad, Third Edition, 1992, p.37 for 
details concerning Namibia.
""Under the Administration of General Ibrahim Babangida, the seat of the Nigerian 
Federal Government was moved from Lagos to Abuja on 12 December 1991. Also, the 
1991 Nigerian census put the country’s population at 88 514 501: Gabriel Umoden, The 
Babangida Years. Lagos: Gabumo Publishing Co., 1992, pp. 181 and 295.
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Sao Tomé & Principe (Sao Tomé, 110 000, 964km^, Lomé II)
Senegal (Dakar, 6 790 000, 196 192km\ Treaty of Rome)
Seychelles (Victoria, 70 000, 280km\ Lomé H)
Sierra Leone (Freetown, 3 850 000, 71 740km\ Lomé I)
Somalia (Mogadiscio, 6 860 000, 637 657km\ Treaty of Rome)
Sudan (Khartoum, 23 130 000, 2 505 813km\ Lomé I)
Swaziland (Mbabane, 710 000, 17 363km\ Lomé I)
Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, 23 220 000, 945 087km^, Lomé I)
Togo (Lomé, 3 150 000, 56 790 km^ Treaty of Rome)
Uganda (Kampala, 16 600 000, 236 036km^, Lomé I)
Zaire (Kinshasa, 32 460 000, 2 345 409km^, Treaty of Rome)
Zamlna (Lusaka, 7 560 000, 752 614km^, Lomé I)
Zimbabwe (Harare, 8 640 000, 391 109km\ Lomé II)
The Caribbean 05)
Antigua and Barbuda (St John's, 80 000, 441km\ Lomé HI)
Bahamas (Nassau, 240 000, 13 935km^, Lomé I)
Barbados (Bridgetown, 250 000, 431km^ Lomé I)
Belize (Belmopan, 170 000, 22 973km\ Lomé HI)
Dominica (Roseau, 80 000, 751km^, Lomé II)
Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo, 6 720 000, 48 734km^, Lomé IV) 
Grenada (St George's, 110 000, 344km\ Lomé I)
Guyana (Georgetown, 990 000, 214 969km^, Lomé I)
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Haiti (Port au Prince, 5 500 000, 27 700km\ Lomé IV)
Jamaica (Kingston, 2 410 000, 10 991km\ Lomé I)
S t Christopher & Nevis (Basseterre, 50 000, 360km^, Lomé HI)
S t Lucia (Castries, 140 000, 616km^ Lomé II)
S t Vincent & TTie Grenadines (Kingstown, 110 000, 340km^, Lomé HI) 
Surinam (Paramaribo, 390 000, 163 265km^ Treaty of Rome-in 1962) 
Trinidad & Tobago (Port of Spain, 1 220 000, 5 128km^ Lomé I)
The Pacific (8)
Fiji (Suva, 700 000, 18 272km\ Lomé I)
Mribati (Bairiki, 70 000, 710km\ Lomé H)
Papua New Guinea (Port Moresby, 3 480 000, 461 691km\ Lomé II) 
Solomon Islands (Honiara, 290 000, 28 446km\ Lomé II)
Western Somoa (Apia, 160 000, 2 842km^ Lomé I)
Tonga (Nuku’alofa, 110 000, 699km\ Lomé I)
Tuvalu (Funafuti, 8 000, 26km\ Lomé II)
Vanuatu (Port Vila, 140 000, 14 760km^ Lomé HI)
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APPENDIX 4A
QUESTIONNAIRE ON AWARENESS OF THE ACP GROUP
(See Chapter 1.2.2 for results of questionnaire)
THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
HOUGHTON STREET, LONDON WC2A 2AE
27 July 1992
Dear Sir or Madam
This questionnaire is drawn up within the framework of a PhD research under the 
supervision of Professor James May all. Convener of the Department of International 
Relations. The subject of research is "ACP-EEC Cooperation : A Study in Group 
Diplomacy".
The questionnaire has two aims : first, to determine whether people with a 
consciousness of individual African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries' foreign 
affairs have a general consciousness of the ACP as a group; and second, to ascertain 
the level of awareness of the ACP by comparing knowledge of member states' regional 
organizations with knowledge of the group itself. The questionnaire is divided into four 
parts to facilitate tlie analysis of the results.
Persons questioned are of different backgrounds representing all regions of the ACP. 
They include diplomats, business people, lecturers, students, journalists, and generally 
all informed people interested in an ACP region. State your profession on the top of 
the questionnaire if it is not adequately represented, and kindly return the completed 
questionnaire to me at the above address.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Yours faithfully
John Mgbere 
Research Student
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
(Also available in French)
A.I. How would you consider your knowledge of African External Affairs? 
a) very good b) good c) fairly good d) not good enough
2. How would you consider your knowledge of Caribbean External Affairs? 
a) very good b) good c) fairly good d) not good enough
3. How would you consider your knowledge of South Pacific External Affairs? 
a) very good b) good c) fairly good d) not good enough
B.4. Do you think there are possible links between any two or all three groups of 
countries mentioned above in the area of :
i. Cultural History a) Yes b) No
ii. Colonial History a) Yes b) No
iii. Economic Development a) Yes b) No
(If yes, please list which groups in each case using numbers as follows :
l=Africa, 2=Caribbean, and 3=Pacific)
5. Could you conceive of them coming together as members in a group for their 
common interest? a) Yes b) No 
Please give reasons, if any :
C.6. Have you heard of the ECOWAS - Economic Community for West African 
States? a) Yes b) No
Do you know any member state? a) Yes b) No
7. Have you heard of the CARICOM - Caribbean Community and Common 
Market? a) Yes b) No
Do you know any member state? a) Yes b) No
8. Have you heard of the SPEC - South Pacific Bureau for Economic 
Cooperation? a) Yes b) No
Do you know any member state? a) Yes b) No
D.9. Have you heard of the Lomé Convention? 
a) Yes b) No
Do you know any signatory?
a) Yes b) No If yes, which one :
10. Are third world members of the above-mentioned regional economic 
organizations also signatories to the Lomé Convention?
a) Yes b) No c) Not sure
11. Have you heard of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group? 
a) Yes b) No
Do you know any member state?
a) Yes b) No If yes, which one :
12. Are Lomé signatories from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific all members 
of the ACP Group?
a) Yes b) No c) Not sure
APPENDIX 4B
QUESTIONNAIRE SUR LA PRISE EN CONSCIENCE DU GROUPE ACP
THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
HOUGHTON STREET, LONDON WC2A 2AE
le 27 juillet 1992 
Madame/Monsieur
Ce questionnaire est établi dans le cadre d'une thèse de doctorat sous la direction du 
professeur James MAY ALL, qui s'occupe du département des Relations Internationales 
à la London School of Economies. Le sujet de recherche est "La Coopération ACP- 
CEE : Une Etude de la Diplomatie de Groupe".
Le questionnaire a deux objectifs. Premièrement, il essaie de déterminer si les 
personnes qui connaissent les relations individuelles des Etats africains, caraïbes et 
pacifiques (ACP) connaissent aussi le groupe ACP. Et deuxièmement, il cherche à 
savoir si le niveau des connaissances des organisations économiques régionales dont 
les Etats membres font partie correspond à celui du groupe même. Le questionnnaire 
est divisé en quatre parties afin de faciliter l'analyse des résultats.
Les personnes interrogées représentent les différentes régions de l'ACP et elles ont des 
expériences professionnelles très variées. Il s'agit de diplomates, d'hommes d'affaires, 
d'enseignants, d'étudiants, de journalistes ainsi que de personnes généralement 
informées et intéressées par une région de l'ACP. Indiquez votre profession en haut du 
questionnaire si elle n'est pas bien représentée et veuillez me l'envoyer à l'adresse ci- 
dessus.
Merci de votre compréhension.
Veuillez, agréer, Monsieur/Madame mes salutations les plus distinguées.
John MGBERE 
Etudiant-Chercheur
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
(Disponible également en version anglaise)
A I. Que diriez-vous de votre connaissance sur les relations extérieures des Etats 
africains?
a) très bon b) bon c) moyen d) insuffisant
2. Que diriez-vous de votre connaissance sur les relations extérieures des Etats des 
Caraïbes?
a) très bon b) bon c) moyen d) insuffisant
3. Que diriez-vous de votre connaissance sur les relations extérieures des Etats du 
Pacifique sud?
a) très bon b) bon c) moyen d) insuffisant
B.4. Croyez-vous que l'on puisse établir des liens entre les deux ou les trois groupes 
de pays mentionnés ci-dessus dans le domaine de:
i. l'histoire culturelle a) Oui b) Non
ii. l'histoire coloniale a) Oui b) Non
iii. développement économique a) Oui b) Non
(Si oui, désignez les groupes concernés en indiquant des chiffres : 
l=Afrique, 2=Caraïbes, et 3=Pacifif"'e)
5. Pouvez-vous les concevoir comme membres coopérant d'un groupe constitué par 
leurs intérêts communs? a)Oui b) Non Avez-vous une raison? -
C.6. Avez-vous entendu parler de la CEDEAO - Communauté Economique des Etats 
de l'Afrique de l'Ouest? a) Oui b) Non
Connaissez-vous un Etat membre? a) Oui b) Non
7. Avez-vous entendu parler de la CARICOM - Communauté et Marché Communs!
Caraïbes? a) Oui b) Non
Connaissez-vous un Etat membre? a) Oui b) Non
8. Avez-vous entendu parler de la SPEC - Bureau pour la Coopération Economique 
du Pacifique sud? a) Oui b) Non
Connaissez-vous un Etat membre? a) Oui b) Non
D.9. Avez-vous entendu parler de la Convention de Lomé? 
a) Oui b) Non
Connaissez-vous un Etat signataire?
a) Oui b) Non Si oui, lequel?
10. Les Etats du tiers monde, membres des organisations économiques régionales 
mentionnées ci-dessus, sont-ils également signataires de la Convention de Lomé? 
a) Oui b) Non c) Incertain
11. Avez-vous entendu parler du Groupe Afrique, Caraïbes et Pacifique (ACP)? 
a) Oui b) Non
Connaissez-vous un Etat membre?
a) Oui b) Non Si oui, lequel?
12. Les signataires de la Convention de Lomé en Afrique, aux Caraïbes et au
Pacifique sont-ils tous membres du groupe ACP*^
a) Oui b) Non c) Incertain
APPENDIX 5
CHRONOLOGY OF ACP-EEC RELATIONS
March 1957 -
July 1961 
30 May 1961 -
26 October 1961-
September 1962
1-2 April 1963
July 1963
Treaty of Rome signed. Part IV of the Treaty concerns EEC 
relations with the OCTs.
Britain applies to join the EEC
Kwame Nkrumah addresses Ghana National Assembly and critises 
Treaty of Rome as a successor to the Treaty of Berlin which 
divided up Africa for exploitative purposes.
Leopold Sédar Senghor gives lecture at Oxford. He sings praise of 
European colonisation and commends EEC association.
Crucial Commonwealth Heads of State and Government Meeting 
in London discusses Britain's application to join the EEC. Britain's 
application was vetoed by France's General de Gaulle, but the 
principle of the application and the effects of a possible future 
successful bid on Commonwealth relations provoke strong reactions 
from various Commonwealth leaders.
Following the failure of Britain's EEC application, the EEC Council 
of Ministers adopt a Declaration of Intent (made public in July) 
giving three options to developing countries, including 
Commonwealth countries, seeking to negotiate special trade 
arrangements with the EEC.
The first Yaounde Convention is signed between the EEC and
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former OCTs which were associated to the Community under Part 
rV of the Treaty of Rome. It enters into force on 1 June 1964.
The Nigeria-EEC Agreement is signed after two and a half years of 
negotiations, but it never enters into force.
29 July 1969 - The second Yaounde Convention is signed between the same
partners as Yaounde I. Mauritius, a member of the Commonwealth, 
later joins in 1972.
24 September 1969 - The Arusha Accord is signed between the EEC and the three
members of the East African Community (Kenya, Tanzania 
Uganda). The Accord enters into force in 1971.
1972 - Britain successfully signs the Act of Accession to the Treaty of
Rome which enters into force in 1973. Protocol 22 of the Act 
invites Commonwealth developing countries with economies 
comparable to those of the Yaounde Associates to join future 
negotiations with EEC for the renewal of the Yaounde Convention. 
The eighteen Associates meet at Nouakschott, Mauritania, and 
decide to cooperate with the Commonwealth Associables in the 
forth-coming Lomé negotiations. But, differences persist between 
the Associates and Associables over the principle of association to 
be adopted in the negotiations.
At conference of the NAM in Guyana, that country's Foreign 
Minister, Mr. S. S. Ramphal calls informal meeting of countries 
eligible for association with the EEC.
February 1973 - ECA calls OAU ministerial meeting at Accra, Ghana to discuss
April 1972
August 1972
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Africa's future relations with the EEC.
11 February 1973 - Nigeria and the East African Community hastily call 
Commonwealth African Trade Ministers meeting in Lagos and 
decide not to discuss Africa-EEC relations at Accra. While 
consensus had not been reached between the Associates and the 
Associables, this decision was taken presumably to avoid further 
divisions over thorny issues such as reverse preferences.
May 1973 - At an OAU Trade Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa, eight
principles to form the basis of joint African negotiations with the 
EEC agreed.
7-9 July 1973 - Lagos meeting called to coordinate African positions before forth­
coming Brussels ACP-EEC preliminary meeting. Nigeria's General 
Gowon and Nzo Ekangaki, OAU Secretary-General, speak on the 
need for African consensus and on the merits of having the OAU 
to coordinate African negotiating positions.
25-26 July 1973 - ACP-EEC preliminary meeting held in Brussels. Nigeria's Minister
of Trade, Mr. Wenike Briggs, presents Africa's position; Guyana's 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. S.S.Ramphal presents Caribbean 
position; and Fiji's Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, 
presents Pacific position.
20-22 Feb. 1974 - The African group in its Council of Ministers meeting held at
Addis Ababa decided that the African, Caribbean and Pacific
countries should adopt a common position vis-à-vis the EEC.
27 March 1974 - At a meeting held in Brussels with the EEC Babacar Ba, speaker
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for the African group declared that there would no longei be three 
groups expressing harmonised positions with one voice, but a single 
group of the ACP countries.
28 February 1975 - ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lomé (Lomé I); enters into force
on 1 April 1976. Novel features: stabex
6 June 1975 - Georgetown Agreement signed in Guyana institutionalising the ACP
Group
31 October 1979 - Lomé II signed; enters into force on 1 January 1981. Novel
features: sysmin
8 December 1984 - Lomé HI signed; enters into force on 1 May 1986. Novel features:
role of women in development, cultural cooperation
15 December 1989 - Lomé IV signed; entered into force in 1990 novel features: 
environment, convention valid for ten instead of usual five years, 
EDF (financial protocol) for five years as before. Signs of 
stagnation sets into ACP-EEC cooperation.
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2.5 Public Lectures and Seminars
"Caribbean Co-operation - The Imperative For Survival": the Fourth Norman Manley 
Memorial Lecture by the Rt Hon Michael Manley, P C , London School of Economics, 
30th October 1992
- lecture was illuminating on the possibility of cooperation between the 
Commonwealth Caribbean ACP countries and the Dominican Republic and Haiti 
(the two new members of the ACP group) in view of the fact that intra-Caribbean 
cooperation was difficult to achieve between these countries prior to the signing 
of Lomé rv  in 1990
"Qui exerce le pouvoir en Afrique? Un modèle de développement à l'Occidentale ou une 
Communauté Economique pour l'Afrique est-ce la solution?" par S. E. Charles Valy Tuho, 
Ambassadeur de la Côte d'ivoire et Professeur Platau (Namur), Université Libre de 
Bruxelles, 15 Mars 1993
"Dialogue des cultures: Parlons-nous le même langage?" par S. E. Raymond Chasle, 
Secrétaire Général de la Fondation ACP-EEC pour la Coopération Culturelle et 
Ambassadeur de l'Ile Maurice; Henry Saby, Président du Comité pour la Coopération et 
le Développement au Parlement Europeén; et Pierre Salmon, Professeur de l'Histoire 
Africaine à l'ULB, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), 17 Mars 1993
- useful in giving definitions of ACP-EEC cultural cooperation which include the
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social and cultural dimensions of development
Pan-Africanism and Africa's future challenges by Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, former President
of Zambia, London School of Economics, 7th December 1993
- of relevance to this thesis, lecture stated that wheat farmers in Zambia could not 
harvest and market their produce in 1993 because cheaper produce from the EEC 
(financed by the CAP) had entered into the Zambian market
2.6 Interviews
Formal interviews were conducted with the following persons:
28 Jan. 1992: M. A. N. Barry, Chef des Relations Publiques, Presses, Information
et Protocol, ACP Secretariat. Main discussions: origins of ACP- 
EEC cooperation; the internal coordination of the ACP group and 
impact of the differences between ACP countries.
30 April 1993: Mr. James Moran, Head of Administrative Coordination Sector,
Commission of the European Communities, DG VTU-Development. 
Main discussions: internal organisation of DG VUI; administration 
of EDF, particularly in view of European Parliament influence over 
Commission budget; evaluation and execution of NIPs and role of 
Commission Delegation in ACP states.
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12 May 1993: Mr. O. G Nnaji, Head of Chancery, Nigerian Embassy, Brussels.
Main discussions: Nigeria's role and influence in contemporary 
ACP-EEC relations, particularly against the background of the 
consideration that she is one of the biggest AGP countries and in 
view of the prominent role she played in the formation of AGP 
consensus at the first Lomé negotiations in 1973-75.
21 May 1993: His Excellency Raymond Ghasle, Ambassador of Mauritius, longest
serving AGP Ambassador - in Brussels since the signing of the first 
Lome Convention, and proponent of several AGP-EEG projects, in 
particular. Cultural Cooperation. Main discussions, ranging from the 
general to the particular: After four Lome Conventions, what 
difference has EEC development cooperation policy made both 
from the EEC and the AGP perspectives? How do certain ACP- 
EEC policies take the local AGP population into consideration: 
cultural cooperation, for example, proposes the establishment of 
data banks and recording libraries for the collection of oral 
traditions when in fact oral tradition should be told from one 
generation to another? What was the experience of Mauritius as the 
first Commonwealth country to join the EEC Association? How did 
Lome come to be the Convention signing city?
Several less formal, yet very useful, discussions were held with numerous other people 
in the UK including Dr. Marc Williams, School of African and Asian Studies, University
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of Sussex; Dr. Christopher Stevens, Institute of Development Studies, University of 
Sussex; Dr. Anna Dickson, Department of Politics, University of Durham (telephone 
discussion); and in Brussels: Myriam Vander Stichele, editor of Lomé Briefing: Dimitrios 
Maghieros, Commission DG VIII, Section 5-Relation with the Institutions including EDF 
allocations; Antonios Petsikos, Commission DG VI-Agriculture; Alain Pena, ACP 
Secretariat. His Excellency James Matheson, former Ambassador of Guyana to the EEC, 
offered some very useful comments at the final stages of the thesis.
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